cible by a politic rule, because sensory appetite has something of its own, and so it can resist the command of reason. For the sensory appetite is naturally moved not only by the estimative (in other animals) and by the cogitative (in humans), which is directed by universal reason, but also by the imaginative power and by sense. Thus we experience that the irascible or concupiscible clash with reason as a result of our sensing or imagining something pleasant that reason forbids, or something unpleasant that reason demands. So the fact that the irascible and concupiscible clash with reason in some respect does not preclude their obeying it.

Ad 3. The external senses require for their actions the external sensible objects that make an impression on them, and their presence is not under the control of reason. But the internal powers, both appetitive and apprehensive, need no external objects. So they are subject to the command of reason, which can not only incite or calm the feelings (affectus) of the appetitive power, but can also form the phantasms of the imaginative power.

Question 82
Will

Next we must consider the will. Here there are five questions:

a1. Does the will have appetites for anything of necessity?
a2. Does it have appetites for all things of necessity?
a3. Is it a loftier capacity than intellect?
a4. Does it move the intellect?
a5. Is the will distinguished into the irascible and the concupiscible?

Article 1. Does the will have appetites for anything of necessity?\(^1\)

It seems that the will has appetites for nothing of necessity:

I. Augustine says in *City of God* V [10] that if something is necessary\(\dagger\) it is not voluntary.\(\dagger\) But everything that the will has an appetite for is voluntary. Therefore nothing that the will has an appetite for is necessarily desired.

\(^1\)QDM 6 [Appendix 2], 16.4 ad 5; ST 1a 19.3, 41.2 ad 5, 60.1–2; 1a2ae 10.1; QDV 22.5; *De principiis* 4; II Sent. 25.1.2; III Sent. 27.1.2.
2. Rational capacities, according to the Philosopher, are open to opposites. But the will is a rational capacity, since (as is said in De anima III [432b5]) the will is in reason. Therefore the will is open to opposites. Therefore it is determined to nothing of necessity.

3. We are in control of our acts because of the will. But we are not in control of that which occurs of necessity. Therefore an act of will cannot occur of necessity.

On the contrary. Augustine says in De trinitate XIII [iv.7] that everyone has an appetite for happiness with a single will. If this were not necessary, but contingent, then there would be at least a few exceptions. Therefore there is something that the will wills of necessity.

Reply. Necessity is spoken of in a number of ways. For the necessary is that which cannot not be. This holds of a thing in one way as the result of an internal principle:

- either material, as when we say that everything composed of contraries is necessarily corrupted;

- or formal, as when we say that it is necessary for a triangle to have three angles equal to two right angles.

This is natural and absolute necessity. That a thing cannot not be holds in another way as the result of an external principle, either an end or an agent:

- It holds as the result of an end when, for instance, someone cannot pursue some end without this, or cannot effectively pursue some end—as food is said to be necessary for life, and a horse for a journey. This is called the necessity of the end, which is sometimes also called utility.

- It holds as the result of an agent when, for instance, someone is forced by some agent in such a way that he cannot do the opposite. This is called the necessity of force.

So this necessity of force is entirely incompatible with the will. For we call that violent that is contrary to the inclination of a thing. But the will's motion is itself a certain inclination toward something. And so just as that which occurs in keeping with the inclination of nature is

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2Metaphysics IX 2, 1046b5.

375.6c49.

41a2ae Q6; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III 1, 1110a1–3, b15–16.
called natural, so that which occurs in keeping with the inclination of will is called voluntary. So just as it is impossible for something to be at once violent and natural, so it is impossible for something to be, without qualification, forced or violent and also voluntary.

Necessity of the end is not incompatible with the will, when one can reach the end in only one way. As a result of willing to cross the sea, for instance, the necessity arises in will of wanting a boat. Likewise, natural necessity is also not incompatible with will. It is in fact necessary that just as the intellect adheres of necessity to first principles, so the will adheres of necessity to its ultimate end, which is happiness (beatitudo). For in practical matters the end stands just as a principle does in speculative matters (as is said in Physics II [200a19–22]). For that which holds of a thing naturally and immovably must be the foundation and principle of all the rest, since the nature of a thing comes first in all things, and every movement comes out of something immovable.

Ad 1. Augustine’s claim should be understood to concern the necessity of force. Natural necessity, on the other hand, does not take away the will’s freedom, as he himself says in the same book [V.x].

Ad 2. The will, considered as it naturally wills a thing, corresponds more to the intellection of natural principles than to reason, which is open to opposites. Considered in this way, then, it is an intellectual capacity more than a rational one.

