Thomas Aquinas
The Treatise on Human Nature
Summa Theologiae 1a 75–89

Translated, with Introduction
and Commentary, by
Robert Pasnau

Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
Indianapolis/Cambridge
be only in that part of the body that is proportioned to the operation of such a capacity.

Ad 5. One part of the body is said to be more prominent than another on account of the different capacities for which the body’s parts serve as organs. For a part of the body is more prominent when it is the organ of a more prominent capacity, or else when it serves the same capacity in a more prominent way.

**Question 77**

**The Capacities of the Soul in General**

We should next consider the characteristics of the soul’s capacities: first in general [Q77] and then specifically [QQ78–83]. With regard to the first there are eight questions.

a1. Is the soul’s essence its capacity?
a2. Does the soul have only one capacity, or more than one?
a3. How are the soul’s capacities distinguished?
a4. On the order of these capacities to one another.
a5. Is the soul the subject of all its capacities?
a6. Do the soul’s capacities flow from its essence?
a7. Does one capacity originate in another?
a8. Do all the soul’s capacities remain in it after death?

**Article 1. Is the soul’s essence its capacity?**

It seems that the very essence of the soul is its capacity:

1. Augustine says in *De trinitate* IX [iv.5] that mind, knowledge, and love exist “substantially in the soul—or, to say the same thing, essentially.” And in Book X [xi.18] he says that memory, intelligence, and will are “one life, one mind, one essence.”

2. The soul is loftier than prime matter. But prime matter is its own capacity. Therefore so, *a fortiori*, is the soul.

3. A substantial form is simpler than an accidental form. An indication of this is that a substantial form is neither intensified nor diminished, but lies in something indivisible. In an accidental form, however, is its

---

1ST 1a 54.3, 79.1; QDSC 11; QQ 10.3.1; QDA 12; I Sent. 3.4.2.

2Aristotle, *Categories* 5, 3b32–4a9; see 76.4 ad 4, 114–15.
own power. Therefore so, *a fortiori*, is a substantial form, which the soul is.

4. The sensory capacity is that by which we sense, and the intellective capacity is that by which we think. But according to the Philosopher in *De anima* II [414a12–13], that by which we first sense and think is the soul. Therefore the soul is its capacities.

5. Everything that is not part of the essence of a thing is an accident. Therefore, if a capacity of the soul is outside of the soul's essence, it follows that it is an accident. This contradicts Augustine in *De trinitate* IX [iv.5], where he says that mind, knowledge, and love "are not in the soul as if in a subject, as color or shape are in a body, or as any other quality or quantity is. For whatever such a thing is, it does not go beyond the subject in which it exists, whereas the mind can also love and cognize things other than itself."

6. A simple form cannot be a subject. The soul, however, is a simple form, since it is not composed of matter and form, as was said above [75.5]. Therefore a capacity of the soul cannot exist in the soul as its subject.

7. An accident is not the basis for a substantial *differentia*. But sensory and rational are substantial *differentiae*, and they are taken from sense and reason, which are capacities of the soul. Therefore the capacities of the soul are not accidents, and so it seems that the essence of the soul is its capacity.*

On the contrary. Dionysius says in *Celestial Hierarchy* 11.2 that the celestial spirits are divided into essence, power, and operation. So *a fortiori*, in the soul, its essence is one thing and its power or capacity is another.

Reply. It is impossible to say that the soul’s essence is its capacity, although some have made this claim.° For now, this is shown in two ways. First, since being and every genus of being divides into potentiality and actuality, four potentiality and actuality must be attributed to the same genus. Consequently, if an actuality is not in the genus of substance, then the potentiality correlated with that actuality cannot be in the genus of substance. But the soul’s operation is not in the genus of

---

3Boethius, *De trinitate* ch. 2: "A form that is without matter could not have been a subject."

4Aristotle, *Met.* IX 1, 1045b32–36; XII 5 1071a4–16.
substance. The only exception is God, whose operation is his substance; so God's power, which is the basis of his operation, is God's very essence. This cannot be true in the soul's case, or in the case of any creature, as was said earlier, too, with regard to angels [Q54].

