THE TRUE
INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM
OF THE
UNIVERSE:
WHEREIN
ALL THE REASON AND PHILOSOPHY OF ATHEISM IS CONTESTED,
AND ITS IMPOSSIBILITY DEMONSTRATED,
WITH A TREATISE CONCERNING
ETERNAL AND IMMUTABLE MORALITY.
BY
RALPH CUDWORTH, D.D.
TO WHICH ARE ADDED,
THE NOTES AND DISSERTATIONS OF DR. J. L. MOSHEIM,
TRANSLATED BY
JOHN HARRISON, M.A.
WITH A COPIOUS GENERAL INDEX TO THE WHOLE WORK.
IN THREE VOLUMES.
VOL. 1.
LONDON:
PRINTED FOR THOMAS TEGG,
75. CHEAPSIDE.
the atomic and the hylozoic

there is nothing. Upon which account, it hath for many ages past been the Anaximandrian Atheism in a manner quite off the stage, and reigned there alone. So that the Democritian or Atomic Atheism seems to be much more considerable of the two, than the Anaximandrian or Hylomorphian.

Again, as for the two other forms of Atheism, if there were any life at all in manner, as the first and immediate recipient of it, then in reason this must needs be supposed to be after the same manner in it, that all other corporeal qualities are in bodies, so as to be visible together with it, and some of it be in every part of the matter; which is according to the hypothesis of the Hylozoists. Whereas on the contrary the Stoical Atheists supposing one life only in the whole mass of matter, after such a manner, as that none of the parts of it by themselves should have any life of their own, do thereby, no less than the Stoical Theists, make this life of theirs to be no corporeal quality or form, but an incorporeal substance; which is to contradict their own hypothesis. From whence we may conclude, that the Cosmo-plastic or Stoical Atheism is of the two, less considerable than the Hylozoic or Stratonical.

Wherefore amongst these four forms of Atheism, that have been propounded, these two, the atomic or Democritian, and the Hylozoic or Stratonical are the chief. The former of which, namely the Democritian Atheism, admitting a true notion of body, that (according to the doctrine of the first and most ancient Atomists) it is nothing but resisting bulk devoid of all manner of life; yet because it takes for granted, that there is no other substance in the world besides body, does therefore conclude, that all life and understanding in animals and men is generated out of dead and stupid matter, though not as qualities and forms (which is the Anaximandrian way) but as resulting from the contextures of atoms, or some peculiar composition of magnitudes, figures, sites and motions; and consequently that they are themselves really nothing else but local motion and mechanism; which is a thing that some time since was very pertinently and judiciously both observed and perstrighted by the learned author of the Exercitatio Epistolica, now a reverend bishop. But the latter, namely the Hylozoic, though truly acknowledging on the contrary, that life, cogitation and under-

standing are entities really distinct from local motion and mechanism, and that therefore they cannot be generated out of dead and stupid matter, but must needs be somewhere in the world, originally, essentially, and fundamentally; yet because they take it also for granted, that there is no other substance besides matter, do thereupon adulterate the notion of matter or body, blending and confounding it with life, as making them but two inadequate conceptions of substance, and concluding that all matter and substance, as such, hath life and perception or understanding, natural and inconceivably, essentially belonging to it; and that sense and conscious reason or understanding in animals arises only from the accidental modification of this fundamental life of matter by organization.

We conclude therefore, that if these two atheistic hypotheses, which are found to be the most considerable, be once confuted, the reality of all Atheism will be ipso facto confuted; there being indeed nothing more requisite to a thorough confusion of atheism than the proving of these two things; first, that life and understanding are not essential to matter as such; and secondly, that they can never possibly rise out of any mixture or modification of dead and stupid matter whatsoever. The reason of which assertion is, because all Atheists, as was before observed, are mere Copernicans, of which there can be but these two sorts; either such as make life to be essential to matter, and therefore to be ingenerable and incorruptible: or else such as suppose life and every thing besides ζωή ανάμεσα, the bare substance of matter, or extended bulk, to be merely accidental, generable or corruptible, as rising out of some mixture or modification of it. And as the proving of these two things will overthrow all Atheism, so it will likewise lay a clear foundation, for the demonstrating of a Deity distinct from the corporeal world.