Ad 3. We are in control of our acts inasmuch as we can choose this or that. But choice concerns not the end, but the things that are for the end, as is said in Ethics III [1111b26–29]. So our appetite for our ultimate end is not one of the things we are in control of.

**Article 2. Does the will have appetites for all things of necessity?**

It seems that whatever the will wills, it wills it all of necessity:

1. Dionysius says in Divine Names 4.32 that what is bad is “beyond will.” Therefore the will tends of necessity to the good proposed to it.

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579.8, 83.4c20–31.
683.4c31–34.
7 QDM 3.3, 6 [Appendix 2]; ST 1a 60.5 ad 5, 1a2ae 10.2; QDV 22.6; InPH I.14; II Sent. 25.1.2.
2. The will's object is related to the will as mover to movable. But the movement of the movable follows necessarily from the mover. Therefore it seems that the will's objects move it of necessity.

3. Just as what is apprehended by sense is the object of sensory appetite, so what is apprehended by intellect is the object of intellective appetite, which is called the will. But what is apprehended by sense moves sensory appetite of necessity: for as Augustine says in De Genesi ad litteram [IX.xiv.24], animals "are moved by the things they see." Therefore it seems that things apprehended by intellect move the will of necessity.

On the contrary. Augustine says that "the will is that by which one sins and lives rightly," and so it is open to opposites. Therefore it does not will of necessity all that it wills.

Reply. The will does not will of necessity all that it wills. To make this clear, consider that just as the intellect adheres naturally, of necessity, to first principles, so the will adheres to its ultimate end (as was already said [82.1c48]). There are some objects of intellect, however, that have no necessary connection to first principles—such as contingent propositions, from whose denial the denial of first principles does not follow. The intellect does not assent to these of necessity. Other propositions are necessary; these have a necessary connection with first principles—such as demonstrable conclusions from whose denial the denial of first principles follows. To objects of this sort the intellect does not assent of necessity, once it grasps the necessary connection of the conclusions to the principles by deducing a demonstration. But it does not assent of necessity before it grasps through a demonstration this sort of necessary connection.

Much the same holds in the case of the will. For there are some particular goods that have no necessary connection with happiness, because a person can be happy without these. The will does not adhere to such things of necessity. Other things have a necessary connection with happiness: those through which a human being adheres to God, in whom alone true happiness consists. Still, before the necessity of such a connection is demonstrated through the certainty of the divine vision, the will adheres of necessity neither to God nor to things involving God. But the will of one who sees God through the divine essence adheres to God of necessity, just as we now will of necessity to be happy. Therefore it is clear that the will does not will of necessity all that it wills.

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880.2c23-24.

9Retractations I.9.
Ad 1. The will can tend toward a thing only under the aspect of the good. But because the good is multifaceted, it follows that the will is not determined of necessity to one thing.

Ad 2. The mover causes movement in the movable of necessity when the power of the mover exceeds the movable, so that its entire potential (possibilitas) is subject to the mover. But because the will’s potential extends to the universal and complete good, its entire potential is not subject to any particular good. And thus it is not moved by it of necessity.

Ad 3. A sensory power is not a power that compares various things, in the way that reason does. It rather apprehends without distinction a single thing, and so in respect of that one thing it moves the sensory appetite in a determinate way. But reason compares several things, and so the intellective appetite, will, can be moved by several things, not by one of necessity.\(^\text{10}\)

**Article 3. Is the will a loftier capacity than intellect?**\(^\text{11}\)

It seems that the will is a higher capacity than intellect:

1. The will’s objects are what is good and the will’s end. But its end is the first and highest of causes.\(^\text{12}\) Therefore the will is the first and highest of capacities.

2. Natural things are found to progress from the less to the more perfect. This is also evident in the soul’s capacities, which progress from sense to intellect, the superior capacity. But there is a natural progression from an act of intellect to an act of will. Therefore the will is a more perfect and superior capacity than intellect.

3. Dispositions are proportioned to capacities as perfections to the things they perfect. But the disposition by which the will is perfected, charity, is superior to the dispositions by which the intellect is perfected.\(^\text{9}\) For it is said in I Corinthians 13.2 that *even if I were to know all mysteries, and even if I were to have all faith, still if I do not have charity, I am nothing.* Therefore the will is a higher capacity than intellect.

On the contrary. The Philosopher holds in *Ethics X* [1177a20] that the intellect is the highest capacity of the soul.

\(^{10}\)ST Ia 82.4 ad 1, 2a2ae 23.6 ad 1; QDV 22.11; QDC 2.3 ad 12–13; SCG III.26; II Sent. 25.1.2 ad 4; III Sent. 27.1.4.