Second, there is a further way in which this appears impossible in the soul's case. For the soul, in terms of its essence, is an actuality. Therefore if the very essence of the soul were the immediate basis of its operation, then anything that has a soul would always actually have the operations associated with life—just as anything that has a soul is always actually living. For the soul, insofar as it is a form, is not an actuality directed at some further actuality, but is the ultimate aim of generation. Consequently, its having the capacity for yet another actuality holds not with respect to its essence (insofar as it is a form), but with respect to its capacity. And it is in this way—insofar as it underlies its own capacity—that the soul is said to be a first actuality, directed at a second actuality. One finds, however, that what has a soul is not always in actuality as regards the operations associated with life. For this reason, Aristotle also says in his definition of the soul that it is "the actuality of a body capable of having life"—a capacity that "does not rule out soul." We can conclude, then, that the soul's essence is not its capacity. For nothing has a capacity in virtue of its actuality, when considered as an actuality.

Ad 1. Augustine is speaking of the mind inasmuch as it knows itself and loves itself. In such a case, then, knowledge and love, when related to the mind as to that which is cognized and loved, exist in the soul "substantially" or "essentially," because the very substance or essence of the soul is cognized and loved.

The remark he makes elsewhere, that [memory, intelligence, and will] are "one life, one mind, one essence," should be understood in the same way. Alternatively, as some say, this claim is true in terms of how a whole capacity is predicated of its parts. Such a capacity-whole falls in between a universal-whole and an integral-whole. For a universal-whole applies to each part in virtue of its whole essence and power (as animal applies to a human being and a horse), and so it is predicated strictly of

5la 14.4.

6Aristotle, Met. V 4, 1015a10–11; VIII 4, 1044b1; Phys. II 7, 198a25–27; II 8, 199a31.

7Aristotle, De an. II 1, 412a27, b5.

8De an. II 1, 412a20–21, a27–28, b25–26.

9Albert the Great, Sentences I.3.34 (vol. 25, p. 140).
its individual parts. An integral-whole, in contrast, is not in each part: neither in virtue of its whole essence, nor in virtue of its whole power. Consequently, it is not in any way predicated of its individual parts. But it is in a certain way predicated of them all at once, although not strictly. (This would be as if we were to say that the walls, roof, and foundation are the house.) A capacity-whole, finally, applies to the individual parts in virtue of its whole essence, but not in virtue of its whole power. And so in a certain way it can be predicated of each part, but not as strictly as a universal-whole can. And this is how Augustine says that memory, intelligence, and will are the soul's "one essence."

Ad 2. The actuality for which prime matter is in potentiality is a substantial form. That is why the potentiality of matter is nothing other than its essence.

Ad 3. An action belongs to the composite, just as existence does, because acting belongs to that which exists. But the composite exists as a substance through its substantial form, whereas it operates through the power that results from the substantial form. As a result, an accidental active form is related to the substantial form of the thing acting (e.g., heat to the form of fire) in the same way that a capacity of the soul is related to the soul.

Ad 4. It is because of the substantial form that an accidental form is the basis of an action. As a result, the substantial form is the first basis of the action, but not the proximate basis. It is in accord with this that the Philosopher says, that by which we think and sense is the soul.

Ad 5. If accident is taken as divided against substance, then nothing can fall midway between substance and accident, because they are divided by affirmation and negation: namely, by being in a subject and not being in a subject. If accident is taken in this way, then since a capacity of the soul is not its essence, it must be an accident, and be in the second species of quality. On the other hand, if accident is taken as one of the five universals, then something does fall midway between substance and accident. For the substance encompasses whatever is essential to the thing; yet not everything outside the essence can in this way be called an accident, but only that which is not caused by the essential principles of the species. For a proprium is not part of the essence of a thing, but it is caused by the essential principles of the species. As a result, it falls midway between essence and accident, when they are so described. And in this way the soul's capacities can be said to fall midway between substance and accident, given that they are the soul's proper natural attributes.
Augustine's claim, however, that knowledge and love are not in the soul as accidents in a subject, is to be understood in the way described earlier [ad I]. He is comparing them to the soul not as to that which is loving and cognizing, but as to that which is loved and cognized. And in this way the argument holds. For if love were to be in the soul loved as its subject, then it would follow that an accident would transcend its subject. For the soul also loves things other than itself.

