It is applied in a third way inasmuch as we judge through knowledge that something that was done was or was not done well. And in this way conscience is said either to excuse or to accuse or torment.

It is clear, however, that all of these result from an actual application of knowledge to the things that we do. Properly speaking, then, 'conscience' refers to an act.

But because a disposition is the basis for an act, the term 'conscience' is sometimes attributed to the first natural disposition, synderesis. Thus Jerome, in his gloss on Ezekiel 1, refers to synderesis as "conscience," Basil refers to conscience as "the natural power for judgment," and Damascene says that it is "the law of our intellect." For it is not unusual to refer to causes and effects through each other.

Ad 1. Conscience is said to be a spirit insofar as 'spirit' is used for mind. For it is a kind of dictate of the mind.

Ad 2. Defilement is said to be in conscience not as its subject, but as something cognized is in the cognition—inasmuch, that is, as someone knows himself to be defiled.

Ad 3. An act, even if it does not always remain in its own right, still always remains in its cause, which is the capacity and its dispositions. But the dispositions that inform conscience, even if there are many of them, all draw their efficacy from one first disposition—namely, from the disposition for first principles that is called synderesis. Hence this disposition especially is sometimes referred to as conscience, as was said above [c.47-49].

**Question 80**

The Appetitive in General

Next we must consider the appetitive capacities. And here there are four things to be considered:

Q80. The appetitive in general.
Q81. Sensuality.

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88 *Commentaria in Ezechielem* I 1.7 (PL 25, 22c)—cf. *Glosa ordin.* (IV, 210 F).
89 *Homily* 12 (PG 31, 405C).
90 *De fide orthodoxa* IV.22.
91 79.12c.
Q82. Will.
Q83. Free decision.

As regards the first there are two questions:

a1. Should appetite be treated as a special capacity of the soul?
a2. Should appetite be divided into sensory and intellective appetite, as distinct capacities?

**Article 1. Should appetite be treated as a special capacity of the soul?**

It seems that appetite is not a special capacity of the soul:

1. No capacity of the soul should be assigned to things common to both the living and the nonliving. But to have appetites is common to both the living and the nonliving, since the good is what all things have an appetite for, as is said in *Ethics* I [1094a2–3]. Therefore appetite is not a special capacity of the soul.

2. Capacities are distinguished in terms of their objects. But we cognize and have appetites for the same thing. Therefore there is no need for an appetitive power to be anything other than an apprehensive power.

3. The general (commune) is not distinguished from the individual (proprium). But every capacity of the soul has an appetite for some particular object of appetite—namely, the object that is suited to it. Therefore, with respect to this general object of appetite, there is no need to admit a capacity distinct from the others, a so-called appetitive capacity.

**On the contrary.** In *De anima* II [414a31–32], the Philosopher distinguishes the appetitive from other capacities. Damascene too, in Book I, distinguishes the appetitive from the cognitive powers.

**Reply.** It is necessary to posit a capacity of the soul that is appetitive. To make this clear, consider that every form has some inclination that follows from it. Fire, for example, is inclined by its form toward a higher place, and toward generating that which is like it. But things that participate in cognition are found to have forms in a more elevated way.

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1ST Ia 78.1 ad 3; QDV 22.3; III Sent. 27.1.2.
277.3, esp. obj. 3.
3De fide orthodoxa II.22.
4Ia 19.1c, 59.1c.
than are those that lack cognition. For in those that lack cognition one finds only a form determining each to its one proper being, the being that is natural to each thing. Therefore a natural inclination, which is called natural appetite, follows from this natural form. In cognitive things, however, each is determined to its natural proper being through a natural form, but in such a way that it is capable of receiving the species of other things. The senses, for example, receive the species of all sensible things, and the intellect the species of all intelligible things. Accordingly, the human soul, in virtue of sense and intellect, is "in a certain way all things." In this certain way, cognitive things come close to a likeness of God, in whom all things preexist, as Dionysius says.

Therefore, just as forms have a more elevated mode of existence in cognitive things, above the mode of natural forms, so there must be an inclination in them above a natural inclination (the so-called natural appetite). This higher inclination pertains to the soul's appetitive power, through which an animal can have an appetite for the things that it apprehends, not just for the things toward which it is inclined by its natural form. So it is necessary, therefore, to posit a capacity of the soul that is appetitive.

Ad 1. As was said [c36-42], cognitive things have appetites in a way that is above the common way that appetite is found in all things. So for this a capacity of the soul must be assigned.