XXXV. Now that life and perception, or understanding, should be essential to matter as such, or that all senseless matter should be perfectly and infallibly wise (though without consciousness) as to all its own concomitants and capabilities, which is the doctrine of the Hylozoists; this, I say, is an hypothesis so prodigiously paradoxical, and so outrageously wild, as that very few men ever could have atheistic faith enough to swallow it down and digest it. Wherefore this Hylozoist Atheism hath been very obscure ever since its first emersion, and hath found so few authors and advocates, that it hath looked like a forlorn and deserted thing. Neither indeed are there any public monuments at all extant, in which it is avowedly maintained, stated, and reduced into any system. Insomuch that we should not have taken any notice of it at this time, as a particular form of Atheism, nor have conjured it up out of its grave, had we not understood that Strato's ghost had begun to

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2 Dr. Seth Ward, Savilian Professor of Astronomy in the University of Oxford, and successively Bishop of Ely and Salisbury. In a work entitled In Thome Kililli Philosopham Exercitatio Epistolica ad amplissimum cruciatus unius D. Johanneum Wilkisium, S.D.C. Collegii Wadhamensis Gardianam. Car subiectur Appendicula ad cadam, ab eo in hoc manuscripto summaris in annisvenis, responsum, 1658, lxxv. In sect. 4, chap. 3, p. 226, of this book, the talent and eloquence of which are considerable, the author labour to show that sense, imagination, skill and magnificence, both in men and beasts, according to Hobbes are nothing more than local motion with reaction, which opinion he refutes.
walk of late; and that among some well-wishers to Atheism, despairing in a manner of the atomic form, this Hylozoic hypothesis began already to be looked upon as the rising sun of Atheism.——— Et tamquam spea altera Trojae, it seeming to smile upon them, and flatter them at a distance, with some faint hopes of supporting that ruinous and desperate cause.

Whereas on the contrary, that other atomic atheism, as it insists upon a true notion of body, that it is nothing but resisting bulk; by which means we, joining issue thereupon, shall be fairly conducted on to a clear decision of this present controversy, as likewise to the disentangling of many other points of philosophy; so it is that which hath filled the world with the noise of it, for two thousand years past; that concerning which several volumes have been formerly written, in which it hath been stated and brought into a kind of system; and which hath of late obtained a resurrection amongst us, together with the atomic physiology, and been recommended to the world anew, under a sanguine show of wit and profound philosophy.

Wherefore, as we could not here insist upon both these forms of Atheism together, because that would have been to confound the language of Atheists, and to have made them, like the Cudeman offspring, to do immediate execution upon themselves; so we were in all reason obliged to make our first and principal assault upon the atomic atheism, as being the only considerable, upon this account, because it is that alone which publicly confronts the world, and like that proud uncircumcised Philistine, openly defies the hosts of the living God; intending nevertheless in the close of this whole discourse, (that is, the last book) where we are to determine the right intellectual system of the universe, and to assert an incorporeal Deity, to demonstrate, that life, cogitation and understanding do not essentially belong to matter, and all substance as such, but are the peculiar attributes and characteristics of substance incorporeal.