Ad 6. The soul, although it is not composed of matter and form, nevertheless contains some potentiality (as was said above [75.5 ad 4]), and consequently it can be the subject of an accident. The claim introduced does apply to God, however, who is pure actuality, and Boethius introduces the claim in that context.

Ad 7. Rational and sensible, considered as differentiae, are not taken from the capacities of sense and reason, but from the sensory and rational soul itself. Nevertheless, because substantial forms, which considered by themselves are unknown to us, become known through their accidents, nothing stands in the way of accidents at times being put in place of substantial differentiae.

Article 2. Does the soul have only one capacity, or more than one?

It seems that the soul does not have more than one capacity:

1. The intellective soul comes closest to a likeness of the divine. But in God there is one simple capacity. Therefore in the intellective soul, too.

2. The more superior a power is, the more it becomes one. But the intellective soul exceeds all other forms in power. Therefore it, above all, ought to have one power or capacity.

3. Operations belong to what actually exists. But, as was established above [76.6 ad 1], a human being has existence at different levels of perfection through the same essence of the soul. Therefore a human being operates in various ways, at various levels, through the same capacity of the soul.

On the contrary. In De anima II [414a29–32], the Philosopher posits more than one capacity of the soul.

Reply. It is necessary to posit more than one capacity of the soul. To make this clear, consider that, as the Philosopher says in De caelo II [292a22–b17], the lowest members of reality cannot attain perfect goodness, but attain some imperfect goodness through few motions. Things superior to these achieve perfect goodness through many
motions, whereas even more superior things achieve perfect goodness through few motions. The highest perfection is found in things that possess perfect goodness without motion. For example, someone is least disposed for health if he cannot attain perfect health, but attains some degree of health through a few remedies. Someone is better disposed, however, if he can attain perfect health, but through many remedies. Someone is still better disposed if he does so through a few remedies, and someone is disposed best of all if he has perfect health without any remedy.

We should say, then, that things beneath human beings attain some particular goods, and so have a few limited operations and powers. A human being, however, can attain universal and perfect goodness, because he can attain beatitude. But human beings are by nature at the outmost reaches among those to whom beatitude is given. As a result, the human soul needs many different operations and powers. Angels, however, require less variety in their capacities, whereas in God there is no capacity or action beyond his essence.

There is another reason why the human soul is so well supplied in its various powers: namely, because it is at the boundary between spiritual and corporeal creatures, and consequently the powers of both come together in it.

Ad 1. The intellective soul comes closer than lower creatures to a likeness of God, insofar as it can attain perfect goodness. But it does so through many different [powers], and in this respect it falls short of superior creatures.

Ad 2. A power that is one is superior if it reaches an equal number [of objects]. But a diversified power is superior if more [objects] are subject to it.

Ad 3. One thing has just one substantial existence, but can have more than one operation. And so the soul has one essence, but more than one capacity.

**Article 3. How are the soul's capacities distinguished?**

It seems that capacities are not distinguished by their acts and objects:

---

10 la Q54 (angels); la 3.1–2, 25.1 (God).

1177.3 ad 4.

12ST 1a 59.4c; QDA 13; InDA I.8.39–73, II.4.120–29, II.5.43–131, II.6, III.1.267–86; II Sent. 44.2.1; InMet IX.7 §1846.
1. Nothing is assigned its species by something posterior or extrinsic. But an act is posterior to the capacity, and an object is extrinsic. Therefore capacities are not distinguished in species by these.

2. Contraries are things that are maximally different. Therefore, if capacities were distinguished by reference to objects, it would follow that the same capacity would not concern contraries. It is clear that this is false in nearly all cases: for the same visual capacity concerns white and black, and the same taste concerns sweet and bitter.

