Is every soul a substantial act?

1. It is argued first that the soul is not an act, because a potency [or power] of the soul is the soul itself, as will be clarified later.\(^1\) But potency is not act, since Aristotle says in his preface to *On the Soul* II that act and potency differ quite a bit. The Commentator likewise remarks that they differ as opposites.

2. Again, in his book *The Substance of the Celestial Sphere*, the Commentator says that an act cannot be receptive. Aristotle makes a similar point in *On Generation and Corruption* I that a form is active, and to be passive or receptive pertains to some other potency. But, clearly, the soul is receptive of sensible and intelligible species; therefore etc.\(^2\)

3. Again, something that is a substantial composite of act and potency is not an act, but is in act, as is a horse or a stone. But our intellective soul is a composite of this sort, as it is composed of the agent and possible intellects; therefore etc.

4. Again, if we were to concede that the soul is act, then one can argue that it is not a substantial act, since every substantial act is a substance, but the soul is not a substance; therefore. The minor premise is proved in several ways. First, it is common to every substance not to be in a subject, as stated in *Categories*, and the soul is in a subject; therefore etc. Second, because the definition of accident applies to it, for the soul inheres in prime matter as its subject, and is present in it and absent from it without its corruption.\(^3\) Therefore, the soul is an accident and not a substance.

\(^1\)The Latin word *potentia* can be translated in both ways, and Buridan actually exploits in his argument the full meaning of the single Latin term, conveyed only together by the two English terms provided in the translation.

\(^2\)Usually, when the conclusion to be drawn is obvious, medieval authors and scribes merely indicate it with this phrase (“therefore etc.” or just “therefore”) without actually spelling it out. The translation will preserve this feature of the text.

5. Again, the Commentator in [his commentary on] this second book distinguishes between substantial and accidental forms on the grounds that an accidental form has a subject in actuality, whereas a substantial form does not. However, in *Metaphysics* V it is stated that the soul is a substance in a subject in actuality, as opposed to the forms of simple bodies, namely the elements. And we have the same claim in *Physics* VIII, where it is said that a heavy inanimate body does not move on its own like an animal does, since it cannot be divided into a part that moves *per se* and a part that is moved *per se*. An animal, however, is divisible in that way, namely into the soul, which moves *per se*, and the body, which is moved *per se*. Therefore, that body is a subject in actuality, since a being in potentiality is not moved *per se*, but only a being in actuality, as stated in *Physics* III. Therefore, the soul is an accidental form.

6. Again, from *Metaphysics* VII we have it that substances are not defined by additional things [outside their essence]. But the soul is defined by an additional thing, namely the body, which is outside its essence; therefore etc.

7. Again, the generation of the soul is not a substantial generation; therefore the soul is not a substance. The antecedent is proved because a substantial generation has to be the transmutation of a whole into a whole,\(^4\) without anything sensible persisting. Yet this is not the case with the generation of the soul. Instead, certain dispositions pre-exist in matter (such as warmth, dampness, and its organization) that are not destroyed but rather perfected [when combined with the soul]; therefore etc.

8. Aristotle establishes the opposite claim. And therefore, we put forth some conclusions. The first is that the soul is a substance. The Commentator proves this as follows: the soul is nobler than any accident that is found in an animated being, as natural cognition tells us, as he says. Therefore, the soul is not an accident, but a substance.

9. Again, the soul is a part from which, together with the body, a *per se*

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\(^4\)The point of this phrase is that in a substantial change a whole new thing is generated out of a whole thing that existed before and totally ceases to be upon the generation of the new thing, as when a horse dies, it totally ceases to be and turns into a cadaver.
subsisting substance is constituted, such as an animal or a plant. And every part of a substance is a substance; therefore etc.

10. Again, if one asks “What is this?” about a per se subsisting suppositum, then the question only asks about the substance [and not its accidents]. For we ask about accidents by means of questions such as “What is this like?” or “How much is this?” or “Where is it?” Therefore, a substance is something the coming or leaving of which changes the answer to the question “What is this?” For this is how Aristotle wanted to distinguish substantial transmutations and substantial forms from accidents. But the coming or leaving of the soul changes the answer to this sort of question. For we say that this is a horse or a donkey, when a horse or a donkey is generated, but not before. And when the soul leaves, we no longer say that this is a horse or a donkey, but that this is a carcass.

11. Again, the main operations of substances ought not to be reduced to some accident as their main source, but rather to a substance. But the main operations of animate beings, such as nutrition, sensation, and so on are reduced to the soul as their main source; therefore etc. And this is confirmed by Aristotle, because vital operations are not sufficiently reduced to accidents. For they are not sufficiently reduced to heaviness and lightness, because then all the bones of an animal would be in its lower part, and so all its flesh and sinews would be in its upper part. Nor are they sufficiently reduced to the four primary qualities, namely warmth and coldness, etc., for then the best candidate for this reduction would be warmth. We cannot say so, because warmth does not have the nature of differently shaping the various members [of the body], or of terminating growth, because fire would grow indefinitely if it were given [enough] fuel, as Aristotle says. Therefore, the natural dispositions of animate beings must be reduced to a different substantial principle as their main source, and that is the soul; therefore etc.

12. The second conclusion is that the soul is an act or form, because an act is that on account of whose coming into matter or into a pre-existing subject something is said to be actually what it was not before, except in potency. This is clear from the meaning of the term [‘act’]. But it is on account of the soul’s
coming into matter that a horse is said to be actually a horse, when, before, it
was not a horse, except in potency. And the same goes for a donkey. We did
not say that it was a donkey, but that it was able to become a donkey; therefore
etc.

13. Again, an animated being is a per se subsisting, and this something. Matter, however, is not this something, nor is it subsisting per se, as Aristotle
says. It follows that an animated being is not simple matter. Therefore, an an-
imated being is substantially composed from matter and form as from potency
and act. And this is the composition from soul and body. Hence, either the
body has to be the form and actuality of the soul, which cannot be said, or the
soul has to be the actuality and form of the body, which was the claim to be
proved.

14. And thus there follows a third conclusion, that the soul is a substantial
act. For every act is either a substantial or an accidental act. But the soul is
not an accidental act, since it is not an accident; therefore etc.

15. Again, on account of a substantial act, a per se subsisting substance is
actually what it is, whereas on account of an accidental act it is such and such,
or is this much, or is somewhere. However, on account of the soul, an animated
being is what it is, such as a man or a horse; therefore etc.

16. But then we should note that 'act' and 'potency' differ from each other
in correlative, corresponding, and multiple ways, as can be seen in Metaphysics
IX.

17. In one way, 'act' signifies the same thing as 'a thing that is, and not
only can be', and 'potency' signifies 'a thing that can be.' And in this way
every being is an act. Hence, in this sense, even prime matter is an act and in
actuality and not only a potency or something in potency. For it not only can

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This phrase is the most common English rendering of the Scholastic technical phrase
'hoc aliquid' and of the corresponding Greek phrase (tode ti) coined by Aristotle to indicate an
individual substance of some unspecified nature, where 'this' does the job of referring to an
individual that can be pointed out as 'this', and 'something' stands in for the name of any
natural kind, such as horse, dog, donkey, and so on.
be, but in fact is. But in this sense the Antichrist is only some potency or is in potency. But it is not in this sense that we are talking about act and potency here.