\(^{11}\)ST Ia 82.4 ad 1, 2a2ae 23.6 ad 1; QDV 22.11; QDC 2.3 ad 12–13; SCG III.26; II Sent. 25.1.2 ad 4; III Sent. 27.1.4.

\(^{12}\)Avicenna, *Metaphysics* VI.5.
Reply. The loftiness of one thing compared to another can be viewed in two ways: either absolutely (*simpliciter*) or relatively (*secundum quid*). A thing is considered to be such absolutely inasmuch as it is such in its own right, whereas it is considered to be such relatively inasmuch as it is said to be such with respect to another.

So if intellect and will are considered in their own right, then the intellect is found to be loftier. This is evident from comparing their objects to one other. The object of intellect † is simpler and more unconditioned than the object of will †: for the object of intellect is the *nature* of what is good and worthy of appetite, whereas the object of will is what is good and worthy of appetite, the thing whose nature is in intellect. But a thing is superior and higher in its own right to the extent that it is simpler and more abstract, and so the object of intellect is higher than the object of will. Therefore, since the proper nature of a capacity is determined by its relationship to its object, it follows that the intellect is in its own right and absolutely higher than and superior to the will.

Relatively, however, and by association with another, will is sometimes found to be higher than intellect—namely, as a result of the will's object being found in a thing that is higher than what the intellect's object is found in. I might say, for example, that hearing is superior to sight relatively, inasmuch as the thing that has sound is superior to the thing that has color—even though color is superior to and simpler than sound. For, as was said above [81.1c20–25], the action of intellect consists in this, that the nature of the thing understood is within the one understanding, whereas an act of will is completed by the will's being inclined to that thing as it is in itself. Thus the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* VI [1027b25–27] that good and bad, the objects of will, are in things, whereas true and false, the objects of intellect, are in the mind. Therefore when the thing that has goodness within it is superior to the soul that has the understood nature within it, then will is higher than intellect, by association with that thing. When, in contrast, the thing that has goodness within it is beneath the soul, then intellect is higher than will, even by association with that thing. Thus the love of God is better than the cognition of God, whereas the cognition of corporeal things is better than the love of such things. Absolutely, however, intellect is superior to will.

Ad 1. The nature of a cause is taken from the relationship of one thing to another, and in such a relationship the character of goodness is

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1377.3c.
found to be preeminent.° But truth is spoken of more unconditionally,\(^{14}\) and it signifies the character of that goodness. Thus what is good is something true. On the other hand, what is true itself is also something good, inasmuch as the intellect is a certain thing, and what is true is its end.\(^{15}\) And compared to other ends, this one is more excellent, just as the intellect is, compared to other capacities.

**Ad 2.** That which is prior in generation and time is less perfect, because in one and the same thing, potentiality temporally proceeds actuality, and imperfection proceeds perfection. But what is prior absolutely and with respect to the order of nature is more perfect: for this is how actuality is prior to potentiality. And in this way the intellect is prior to the will, just as what produces movement is prior to the movable, and the active to the passive. For the good that is an object of intellect moves the will.°

**Ad 3.** That argument holds for the will in virtue of its association with what is above the soul. For the virtue of charity is that by which we love God.

**Article 4. Does the will move the intellect?\(^{16}\)**

It seems that the will does not move the intellect:

1. That which moves is superior and prior to the thing it moves, because that which moves is the agent, and an agent is superior to what it acts on, as Augustine says in De Genesi ad litteram XII [xvi.33] and the Philosopher says in De anima III [430a18–19]. But the intellect is prior and superior to the will, as was said above [82.3]. Therefore the will does not move the intellect.

2. That which moves is not moved by the thing it moves, except perhaps accidentally. But the intellect moves the will, because an object of appetite apprehended by intellect is an unmoved mover, whereas the appetite is a moved mover.\(^{17}\) Therefore the intellect is not moved by the will.

3. We can will only what has been thought. Therefore if the will moves the intellect to think by willing the thinking, then that act of will too will have to be preceded by another thought, and that thought by

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\(^{14}\)la 16.4.  
\(^{15}\)79.11 ad 2, 82.4 ad 1.  
\(^{16}\)QDM 6 [Appendix 2]; ST 1a 107.1, 1a2ae 9.1; SCG III.26; QDV 22.12.  
\(^{17}\)80.2c\_23–24.
another act of will, and so on to infinity, which is impossible. Therefore the will does not move the intellect.

**On the contrary.** Damascene says “it is up to us to acquire or not acquire whatever skill we want.” But something is “up to us” through the will, and we acquire skills through the intellect. Therefore the will moves the intellect.

