In the ninth, it is asked whether Aristotle speaks well about identity and diversity of the whole to its parts. And this is a question of a metaphysical consideration; nevertheless it is accustomed to treat it here, since it affects the discussion here. For this reason, the ninth question now arises as to whether the whole is its parts.

It is argued that it is not, and this is so from the authorities:

<1> Second, for in De anima [Il, 1, 412a 6-9], Aristotle distinguishes the composed in contrast to matter and form, which are its parts; therefore the composed is not matter and form.

<2> Likewise in Bk. VII of the Metaphysics [VII, 17, 1041b 14-16]: “the composed is not the elements from which it is composed nor the same to them, as the syllable ‘ba’ is not ‘b’ and ‘a.’” Which Aristotle proves, since ‘b’ and ‘a’ remain by themselves after having been dissolved from one another; and the syllable does not remain. For this reason, he again concludes, saying: “therefore the syllable is something, not only its elements (vowel and consonant), but also something other.”

<3> Likewise, in Bk. VIII of the Metaphysics [VIII, 6, 1045a 9-10]: “of all things having several parts and the whole is not as it were a heap, but the whole is in it more than the other, there is another cause.”

<4> And the Commentator in Bk. 12 of the Metaphysics [XII, comm. 39, f. 322I]: “when substance will have been enumerated, the association will be one through an added intention.”

<5> Likewise, in Bk. V of the Metaphysics [14, 1020b7-8]: “twice three are not six.” Thus commonly all allege the authority. Therefore etc.

In the next place it is argued with reasons:

<6> First, that matter and form are parts of composite even taken simultaneously; and the composite is not a part of the composite.

<7> Or also thus: matter and form are parts of the composite; and nevertheless matter and form are not parts of matter and form.

<8> Or thus: the composite is the whole with respect to the matter and to the form, and it is not the whole with respect to itself.

<9> Likewise, the whole is composed from parts and not parts from parts. Or thus: the whole is composed from parts and the whole is not composed from the whole.

<10> Likewise, the whole is divided into parts, not the whole into the whole. Or thus: the whole is divided in parts, and not the parts into themselves.

<11> Likewise, the parts are in the whole, and not the whole in the whole. Or thus: the parts are in the whole, not the parts into themselves.

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1 W.D. Ross gives the following, modern English translation: “In the case of all things which have several parts and in which the whole is not, as it were, a heap, but the totality is something besides the parts, there is a cause of unity.”
Likewise, matter and form are causes of the composite, the composite is not the cause of the composite. Or thus: matter and form are causes of the composite, not of the themselves.

Likewise, matter itself and form are prior naturally to the composite, and the composite is not prior to the composite. Or thus: matter and form are naturally prior to the composite, and not to themselves.

Likewise, it follows that essential parts are quantitative parts, which is false, since quantitative parts are beyond each other in situation, not, however, essential parts. The consequence is clear, since this composite is matter and form, which are its essential parts; and similarly this composite is of two intermediates, which are its two quantitative parts; therefore those quantitative parts are its essential parts. For this is an expository syllogism, and the adversary has to concede these premises.

Likewise, I posit a case where a square, as described on a wall, is imagined to be divided into two sections, namely the right and left sides by line \( a \); and divided again into two more sections, namely one on top and one on bottom through line \( b \). Then it is argued thus: if the whole were its parts, it would follow that the right and left section would be the top and bottom sections; the consequent is false; therefore so also is the antecedent. The falsity of the consequent is proved by this argument: line \( a \) is between the left and right sections; but it is not between the top and bottom sections; therefore the top and bottom sections are not the left and right sections. But the first consequence is clear through an expository syllogism, whose premises our adversary concedes. For the square is a right and left section; and also it is a top and bottom section; therefore etc. Or thus: between the right and left section is line \( a \); but between the top and bottom section it is not; therefore etc.