18. In the second way a form inherent in matter or in a subject is said to be an act with regard to that subject, because it is only the form that is actually such or so much or is in such and such a way. Indeed, if the form in question is a substantial form, then it is called an act because it is on account of this form that the composite substance is called what it actually is. And the matter or subject in which it inheres is called subjective potency with respect to that form. And it is in this way that in all animate bodies the body is said to be potency with regard to the soul, and the soul is said to be act with respect to it.

19. In the third way, some motion or operation is called an act with regard to the thing operating, whether actively or passively. And the thing operating, whether actively or passively, is said to be an active or passive potency [or power] with regard to the operation itself. It is in this way that it is said in Physics III that motion is the act of the moveable thing and of the moved thing, insofar as the moveable thing is [actually] moved; and the soul does not have to be an act in this sense. Indeed, in this sense every soul is [in] potency with regard to vital operations.

20. In the fourth way, the agent and the mover is said to be [in] act with regard to the recipient and the thing moved. For the recipient or the thing moved is said to be [in] potency with regard to the agent, because the agent has in formal or virtual actuality the likeness of that for the reception of which the recipient is in potency. And in this way each soul is the act of the body, for

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6The Antichrist in medieval logical and metaphysical discussions is the standard example of a singular entity that will contingently exist in the future, whose future existence we know from revelation.

7The fire of a piece of wood generating fire in another piece of wood has the likeness of the fire generated formally, namely in its own substantial form; the sun generating fire in the same piece of wood has a similitude of the fire it generates virtually, namely in its power (virtus), which is not of the same kind or form (clearly, even in modern science we would say that the...
the soul is not only the formal and substantial cause of the body, but also the
efficient and final cause, as Aristotle remarks in the second book of this work.

21. And we should know further that if the intelligences are to be called
the souls of the heavens, the soul in their case is not an act of a body as an
inherent form, according to Aristotle, but only in the fourth sense, namely as
the agent is the act of the patient and the mover is the act of the moved thing,
as he noted in the second book of this work, when he said “[it is there] as the
pilot is in a ship” etc. And the Commentator believed that the intellect is the
act of man in the same sense. Therefore, he posited in man another soul, a
sensitive, corruptible one that informs matter. But we shall take up this issue
in the third book.

22. Now we should respond to the objections. To the first, we have said that
the soul may well be said to be [in] potency with regard to some operation,
and to be an act with regard to the body.

23. To the second, we concede that a substantial act cannot receive a sub-
stantial act, but a substantial act may receive accidental acts. And it is only
matter that can receive substantial forms.

24. To the third we should reply that the human intellective soul is a simple
form. We shall discuss the agent and possible intellect in Book III.

25. One should check the Categories concerning the next objection. Some
expound it that this property of substance should be understood to concern
total substances, calling a “total substance” one that is not a part of another
substance, although a partial substance, such as a form, may well be in a sub-
ject. This property is expounded in another way by saying that by the term
‘substance’ Aristotle merely meant terms in the category of substance, and by
‘being in a subject’ he meant denominative predications. And in this way, he
intended that no substantial term is predicatable denominatively of another as
mostly hydrocarbon fire of wood is not the same kind of thing as the thermonuclear “fire” of
the sun).

8The “intelligences” in this context are the immaterial movers of the celestial spheres of
the Aristotelian cosmos.

9This is in fact Buridan’s exposition in the Summ. de dial. 3.2.3 (158).
its subject; rather, this mode of predication is characteristic of accidents.

26. To the next argument; clearly, one needs to check Porphyry for the definition of accident. For that definition was given about accidentally predicable terms. And by ‘presence’ and ‘absence’ one should understand affirmative and negative predication, and not true inherence, in the way form inheres in matter. But then this argument is irrelevant to the question, so you should check my comments on Porphyry regarding this issue.\(^{10}\)

27. To the next, one should reply that this distinction of the Commentator’s has to be understood so that the subject of the accident is in actuality, that is to say, even if we exclude the accident, the remainder is still said to be *this* something in actuality. However, if we exclude the substantial form, the remainder is not said to be *this* something. And matter of itself is not *this* something. Neither is it called *something* on account of an accident; rather, on account of an accident it is called such and such or so much. Likewise, the authority of Aristotle in *Metaphysics* V and *Physics* VIII is to be expounded not as saying that the body that is the subject of the soul is *this* something in actuality if we exclude the soul, but rather as saying that it would still be able to actually move and resist on account of the powers of the elements that remained in their mixture. But in the case of a simple element, if the substantial form and its proper powers are excluded, the remainder would not actually be able to move or resist. It is for this reason that it does not move on its own, for resistance has to be that of the mobile thing against the mover, which is not present in a simple element, except from some extrinsic principle. But in an animal it is clearly from an intrinsic principle. And this should be seen in more detail in *Physics* VIII and IV.\(^{11}\)

28. To the next, one should reply that Aristotle’s intention in *Metaphysics* VII was that substances, that is, terms in the category of substance, provided they are to be defined purely quidditatively, should not be defined by means of [extrinsic] additions, but only by means of essential predicates, because they

\(^{10}\text{Cfr. Buridanus, QQ. in Porph. Isc. 13; Summ. de dial. 2.6.1.}\)

\(^{11}\text{This discussion takes place primarily at Physics VIII.4.}\)
connote nothing extrinsic to what they supposit for.\textsuperscript{12} However, accidental and connotative terms do not have such definitions. But Aristotle also intended further that the natural scientist should define these substantial terms by means of additions and not purely quidditatively, since he does not consider them absolutely quidditatively, as does the metaphysician, but in their relation to motion. Indeed, he \textit{has to} define them by means of motion and matter apt to be moved, as is noted in \textit{Physics} II and \textit{Metaphysics} VI, as well as in the preface of this book.

29. To the next, we should respond that in substantial generation the same accidental sensible dispositions may well remain in the corrupted and generated thing. But the same subject does not remain, understanding by ‘subject’ the \textit{per se} subsisting suppositum, which is said to be \textit{this} something. And Aristotle did not say, in the description of generation, that absolutely no single sensible remains the same, but he added, “no single sensible remains in the same subject,” understanding ‘subject’ in the way just described. And in this way the question is clear.

\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Cfr. Summ. de dial.} 8.2.4, especially pp. 642–644.
Is every soul the first act of an organic body?

1. It is argued that the soul is not the first act, since only God alone is the first act. For everything else is posterior to Him. And even the forms of the elements are naturally prior to other forms. Therefore, the forms of mixed bodies such as souls are not first acts. Again, for its being received in its subject, the soul requires in it several primary dispositions, which are certain forms and acts. Therefore, the soul is not the first act.

2. Aristotle says in this second book that the vegetative soul is the first among others. Thus, at least the other souls are not first acts, but only the vegetative soul is.

3. The same point is supported by the authority of *Metaphysics* V,\(^1\) which claims that the soul is a substance in a subject that is in actuality. And there is also the authority of the Commentator in *On the Heavens* III, [saying] that matter receives the forms of mixed bodies only through the mediation of the forms of the elements.

4. Furthermore, one can also argue that not every soul is the act of a body, on the authority of Aristotle,\(^2\) who states in the second book of this work that nothing prevents a certain soul, namely the intellective soul, from being separated from body, for it is not the act of any body.

5. Furthermore, even conceding that every soul is the act of a body, one may still argue that not every soul is the act of an organic body, first because celestial bodies, whose intelligences are said to be souls, are not organic, as they do not have parts assigned to perform diverse functions.