XXXVI. However, since we have now started these several forms of Atheism, we shall not in the mean time neglect any of them neither. For in the answer to the second atheistic ground, we shall confute them all together at once, as agreeing in this one fundamental principle: That the original of all things in the universe is senseless matter, or matter devoid of all animality or conscious life. In the reply to the fourth atheistic argumentation, we shall briefly hint the grounds of reason, from which incorporeal substance is demonstrated. In the examination of the fifth, we shall confute the Anaxiandrian Atheism there propounded, which is, as it were, the first sketch and rude delineation of Atheism. And in the confutation of the sixth, we shall show, how the ancient atomic atheists did preventively overthrow the foundation of Hylozoism. Besides all which, in order to a fuller and more thorough confutation, both of the Cosmo-plastic and Hylozoic Atheisms, we shall in this very place take occasion to insist largely upon the plastic life of nature, giving in the first place, a true account of it; and then afterwards showing, how grossly it is misunderstood, and the pretence of it abused by the asserters of both these Atheistic hypotheses. The heads of which larger digression, because they could not be so conveniently inserted in the contents of the chapter, shall be represented to the reader's view at the end of it.

XXXVII. For we think fit here to observe, that neither the Cosmo-plastic or Stoical, nor the Hylozoic or Stratonic Atheism are therefore condemned by us, because they suppose such a thing as a plastic nature, or life distinct from the animal; albeit this be not only exploded, as an absolute non-entity, by the Atomic Atheists, who might possibly be afraid of it, as that which approached too near to a Deity, or else would hazard the introducing of it; but also utterly discarded by some professed Theists of later times,6 who might notwithstanding have an undiscovered taint of the mechanic Atheism, hanging about them, in that their so constant rejecting of all final and intending causality in nature, and admitting of no other causes of things, as philosophical, save the material and mechanical only; this being really to banish all mental, and consequently divine causality, quite out of the world; and to make the whole world to be nothing else but a mere heap of dust, fortuitously agitated, or a dead cadaverous thing, that hath no signatures of mind and understanding, counsel and wisdom at all upon it; nor indeed any other vitality acting in it, than only the production of a certain quantity of local motion, and the conversation of it according to some general laws; which things the Democritic Atheists take for granted, would be as all as they are, though there were no God. And thus Aristotle6 describes this kind of philosophy, that it made the whole world to consist, ἐκ ἀρχηγῶν μονῶν, καὶ μονάδων ταῶν μὲν ἐν χώρον, ἀφήγων δὲ τὰ μὲν πάντα, "of nothing but bodies and monads," that is, atoms or small particles