3. Take away the cause and you take away the effect. Therefore, if the difference in capacities were to come from a difference in objects, then the same object would not belong to distinct capacities. This is clearly false, since a cognitive capacity cognizes the same thing that an appetitive capacity desires.

4. That which is the per se cause of a thing causes it in all cases. But there are distinct objects that belong to distinct capacities and also belong to a single capacity: sound and color, for example, belong to sight and hearing, which are distinct capacities, and yet they also belong to a single capacity, the common sense. Therefore capacities are not distinguished in terms of a difference in objects.

On the contrary, the posterior is distinguished in terms of the prior. But the Philosopher says in De anima II [415a18–20] that “acts and operations are conceptually prior to capacities, and still prior to these are their counterparts,” their objects. Therefore capacities are distinguished in terms of their acts and objects.

Reply. A capacity, considered as a capacity, is directed toward an act. Consequently, one must derive the nature (rationem) of a capacity from the act toward which it is directed, and as a result the nature of the capacity must differ as the nature of the act differs. But the nature of an act differs according to the differing nature of its object. For every action belongs to either an active or a passive capacity. An object is related to the act of a passive capacity as its source and moving cause: so color, inasmuch as it moves sight, is the source of seeing. An object is related to the act of an active capacity as its outcome and end: in this way the object of the power for growth is the full size that is the end of growth. Now an action takes its species from these two things: from its source and from its end or outcome. For heating differs from cooling inasmuch as the former goes from something hot (the active source)

\[1378.4\text{ ad 1–2.} \]
toward something hot, whereas the latter goes from something cold toward something cold. Consequently, it is necessary for capacities to be differentiated in terms of their acts and their objects.

It is important to notice, however, that what is accidental (per accidens) does not make a difference to the species. For the species of an animal is not made to differ by a difference in color, just because the animal accidentally has some color. The species is made to differ, instead, by a difference in what holds of the animal per se: a difference, namely, in sensory soul, which sometimes comes with reason and sometimes without. As a result, rational and nonrational are the distinguishing differentiae of an animal, and they form distinct species. It follows, therefore, that not every distinction among objects differentiates the soul's capacities. The difference that matters is in that which the capacity is concerned with per se. Sense, for example, is concerned per se with affective quality, which is divided per se into color, sound, and the like. And thus one sensory capacity, sight, has to do with color, whereas another, hearing, has to do with sound. But it is accidental to an affective quality (to something colored, for instance) that it is musical or grammatical, large or small, a human being or a stone. And so the soul's capacities are not distinguished by reference to those sorts of differences.

Ad 1. An act, although posterior to the capacity in existence, is nevertheless prior in plan (intentione) and conceptually—just as an end is, for an agent. And an object, although extrinsic, is nevertheless the source or end of the action. To this source and end, the intrinsic features of a thing are proportioned.

Ad 2. If some capacity were to be concerned per se with one of two contraries as its object, then the other contrary would have to belong to a different capacity. But a capacity of the soul is concerned per se not with the distinctive character (rationem) of one contrary, but with a characteristic that is common to both contraries. Thus sight is concerned per se not with the character of white, but with the character of color. And the reason for this is that one contrary has in a certain way the character that the other has, since their relationship to one another is that of the complete to the incomplete.

Ad 3. Nothing prevents that which is the same in subject from being distinct in character. Consequently, [the same object] can belong to distinct capacities of the soul.

1480.1 ad 2.
Ad 4. Compared to a lower capacity, a higher capacity is concerned per se with a characteristic of its object that is more universal. For the higher a capacity is, the more things it extends itself toward. As a result, many share in the one characteristic of an object that the higher capacity is concerned with per se. They differ, however, relative to the characteristics that the lower capacities are concerned with per se. This is why different objects belong to different lower capacities and yet fall within the scope of a single higher capacity.

Article 4. The order of the soul’s capacities to one another. It seems that there is no order among the soul’s capacities:

1. There is no prior and posterior among things that fall within a single division; instead, they naturally occur together. But the soul’s capacities are divided against one another. Therefore there is no order between them.