Likewise, it follows that equals (\( paria \)) are unequal (\( imparia \)). But the consequent is impossible, since if equals were unequal, it would follow that they would not be equal; therefore they would not be equal; and thus would be equals and not equal, which implies a contradiction. But the first consequent is clear according to arithmetic, since all twos are equal and all threes are unequal; and nevertheless two would be three, since two sections of the line \( b \) would be three thirds of line \( b \).

Again it follows that equals (\( aequalia \)) would be unequal (\( inaequalia \)). The consequent is impossible, which is proved as in the preceding account. The consequence holds by positing that lines \( a \) and \( b \) are two sections of line \( g \), but again, the same line is imagined to be divided into two parts, one of which is double the other, and these would be \( c \) and \( d \). I argue then thus: \( a \) and \( b \) are equal to each other; but \( c \) and \( d \) are unequal; and nevertheless \( a \) and \( b \) are \( c \) and \( d \). This is clear through an expository syllogism. For line \( g \) is line \( c \) and \( d \); and this also is line \( a \) and \( b \); therefore \( a \) and \( b \), which are equal, are \( c \) and \( d \), which are unequal.

Again it follows that the same is white and black, which is false. The consequence is clear, if the sections of some shield are \( a \) and \( b \) and \( a \) is white and \( b \) is black, etc.

Again, the parts would be the same among themselves, which is false. The consequence is clear through the rule that "whatever are the same in one nad
the same in number, they are the same among themselves;” and the parts would be
the same to the whole, which is one in number.

<20> Again, seeing Socrates he would see some two, about one of which he
would see nothing, which seems impossible. The consequence is clear, since seeing
two sections of Socrates, of which one is before and the other after, since these
would be Socrates; and nevertheless about that which is after he would see nothing.

<21> Again, \( a \) is greater and less than \( b \) and equal to \( b \), which seems
impossible. The consequence is clear by positing that \( b \) is of two feet and \( a \) six feet
and that \( a \) is imagined to be thus divided so that the first part is 3 feet and that a
second section is 2 feet and the third section 1 foot, and these are called \( c, d, \) and \( e \).
And I argue then thus: \( a \) is \( c \) and \( d \) and \( e \), therefore etc.

<22> Likewise, this mental proposition “every man is animal” would
simultaneously be true and false, which is impossible. The consequence is clear,
since in the mind it is one whole aggregated from those four parts corresponding to
the four words ‘every’, ‘man’, ‘is’, ‘animal’; and these four parts in the intellect do not
have an order of position to each other on account of the indivisibility of the
intellect; therefore by this account the whole in the mind would be this proposition
“every man is animal,” by the same reason would be this proposition “animal is
every man,” and nevertheless “every man is animal” is true and the other is false,
therefore etc.

To the opposite is argued from the authorities.

<1> For it is said in Bk. IV of the *Physics* [2, 210a 16] that the whole is
nothing except its parts.

<2> It is also said in Bk. I of the *Physics* [2, 185b 34]: “for many are
accordingly one;” namely since many parts are one whole.

<3> It is also said in Bk. IV of the *Physics* [14, 224a 1-2] that “many
measures the whole,” namely since the parts are the measure of the whole. Hence
on this passage the Commentator [*In Physicam*, IV, comm. 133, f. 205F] said the
measured is many measures and number is many unities.

<4> Likewise, it is said Bk. V of the *Metaphysics* [6, 1015b 36-1016a 2] that
some are one, since they are connected [continua] to each other.

<5> Likewise, in Bk. II of *De anima* [1, 413a 2-3] it is said: “just as the
pupil and sight are the eye, so the soul and body are the animal.”

<6> Likewise, in the *Enchiridion* of Athanasius,2 “just as the rational soul
and body [caro] are one man, so also God and one man is Christ,” etc.

To the first I say that no whole is its parts and that no part is the whole of
which it is a part. And this I believe conceding nevertheless that the principle
[principio] is per se known and commonly conceded. And the sophist, wishing to
deny this ought to deny that “every whole is greater than its part,” since nothing can
be greater than its very self, and it is absurd to say that something can be composed
from its very self and from a certain other.