6 Besides Hobbes, Descartes and his followers are here intended. But it is also well-known that some of the followers of Descartes did not in this manner adopt the views of their master, and others spared no pains to interpret his opinions somewhat more agreeably. Vide Descartes in Principiis Philosophiae, P. 1. sect. 26. p. 37. and P. 3. sect. 9. p. 56. 
7 De Cael. lib. cap. 12. p. 656. tom. 1. opp. The learned Doctor, when he wrote this sentence, seems to have been thinking of something else. For Aristotle in this passage speaks concerning himself, not regarding Democritus or his followers. After saying he had usefully examined and discussed many things concerning planets and constellations, he adds that he would consider the stars only as bodies. Ἑμεῖς, οὐ πρός ἀρχηγόν μονῶν αἰώνων καὶ μονάδων, ταῶν μὲν ἐν χώρον, ἀφήγων δὲ τὰ μὲν πάντα, ἀπαφημία.
of matter "only ranged and disposed together into such an order, but altogether dead and inanimate." 2. For unless there be such a thing admitted as a plastic nature, that acts fixed and free, for the sake of something, and in order to ends, regularly, artificially, and logically, it seems, that one or other of these two things must be concluded; that either in the effusion and organization of the bodies of animals, as well as the other phenomena, every thing comes to pass fortuitously, and happens to be as it is, without the guidance and direction of any mind or understanding; or else, that God himself doth all immediately, and, as it were with his own hands, forms the body of every great and fly, insect and mite, as of other animals in generations, all whose members have so much of contrivance in them, that Galen professeth, he could never enough admire that artifice, which was in the legs of a fly (and yet he would have admired the wisdom of nature more, had he been but acquainted with the use of microscopes): I say, upon supposition of no plastic nature, one or other of these two things must be concluded; 5 because it is not conceived by any, 6 but I apprehend there are many who will maintain that it is not necessary for those who deny a plastic nature to adopt either of these opinions. 1. They who adopt the philosophy of Descartes will complain that injustice is done to them, and will affirm that they do not attribute the production of all things to the fortuitous agitation of matter. And those who contend that God has joined fixed laws of motion with matter, will say that God preserves those laws, and who moreover affirm that from those fixed and maintained laws of motion the production of the universes had its effect, those I say, so far from referring all things to accident and the fortuitous motion of matter, even in the judgment of some to attribute too much to fate and necessity. If I am not mistaken, the opinion of Descartes lies somewhere between those who attribute the origin of things to motion and matter, and those who regard all things as proceeding from God. For he maintained that matter was bound by fixed laws of motion: nevertheless, that God governs and directs the motions of matter. Vide. Nich. Malebranche Elucubrations sur l'Optique, sect. 29. p. 402 towards the end of the book. De Inquirenda Veritate, and many other writers of the same class. 2. We know also that many philosophers affirm that bodies form themselves a soul; some of whom think that the animating principle or soul lies concealed in every soul, others that the soul is introduced into the seed extrinsically and by God. See, out of many, Dan. Sennernus De Generatione Vivescium, to. 1. cap. 1. p. 128, and William Harvey De Generatione Animal. Exercit. 69. p. 271. In fact, Dr. Codwath himself does not seem to be far off from the former of these views, since, though in this chapter he often speaks as if nature were a sort of plastic thing, uniformly and separately acting, lower down, sect. 29, he does not hesitate to approve of the opinion of Aristotle, who thought that nature was pure mind, endowed with reason and sense. They who are of this opinion do not attribute the construction of bodies either to the motion of matter only, or to God only, yet they are not believers of such a plastic power as was, Dr. Codworth maintains. 3. Nor are there wanting among both ancient and modern philosophers those who maintain that the soul is in the seed itself a plastic or producing power, and that bodies are produced and formed by this power. As Nipolea, an Italian, of our own times, related by Antonio Conti, who fancied I knew what it was, and whom he calls hominum seminum. Vid. Benet. De Hominum seminum. De M. Liebicans, Clark Newton, tom. 2. p. 337. These, not wisely indeed, since they seem as if considering ignorance under the philosophy they adopt, neither approve of the opinion of Aristotle, who, as Dr. Codworth says, did not believe in the immortal soul: 4. The most illustrious philosophers of our own age, and even many of the followers of Descartes, regard all bodies as formed at the commencement of the creation with that the things of nature are all thus administered, with such exact regularity and constancy everywhere, merely by the wisdom, providence, and efficiency of those inferior spirits, demons or angels. As also, though it be true, that the works of nature are dispensed by a divine law and command, yet this is not to be understood in a vulgar sense, as if they were all effectually by the mere force of a verbal law or outward command, because inanimate things are not commendable nor governable by such a law. And therefore besides the divine will and pleasure, there must needs be some other immediate agent and executioner provided for the producing of every effect; since not so much as a stone, or other heavy body, could at any time fall downward, mind, by God himself, and that therefore no new body is now produced, but only that the minute corpuscles, long since created by God, are expanded, evolved, and increased to their proper size gradually, and by the aid of the laws of motion. Vide. Malebranche, Researches, lib. 2. cap. 7. p. 284, and Elucubrations sur l'Optique, p. 467. 308. Liebnitz, in the Journal des Sçavans, A 1695. p. 449, and many others whom it is not necessary to name. Neither do these philosophers adopt either of the alternatives Dr. Codworth mentions. For they do not attribute everything to the laws of matter, nor do they maintain that God now creates every animal and every man. I say nothing of the formes substantialis of the Peripatetics, and of other things of the same class. I am not saying, nevertheless, either to oppose the doctrine of plastic nature, or to support the opinions of these philosophers concerning the production of bodies as preferable to the doctrine of Dr. Codworth, whatever may be thought of my reference to the latter; I am bringing forward both those which I have mentioned, and those which I may yet mention, for the sake of illustration, not of contention. For I have resolved to adopt, in this place, the opinion of no one on a matter so difficult, but to point out, as I have said, a judgment of the more sagacious. What, however, I think necessary to be known of the notions maintained, and the controversies carried on, in modern times respecting plastic nature, it is my intention to add in the present place. 5. Still that there have been and are those who believe this, is beyond all controversy. I do not speak of those Platonists and ancient Christians who taught that there were producing spirits set over every kind of animals by God, concerning whom Job, chap. iv. 17. 18. speaks. Ad Hermen Pastorem, lib. 1. cap. 4, p. 4. 5. P. Apostol. Nor do I mention many others, both of the Jews, Egyptians, and ancients, who, as appears from Irenacus, Tertullian, and many others, taught that God created the world and all the heavens in a most superior and very amazing manner, as the highest God, above inferior to the supreme God. I will only refer to one or two of the more recent philosophers who hold this sentiment. Joh. Bodinus some time ago was of this opinion. He says, in Univ. Naturae Theor., lib. 5. p. 631. 632. "Quammodomum in republicis hominum universis constitutis non minus sunt necessarium carnis, licet repulserunt, quam carnis regimine et praeceptis et fructibus et curis: se habetur rep. mundana Deus ipse ad suam suam quae est in ipsis humanis organis peculiari, neque eis quae sunt in alius organis typicae, exemplaria, abstrata, --- principes ad moderatae eos omnium."