2. The soul’s capacities are related to their objects, and also to the soul itself. But there is no order between them as regards the soul, because the soul is just one thing. Nor, likewise, is there an order as regards their objects, because these are distinct and entirely dissimilar, as is clear in the case of color and sound. Therefore there is no order among the soul’s capacities.

3. One finds among ordered capacities that the operation of one depends on the operation of another. But the act of one capacity of the soul does not depend on the act of another: sight, after all, can perform its act without hearing, and vice versa. Therefore there is no order between the soul’s capacities.

On the contrary. In De anima II [414b20–31], the Philosopher compares the parts or capacities of the soul to shapes. But shapes have an order to one another. Therefore so do the soul’s capacities.

Reply. Since the soul is one, its capacities several, and many things come from one in an ordered sequence, there is necessarily an order between the soul’s capacities. There are, however, three sorts of order that we can identify among them. Two of these are characterized in terms of the dependence of one capacity on another, whereas the third is drawn from the order among objects.

The dependence of one capacity on another can be understood in two ways. First, in terms of the order of nature, inasmuch as the perfect

15QDA 13 ad 10.
are prior by nature to the imperfect. Second, in terms of the order of generation and time, inasmuch as things go from being imperfect to being perfect. With respect to the first ordering of capacities, then, the intellective capacities are prior to the sensory; as a result, they direct and command them.\textsuperscript{16} Likewise, the sensory capacities are prior, in terms of this ordering, to the capacities of the nutritive soul. As regards the second ordering, however, the situation is reversed. For the capacities of the nutritive soul are prior, in the process of generation, to the capacities of the sensory soul; as a result they prepare the body for sensory activities. The same is true for the sensory capacities, with respect to intellective ones.\textsuperscript{17}

As regards the third ordering, some of the sensory powers are ordered to one another—namely, sight, hearing, and smell. For the visible is prior by nature, since it is common to higher and lower bodies. Sound, in contrast, becomes audible in the air, and air is prior by nature to a mixture of the elements, from which odor results.\textsuperscript{5}

\textbf{Ad 1.} The species of any genus are related to one another in terms of prior and posterior (just as numbers and shapes are) with respect to their being. But they are said to occur together inasmuch as a common genus is predicated of them.

\textbf{Ad 2.} This order among the soul's capacities holds both as regards the soul (which, even though it is one in terms of its essence, has a disposition for various acts, in a certain order) and as regards objects. It also holds as regards acts, as has been said [c\textsuperscript{30–33}].

\textbf{Ad 3.} That argument holds for those capacities in which only the third sort of order is present. Capacities that are ordered in the other two ways are related so that the act of one depends on the other.

\textbf{Article 5. Is the soul the subject of all its capacities?}\textsuperscript{18}

It seems that all the capacities of the soul exist in the soul as their subject:

\textbf{I.} The capacities of the soul are related to the soul in just the way that the capacities of the body are related to the body. But the body is the subject of its bodily capacities. Therefore the soul is the subject of its capacities.

\textsuperscript{16}la2ae Q17.

\textsuperscript{17}76.3 ad 3.

\textsuperscript{18}QDSC 4 ad 3; CT 89.
2. The operations of the soul's capacities are attributed to the body on account of the soul. For, as is said in *De anima* II [414a12–13], "the soul is that by which we first sense and think." But the proper bases of the soul's operations are its capacities. Therefore these capacities are already in the soul.

3. Augustine says in *De Genesi ad litteram* XII [vii.24] that the soul senses some things not through the body, but without the body (such as fear and the like) whereas it senses other things through the body. But if the sensory capacity were not in the soul alone as its subject, then it could not sense anything without the body. Therefore the soul is the subject of the sensory capacity and, by the same reasoning, of all the other capacities.

**On the contrary.** The Philosopher says in *On Sleep* [454a7] that "sensing is proper neither to the soul nor to the body," but to the compound. Therefore the sensory capacity exists in the compound as its subject. Therefore it is not the soul alone that is the subject of all its capacities.