Ad 2. An object of both apprehension and appetite is the same in subject, but differs in character (ratione). For it is apprehended insofar as it is a sensible or an intelligible being, whereas it is the object of appetite insofar as it is suitable or good. But a distinction among capacities requires a distinction in character between objects, not a material distinction.

Ad 3. Each capacity of the soul is a certain form or nature and has a natural inclination for something. Accordingly, each one has a natural appetite for the object that is suited to it. Above this is animal appetite, which follows apprehension. Something is the object of animal appetite not because it is suited to the act of one capacity or another—as sight has an appetite for seeing, and hearing for hearing—but because it is suited to the animal as a whole.

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5 Aristotle, De an. III 8, 431b21.

6 Divine Names 5.5.
Article 2. Should appetite be divided into sensory and intellective appetite, as distinct capacities?\(^7\)

It seems that sensory and intellective appetite are not distinct capacities:

1. Capacities are not distinguished by accidental differences, as was said above [77.3c42-59]. But it is accidental to an object of appetite that it is apprehended through sense or intellect. Therefore sensory and intellective appetite are not distinct capacities.

2. Intellective cognition concerns universals, and is accordingly distinguished from sensory cognition, which concerns singulars.\(^8\) But this distinction has no place with regard to the appetitive. For appetite is a movement from the soul toward things, which are singulars, and so every appetite seems to concern something singular. Therefore intellective appetite should not be distinguished from sensory appetite.

3. Just as the appetitive is placed beneath the apprehensive, as a lower capacity,\(^9\) so too is the motive capacity.\(^10\) But in human beings there is no motive capacity that follows intellect, other than the one that, in other animals, follows sense. Therefore, by the same reasoning, there is also not another appetitive capacity.

On the contrary. In De anima III the Philosopher distinguishes two appetites and says that the higher appetite moves the lower [432b5–6; 433a23–26; 434a12–15].

Reply. It is necessary to say that intellective appetite is a different capacity from sensory appetite. For an appetitive capacity is a passive capacity that is naturally suited to be moved by something apprehended.\(^10\) Hence something apprehended that is the object of appetite is an unmoved mover, whereas appetite is a moved mover, as is said in De anima III [433b16–18] and Metaphysics XII [1072a26–30]. But passive, movable things are distinguished according to the distinctions that hold among the things that act on them and move them: for (a) mover must be proportioned to movable, and active to passive; and (b) a passive capacity takes its proper nature from its relationship to what acts on it. Therefore, since what is apprehended by intellect is of a different genus from what is apprehended by sense,\(^9\) it follows that intellective appetite is a different capacity from sensory appetite.

\(^{7}\)ST 1a 59.1; QDV 22.4, 25.1; InDA III.14.120–33.

\(^{8}\)86.1.

\(^{9}\)See 82.3 for the case of will and intellect.
Ad 1. Being apprehended through sense or intellect is not accidental to an object of appetite. Rather, this applies to it per se, because an object of appetite moves the appetite only insofar as it is apprehended. As a result, differences in what is apprehended are per se differences in the object of appetite. As a result, appetitive capacities are distinguished according to the difference between the things apprehended—which is just as to be distinguished according to their proper objects.

Ad 2. Intellective appetite, even if it is drawn to things outside the soul that are singulars, is nevertheless drawn to them in virtue of some universal character—as when it has an appetite for something because it is good. Thus the Philosopher says in the *Rhetoric* [1382a5–7] that hatred can concern something universal—for example, when we hate every kind of thief. Likewise, too, we can have an intellective appetite for immaterial goods, which the senses do not apprehend, such as knowledge, the virtues, and other such things.

Ad 3. As is said in *De anima* III [434a16–21], universal opinion produces movement only through the mediation of particular opinion, and likewise higher appetite produces movement through the mediation of lower appetite. Thus there are not different motive powers that follow intellect and sense.

**Question 81**

**Sensuality**

Next we must consider sensuality. There are three subjects of inquiry:

a1. Is sensuality solely an appetitive power?

a2. Is sensuality divided into the irascible and the concupiscible, as distinct capacities?

a3. Do the irascible and concupiscible obey reason?

**Article 1. Is sensuality solely an appetitive power?**

It seems that sensuality is not just appetitive, but also cognitive:

1. Augustine says in *De trinitate* XII [xii.17] that “the soul’s sensual movement, which extends to the body’s senses, is common to us and to beasts.” But the body’s senses are classified as cognitive powers. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power.