**Reply.** There are two ways in which a thing is said to move another. First, there is the way an end moves—as the end is said to move an efficient cause. This is how the intellect moves the will: for something good grasped by intellect is the object of the will, and moves it as an end. Second, a thing is said to move another in the way that an agent moves—as that which alters moves that which is altered, and that which pushes moves that which is pushed. This is how the will moves the intellect and all the soul’s powers, as Anselm says in *De similitudinibus* [2–4].

The reason for this is that in all ordered active capacities, the capacity that concerns the universal end moves the capacities that concern particular ends. This is clear in both nature and politics. For the heavens, which act for the universal preservation of generable and corruptible things, move all lower bodies, each one of which acts to preserve either its own species or else the individual. Also, a king who aims at the common good of his whole kingdom moves by his command the individual governors of the cities, who exert the government’s control over their individual cities. Now the will’s object is what is good and the will’s end in general, whereas each capacity is related to one specific good that suits it—sight, for example, to the perception of color, and intellect to the cognition of what is true. So the will, as an agent, moves all the soul’s capacities to their acts, except for the natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our decisions.

**Ad 1.** The intellect can be considered in two ways: first, in terms of its apprehending universal being and truth; second, in terms of its being a certain thing and a particular capacity with a determinate act. The will can likewise be considered in two ways: first, in terms of the generality of its object—inasmuch, that is, as it has an appetite for what is good in general; second, in terms of its being a certain determinate capacity of the soul, with a determinate act. Therefore if intellect and will are to be

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18 *De fide orthodoxa* II.26.

19 In fact, the author is not Anselm but his disciple, Eadmer (c. 1064–c. 1124).

20 78.1c66, 79.2c34–35.
compared in terms of the general notion of each of their objects, then
(as was said above [82.3c23-34]) the intellect, absolutely, is higher and
superior to the will. If the intellect is considered in terms of the gener-
ality of its object and the will in terms of its being a certain determinate
capacity, then again the intellect is higher and prior to the will, because
the will itself, and also its act and object, is contained under the notions
of being and what is true, which is what the intellect apprehends. Thus
the intellect thinks about the will, its act, and its object, just as it does the
other specific objects of intellect, like stone or wood, which are con-
tained under the general notions of being and what is true.

If, in contrast, the will is considered in terms of the general nature of
its object (what is good), and the intellect in terms of its being a certain
thing and a specific capacity, then the intellect itself, and also its act of
thought and its object (what is true) are contained under the general
nature of what is good, as a certain specific thing. Each one of these is a
certain specific good. So considered, the will is higher than the intel-
lect and can move it. These considerations explain why these capacities
encompass within each other their acts: for the intellect thinks about
the will’s willing, and the will wills the intellect’s thinking. And for a
similar reason what is good is contained under what is true, inasmuch
as it is a certain true object of intellect, and what is true is contained
under what is good, inasmuch as it is a certain good object of desire.

Ad 2. The way the intellect moves the will is different from how the will
moves the intellect, as was already said [c22-30].

Ad 3. There is no need to proceed to infinity; instead, [the regress] stops
at intellect, which comes first. For it is necessary that every motion of
the will be preceded by an apprehension, but not that every apprehen-
sion be preceded by the will’s motion. But the source of counsel and
thought is an intellective principle that is higher than our intellect—
God, as Aristotle too says in Eudemian Ethics VII [1248a24–29]. In this
way he shows that there need not be an infinite regress.

Article 5. Is the will distinguished into
the irascible and the concupiscible?

It seems that the irascible and concupiscible ought to be distinguished
in the higher appetite, the will:

21 87.4.
22 79.11 ad 2.
23 ST la 59.4; QDV 25.3; QDM 8.3c; InDA III.14.120–33; III Sent. 17.1.3.
1. The concupiscible power is so-called from wanting (concupiscendo), and the irascible power from being angry (irascendo). But there is some concupiscence that cannot pertain to sensory appetite, but only to intellectual appetite, the will. There is, for example, the concupiscence for wisdom, concerning which Wisdom 6.21 says, *the concupiscence for wisdom leads to the eternal kingdom.* There is also a kind of anger (ira) that cannot pertain to sensory appetite, but only to intellec­tive—when, for example, we are angry about vice. Thus Jerome, in his *Commentary on Matthew* [13.33], warns us to maintain within the irascible a hatred of vice. Therefore the irascible and the concupiscible ought to be distinguished in the intellectual appetite, as in the sensory.

2. According to what is commonly said, charity is in the concupiscible, hope in the irascible. But these virtues cannot be within sensory appetite, because they do not have sensory objects, but rather intelligible ones. Therefore the concupiscible and irascible must be placed within the intellectual part.