6. Again, since the soul is a simple form, it requires a simple subject. But an organic body is not simple, but heterogeneous, namely composed of diverse members.

7. Again, in the body of a horse one may designate a homogeneous part

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\(^1\) *Metaphysics* V.8 1017\(^b\).15.

\(^2\) *On the Soul* II.1 413\(^a\)7.
among other parts that is not composed of quantitative parts of different sorts, such as a tiny piece of flesh. And so, this tiny piece of flesh is not an organic body. But then, since the soul of the horse is extended with the whole body of the horse, there has to be a part of this soul that adequately informs this tiny piece of flesh, and which is adequately its act. However, this part of the soul is a soul. For just as any part of some whiteness is whiteness, so too, any part of a soul is a soul, and not some other form. Let this partial soul be called $B$. Then I should say that $B$ is a soul and it is not the act of an organic body; therefore, etc.

8. Aristotle claims the opposite, insofar as he says that the soul is a first act. One needs only explicate the meaning of the term and [his] intent will be clear. If we talk about act absolutely speaking, then it is obvious in the first place that God alone is the first act. For all other things, whether they are acts or potencies, are posterior to Him. But, in the second place, one may understand [the claim to mean] that the soul is the first act among all the acts that are acts of the body, of which this soul is an act. For example, since the body of a man or a donkey has several acts and forms, namely qualities and quantities, the soul is said to be the first among all these acts.

9. Note, however, that it may well be doubted whether this is in fact the case. For if one assumes several substantial forms in the same body, such as the forms of the elements along with the form of the mixed body and the soul, then one should say that the forms of the elements are naturally prior, and prior even in time. And so, the soul would not be [the] first act [of the body]. Indeed, if one posits several souls, such as the vegetative, sensitive, etc., then everybody would agree that the vegetative soul would be naturally first, and thus, again, not all souls would be first. But if in every suppositum there is only a single substantial form, then the only remaining comparison will be with the accidental forms existing in the same subject, namely whether this substantial form is prior to those accidental forms or some of them are prior to the soul in this subject. [In response] to this there is the opinion that in this way every soul, indeed, every substantial form, is a first act. For those who hold this opinion say that, although many primary dispositions are
required in matter in order that a substantial form can come to be and be received in this matter, nevertheless, upon the arrival of this substantial form, all these primary accidental dispositions are destroyed. And next, upon the introduction of the substantial form, other accidental forms, similar to the prior ones, are introduced. For example, when water turns into fire, its matter needs to be predisposed by warmth and dryness. But upon the arrival of the substantial form of fire, this warmth is destroyed. And next, after the form of fire, another warmth is generated, similar to the first, but numerically different.

10. And they are moved to take this position by authorities. One is Aristotle, who says in *On Generation and Corruption* I, that generation, namely a substantial generation, is a “transmutation of some whole into this whole, with no sensible thing remaining.” And yet another is Aristotle’s dictum in *Physics* II that matter with form is the cause of all the accidents that are produced in these things. The third is Aristotle’s remark in *Metaphysics* VII that substance is prior to accident. The fourth is the claim that one should not look for a cause as to why body and soul constitute /one/ thing. And he does not mean that one should not look for the efficient cause that produces this form in matter. Rather, he seems to mean that one should not look for a cause mediating between matter and form, because this substantial form is received immediately in this matter. And this may be confirmed by an argument, because matter and substantial form constitute something one *per se*. But something one *per se* is not so constituted from matter and an accident. However, it would seem that matter and some accident should constitute something one *per se* more than matter and substantial form do, if an accident were received more immediately in matter than a substantial form is. And this seems to be the point of the Commentator’s authority in this second book, saying that an accidental form has a subject in actuality, which is composed of matter and substantial form. A substantial form, however, has a subject in pure potentiality, in accordance with what is said in *On Generation and Corruption* I, namely that *hyle*, that is, prime matter, is most properly the subject of substantial generation, and, consequently, of substantial form, because in [connection with] *Physics* I, one must point out that the generation of a substantial form is the substantial
form itself.

11. Again, it is commonly stated that it is impossible for an accident to migrate from one subject to another. Therefore, it is necessary for accidents to perish with the destruction of their subjects. However, the subject of an accident is a *per se* subsisting substance, as water is the subject of warmth or coldness, or alteration or locomotion. Indeed, it is water itself that is truly cold or warm, and that is truly altered or moved. But with the corruption of a substantial form, a *per se* subsisting substance, such as water or a horse, is destroyed. Therefore, all its accidents are then destroyed.

12. However, these arguments notwithstanding, I believe the opposite, the demonstration of which pertains to my commentary on *On Generation and Corruption*. Therefore, I run over this very quickly, touching only on two main reasons. The first is that if a horse is killed, and all its warmth is destroyed upon the corruption of its soul, nevertheless, even after it has been dead for a while, it is still very warm inside its chest. What, then, generated this new warmth? Not the killer, because it does not have the nature to generate warmth rather than cold, nor is this warmth generated in the way of something that follows upon the form of the carcass, for that form would rather determine coldness for itself than such warmth.

13. Again, when water turns into fire, the water gets warm. It is clear that although this warmth is naturally brought forth from the potency of matter, which naturally inclines toward the form of fire, for which this warmth prepares it, nevertheless, this warmth is not brought forth from the substantial form of water, since it is unnatural to and discordant with the substantial form of water. Indeed, the substantial form of water would rather resist the generation of warmth than contribute to its generation. Therefore, if the substantial form of water is destroyed, this warmth still need not be destroyed at all, because the matter, from whose potency it was brought forth, remains.

14. These arguments and others are to be assumed and should be presented in my commentary on *On Generation and Corruption*. Nor are the weaker argu-

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3 According to Aristotle, water by its very nature would be cold.
ments for this opinion sound. We already touched on the issue of the transmutation of a whole into a whole in the preceding questions. We concede that the cause of all the accidents pertaining to a composite substance and its form is this form itself. And even if [the form] is not their subjective or effective cause, nevertheless it is their final cause. For the form is the end of the dispositions of matter predisposing matter for the reception of this form. We discussed the authority of *Metaphysics* VII in q. 6 of the Preface to this work. As for the authority that one should not look for a cause as to why matter and form constitute one thing, Aristotle states this in *Metaphysics* VIII, concerning accidental forms and their subjects, and concerning substantial forms. Aristotle said this in order to refute the opinion of those who claimed that every form is united to matter or to a subject through some added union, which some called composition, some participation, or inherence or coexistence, as is clear in *Metaphysics* VIII.

15. In response to the other argument, it is clear that Aristotle says in this second book, just as well as in *Metaphysics* VII and VIII, that something one *per se* results from wax and its shape, and, in general, from subject and accident, just as from matter and substantial form, without any mediating cause to be sought. But one substance, which is this *one* something, results only from matter and substantial form. However, from matter and accident there results an accidental composite that is one *per se*. We discussed the authority of the Commentator in another question. Concerning the authority of Aristotle we should say that, although dispositions preexist in matter preparing it for the form to be generated, yet the form is not received in these dispositions, but in the matter thus disposed, and it is educed from the potency of matter.