"As in a well constituted state, there are of necessity executioners, licentia, and those who perform the office of masters, as well as magistrates, judges, and superintendents, so in this present state of society, God himself has appointed for the generation and promotion of the things, and for their defence, angels over all celestial regions, over the elements, and over all living beings --- as princes and governors." And at the present time the reverend the doctor of the French church, Mr. [name], Soc. [full name], in Histoire de l'Exercite, has propounded this opinion, and attempted to maintain it by some passages out of the sacred writings. Vide. Bibloth. German. t. 9. p. 157. 158. It is needless to mention more, since the celebrated Bayle abounds in it, and Dr. [name], who wrote the history of the universal wind and intelligent nature, that they may explain, I know not by what law, the forming of bodies. Diction. Histor. et Critique, tom. 1. v. Candes, p. 718.
universe turned round in a vortex. But, as the same Aristotle adds, no carpenter or artificer is so simple as to give such an account as this, and think it satisfactory, but he will rather declare, that himself directed the motion of the instruments, after such a manner, and in order to such ends: Blaive δυνατον ου γαρ λατον ίδεται αυτον, τονοησης ειτει δει ιμποστης το λυγγανος, κατα διην την πληγην εφαινασα τονοησην, και της εναντι της πολυτοι ον και της παροι, καπιτον ομαντοις μεριμνητητης της μορφης γινομεθα, “A carpenter would give a better account than so, for he would not think it sufficient to say, that the frame came to be of such a form, because the instruments happened to fall so and so, but he will tell you that it was because himself made such strokes, and that he directed the instruments and determined their motion after such a manner, to this end that he might make the whole a fabric fit and useful for such purposes.” And this is to assign the final cause. And certainly there is scarcely any man in his wise, that will not acknowledge the reason of the different values in the heart from the apparent usefulness of them, according to those particular structures of theirs, to be more satisfactory, than any which can be brought from mere fortuitous mechanism, or the unguided motion of the seminal matter.