From this it is inferred that the locution, although it may be common, is not proper, when the denomination of the whole occurs from the denomination of the parts. I say, therefore, that this locution is very common. For we commonly say “man is snub nosed,” since he has a snubbed nose, and “man is curly,” since he has curly hair. And Aristotle shows well in Bk. IX of the Ethics [8, 1168a 28-1169a 10] how we often use this mode of speaking. For in the same place he changes the question whether a self-lover, that is a lover of one’s self, is to be praised or blamed, and he solves it through a distinction. For since it is imagined that there are two parts in a man, namely his sensual and his intellectual parts, sometimes a man is named a self-lover from the name of each part. For many are said to love themselves excessively, since they love the sensual part, all wishing to pursue that part to which his sensitive appetite inclines himself, such as honors, money, carnal delights, etc., and as they obtain these, they do not shrink back from injuring others. And such self-lovers, that is a lover of one’s self, are blamed, indeed such a lover draws himself to every vice. Others, however, are said to love themselves, since they love the intellectual part, wishing to do nothing that right reason does not dictate, which always is deprecated to the best, as is said in Bk. I of the Ethics [13, 1102b15-16]. And such self-lovers, that is lovers of one’s self, are always praised and glorified.

But then it is asked: which of these is properly called a self-lover? And it is said that the one who loves his intellect, since man either is his intellect or most greatly is his intellect, just as a city and every congregation is most greatly the most principal part, that is the most principal part of it. And Aristotle notably says disjunctively that man is an intellect or most greatly an intellect to note that simply or according to the proper locution this is false “man is intellect,” but by a permissive locution insofar as the name of the whole is taken from the name of the part, it must be conceded that man is most greatly an intellect, that is, that man is to be named from the name of the intellectual part rather than from his sensitive part, since he is that part principally. Because, however, such denominations are not true according to a proper locution it is manifest, since every intellect is indivisible and not composed from soul and body; but man is thus composed; therefore man is not the intellect. And similarly every snubbed nose is a curved nose, since this is the definition of a snubbed nose; but no man is a snubbed nose; therefore no man is snubbed.

It is thus manifest that according to the proper locution the conclusion first posited ought to be conceded, namely that no whole is its part, although nevertheless I will posit the opposite according to an improper locution and many customs.

But, nevertheless, for the verification of the speech of the conclusion it is expedient to distinguish the name ‘whole’, since sometimes it is taken categorematically and signifies the same thing that has integral parts. For we do not care about the other modes of the whole, as about the whole in a way or about a universal whole, since no question is raised about these. In another mode, ‘whole’ is taken syncategorematically, and then it implies in itself a sign universally distributing the name ‘part’, in that it is the same to say the ‘whole man’ and ‘each and every part of man’ or the ‘whole Socrates’ and ‘each and every part of Socrates’.
Therefore, in this way, the conclusion posited must be understood by taking ‘whole’ categorematically. If the ‘whole’ is truly taken syncategorematically, then it must be said that a whole man is part of man and the whole Socrates is part of Socrates, and thus of the others. And this is manifest through the things being put forth. For whatever part of man is a part of man, and whatever part of Socrates is a part of Socrates, and thus of the others. But no part of man is the whole man, since no part of man is whatever part of man.

But now I come directly to the question, which was asked not whether the whole is one part, but whether the whole is its parts.

And first I will speak by taking ‘whole’ categorematically. And about this it is customary to give a suitable distinction, namely that this proposition the “whole is its parts” can be understood either conjointly or separately. I say separately, since about each part without the other it is true to say that the whole is that part. But I say conjointly, since it is true to say the whole is this part and that part and that one, etc. For example, separately we say that these stones are stones measuring a foot, if each is a foot long, but conjointly we say that these stones occupy the space of two feet. For it is not true to say that each occupies the space of two feet, but the aggregate from them does. And just as I said about that, i.e., the “whole is its parts,” so I say about this: “the composite is matter and form.” For according to sense, the division is resolved into this connection (copulativum): “the composite is matter and the composite is form,” but according to the sense the composite cannot become thus.