16. To the last argument we respond that on account of our ignorance of matter and familiarity with composite substance, in ordinary speech we attribute all accidents to the composite substance, and not to matter, although they are educed only from the potency of matter, at least those that are seen to

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4The question at issue there is: “Do accidents contribute a great deal towards knowing what something is?”
be similar in the composite substances belonging to diverse species. Therefore, some people would want to interpret Aristotle’s claim by saying that every substantial form, among all forms inhering in its subject, is first and is the first act, in the order of nobility and perfection. And this is true, but does not seem to be what Aristotle proposed, since he also said that knowledge is a first act. And so we should expound it in the following way: in Aristotle’s claim, an act is called “first” or “second” by comparing a form or habit to the operation stemming from it, so that every form or habit, from which some operation is apt to proceed is said to be a first act. But as regards these operations, the operation is said to be a second act relative to the form or habit in question. It is in this way that Aristotle called knowledge a first act and utilizing knowledge a second act. And in this way, in general, every soul is a first act with respect to the vital operations that are apt to proceed from it, and this is easy to accept.

17. Furthermore, we already stated in the last question in what sense the soul is the act of the body. But in response to the question, then, whether the soul is the first act of an organic body, one can say that it is. And this is not doubtful concerning the total souls of corruptible bodies, namely animals and plants. For in the case of these bodies one can observe several very different parts serving various functions. But concerning the partial soul of that tiny piece of flesh, one may say that this piece of flesh is said to be an instrumental organic body, not because it is composed of dissimilar parts, nor of dissimilar instruments, but because flesh in itself is an organ or instrument, instrumentally distinct from bone and sinew, which serve other functions of the soul.

18. About the heavenly spheres one may plausibly claim that although they have [in their parts] similar and regular shapes, nevertheless, their poles and other parts serve differently the motion by which they are moved by the intelligences. And Aristotle in On the Heavens II posits a left and right side and other differences in the heavens. Also, even the stars serve a different function.

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That is to say, insofar as we have the habit of knowledge, such as the knowledge of a foreign language, it is a first act, as opposed to the actual exercise of it, as when we actually speak that foreign language, which is a second act.

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than the spheres carrying them.

19. We respond to the objections. It is clear that all the arguments that argued about the organic body and the first act are solved by what has been said. But in response to the one referring to Aristotle’s saying that some soul is the act of no body, one may say that he meant the act brought forth from the potency of body and matter, for in this way the intellective soul is not an act of the body. Or indeed he may have meant the act inherent in a body, for /in this sense/ the souls of the heavens, namely the intelligences, are not acts of bodies, although they are their acts [in another sense], as was said in the other question.
Are the vegetative and sensitive souls the same in an animal?

1. First we argue that they are not, but that they are diverse forms and diverse souls, for we can argue for the diversity of substantial forms only on the basis of their diverse activities, because we are led to the cognition of substances only through their accidents and properties. But it is clear that sensing, which is the function of the sensitive soul, and nourishing, which is the function of the vegetative soul, are very diverse activities, differing in species, indeed, in genus, since according to Aristotle, nourishing is action, and sensing is passion.

2. Again, activities that are more different are supposed to proceed from forms and principles that are more different. But it is clear that seeing and nourishing in this horse are activities that are more different than are seeing in this horse and seeing in that donkey, which is obvious from the fact that the respective organs and subjects are more different. Therefore, if seeing in the donkey and seeing in the horse proceed from souls different in species, it follows that it is even more the case that seeing and nourishing in the horse are proceeding from souls that are different in species.

3. Again, to inhere in something on account of itself is to inhere in it by its nature or essence. Therefore, to inhere in an animal insofar as it is an animal is to inhere in it on account of the nature by which it is an animal. And so, also, to inhere in a living thing insofar as it is a living thing is to inhere in it on account of the nature by which it is a living thing. But to be sensitive inhere in Brunellus insofar as he is an animal, but not insofar as he is a living thing, and to be vegetative inhere in him insofar as he is a living thing, but not insofar as he is an animal. Therefore, to be sensitive in him on account of the nature by which he is an animal, and not on account of the nature by which he is a living thing, and the converse is the case with his being vegetative. Therefore, in Brunellus there is a nature whereby he is an animal, and another nature whereby he is alive, and these [natures] are the vegetative and sensitive souls; therefore, etc.

4. Again, in *On the Heavens* I it is stated that a single simple body has to
have a single simple motion by nature. Therefore, a single simple soul should also have a single simple activity. However, the vegetative soul is a simple form that has nourishing as its activity; therefore, sensing is not its activity, but the activity of another soul.

5. Again, a power of the soul is not distinct from the soul itself, as will be shown later. But in a horse the vegetative and sensitive [powers] are distinct powers; therefore, these are distinct souls as well.

6. The opposite is argued by the authority of the Commentator, in *The Substance of the Celestial Sphere*: it is impossible for one subject to have several substantial forms.

7. Again it would follow that a horse is several animate things, for each soul makes an animate being; and this seems unacceptable.

8. Again, from several actual things does not result something one *per se*, as stated in *Metaphysics* VII. However, any soul makes a thing in actuality. Therefore, an animal, were it to have several souls in this way, would not be something one *per se*, which is false.

9. Again, Aristotle in *Physics* I — and wherever he speaks about this matter — reprehends ancient philosophers for assigning as the first subject of natural change some substance in actuality, such as air, water or fire, or some intermediary among these. Aristotle’s point is that in that case there would no longer be generation in the absolute sense, but only alteration. For when the same subject remains in substantial actuality, then its change is not generation in the absolute sense, but only alteration. Neither is the form acquired in such a change a substantial form, but an accidental form. With the assumption of this point, therefore, it is obvious that the sensitive soul in a horse would not

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1For several actual things together only make an aggregate of those several actual things, but are not fused into a thing that is genuinely one, in which they would lose their actuality and actual distinctness.

2Alteration is a mere qualitative change of a substance pre-existing in actuality, and persisting throughout such a change; therefore, such a change is a mere accidental change, a change with qualification, namely a substance’s coming to be somehow; but this is not a generation of a substance absolutely speaking, *i.e.* it is not a substance’s coming to be.
be a substantial form, nor would its generation be a substantial generation, but some alteration, for it would have a subject substantially actualized by the vegetative soul. And these implications are unacceptable; therefore, etc.

10. This question is rather difficult, for it is difficult to prove either position. For those who posit several souls and several substantial forms in the same suppositum, ground their opinion [by saying] that, corresponding to the grade and order of quidditative predicates, namely the genera and species arranged [on the Tree of Porphyry], there are several substantial forms in the same individual, similarly ordered. For instance in Socrates there is the first form on account of which he is a substance, and another, by which he is alive, and yet another, by which he is an animal, and another, specific form, by which he is a man. And just as prime matter is naturally in potentiality toward the first, most generic form, so that this form is the first act of this matter, wherefore they make up something one per se, so too, the second form is related to the composite of matter and the first form in the same way, namely so that this composite is in potentiality per se toward the second form. And that is the formal act of the composite, so that from them [the form and the composite] something one per se comes about, just as it came about from matter and the first form. And the same goes for the third form and the composite of matter and the first two forms, that is, there comes about something one per se. And the same is repeated until the ultimate, most specific form is reached, which then

3 The “Tree of Porphyry” is the traditional graphic representation of the arrangement of genera divided into their subordinated species (and those, in turn, into their species, until the division reaches the most specific species) by means of specific differences within the same category (which is a most general genus). Thus, the category of substance is divided into corporeal and incorporeal. Corporeal substance constitutes the genus of body, which is divided into living (animate) and non-living (inanimate) body. Living bodies are divided into sensitive bodies (constituting the genus of animals) and non-sensitive ones (constituting the genus of plants). Finally, the genus of animals is divided into non-rational animals (yielding the genus of brute animals) and rational ones, yielding the species of humans. The members of this species no longer differ in essential, specific differences, but only in accidental, individual differences, and so this species can no longer be divided into further species, which is why it is a most specific species.
is not in potentiality toward another substantial form. Therefore, every disposition coming on top of it would be an accidental form. And a change, while this specific form stays in place, would be an alteration, and not a substantial generation. And these people imagine that, with regard to the sensitive soul, all animals are of the same substantial nature, from which we take the genus of animals, and it is on account of the further, specific forms, that there are men, horses, and dogs, which have their diverse, specific, substantial natures.