**Reply.** The subject of an operative capacity is that which is capable of operating, because every accident refers back to its proper subject. But that which is capable of operating is the same as that which operates. Consequently, a capacity must belong to that, as its subject, to which its operation belongs—as the Philosopher also says, at the start of *On Sleep* [454a8–11].

But it is clear from things said above [75.2] that the soul has some operations that are carried out without a bodily organ: in particular, the operations of intellect and will. Consequently, the capacities that are the bases of these operations are in the soul as their subject. But the soul has other operations that are carried out through bodily organs, such as seeing (through the eye) and hearing (through the ear). And the same is true for all the other operations that belong to the nutritive and sensory parts. As a result, the capacities that are the bases of these operations are in the compound as their subject, not in the soul alone.

**Ad 1.** All the capacities are said to belong to the soul, not as their subject but as their source. For it is through the soul that the compound is capable of carrying out such operations.

**Ad 2.** All capacities of this sort, before existing in the compound, exist in the soul—not as their subject but as their source.

---

1977.6.
Ad 3. Plato's view was that sensing is the proper operation of the soul alone, just as thought is. Augustine makes use of Plato's views in many philosophical matters: not asserting them, but merely reporting. Still, as far as we are now concerned, this claim that the soul senses some things with the body and some things without the body can be understood in two ways. First, that the words 'with the body' or 'without the body' apply to the act of sensing insofar as it proceeds from the one sensing. And in this way one senses nothing without the body, because the action of sensing can come from the soul only through a bodily organ. Second, the claim can be understood so that the above words apply to the act of sensing with respect to the object that is sensed. And in this way one does sense some things with the body (i.e., things existing in the body, as when one senses a wound or something of that sort) and some things without the body (i.e., things that do not exist in the body but only in the soul's apprehension, as when one senses one's sadness or joy about something heard).

Article 6. Do the soul's capacities flow from its essence? It seems that the soul's capacities do not flow from its essence:  
1. Diverse things do not come from one simple thing. But the soul's essence is one and simple. Therefore, since the soul's capacities are many and diverse, they cannot come from its essence.  
2. That from which something comes is the cause of it. But the soul's essence cannot be called the cause of its capacities, as is clear when one runs through each kind of cause. Therefore the soul's capacities do not flow from its essence.  
3. ‘Emanation' refers to a kind of motion. But nothing is moved by itself, as is proved in Physics VII [241b24–242a14], unless perhaps by one of its parts. (An animal is said to be moved by itself in that way, because one part of it is the mover, the other part moved.) Nor is the soul even moved, as is proved in De anima I [408a34–b31]. Therefore the soul does not cause within itself its own capacities.  
On the contrary, the soul's capacities are its proper natural attributes. But a subject is the cause of its proper accidents—hence it is included in the definition of an accident, as is clear in Metaphysics VII [1029b30–

\[2075.3c21–22.\]
\[21\] I Sent. 3.4.2; II Sent. 17.1.2 ad 6.
\[22\] 77.1 ad 5.
1030a16]. Therefore the soul's capacities come from the soul's essence, as their cause.

Reply. Substantial and accidental forms are partly alike, partly different. They are alike in that each is an actuality and in virtue of each, something is somehow in actuality. They differ, however, in two ways.

First, a substantial form brings about being unconditionally, and its subject is only potentially a being. An accidental form, in contrast, does not bring about being unconditionally, but being such, or so much, or in some sort of relationship. For its subject is an actual being. It is clear, then, that actuality is found in a substantial form before it is found in the subject of that form. And since, in any genus, that which is first is the cause, the substantial form is the cause of actual being in its subject. Conversely, actuality is found in the subject of the accidental form before it is found in the accidental form. As a result, the actuality of an accidental form is caused by the actuality of the subject: thus the subject, insofar as it is in potentiality, is capable of receiving the accidental form, while insofar as it is in actuality, it is capable of producing it. (Here I am speaking of a proper and per se accident. With respect to an external accident, the subject is merely capable of receiving; it is the extrinsic agent that is capable of producing such an accident.)