Then two conclusions are posited. The first is that according to sense this division must be denied “the whole is its parts,” since it follows from these signate parts (which are \(a\) and \(b\)) that this whole would be this part \(a\) and that it would also be this part \(b\); but this is impossible, since it was said previously that no whole is the part.

The second conclusion that according to the conjoined sense it must be conceded that the “whole is its parts.” And a great proof of this conclusion is for me through the authorities previously adduced. For I believe well that a rational soul and flesh are one man by taking ‘flesh’ largely for the total human body. For the Psalm or Symbol of Athanasius in which this is said, as it were, is approved through the church.

But also reasons can be adduced that it is probable enough. For if the whole were not its parts, it would follow that no matter would be perpetual even with the conceded opinion of Aristotle about the perpetuity of the world, which is against Aristotle. The consequence is clear, since if matter \(b\) is divided into two sections, that will not be more, since alone they will be its parts, which neither are the former nor were the former, but that is not perpetual which previous is and subsequently is not, therefore etc.

Likewise, it follows that two half scales pull down the scales just as much as when one scale has been removed from them, insofar as they pull down with that scale. The consequent seems false, since then that scale draws nothing, which nevertheless is the greatest weight that is in the scale. The consequence is clear through you, since if the scale is divided into two sections, these two sections pull
down just as much as, insofar as they pull down with a scale which was the whole of these parts; and nevertheless when that one scale was removed, since they did not remain except the parts, which neither are nor will be that scale.

Again, I take the composite $a$ and the form of it as $b$ and the matter of it as $c$. It is agreed (constat) that the form does not have a greater union to the matter than the composite to the matter and form. But matter and form either are one or from them something is one. And if they are one, with equal reason this can be said about form and matter. If they are not one, but from them something is one, then thus it will be necessary to posit that this is a fourth being distinct from each of these three from which that is, as it is necessary that the composite is one third thing distinct from matter and form. And thus it will proceed to infinity, which is unsuitable.

Again, nothing ought to be posited in vain in nature; but it is in vain to posit the whole distinct from the parts, since without this, all the problems can be solved, as will appear, if reasons unbind the things having been posited.

If indeed the name ‘whole’ is taken syncategorematically, then I say that it has two parts: one of which is of anything that is divisible, as horse, stone, water, etc.; the other is of anything that is indivisible. In which things, however, whose part is divisible I say that the whole is its parts. For example, the whole horse is its parts, as is evident through explanation. For whatever part of a horse is its parts. For whatever part has two sections and is the two sections according to what was said previously. But in those things whose part is indivisible, it must be denied that the whole its parts. For example, the whole man is not his parts, since not every part of him is his parts. For an instance is about his intellectual soul, which is not his parts, since it is indivisible.

Therefore, I then respond to the reasons adduced in the beginning of the question.

<To argument 1> To the first, I say that Aristotle distinguishes the composite in contrast to the matter and also distinguishes it in contrast to the form, but he does not intend to distinguish it in contrast to matter and form conjoined together.

<To argument 2> To the other, I say that Aristotle intends about the composite that it is per se one and is composed either from a mixture of many elements, by taking ‘element’ for that which holds itself through the mode of matter. For such, if it is per se one, lacks another part, besides those certain elements, namely the form, according to whose unity the former is per se one in act. Therefore it is conceded that what is composed from the material principles, namely matter, and form is not that material principle, but what is composed of matter and form is only matter and form. But when it is argued that God can separate matter and form from each other and conserve them (for then matter and form would exist but the composite would not, therefore that composite is not matter and form), I say that the composite will remain, as long as matter and form will remain, but the composite will not remain, and the whole will remain, but the whole will not remain.
<To argument 3> In the same way it must be said to the other authority. For it was spoken about material parts, and through ‘another cause’ he intended the form.