11. And then they solve the arguments and authorities for the opposite side.

Concerning the Commentator's authority they claim that he meant that one subject can only have one ultimate substantial form, namely the one from which we take the most specific species in the category of substance, but it surely does have several prior, generic substantial forms.

12. To the other they reply that there is nothing impossible in one animate thing being several animate things, for the whole animate thing is its quantitative parts, any of which is animate. And although these are several, nevertheless, the composite whole is one animate thing, for it results from these parts as something one per se, in the way described above.

13. In response to the other they concede that several things that are in their specific and ultimate actuality do not make something one per se, but [they claim that] several forms ordered so that one is in potency with respect to the other do make something one per se, as has been said.

14. To the other they reply that Aristotle reprehended the ancient philosophers because they claimed that the subject in question is in substantial actuality by a specific and ultimate form, from which it follows that, while it remains in place, there is no substantial generation, only alteration.

15. These arguments notwithstanding, I believe the opposite, namely that in a horse there is a single soul, and the vegetative soul is not distinct in it from the sensitive soul, nor is the sensitive soul distinct from the vegetative soul. Indeed, to disprove in general the multiplication of forms according to the multiplicity of quidditative predicates pertains to *Metaphysics* VII. ⁴ There-

⁴Buridanus, Q. Met. VII.14.

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fore, assuming this position, I would say nothing here except what pertains particularly to souls and animate beings.

16. Thus, I present some plausible arguments to prove that in a horse there are not sensitive and vegetative souls distinct in this way. The first argument is this: let the horse’s sensitive soul be separated from the vegetative or conversely. For God could remove one from the other, if they were distinct souls. Therefore, after the removal of the sensitive soul, while the vegetative remains, what would remain would be a plant. For every animate being having a vegetative soul without a sensitive soul is a plant. On the other hand, after the removal of the vegetative, while the sensitive remains, what would remain would be an animal. And the horse is now composed of these two. Therefore, it is composed of an animal and a plant, which is absurd.

17. Again, it follows that the vegetative soul in a horse, indeed, in this particular horse, would be nobler than the sensitive soul, which is absurd. The consequence is clear, for its function is nobler, since the function of the vegetative soul is to act substantially in nutrition and generation, whereas the function of the sensitive soul is just to receive sensible species from outside in sensation, which is only some accident. However, acting is nobler than suffering, and to produce a nobler effect is nobler than to produce a less noble one, if we are talking about diverse agents.

18. Again, there is a more difficult argument. For these people claim that, with regard to the sensitive soul, a horse and a dog are of the same substantial nature, however, they differ with regard to their specific substantial natures, that is to say, they differ by the diverse specific substantial forms added to the sensitive soul or to their sensitive souls. I ask, therefore, whether that specific substantial form that is in the horse besides its sensitive and vegetative soul is a soul or some other form. And both answers will be unacceptable. First, it will be unacceptable that this form is not a soul, for then it is less noble than a soul. And this is unacceptable, for the specific form, according to these people, is related to the generic form as some act and substantial perfection is related to potency, and as the generic form is related to matter. But a substantial perfection has to be nobler than a perfectible potency, just as the generic form...
is claimed to be nobler than matter itself, insofar as it is less noble than the soul. This is clear, because everybody claims that the soul is nobler than any other natural form. Again, whether this specific form is a soul or not, it is either cognitive or non-cognitive. If that specific form non-cognitive, then it will be less noble than the sensitive soul, because every cognitive form seems to be nobler than a non-cognitive one. And this is unacceptable in accordance with what has been said, namely that the specific form, according to this opinion, would be less noble than the generic form. If that specific form is cognitive, than it is either sensitive or intellective, since every cognition is either sensation or intellection. And there is no intellective soul in a horse; therefore, it would be sensitive, and not distinct from the sensitive soul. And likewise, since a pear tree and an apple tree do not differ with regard to their substantial nature by their vegetative soul, but by their other specific forms, it is asked whether these specific forms would be souls or not, and an unacceptable conclusion would follow, just as before.

19. Again, these people claim that the vegetative soul is of the same nature in man, horse, fish and worms; but this is very implausible, because then it would have to nourish in the same way and produce the same sort of flesh and form similar members, which is clearly false. And the consequence is clear, for if we were to posit souls other than the vegetative soul, then among those souls none would work for nutrition, growth and generation and consequently for the generation of flesh and bones and the formation of members, except the vegetative soul through its own powers. But it is supposed to be of the same essence and of a similar nature in all these animals; and it would also have to have similar powers and similar activities in them. However, if someone wanted to say that the vegetative soul is not of the same essence and of a similar nature in the above-mentioned animals, then these animals would differ from each other in species with regard to their substantial essences by their vegetative souls, and would not only differ in this way from inanimate things. And so, there would not have to be a substantial form other than the vegetative soul in any animals or plants because of their specific differences.

20. Again, one would not posit in a horse a sensitive soul distinct from the
vegetative soul, except because of the diversity of activities. However, this would not be a sufficient reason for the diversity of substantial forms in the same suppositum, for the same intellective soul has several diverse activities, such as thinking and willing, as well as apprehending, affirming and denying,\textsuperscript{5} indeed, even moving the body and bodily powers. And there is no vegetative soul — even in a plant, no matter how imperfect — that would not have different activities, such as absorbing nutrients through the roots, digesting them, nourishing, growing, producing leaves and bearing fruits, or reproducing. Indeed, even the form of an element, such as water, by heaviness moves itself downwards, by cold it cools, and by its humidity humidifies. And if it is heated up, then after the removal of the heat source, it would cool down by itself.