And as for the latter part of the disjunction, that every thing in nature should be done immediately by God himself; this, as according to vulgar apprehension, it would render divine providence operose, solicits, and distractions, and thereby make the belief of it to be entertained with greater difficulty, and give advantage to Atheists; so, in the judgment of the writer De Mundo, it is not so decorous in respect of God neither, that he should αυτοφυγηται αυτου, set his own hand, as it were, to every work, and immediately do all the meanest and triflingest things himself drudgingly, without making use of any inferior and subordinate instruments: Εβαίνοι αυτους ζητος υποταια της παροι, και τοιαλελειχας της μορφης γινομεθα, “If it were not congruous in respect of the state and majesty of Xerxes the great king of Persia, that he should condescend to do all the meanest offices himself, much less can this be thought decorous in respect of God. But it seems far more agreeable, and becoming of the divine majesty, that a certain power and virtue, derived from him, and passing through the universe, should move the sun and moon, and be the immediate cause of those lower things done here upon earth.”

Moreover, it seems not so agreeable to reason neither, that nature, as a distinct thing from the Deity, should be quite superseded or made to signify nothing, God himself doing all things immediately and miraculously; from whence it would follow also, that they are all done either foolishly and violently, or else artificially only, and none of them by any inward principle of their own.

Lastly, This opinion is further confuted by that slow and gradual process, that is in the generations of things, which would seem to be but a vain and idle pomp, or a trifling formality, if the agent were omnipotent: as also by those αμοιριματα, (as Aristotle calls them) those errors and bungles, which are committed, when the matter is inept and contumacious; which argue the agent not to be irresistible, and that nature is such a thing, as is not altogether uncapable (as well as human art) of being sometimes frustrated and disappointed, by the indisposition of matter. Whereas an omnipotent agent, as it could dispatch its work in a moment, so it would always do it infallibly and irresistibly; no ineptitude or stubbornness of matter being ever able to hinder such a one, or make him bungle or fumble in any thing.

5. Wherefore since neither all things are produced fortuitously, or by the unguided mechanism of matter, nor God himself may reasonably be thought to do all things immediately and miraculously; it may well be concluded, that there is a plastic nature
under him, which, as an inferior and subordinate instrument, doth drudgingly execute that part of his providence, which consists in the regular and orderly motion of matter; yet so as that there is also, besides this, a higher providence to be acknowledged, which presides over it, doth often supply the defects of it, and sometimes overrule it; forasmuch as this plastic nature cannot act electively, nor with discretion. And by this means, the will and providence of God will not be shut up nor concluded wholly within his own breast, but will display itself abroad, and print its stamps and signatures everywhere throughout the world; so that God, as Plato5 (after Orphicus) speaks, will be not only the beginning and end, but also the middle of all things; they being as much to be ascribed to his causality, as if himself had done them all immediately, without the concurrent instrumentality of any subordinate natural cause. Notwithstanding which, in this way it will appear also to human reason, that all things are disposed and ordered by the Deity, without any solicitous care or diatriuctive providence.

And indeed those mechanistic Theists, who rejecting a plastic mundane affect to concern the Deity as little as is possible in mundane affairs, either for fear of debasing, and bringing him down to too mean offices, or else of subjecting him to solicitious incumbrance, and for that cause would have God to contribute nothing more to the mundane system and economy than only the first impressing of a certain quantity of motion upon the matter, and the after-continuance of it, according to some general laws: these men (I say) seem not very well to understand themselves in this. Forasmuch as they must of necessity either suppose these their laws of motion to execute themselves, or else be forced perpetually to concern the Deity in the immediate motion of every atom of matter throughout the universe, in order to the execution and observation of them. The former of which, being a thing plainly absurd and ridiculous, and the latter that, which philosophers themselves are extremely abhorrent from, we cannot make any other conclusion.

5 De Legibus, lib. 4, p. 600, op. I apprehend all will be glad to have the passage of Plato, here alluded to quoted, θεός λέγεται, τό αὐτόν τι πρωτότοκον. Διός ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀρμονία, ἡ τοῦ κόσμου πρωτότοκος, τῷ περὶ τούτου παράγειν. Πρὸς τὸ γὰρ τιμῆσαι, τὸν ἄλλον ἐν μένι πρωτότοκον, “God (as was already said) is the beginning, the end, and the middle of all things.” What Plato here calls πρωτότοκον, Dr. Geddes suppose to have been taken from Orphicus. And indeed among the errors attributed to Orphicus there are sentiments not very dissimilar in Apul. de Mundo, p. m. 25.