<To argument 4> The authority of the Commentator, however, must altogether be denied to that sense to which he posited it. For he said that to the negation of the divine Trinity. For he wised to say that, if God is really three, namely in persons, and is altogether substantially one undivided, it is necessary that he is a certain addition and another person to the substance; and this is false and heretical. Nor does he have the place in the proposition, since although there is unity and trinity, nevertheless they are there the whole and part.

<To argument 5> To the other, I say that the authority was not alleged well, indeed Aristotle said there and intended that simultaneously six are six and not twice six nor thrice six, indeed that twice six is twelve. And Aristotle wished to say that the term ‘twice six’ is not of the category quantity, but quality of the fourth species. For it is a passion convertible with the predicable about that term ‘twelve’, which is about the category of quantity.

<To argument 6> To the other, I concede that matter and form are parts of the composite and that the composite is not part of the composite, but the composite is parts of the composite.

<To argument 7> To the other I say that matter and form are separately parts of the composite, since each is a part of the composite, but conjoined matter and form are the composite. When, however, it is said that matter and form are not parts of matter and form, I say that there are infinite quibblings of logic and with little meaning (pauca sententia). For this is indefinite “matter and form are not parts of matter and form;” (materia et forma sunt partes materiae et formae) ³ and is true, since the matter of fire and form of man are not parts of matter and form. This also is indefinite “matter and form are parts of matter and form;” and is true, since when a quantitative part of form is form and part of matter is matter, it follows that matter and form are parts of matter and form. But if we are to speak to each about the same matter and form, as about the total matter of this horse and of the total form of it, to this proposition it will be true, namely that matter and form are parts of matter and form, by taking matter and form conjoined as from the part of subject rather than from the part of the predicate, since it was conceded that a composite is part of the composite. Similarly, by taking the terms from the part of the subject separately and from part of the predicate conjoined, the proposition can be conceded, since as matter rather than form is part of the composite, which is matter and form. But by taking matter and form separately from the whole, it is false, since neither matter nor form are parts of matter nor are they parts of form, nor is matter a part of matter nor is form a part of form, from which we say to each about the same matter and form.

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³ In this and subsequent passages, I’m taking ‘materiae et formae’ as being in the genitive cases, since ‘compositi’ in n. 6 is clearly in the genitive, and so are ‘hominis’ and equi’ later in this paragraph. However, they could be datives, and the sense would be ‘with respect to matter and form’ or ‘for matter and form’.
<To argument 8> When it is also said that the composite is the whole with respect to matter and form, I say that this is true separately, since the whole is in respect to matter and the whole is in respect to form, but conjoined neither is the whole of them nor part of them, but is the two things, of which each and every is a part of it. For thus I understand that the composite is parts of the composite, since it is these things, of which each and every is a part of the composite.

<To argument 9> To the other, it seems to me that it must be said that the phrase “the whole is composed or was composed from its parts” is not a proper form of speaking, although it is very commonly said. For according to grammar, ‘to be composed’ (componi) signifies ‘to be put together with another (cum alio poni).’ For this reason the part is that which composed of another part and is united or it is that which was composed and united of another part. And when I say that the whole is composed from parts, it ought not be understood through this except that the sense, namely that each part is composed of another. Or it is said that a stone is composed of matter and form signifies nothing other in the proposition than that matter and form are parts of the stone, which is true in a divided sense, since each is part of a stone, and in this sense nothing unsuitable follows.

<To argument 10> To the other similar argument, it seems to me that the phrase “the whole is dived into its parts” is not a proper form of speaking, although it too is very commonly said. But a part is what is divided and separated from a part, and nothing else ought to be understood, when we say that the whole is divided into its parts. Or if it is not a real division, then the whole to be divided into its parts, as the Zodiac into tits twelve signs, signifies nothing other than many and diverse beings, of which each is a part of it. And then it is manifest by considering that none or nothing unsuitable follows.

<To argument 11> To the other I concede that by speaking separately parts are in the whole, since each and every is in the whole, but conjoined they are not in the whole.