21. Now we may respond to the objections. To the first we reply that we can argue for the specific diversity of substantial forms in the case of material substances only from the diversity of their activities. This is conceded. However, not any specific diversity of activities is a reason for the diversity of substantial forms. For this diversity of activities is not a sufficient reason for the diversity of substantial forms in the same suppositum, because a form of superior perfection and greater actuality is capable of more and nobler activities, and potentially contains inferior forms, just as a mixed body contains and retains from the elements some powers and activities, which are similar to their own activities, according to which a mixed body moves in accordance with the element predominant in it, although the substantial forms of the elements do not

\textsuperscript{5}In medieval logic, the Latin phrase \emph{componere et dividere} is the technical expression indicating the intellectual combination of concepts in a judgment affirmatively (composing, \emph{i.e.} putting together the concepts of subject and predicate) or negatively (dividing, \emph{i.e.} separating in a negative judgment the concepts of subject and predicate). Buridan’s own technical phrase for conceptual combination in general is \emph{complexio}, concerning which he also uses the traditional distinction between \emph{complexio distans} (the combination of concepts by means of a copula in a judgment, such as ‘A man is wise’) and \emph{complexio indistans} (the combination of concepts without a copula, resulting in a complex term, as in ‘a wise man’). \textit{Cfr. Summ. de dial.} 4.6.6 (302) and 8.3.2 (669).
remain in the mixed body in actuality, as I assume. And this is what Aristotle means by saying in the second book of this work that the case is similar with souls as with figures. For in the posterior one there is always in the prior potentiality, as in the quadrangle the triangle, and in the sensitive soul the vegetative soul. However, if two diverse, perfect and naturally non-defective supposita are such that one of them is naturally (and not through acquisition) capable of some activity of which (or a similar one) the other is not capable, then these supposita are judged to have specifically diverse substantial forms. And this is obviously judged in the case of living things from the different configuration of their bodies and members, as for example a horse naturally has legs for walking and a fish does not. And this is even more obviously concluded from reproduction, as for example, the seed of a horse or wheat never generates a dog or barley. For this reason it is clear that the first and second objections do not prove their conclusion of necessity.

22. To the third objection we reply that Brunellus, by his very essence and nature, is Brunellus, and a horse, and an animal, and alive, and a body. And when it is said that to be sensitive inheres in Brunellus insofar as he is an animal, but not insofar as he is alive, we understand by this claim that the predication ‘An animal is sensitive’ is true per se and primarily, but the predication ‘A living thing is sensitive’ is not. Thus, by ‘a thing is something on account of what it is’ one should understand a predication of convertible terms, or a predication that is primary, or immediate, or something of this sort, understanding it in one of the several ways in which a reduplicative phrase is expounded. Thus, this phrase did not indicate real inherence.

23. To the other one may reply that the forms of elements are primary and of the lowest perfection among substantial forms, and they do not include

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6The idea expressed here is that mixed bodies in which, say, the heavy element of earth is predominant, as in a rock, would fall, whereas those in which the light element of fire is predominant, as in hot vapors or smoke, would naturally rise, despite the fact that these mixed bodies do not contain these elements in actuality, only “virtually,” insofar as they have qualities that result from the combinations of the powers (virtus) of the elements from which they came to be. For more discussion, see Buridanus, QQ. De gen. et corr. 1.22.
somehow virtually the qualities and powers of prior bodies. Therefore, it is reasonable that they do not have a diversity of operations, at least in the same genus of motion. But this is not reasonable with regard to more perfect, superior forms. And we should consider this objection in more detail in connection with On the Heavens I.7

24. To the last objection one should reply that the sensitive power is the sensitive soul and the vegetative power is the vegetative soul. Thus, I say that in the same [suppositum] the same soul is the sensitive power and the vegetative power, but it is named by these different names, because in terms of these names it is understood to be the principle of these different activities, as will be explained in more detail later.

7Buridanus, QQ. De caelo I.6.
1. **[2.1]** And it is argued first that it is, by the definition of soul given in *On the Soul* II, which Aristotle says is “most general.” Consequently, it is proper to the intellective soul, for he says there that the soul is “the act of the body,” etc. But act and form are the same. Therefore, etc.

2. **[2.2]** Again, the human intellect is a substance, and every substance is matter, or form, or a composite of matter and form, as is held in *On the Soul* II and *Metaphysics* VII. And the intellect is neither matter nor a composite. Therefore, it is a form, and it is not the form of anything else but the human body. Therefore, etc.

3. **[2.3]** Again, the specific differences of species from the category of substance must not be taken from accidents or extrinsic considerations, but from the substance of the thing; and not from the matter, since it has the same nature in all generable and corruptible things. Therefore, the specific difference of man, *viz.* rational, is taken from the substantial form, *viz.* from the intellect, whose activity is to reason. Therefore, the intellect is the substantial form of man.

4. **[2.4]** Again, if the intellect does not come from the nature and substance of man, since it does not come from his matter, it must be his substantial form. But it is argued that it does come from the nature and substance of man: first, because otherwise, human happiness would not consist in its activity, the opposite of which Aristotle states in *Nicomachean Ethics* I and X; second, because otherwise, man himself would not be said to be the intellect, and to the highest degree, which is the opposite of Aristotle’s intention in *Nicomachean Ethics* VI and IX; third, because man would not be said to understand by virtue of the fact that the intellect understands, and yet he is not said to understand in any other way; fourth, because otherwise, man would not exist in his substance, but only as a brute animal, since he would not have an intellective soul from his substance, but only a sensitive soul. And in that case, he would not be obliged to love intellect more than sense, which is contrary to Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics*. 

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Ethics IX. The consequence is obvious because it is evident that after God, at least, man is obliged to love nothing but himself.

5. [3.1] The opposite is argued by Aristotle, when he says in *On the Soul II* that nothing prevents a certain part of the soul from being separated, since it is the act of no body. And he is speaking here of the intellect. Therefore, the intellect is not the act or form of the human body.

6. [3.2] Again, it would follow that man is everlasting, which is false, since he dies. The consequence is obvious, because a thing is seen to be everlasting whose substantial form is everlasting, which indicates that it is something in actuality. And yet Aristotle posits that the intellect is everlasting, for as he says, it is separated from other things, “as what is everlasting from what is corruptible.”

7. [3.3] Again, the form of the human body is not an admixture, *i.e.* it has not been mixed with matter and compounds of corporeal qualities, although the human body is material and complex. And yet Aristotle says the intellect itself must be “unmixed,” because “it understands all things.” When explaining this, the Commentator expressly says that it is necessary that it “be neither a body nor a power in a body,” etc.

8. [4.0] This question has been raised to distinguish opinions about the intellect in order to see where they agree and disagree, after which we will inquire into their differences.

9. [4.0] I say, then, that there have been three renowned opinions about this intellect.

10. [4.1] The first was Alexander’s, when he says that the human intellect is a generable and corruptible material form, derived from a material potentiality and materially extended, just like the soul of a cow or dog, and that it does not remain after death.

11. [4.2] Another was the opinion of Averroes, when he says that the human intellect is an immaterial, ungenerated, and incorruptible form, and that it is not derived from a material potentiality, extended, or, indeed, multiplied by the number of men; but rather, there is a unique intellect for all men, *viz.* an intellect by which I understand, you understand, and so for everyone else. Thus,
it is not a form inhering in a body. That is why he imagines that just as God is present and immediate to the whole world and to each and every part of it without inhering in the world or any part of it, so the intellect is related to men, viz. such that it does not inhere in any of them, but it is immediately present to each of them, despite being indivisible.

12. [4.3] The third opinion is the truth of our catholic faith, to which we must firmly adhere, viz. that the human intellect is the substantial form of a man inhering in the human body, but not derived from a material potentiality or extended by its extension, and so not naturally generated or corruptible. But it is not everlasting simpliciter because it was created in time. Nevertheless, it is sempiternal hereafter in such a way that it will never be corrupted or annihilated, though God could, by his absolute power, annihilate it.

13. [5.1] However, all these opinions agree in one conclusion concerning which the present question was asked, viz. that the human intellect is the substantial form of the human body. And this seems sufficient to conclude the arguments that were made at the beginning of the question.

14. [5.2] And finally, the faithful and the Commentator are in agreement in regard to a second conclusion, viz. that the human intellect is not a material form in the sense that it is derived from a material potentiality, or materially extended.