3. It is said in the book *De spiritu et anima* [13] that "the soul has these capacities (irascible, concupiscible, and rational) before it is joined with the body." But no capacity of the sensory part belongs to the soul alone, but to the compound, as was said above [77.5]. Therefore the irascible and concupiscible are in the will, the intellectual appetite.

On the contrary. Gregory of Nyssa says that the nonrational part of the soul is divided into the desiring and the irascible, and Damascene says the same in Book II.24 The Philosopher too says in *De anima* III [432b5–6] that the will is in reason, whereas in the nonrational part of the soul there is "concupiscence and anger" (ira)—or desire and spirit (animus).

Reply. The irascible and concupiscible are not parts of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. For, as was said above [79.7c21–24], a capacity that is related to some object in respect of that object's common nature is not made to differ by specific differences contained within that common nature. For example, since sight is concerned with the visible in respect of the nature of being colored, visual capacities are not multiplied by the different species of colors. But if there were a capacity that were of white things considered as white, and not considered as colored, then it would be made to differ from a capacity that was of black things considered as black.

24Nemesius, *De natura hominis* ch. 16 (p. 348), ch. 17 (p. 350); John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* II.12.
Now sensory appetite is not concerned with the common nature of the good, because the senses do not apprehend what is universal. So the parts of sensory appetite are made to differ by the different natures of their particular goods: for the concupiscible concerns the proper nature of the good insofar as it is pleasant to the senses and agreeable to one's nature (naturae), whereas the irascible concerns the nature (rationem) of the good by being resistant and combative toward that which brings harm. The will, in contrast, concerns the good under the common nature of the good. Accordingly, this intellective appetite does not contain several different appetitive capacities—so that in the intellective appetite there would be one irascible capacity and another concupiscible capacity. (Similarly, in the case of intellect as well there are not multiple apprehensive powers, even though in the case of the senses there are multiple powers.)

Ad 1. Love, concupiscence, and the like are taken in two ways. Sometimes they are taken as a sort of passion, the sort that appears along with a certain arousal of the spirit (animi). Taken this way, which is how they are generally taken, they are found solely in the sensory appetite. Taken another way, they signify a simple affect, without any passion or arousal of the spirit. Taken this way, they are acts of the will, and also are attributed to the angels and to God. But when so taken, they do not pertain to different capacities, but to just one capacity, which is called the will.

Ad 2. The will can be called irascible inasmuch as it wills to combat the bad—not through a passionate impulse, but through a rational judgment. It can in the same way be called concupiscible, because of its desire for what is good. It is in this way that charity and hope are in the irascible and concupiscible—i.e., they are in the will, inasmuch as it has a tendency (ordinem) for acts of this sort. In this way we can also understand what is said in the De spiritu et anima, that the irascible and concupiscible belong to the soul before it is united to the body (understanding this in terms of natural order, not temporal). But it is not necessary to put any faith in the words of that book.

Thus the solution ad 3 is clear.

2581.2.
2677.3 ad 4, 79.7c.
271a 59.4 ad 2–3 (angels); 1a 20.1 ad 1 (God).
Question 83
Free Decision

Next we must consider free decision (libero arbitrio). And here there are four points of inquiry:

a1. Do human beings have free decision?
a2. What is free decision: a capacity, an act, or a disposition?
a3. If it is a capacity, is it an appetitive or a cognitive capacity?
a4. If it is appetitive, is it the same capacity as the will or a different capacity?

Article 1. Do human beings have free decision?¹

It seems that human beings do not have free decision:

1. Whoever has free decision does what he wills. But a human being does not do what he wills. For Romans 7.15 says, for this good that I will, I do not do; but that evil that I hate, I do. Therefore human beings do not have free decision.

2. It belongs to anyone with free decision to will and not to will, to act and not to act. But this does not belong to human beings. For Romans 9.16 says, it does not belong to him who wills (to will), nor to him who runs (to run). Therefore human beings do not have free decision.

3. That is free that is by cause of itself, as is said in Metaphysics I [982b25–26]. Therefore, that which is moved by another is not free. But God moves the will. For Proverbs 21.1 says, the heart of the king is in the hand of God, and he turns it wherever he likes. Also, Philippians 2.13, it is God who works within us to will and to achieve. Therefore human beings do not have free decision.

4. Whoever has free decision is in control of his acts. But a human being is not in control of his acts. For as Jeremiah 10.23 says, a person’s way is not up to him, nor does it belong to a man to direct his steps. Therefore human beings do not have free decision.