<To argument 12> To the other, it is said by conceding that speaking separately matter and form are causes of the composite, since each is a cause of the composite, but conjoined are the composite. And the composite also is not a cause of the composite, but is of the cause of the composite, since it is that of which each is a cause of the composite. Matter and form also are causes of matter and form by speaking of each separately, since matter is cause of (with respect to? or for?) form and form is cause of (with respect to? or for?) matter.

<To argument 13> Similarly to the other I say that matter and form are naturally prior to the composite by speaking separately, since each part is prior. And the composite also is prior to the composite. And altogether this is said about priority as it was said about causality, since one is not there naturally prior to another, unless since one is cause of the other.

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4 Grammatically, I assume that ‘materiae’ and ‘formae’ are genitives, since ‘compositi’ in the same reply is clearly genitive, though they could be datives. In English, I think it would be more common to say that “matter is a cause with respect to or in relation to form,” where we would use something closer to a dative of respect.
<To argument 14> To the other I say that by speaking conjointly, essential parts of the composite are quantitative parts of the composite, but by speaking separately the whole is false. For no essential part of the composite is its quantitative part according to an assigned difference between parts of this kind. But if we wish to call every part which is of the integrity and essence of the thing essential parts, then the quantitative part of a thing would well be its essential part.

<To argument 15> To the other, I say that by speaking conjointly the right part and the left part are the part above and the part below, but by speaking separately the whole is false. But when it is argued “since by speaking conjointly this is true ‘between the right section and the left section is line a’ (for we are not speaking separately that between the right part is line a nor that between the left part is line a), therefore the account proceeded well,” I speak as from beyond each (sicut de extra invicem). For it is permitted for us to say that a and b are beyond each and we do not say that a is beyond each nor that b is beyond each, nevertheless this syncategorematic term ‘beyond each’ (extra invicem) designates a separate sense. For the sense is that a is beyond b and that b is beyond a. Thus also in the proposition, this expression ‘between’ (inter) signifies a divided sense, since it signifies that right would be standing apart or divided from the left through the medium a and that also from the converse.

<To arguments 16-17> Concerning the other accounts, however, which argued that equals (paria) would be unequal (imparia) and equals (aequalia) would be unequal (inaequalia) it would be addressed perfectly in the third book.5

<To argument 18> To the other I concede that the same is white and black by speaking conjointly, namely that the same shield divided up, but it is not true separately.

<To argument 19> To the other I say that the rule must be understood when speaking separately that these are the same, so that each is the same to this.

<To argument 20> To the other it seems to me that this phrase ‘I see Socrates’ is according to the denomination of the whole from the part, since, although properly it is not true, nevertheless it a common way of speaking on account of a certain appropriation. For since the snub nosed determines its nose and the trembling determines the fiber or hairs, for this reason from the curvature (simitate) of the nose, he is said to be snub-nosed, and so also from the curl. Neither is this proposition ‘man is snub-nosed or curly’ true, unless to that sense, since the nose of man is snubbed or his hairs are curly. So also, since the opaque determines the exterior surface to be seen rather than (versus?) seeing, we say that the body is seen, if the surface of it is seen. But this is not properly true, indeed this is not true “I see Socrates,” except to this sense, since I see the external surface of Socrates. Or when this I said, since I alone see the exterior garment by which he is clothed.

<To argument 21> To the other I concede that speaking conjointly a is greater than b and less than b and equal to b, but not separately.

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5 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, III, q. 17, ed. Parisiis 1509, XXX.
To the last, I say that the distributive supposition or only confused (supposition) or determinate (supposition) in the spoken propositions correspond in the mind to certain diverse modes of understanding superadded to the categorematic concepts, according to which modes of understanding these mental terms supposit otherwise. And these modes of understanding are of the integrity of the proposition. And thus in the mental proposition corresponding to the spoken proposition “every man is animal” is a mode of understanding added to a designated concept through this word ‘animal’, according to which it supposits confusedly and distributively. Which is not added to it in the proposition corresponding to this utterance ‘animal is every man’. For this reason these two mental propositions are not composed from all the same parts, on account of the fact that this is not that, but this is true, that is false.

And thus is the end of the question.