15. [5.2.1] Aristotle and the Commentator seem to want to demonstrate this conclusion with many arguments, the first of which is from what was stated in the preceding question, viz. since the human intellect understands all things, it must be unmixed.

16. [5.2.2] The second is that it is everlasting, and no form derived from a material potentiality is everlasting.

17. [5.2.3] The third argument is that if it were material in this way, then in order to exercise its proper operation it would require a certain arrangement of tangible qualities in the matter subject to it or in the organ through which it would exercise its operation, and this is false. Therefore, the consequence

\[1\] Explain tangible qualities...
is obvious, since every form that is material in this way is the form of a simple element, or of a body mixed from elements. If it is the form of a simple element, it is agreed that it determines a certain arrangement of qualities, as fire determines hot and dry, water determines cold and moist, etc. If it is the form of a mixed body, then it would determine for itself a proportion of qualities in keeping with the proportion of elements in the mixture, because it is said in On the Heavens I that a mixture is moved according to the nature of its determining elements.

18. [5.2.3.1] But the falsity of the consequent is proved by Aristotle, first because certainly any compound of this kind of body, or of its organ, whether the body or the organ subject to it, would be more hot than cold, more moist than dry, or conversely. This could not be consistently said, since it understands hot and cold alike, moist and dry alike, and conversely, in every degree.

19. [5.2.3.2] Second, the same falsity of the consequent is proved because every form determining an arrangement of tangible qualities for itself in this way is capable of being affected with a corruptive affection, and Aristotle says that the intellect is unaffected in this way.

20. [5.2.3.3] Third, the same conclusion is further proved because the intellect is not affected in this way in performing its operation, as is sense. For because sense needs a corporeal organ and a certain amount of organic complexity, it is overburdened by what is exceedingly sensible, so that after very loud sounds, we cannot hear soft sounds very well, nor are we able to perceive feeble odors after strong ones. But the intellect is not overburdened in this way, because it does not understand by means of a corporeal organ. That is why, when it has understood something intelligible in the highest degree, such as God or the Intelligences, it does not understand the lowest things less, but even more.

21. [5.2.4] The fourth argument for the main thesis is that if the intellect were derived from a material potentiality and extended, it would be unable to receive anything except singularly and individually, just like sense. Therefore, it could cognize nothing universally.

See III.1 on corruptive affections.
22. [5.2.5] The fifth argument is that it could only receive extended things. Thus, it could not cognize indivisibles such as God and the Intelligences, which is false.

23. [5.2.6] The sixth argument is that a corporeal and extended power can be reflected neither on itself nor on its own operation. Thus, the intellect would not be able to cognize itself or its own activity, just as the sense of sight or hearing does not cognize its own act because it cannot be reflected. For this reason, Aristotle concludes that a common sense must be posited for cognizing the acts of the exterior senses.

24. [6.0] Nevertheless, it must be noted that although the second conclusion is absolutely true and should be firmly held by faith, and although the arguments adduced for it are probable, it is not apparent to me that they are demonstrative, based on evident principles, leaving the catholic faith aside, unless God with a grace that is special and outside the common course of nature were to make it evident to us, just as he could make evident to someone the article of the Trinity or the Incarnation.

25. [7.0] For this reason, I think Alexander replied in the following way to these arguments.

26. [7.1] To the first, he said what was said in the preceding question.

27. [7.2] To the second, he denied that the human intellect is everlasting in the way the divine intellect is.

28. [7.3] To the third, he spoke just as we speak of the common sense or cogitative power, for certainly when it is said what type of compound it would be, one would say that it would be a compound of the organ of common sense or the imagination or the cogitative power, and one would say that the intellect is capable of being affected in the same way, just like the common sense. For this reason, he also said that just as we cannot see or hear well when the organ of sight or hearing has been damaged, so when the organ of common sense or imagination has been damaged, we cannot understand or reason well. But why, then, do we understand the lowest intelligibles better after we understand what is most intelligible? Because we understand those things, *viz.* God and the Intelligences, by reasoning and discursive thought. Things that are understood...
in this way, however, do not overburden our organs as exterior objects can overburden them.

29. [7.4] To the fourth argument, Alexander said that an extended power is indeed carried to its object in a universal way, just like a horse’s appetite. For the thirsty horse desires water, and not determinately this water to the exclusion of that, but indifferently, any water at all. Thus, it drinks whichever it finds first.

30. [7.5] To the fifth, he would say that the intellect understands an indivisible in a privative fashion, as Aristotle observes in *On the Soul* III. And it does this by attaching negation to the concept of a divisible.

31. [7.6] To the last, he would say that the intellect or sense is not strictly speaking reflected, but that it understands discursively, which many say is to understand reflexively, and also that reflection more strictly pertains to bodies than to separate substances.
1. [2.0] It is argued that it is, on the authority of Alexander and the Catholic faith.

2. [3.0] The opposite is argued on the authority of the Commentator. The opinion of the Commentator was that the intellect does not inhere in the body but is present to it, just as Aristotle thought that an intelligence is present to a celestial sphere, or God is present to the world. For an intelligence, though indivisible and non-inherent, is thought to be immediately present to the entire sphere and to each of its parts, just as God is present to the entire world and to each of its parts. In this way, then, the Commentator says that the human intellect, existing indivisibly and uniquely, is immediately present to each man without inhering in any man.

3. [3.1] In this connection, we have the Commentator’s probable arguments. The first is that no form inheres in matter unless it is derived from a material potency. But the human intellect is not derived from a material potency, as the Commentator says. Therefore, etc.

4. [3.2] His second argument is that there is a single intellect belonging to all men, for it is, he says, everlasting, and that which is everlasting is not made many by the number of corruptible things. But what is unique and undivided does not inhere in many things that are separate and distinct in place, like human bodies. Therefore, etc.

5. [3.3] Again, the intellect is thought to be indivisible, and according to the faith as well, because it is not materially extended, since it is not derived from a material potency. For such an indivisible would not inhere in a divisible subject like the human body. Therefore, etc.

6. [3.3.1] This argument can be set out deductively as follows: if an indivisible existing intellect inhere in a divisible body, it must inhere in each part of that body, or else in some parts and not in others. If it is said that it inhere in one part and not in the others, this will seem a fiction, because it could not be consistently attributed to any part and quantity. But if it is said
that it inheres in the entire body, \textit{i.e.} in each part of it, it is obvious this will be in the body as a whole, since it is not divisible.

7. [4.0] And many absurdities seem to follow from this. [4.1] The first absurdity is that the same thing would, considered as a whole, be moved and at rest at the same time; and since resting is not being moved, the same thing would be moved and not moved at the same time, which implies a contradiction. The consequence is clear: suppose your foot is at rest and your hand is moved. Then the same thing which, considered as a whole, is in your hand, is moved with the motion of your hand; otherwise, it would not be continuous with your hand and in your hand. And so as well, what is continuous in your foot is at rest with your foot, for it remains continuously in the same place, \textit{viz.} in your foot. Therefore, your intellect, the same indivisibly existing thing, would be moved and at rest at the same time, because it would be moved in your hand and at rest in your foot.

8. [4.2] But it gets worse, because it would follow that the same thing would, considered as a whole, be moved by contrary motions simultaneously if you moved your one hand to the right and your other to the left, or one higher and the other lower. A further absurdity is that it would follow that the same thing is separate from itself, which is impossible. The consequence is obvious, since the hand is separate from the foot; thus, what is in the hand as a whole is separate from what is in the foot as a whole.