5. The Philosopher says in Ethics III, “of whatever sort one is, so the end seems to him” [1114a32]. But it is not in our power to be of a certain sort; rather, this comes to us by nature. Therefore it is natural for us to follow a certain end, and therefore this does not come by free decision.

¹QDM 6 [Appendix 2], 16.5; QDV 23.1, 24.1–2; ST 1a 59.3, 1a2ae 13.6; CT 76; II Sent. 25.1.1; SCG I.88, II.47–48.
On the contrary is what is said in Ecclesiasticus 15.14: *God established human beings from the start, and left them in the hands of their own counsel*—i.e. (according to the Gloss\(^2\)) with free decision.

**Reply.** Human beings have free decision.\(^o\) Otherwise counsel and encouragement, commands and prohibitions, reward and punishment would all be pointless.\(^o\)

To clarify this, it is important to consider that some things act without judgment,\(\dagger\) as a stone is moved downward—and all things lacking cognition do likewise. Other things act with judgment, but not free judgment, as do brute animals. For when a sheep sees a wolf, it judges by a natural judgment, not a free one, that the wolf should be fled. For it makes this judgment through a natural instinct, not through a comparison. And this is likewise true for every judgment made by brute animals.\(^3\)

A human being acts by judgment because through his cognitive power he judges that something should be fled or pursued. But because this judgment occurs from a certain rational comparison, and not from a natural impulse for a particular course of action, he thus acts by free judgment,\(^o\) being capable of being drawn toward different things. For reason is open to opposites, as regards contingent things. (This is clear in dialectical syllogisms and rhetorical persuasion.)\(^o\) But particular courses of action are contingent things, and so in their case the judgment of reason is open to various outcomes, and is not determined to one. Accordingly, human beings necessarily have free decision, from the very fact that they are rational.\(^o\)

**Ad 1.** As was said above [81.3 ad 2], sensory appetite, even if it obeys reason, can still clash in part, by desiring (concupisciendo) the contrary of what reason dictates. This, then, is the “good” that one does not do when one wills—namely, not to desire contrary to reason,\(^o\) as Augustine says in his gloss on the same passage.\(^4\)

**Ad 2.** The Apostle’s claim should be understood as meaning not that a person does not will and run by free decision, but rather that free decision is not sufficient for this unless moved and aided by God.

**Ad 3.** Free decision is the cause of its motion, because through free decision a human being moves himself to act. But freedom does not

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\(^2\)Glossa ord. (III, 401v).

\(^3\)78.4c\(66-72\).

\(^4\)Sermones ad populum 154.3 (cf. Glossa ord. VI, 17r).
necessarily require that what is free be the first cause of itself, just as one thing's being the cause of another does not require that it be the first cause of that other. God, then, is the first cause, moving both natural and voluntary causes. And just as his moving natural causes does not take away from their acts' being natural, so his moving voluntary causes does not take away from their actions' being voluntary. Instead, he makes this be so for them, because he works within each thing in accord with its own character.

Ad 4. A person's way is said to be "not up to him" with regard to carrying out his choices. In this respect a person can be impeded, whether he wills it or not. But the choices themselves are up to us, assuming that God assists us.

Ad 5. There are two kinds of human qualities, one natural and the other acquired (superveniens). Natural qualities can pertain either to the intellective part or to the body and the powers attached to the body. So because a human being is of a certain sort due to a natural quality associated with the intellective part, a human being has a natural appetite for his ultimate end, happiness. This is of course a natural appetite, and is not subject to free decision, as is clear from things said above [82.1c48].

With respect to the body and the powers attached to the body, a human being can be of a certain sort due to a natural quality inasmuch as he is of such a constitution or state. This is the result of some impression from bodily causes, which cannot make an impression on the intellective part because it is not the act of any body. Therefore, of whatever sort anyone is with respect to bodily quality, so the end seems to him: for it is from a state of this sort that a human being is inclined to choose or reject a thing. But these inclinations are subject to rational judgment, which lower appetite obeys, as was said [81.3]. As a result, this is not prejudicial to free decision.

Examples of acquired qualities are dispositions (habitus) and passions, in virtue of which someone is more inclined toward one thing than toward another. Still, these inclinations are also subject to rational judgment. And even such qualities are subject to judgment inasmuch as it is up to us either to acquire such qualities, causally or dispositionally, or else to expel them from ourselves. And so there is nothing here that is incompatible with free decision.

575.2.
Article 2. What is free decision: a capacity, an act, or a disposition?\textsuperscript{6}

It seems that free decision is not a capacity:

1. Free decision is nothing other than free judgment. But 'judgment' refers to an act, not a capacity. Therefore free decision is not a capacity.