ζέος ἀρτὸς γίνετο. ζέος ἄρτος ἄρτοι ἀρτοῖσαμεν. ζέος κυριλλ. ζέος μίσης.

First of all is Jupiter; he also is the last, Jupiter is both beginning and the middle.
plastic nature, acting upon the matter of the whole corporeal universe, both maintaining the same quantity of motion always in it, and also dispensing it (by transferring it out of one body into another) according to such laws, fatally impaired upon it. Now if there be a plastic nature, that governs the motion of matter every where, according to laws, there can be no reason given, why the same might not also extend farther to the regular disposal of that matter, in the formation of plants, and animals, and other things, in order to that apt coherent frame and harmony of the whole universe.

And as this plastic nature is a thing, which seems to be in itself most reasonable, so hath it also the suffrage of the best philosophers in all ages. For first, it is well known that Aristotle concerns himself in nothing more zealously than this, that mundane things are not effected merely by the necessary and on the other. I determine nothing on this point. Let those determine to whom the matter properly belongs. II. The advocates of plastic nature maintain their opinion on this account chiefly, that it relieves the Deity of a perpetual and most troublesome task, and moreover removes from the eternal and infinitely wise Author of the universe all blame on account of those vicissitudes and deformities which everywhere afflict nature. They say that they who maintain that God is the immediate cause of all things, most unworthily impose on him an endless burden—an incredible multitude of anxious concerns; nor do they spare Descartes, inasmuch as he makes of motion in matter were preserved by God, which they think is as if he maintained that God never enjoyed leisure and repose. But these advocates of plastic nature themselves, since they maintain that the Deity is ever watchful lest their nature should occasion accidents and vicissitudes; since they deny that it is endowed with a faculty of distinguishing between right and wrong; since they think that God governs his own actions; since, in one word, they maintain that God corrects and amends what perhaps nature may do wrong; not to mention other matters; do they impose less care and less of trouble on God than those against whom they contend? That master certainly has enough to do who must continually take care that the servants whom he employs, unskillful and void of reason, do not err; who must preside over all the actions of his agents, and who must apply the fitting remedy to all the defects and imperfections in their conduct. And there will be, I say, I cannot doubt, the same end to which it will be more applicable and simple to regard God as effecting all things himself, than to associate with him a nature, neither wise nor powerful, but exceedingly ignorant, and whose acts are most perpetually direct; especially if they bear in mind that God is partly powerful, to whom therefore no confusion or adjustment of matter can create anxiety, any more than is occasioned by creating out of nothing. Is that master the happier man who possesses the power of conducting his own affairs, and who employs the aid of no servant, or be he who must avail himself of the aid of servants of little care and prudence, the mischief of whose unskillfulness and rashness are always to be guarded against? Why, moreover, they should smile at the God of Descartes preserving the laws of motion. I cannot find out. For what difference can there be between a Deity always watchful best plastic nature should do mischief, and always correcting its errors, and a Deity watching over and preserving the laws of motion in matter? As to what pertains to the deformities and defects, if such words may be permitted, which are everywhere behold in the universe, though plastic nature be associated with God, may still maintain that the Deity always observes the difficulty. If God always observes the difficulty; if he governs its actions, if he takes care that it transgress no law, if he corrects its mistakes, is it not he after all the final cause of all things? Is not the master who never trusts a servant the happiest who, and who directs all his labors, the multitude of his actions, in such a manner that the servant fails? I do not say these things as approving of the sentiments of Descartes, or of any other; I state freely what has occurred to me, that readers may the more easily judge concerning the whole of this dissertation of Dr. Cudworth.

unguided motion of matter, or by fortuitous mechanism, but by such a nature as acts regularly and artificially for ends; yea, as that this nature is not the highest principle neither, or the supreme Numen, but subordinate to a perfect mind or intellect; he afirms, that 'νούς αίτι τινα και φύσις τούτω τον παντότε, "that Mind, together with nature was the cause of this universe," and that heaven and earth, plants and animals, were framed by them both; that is, by Mind as the principal and directive cause, but by nature as a subervient or executive instrument; and elsewhere, in like manner God and nature both together, as when he concludes, "That God and nature do nothing in vain."