9. [4.3] Third, it would follow that your foot would understand because the intellect considered as a whole would be present in it, and consequently, so would the act of thinking.

10. [4.4] Fourth, it would follow that your foot is a man, because even though a substantial form gives us something actual, there must be a composite of body and entire human substantial form for there to be an actual man. And your foot would be this kind of thing, since the intellect is the substantial form of the entire man.

11. [4.5] Fifth, it would follow that a substantial form would travel from subject to subject, which seems absurd. The consequence is obvious, because through change, some parts of the body leave and others arrive, and so the
same intellect that was previously in the parts that have left would later on be in those that are arriving.

12. [5.0] Nevertheless, this opinion is false.

13. [5.1] Accordingly, I propose the opposite conclusion, viz. that your intellect, by which you understand, inheres in your body without your matter. For in the first place, this conclusion must be firmly held on the basis of the Catholic faith. Second, it must be held by natural arguments, leaving the Catholic faith aside, as a pagan philosopher would hold it. My proof is that I think a pagan would hold the opinion of Alexander, about whom something will be said later.

14. [6.0] There are, however, some natural arguments that the soul inheres in the human body.

15. [6.1] The first is that otherwise, it would not belong to the essence of man, or a man would not be something one per se. Both seem absurd. Hence, it was sufficiently argued in the preceding question that the intellect must belong to the substance of a man, and belong intrinsically.

16. [6.2] The second argument is that one would assume either that there is a unique intellect for all men, or that there are many, in keeping with the number of men. But it is apparent that both of these are absurd. For first, it is absurd that the intellect is assumed to be unique, as will be seen later. But I also state that if it is not inherent, it must not be assumed that there is one for you and another for me, because let us suppose that A is your intellect and B is mine; then they must have the same nature and also not be moveable relative to your movement or mine, because they do not inhere in us. Thus, intellect A would not be closer or more proximate to you than intellect B, nor even to me, nor conversely, viz. before either of us understood. Therefore, natural reason does not dictate that A is any more your intellect than mine.

17. [6.3] The third argument is close to the preceding, viz. that Socrates’ intellect is either moved from place to place with Socrates, or not. If you say that it is, this does not seem like a natural thing to say, since it does not inhere in him. For no means could be given by which this would happen, whether by touch or impulse, for it could not be said what sort of connection the intellect
has to Socrates’ body on the basis of which it is moved with Socrates’ body. This, however, could not be said, especially not before Socrates cognizes something. On the other hand, if you were to say truly that it is not moved from place to place with Socrates, then he would be separate from his intellect, and so he could not understand through himself, unless you were to say that this intellect is everywhere by immediacy, as we would say of God. In that case, only one intellect would need to be posited, since it would be just as close to me as to you, especially before either of us was cognizing. Therefore, I could understand through it just like you, and so it would be a fiction to posit one for you and another for me. That is why the Commentator believed it to be unique, a view that will later be disproved.

18. [6.4] The fourth argument is that human reason, leaving faith aside or even including the faith, does not dictate that your intellect exists before you do, unless it is thought to be everlasting and unique, as the Commentator wished. But if it was made in time, this would be either by creation, which natural reason, leaving the faith aside, would not dictate, or by natural generation, in which case it would be derived from a material potency and inherent. For everyone must assent to this conclusion, as long as man lives in this age, and whether a member of the faithful or not. For this reason, it must be noted, as it seems to me, leaving faith and supernatural action aside, that natural reason dictates that these, or their opposites, obtain in a form: *viz.* inhering in matter, being derived from a material potency, being materially extended, being made many (and not unique, undivided by bodies that are separate and spatially distinct), being generated, and being corruptible. Alexander assumed all of these, then, in connection with the human intellect, and Averroes denies all of them together. But we assume by faith that they do not necessarily follow upon one another, namely we posit the inherence and multiplication, and we deny the derivation from material potency and the extension. And we assume that it was made in a supernatural way, *viz.* by creation and not by natural generation. Nor is it strictly corruptible, *viz.* by natural means, but it is capable of being annihilated, and yet it will never be annihilated.

19. [7.0] To the Commentator’s arguments, however, the faith would re-
spond in one way, and Alexander in another.

20. [7.1] To the first (3.1), the faith would deny the major and Alexander the minor.

21. [7.2] As for the second argument (3.2), the faith and Alexander both would deny that there is a unique intellect belonging to all human beings, and something will be said about this later on.

22. [7.3] To the third argument (3.3), Alexander would deny that the intellect is indivisible, and so the absurdities raised against its being indivisible would not be against him. But the faith grants that it is indivisible.

23. [8.1] And so to the first counter-instance (4.1), it is replied that the intellect is not moved and at rest at the same time because a contradiction would follow, as was argued above. But it is granted that the intellect is moved in the hand and at rest in the foot at the same time; indeed, it is simultaneously moved in the hand and not moved in the foot, and this is not a contradiction. For this reason, ‘it is at rest in the foot; therefore, it is at rest’ does not follow, since ‘it is not moved in the foot; therefore, it is not moved’ likewise does not follow. But when it is said that it is moved by contrary motions, we can speak just as we speak of the body of Christ in the consecrated host, when one priest carries the body of Christ to the right and another to the left. For the body of Christ is not moved per se by contrary motions, just as there is no absurdity when something is denominated as being moved by contrary motions, because it would not follow from this that contraries are in the same thing at the same time, just as it is not absurd for the same thing to be in places that are different or separate from each other, as will be discussed in the solution to the next argument. So it is not absurd for the same thing to be moved to those places at the same time, since the motions do not inhere in it, nor are they commensurably related to it.

24. [8.2] To the second counter-instance (4.2), it is said that the intellect is not separate from itself because it is not in the hand or foot commensurably, since it is not extended by the extension of the hand or foot. And it is not absurd for the same thing to be wholly and non-commensurably and in different places separate from each other, although this would be in a supernatural way, as the
body of Christ is simultaneously in paradise and on the altar. For the body of Christ in the host on the altar is not commensurate with the magnitude of the host, but it is whole in each part of the host; although the parts are separate from each other, it is not on that account separate from itself. And so in the same way, the intellect is somehow in the hand and foot, and in neither commensurably, since it is not extended in any of those members.

25. [8.3] To the third counter-instance (4.3), it would not be thought absurd that your foot understands as a partial understanding, not as a whole. But, you ask, what is a partial understanding? I say that a ‘partial understanding’ is that which is part of another understanding, and a ‘whole understanding’ that which understands, when it is not part of another understanding. For this reason, neither the intellect nor some part of a man is a whole understanding, but only the man himself.

26. [8.4] To the fourth counter-instance (4.4), it would be said that nothing is said to be a man or an animal in familiar and ordinary speech except the whole substance, *viz.* that which is not part of another substance. Nor is any other substance properly said to be a *this* something, whether on the basis of a substantial form or in another way, especially in organic things, except for the entire substance. And this should really be explored elsewhere.

27. [8.5] To the final counter-instance (4.5), it would be said that the way in which the intellect inheres in the human body is not natural but supernatural. And it is certain that supernaturally, God could not only form what is not derived from a material potency, but also separate what has been derived from its matter, conserve it separately, and place it in another matter. Why, then, would this not be possible as regards the human intellect?