2. Free decision is said to be "an ability of will and reason."\textsuperscript{7} But 'ability' refers to the capability of a power, which comes from a disposition. Therefore free decision is a disposition. Also, Bernard says that free decision is "a disposition of the soul, free on its own."\textsuperscript{8} Therefore it is not a capacity.

3. No natural capacity is removed by sin. But free decision is removed by sin. For Augustine says that "a human being who abused free decision destroyed both himself and it."\textsuperscript{9} Therefore free decision is not a capacity.

On the contrary. It seems that nothing is the subject of a disposition except a capacity. But free decision is the subject of grace, with whose assistance it chooses the good. Therefore free decision is a capacity.\textsuperscript{10}

Reply. According to the proper signification of the phrase, 'free decision' refers to an act. Nevertheless, according to our common way of speaking, we say that free decision is the basis of this act—namely, that by which a human being judges freely.\textsuperscript{11} But the bases of an act within us are both capacities and dispositions: for we are said to cognize a thing both through knowledge and through the intellective capacity. Therefore free decision must be either a capacity, or a disposition, or a capacity with some disposition.\textsuperscript{12}

It is clear for two reasons that it is neither a disposition nor a capacity with a disposition.

First, if it is a disposition, it must be a natural disposition, because having free decision is natural to human beings. But we have no natural disposition for the things that come under free decision, because the things we have natural dispositions for are the things we are naturally inclined toward (such as assenting to first principles), and the things we are naturally inclined toward do not come under free decision (as was said of the appetite for happiness [82.1]). So it goes against

\textsuperscript{6}QDV 24.4; II Sent. 24.1.1.

\textsuperscript{7}Peter Lombard, Sentences II.24.3.

\textsuperscript{8}Tractatus de gratia et libero arbitrio chs. 1, 2.

\textsuperscript{9}Enchiridion ix.30.
the distinctive character of free decision for it to be a natural disposition, and goes against its naturalness for it to be a nonnatural disposition. So what remains is that it is not a disposition at all.

Second, as is said in *Ethics* II [1105b25-26], we speak of dispositions "inasmuch as we are in good or bad standing relative to our passions" or acts. For through temperance we are in good standing relative to our wants (*concupiscentias*), whereas through intemperance we are in bad standing. Also, through knowledge we are in good standing relative to the act of intellect (when we cognize what is true), whereas through the contrary disposition we are in bad standing. Free decision, however, stands indifferent to choosing well or badly. Thus it is impossible for free decision to be a disposition. What remains, then, is that it is a capacity.

Ad 1. It is customary for a capacity to be signified by the name of its act. So the capacity that is the basis of the act that is free judgment is named for this act. Otherwise, if ‘free decision’ were to refer to an act, it would not always remain within someone.

Ad 2. Sometimes ‘ability’ refers to a power that is all set to function, and it is in this sense that ‘ability’ is included in the definition of free decision. Bernard, however, takes *disposition* not as it is divided against *capacity*, but as it signifies someone’s standing disposed in a certain way relative to an act. This occurs through both a capacity and a disposition. For through a capacity one stands able to function, whereas through a disposition one is suited to function well or badly.

Ad 3. Human beings, by sinning, are said to have destroyed free decision not with respect to natural freedom — freedom from force — but with respect to freedom from fault and misery. This will be discussed below in the treatise on morals.

*Article 3. Is free decision an appetitive or a cognitive capacity?*

It seems that free decision is a cognitive capacity, not an appetitive one:

1. Damascene says that “free decision is in the immediate company of the rational.” But reason is a cognitive capacity. Therefore free decision is a cognitive capacity.

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1082.1c35-42.
111a2ae QQ81-89.
12ST 1a2ae 13.1; II Sent. 24.1.2; InNE III.6, III.9, VI.2; QDV 22.15, 24.5.
13De fide orthodoxa II.27.
1479.8.
2. 'Free decision' is used in the sense of *free judgment*. But judging is an act of a cognitive power. Therefore free decision is a cognitive capacity.

3. It is choice, above all else, that pertains to free decision. But choice seems to pertain to cognition, since 'choice' implies relating one thing to another, which is distinctive of a cognitive power. Therefore free decision is a cognitive capacity.

**On the contrary.** The Philosopher says in *Ethics* III [1113a10–11] that choice is "the desire for things that are up to us." But desire is an act of an appetitive power. Therefore so is choice. Free decision, however, is that in virtue of which we choose. Therefore free decision is an appetitive power.

**Reply.** What is distinctive of free decision is choice. For we are said to have free decision as a result of being able to take one thing while refusing another—this is to choose. And so one must get at the nature of free decision through choice.