Neither was Aristotle the first broacher or inventor of this doctrine, Plato before him having plainly asserted the same.

The first two books of Aristotle's physics place it beyond all doubt that that philosopher said a great deal about a ψηφική or nature whence all things proceeded. He mentions that this nature is of two kinds, one the substance, the other form, Physic, lib. 2, cap. 1, p. 464; and cap. 2, 463, tom. 1, 499. His form rather than the substance is nature, since it is the efficient and active agent, yet he does not deny that this form acts according to a certain end, lib. 2, cap. 8, p. 475. But this nature or Aristotle, of which perhaps he did not himself form an entire accurate notion, is a very different one from the plastic nature of Dr. Cudworth, which in some way is a partner of reason, and is distinct from, and the will of God. But Aristotle deplores his nature, whatever it is, of all sense, and binds it to material necessity, Physic, lib. 2, cap. 11, p. 461. It is well known that he entirely removes Deity from the government of mundane affairs. I suspect that the form of Aristotle does not greatly differ from that ZWFLAXLEUΔ, or animal warmth, springing, I suppose, from the sun and stars, where pronounces present in all things, as the cause of universal generation, De General. Animal lib. 3, cap. 11, p. 664. whence he has this dogma, that all things are full of soul, δέ γὰρ τὰ πάντα ψυχεῖν τὰν ἐγένετο. But what will become of those two passages by which Dr. Cudworth endeavoured to prove that Aristotle sought to associate God with nature? I will briefly answer this question. As to the first, I affirm confidently that it is not to be found in Aristotle. The memory and preoccupations of the excellent author somewhat misled him. There is no passage in Aristotle like this, unless my eyes deceive me. I repeat the following: Δύο γὰρ, τῆς μὲν ψυχῆς τούτης καὶ τῆς φύσεως ἡ τὰς πάσας εἴνα τινάς πάθησις, ἀλλὰ γονέως Φυσικ., ὥστε τῆς διά τῆς τότε πάθησις εἴνας μὲν τρίσανας ἀρχές, γονέως δὲ τούτοις ἐστὶν ἀρχήν. There are those that think that animals and plants are not fortitately preformed, but that the cause of them is either nature or mind, or something else of that kind, Physic. Aestute. lib. 2, cap. 4, p. 470. But in this particular passage, his own opinion, but that of others, and he does not associate, but plainly displays mind and nature. The other dogma, that God and nature do nothing in vain, is to be found both in Aristotle and in other ancient authors. But it is incredible none more than that not God only, but nature also, acts with fixed design; it does not subject nature to the control of God, nor affirm that it performs its operations by his aid.

And there again I am compelled to complain of the negligence of the learned author, but of the too strong affection with which he regarded the opinions he had imbibed. I could show, did space permit, from De Legibus, lib. 12. from the Symposium, and from other works of Plato, that that philosopher attributed the constitution and proper creation of all things to a soul diffused through the universe. I readily concede that Plato's soul of the universe is very similar to the plastic preforming nature of the universe, because the learned author here treats. Hear the testimony of the Apoloeus respecting the doctrine of Plato, p. 32. "Sed illam coelestem animam, fontem animorum omnium, optimam et sapientissimam, virum quemque esse verum, scripsit Epicureus, scripsit enim Epicureus Diot. ad præmio omnin omnium eoa."

But that celestial soul, the fountain, springs from all souls, the best and the wisest, the plastic energy, obeys the will of the great Creator, God, and promptly performs his bidding. Add that also of Chalcidius, a not