Substantial and accidental forms differ in a second way. Since what has less priority exists for the sake of what has more, matter exists for the sake of the substantial form, whereas conversely an accidental form exists for the sake of completing the subject.

It is clear from what has been said [77.5], however, that the subject of the soul's capacities is either (1) the soul itself alone, which can be the subject of an accident inasmuch as it has some degree of potentiality, as was said above [77.1 ad 6], or (2) the composite. But the composite is actualized by the soul. It is clear, then, that all the soul's capacities, whether their subject is the soul alone or the composite, flow from the essence of the soul as their source. For it was said already [c32-35] that an accident is caused by its subject inasmuch as that subject is in actuality, and is received in it insofar as it is in potentiality.

Ad 1. Many things can come naturally from one simple thing, [both] when there is an order of some kind, and also as the result of variety among the recipients. Therefore, many diverse capacities come from the soul's one essence both as a result of how the capacities are ordered, and also in virtue of the variety of bodily organs.
Ad 2. A subject is both the final and in a way the active cause of its proper accident. It also serves as the material cause, inasmuch as it is capable of receiving the accident. And we can infer from this that the soul's essence is the cause of all its capacities as their end and their active source, and the cause of some of its capacities as their recipient.

Ad 3. The emanation of proper accidents from a subject does not take place through any transformation, but through natural succession. In this way, one thing naturally proceeds from another—color, for example, from light.

**Article 7. Does one capacity of the soul originate in another?**

It seems that one capacity of the soul does not originate in another:

1. Of things that begin to exist at the same time, one does not originate in another. But all the soul's capacities are created at the same time as the soul. Therefore one does not originate in another.

2. A capacity of the soul originates in the soul just as an accident originates in its subject. But one capacity of the soul cannot be the subject of another, because accidents do not have accidents. Therefore one capacity does not originate in another.

3. Opposite does not originate in opposite; rather, everything originates in what is like it in species. But the soul's capacities are divided as opposites, in the way that different species are. Therefore one does not come from another.

On the contrary, capacities are cognized through acts. But the act of one capacity is caused by another: an act of phantasia, for example, by an act of sense. Therefore one capacity of the soul is caused by another.

Reply. In cases where many things come from one in a natural order, just as the first is the cause of them all, so that which is closer to the first is in a way the cause of those that are more distant. But it was shown above [77.4] that the soul's capacities are ordered in various ways. As a result, one capacity of the soul comes from the soul's essence mediated by another.

Now the soul's essence is related to its capacities both as their active and final principle, and as their receptive principle (either separately

---

24 Sent. 3.4.3; II Sent. 24.1.2; QDA 13 ad 7–8.
25 77.3, Q87.
on its own, or else together with the body). But agents and ends are more perfect, whereas a receptive principle, considered as such, is less perfect. It follows, then, that the capacities of the soul that are prior in order of perfection and nature serve as principles for the others by being their end and active principle. For we see that the senses exist for the sake of intellect, not vice versa. Also, the senses have a kind of deficient participation in intellect, and so in terms of their natural origin they in a certain way come from intellect, as the imperfect comes from the perfect.

Conversely, by way of receptive principle, the less perfect capacities are identified as principles with respect to the others. Thus the soul, considered as having the sensory capacity, is viewed as the subject and a kind of material for intellect. And for this reason the less perfect capacities are prior in the process of generation, since the animal is generated prior to the human being.

Ad 1. Just as a capacity of the soul flows from the soul’s essence through a certain natural process rather than through a transformation, and [yet] exists at the same time as the soul, so too for one capacity relative to another.

Ad 2. One accident cannot be the subject of another per se, but one accident is received in a substance prior to another—e.g., quantity prior to quality. In this way, one accident is said to be the subject of another (as a surface is the subject of a color), inasmuch as the substance receives one accident mediated by another. Something similar can be said about the soul’s capacities.

Ad 3. The soul’s capacities are contrasted with one another by the contrast between perfect and imperfect, just as are the species of numbers and shapes. But this contrast does not prevent one from having its origin in another, because the imperfect naturally come from the perfect.

Article 8. Do all the soul’s capacities remain in it after death?