Both a cognitive and an appetitive component come together in choice. On the cognitive side, counsel is required, through which one judges that one thing is preferable to another. On the appetitive side, one is required to accept, by appetite, that which is judged through counsel. This is why Aristotle leaves it open to question in *Ethics* VI [1139b4–5] whether choice pertains primarily to the appetitive or the cognitive power. For he says that "choice is either appetitive intellect or intellective appetite." But in *Ethics* III [1113a11] he inclines to the view that it is intellective appetite, referring to choice as "desire based on counsel." The reason for this is that the proper object of choice is that which is for an end. But this object, so considered, has the character of being good. (It is said to be *useful*.) So since it is the good, as such, that is the object of appetite, it follows that choice is primarily an act of an appetitive power. And so free decision is an appetitive capacity.

**Ad 1.** Appetitive capacities accompany apprehensive ones. It is in this respect that Damascene says that free decision is in the immediate company of the rational.

**Ad 2.** Judgment serves as the conclusion and completion of counsel. But counsel is completed first by the assertion of reason, and second by

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15 83.2 obj. 1, 83.2c18–19.

16 1a2ae Q14.

17 83.4c31–34.
the acceptance of appetite. This is why the Philosopher says in Ethics III [1113a11-12] that "when we make a judgment based on counsel, our desires accord with that counsel." In this way choice itself is said to be a sort of judgment, and this is how free decision gets its name.

Ad 3. The comparison implied in the term 'choice' pertains to the preceding counsel, that of reason. For although appetite does not compare, still, insofar as it is moved by a cognitive power that does compare, it does something like comparison, when it opts for one thing over another.º

Article 4. Is free decision the same capacity as the will or a different capacity?¹⁸

It seems that free decision is a different capacity from the will:

1. Damascene says, in Book II,¹⁹ that thelesis is one thing, boulesis another. But thelesis is will, whereas boulesis seems to be free decision. For boulesis, according to Damascene, is the will that concerns a thing in cases where the one is compared to another. Therefore it seems that free decision is a different capacity from the will.

2. Capacities are cognized through acts.²⁰ But choice, which is the act of free decision,²¹ is different from will, as is said in Ethics III [1111b26-27]. For will concerns the end, whereas choice concerns things that are for the end. Therefore free decision is a different capacity from will.

3. The will is an intellective appetite. But with respect to intellect there are two capacities: agent and possible intellect.²² Therefore with respect to intellective appetite, too, there should be another capacity in addition to will. This seems to be nothing other than free decision. Therefore free decision is a different capacity from will.

On the contrary. Damascene says in Book III²³ that "free decision is nothing other than will."

¹⁸ST 3a 18.3-4; QDV 24.6; II Sent. 24.1.3.
¹⁹De fide orthodoxa II.22.
²⁰Q87.
²¹83.3c₁₇-2₀.
²²79.2-4.
²³De fide orthodoxa III.14.
Reply. Appetitive capacities must be proportioned to apprehensive capacities, as was said above [80.2]. And just as in intellective apprehension there is intellect and reason, so in intellective appetite there is will and free decision, which is nothing other than the power of choice. This is clear from the relationship between their objects and acts. For intellecction implies the simple grasp of a thing, which is why the objects of intellecction, strictly, are said to be principles: things cognized per se, without comparison. But to reason, strictly speaking, is to go from the cognition of one thing to the cognition of another. This is why, strictly speaking, we reason about conclusions, which are made known through principles. Likewise, with respect to appetite, willing implies a simple appetite for a thing. This is why the will is said [obj. 1-2] to concern an end that is desired for its own sake. To choose, however, is to desire one thing for the sake of pursuing another, which is why strictly speaking it concerns things that are for the end.

Now just as in the cognitive realm a principle is related to a conclusion, to which we assent on account of the principles, so in the appetitive realm an end is related to things that are for the end, which one desires on account of the end. And so it is clear that just as intellect is related to reason, so will is related to the power of choice—that is, to free decision. But it was shown above [79.8] that intellecction and reasoning belong to the same capacity, just as resting and moving belong to the same power. Thus willing and choosing also belong to the same capacity. Therefore will and free decision are not two capacities, but one.

Ad 1. Boulesis is distinguished from thelesis not because of a difference in capacities, but because of a difference in acts.

Ad 2. Choice and will (i.e., the willing itself) are different acts, but still they concern a single capacity, just as do intellecction and reasoning, as was said [c20-23, 38-44].

Ad 3. The intellect is related to the will as its mover. As a result, there is no need in the will's case to distinguish an agent and a possible will.  

\[24\] 83.3c17-20.

\[25\] 79.8.

\[26\] 82.3 ad 2, 82.4c24.