It seems that all the soul’s capacities remain in the soul once it is separated from the body:

26 76.3 ad 3, 77.4c34–38.
27 77.6 ad 3.
28 77.4sc, ad 1.
29 QDA 19; QQ 10.4.2; SCC II.81; QDVCard 4 ad 13; ST 1a2ae 67.1; CT 92; IV Sent. 44.3.3.1–2 (= ST 3a supp. 70.1–2), 50.1.1.
1. It is said in the book *De spiritu et anima* [15] that the soul leaves the body, “taking with it sense and imagination, reason, intellect and intelligence, and also the concupiscible and irascible powers.”

2. The soul’s capacities are its proper natural attributes. But a proprium is always present, and never separated from that of which it is a proprium. Therefore the soul’s capacities are in it after death.

3. The soul’s capacities, even the sensory ones, are not weakened when the body is weakened. For, as is said in *De anima* I [418b20–21], “if an old man were to receive the eye of a young man, he would see the way a young man does.” But weakness is a step on the way toward corruption. Therefore the capacities of the soul are not corrupted when the body is corrupted; instead, they remain in the separated soul.

4. Memory is a capacity of the sensory soul, as the Philosopher proves. But memory remains in the separated soul. For at Luke 16.25 it is said to the rich glutton whose soul is in hell: *remember that you have received good things in your life.* Therefore memory remains in the separated soul, and consequently so do the other capacities of the sensory part.

5. Joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible power, which is a capacity of the sensory part. But it is obvious that separated souls sorrow and rejoice over the rewards and punishments they are given. Therefore the concupiscible power remains in the separated soul.

6. Augustine says in *De Genesi ad litteram* XII [xxxii.60] that just as the soul sees things through an imaginary vision when the body lies “senseless but not completely dead,” so too when it has been entirely separated from the body by death. But the imagination is a capacity of the sensory part. Therefore a capacity of the sensory part remains in the separated soul, and consequently so do all the other capacities.

On the contrary is what is said in *On Church Dogma* [19]: “a human being consists of only two substances: soul, including reason, and flesh, including the senses.” Therefore, once the flesh dies, the sensory capacities do not remain.

Reply. As was said already, all the soul’s capacities are related to the soul alone as their source [77.6], whereas some are related to the soul...
alone as their subject—namely, intellect and will [77.5]. Capacities of the latter sort necessarily remain in the soul after the body is destroyed. But other capacities are in the compound as their subject—as are all the capacities of the sensory and nutritive parts. Now once a subject is destroyed, its accidents cannot remain. Thus, once the compound has been corrupted, such capacities do not actually remain, although they do virtually remain in the soul, as in their source or root. And so it is false to claim, as some do, that such capacities remain in the soul even after the body has been corrupted. And it is even more false to claim that the acts of these capacities also remain in the separated soul. For the action of such capacities occurs only through a corporeal organ.

Ad 1. That book has no authority, and so what was written there can be dismissed as easily as it is stated. Nevertheless, it can be said that the soul takes these capacities with itself virtually, although not actually.

Ad 2. Those capacities that we say do not actually remain in the separated soul are proper attributes not of the soul alone, but of the compound.

Ad 3. The reason such capacities are said not to be weakened when the body is weakened is that the soul remains unchangeable, and it is the virtual source of such capacities.

Ad 4. Such remembering is taken as the memory that Augustine locates in the mind, not as the memory that is located as part of the sensory soul.

Ad 5. Sorrow and joy are in the separated soul not because of sensory appetite but because of intellective appetite—as is also the case for angels.

Ad 6. Augustine is speaking there by way of inquiry, not assertion; hence he rethinks some of what he said there.

---

33That the capacities remain, see De spiritu et anima 15, as quoted in obj. 1. That the acts of the capacities remain as well, see De spiritu et anima 30: “a soul stripped of its body lives, sees, hears, and holds onto all of its senses and traits in full.” Compare the view ascribed to Plato in 75.3c19–22.

3478.4, 79.6sc.

3582.5 ad 1.

36Retractations II.24.