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1. QDV 25.1; II Sent. 24.2.1.
2. Things that fall under a single division seem to be part of a single genus. But Augustine, in *De trinitate* XII [xii.17] divides sensuality from higher and lower reason, which pertain to cognition. Therefore sensuality is also a cognitive power.

3. In human temptation, sensuality takes the place of the serpent. But when our first ancestors were tempted, the serpent was what announced and proposed the sin, which is what a cognitive power does. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power.

**On the contrary.** Sensuality is defined as “the appetite for things pertaining to the body.”

**Reply.** The term ‘sensuality’ seems to have been taken from the sensual movement that Augustine discusses in *De trinitate* XII [xii.17]. This is to take the name of a capacity from its act, just as ‘sight’ is taken from seeing. Now sensual movement is the appetite that follows sensory apprehension. For the act of an apprehensive power is not called a *movement* in as strict a sense as the action of appetite is, since the operation of an apprehensive power is completed when the things apprehended are within that which apprehends, whereas the operation of an appetitive power is completed when that which has the appetite is inclined toward the object of its appetite. As a result, the operation of an apprehensive power is like rest, whereas the operation of an appetitive power is more like movement. Accordingly, sensual movement is understood as the operation of an appetitive power. So ‘sensuality’ is a term for sensory appetite.

**Ad 1.** When Augustine says that “the soul’s sensual movement extends to the body’s senses,” we are meant to think not that the body’s senses are included in sensuality, but rather that the movement of sensuality is a certain inclination toward the body’s senses—namely, when we have an appetite for the things apprehended by the body’s senses. And so the body’s senses serve as preliminaries to sensuality.

**Ad 2.** Sensuality is divided from higher and lower reason insofar as they share in the act of motion. For the cognitive power, which includes higher and lower reason, produces motion, and so too does the appetitive, including sensuality.

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²79.9.
³79.12 obj. 2.
⁴Peter Lombard, *Sentences* II.24.4.
Ad 3. The serpent not only showed them the sin and proposed it, but also inclined them to carry it out. And it is in this respect that the serpent signifies sensuality.

Article 2. Is sensuality divided into the irascible and the concupiscible, as distinct capacities?²

It seems that sensory appetite is not distinguished into the irascible and concupiscible, as distinct capacities:

1. The same capacity of the soul is concerned with a single contrary pairing: sight, for example, is concerned with white and black, as is said in De anima II [422b23–24]. But the agreeable and the harmful are contraries. Therefore, since the concupiscible deals with what is agreeable, and the irascible with what is harmful, it seems that the irascible and concupiscible are the same capacity of the soul.

2. Sensory appetite concerns only things that are agreeable to sense. But what is agreeable to sense is the object of the concupiscible. Therefore there is no sensory appetite differing from the concupiscible.

3. Hatred is in the irascible. For Jerome, in his Commentary on Matthew [13.33], speaks of our possessing in the irascible a hatred of vice. But hatred, since it is the contrary of love, is in the concupiscible. Therefore the concupiscible and irascible are the same power.

On the contrary. Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene posit two powers, the irascible and the concupiscible, as parts of sensory appetite.⁶

Reply. In genus, sensory appetite is one power, which is called sensuality. But it is divided into two capacities that are species of sensory appetite: the irascible and the concupiscible. To make this clear, consider that in natural corruptible things there must be an inclination not only for pursuing what is agreeable and fleeing what is harmful, but also for resisting corrupting and contrary forces that impede the agreeable and inflect the harmful. Fire, for example, has a natural inclination not only to draw back from lower places, which do not agree with it, and to aim at the higher places agreeable to it, but also to resist corrupting and impeding forces. Therefore, since sensory appetite is

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²ST Ia 82.5, Ia2ae 23.1, 25.1; III Sent. 26.1.2; QDV 25.2; QDM 8.3c; InDA III.14.120–62; QDA 13c.

⁶De natura hominis ch. 15 (p. 92), ch. 16 (p. 95); Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II.12. See also Plato, Republic IV 435–45, which is the ultimate source for this distinction.
an inclination that follows sensory apprehension, just as natural appetite is an inclination following a natural form, there are necessarily two appetitive capacities in the sensory part. Through the first, the soul is inclined simply to pursue what is agreeable to the senses and to flee what is harmful: this is called the concupiscible. Through the second, an animal resists those forces that combat the agreeable and bring harm: this power is called the irascible. And thus its object is said to be the arduous: for it aims at overcoming contrary forces and rising above them.

These two inclinations do not reduce to a single principle. For sometimes the soul applies itself to painful things, contrary to the inclination of the concupiscible, so that in keeping with the inclination of the irascible it combats contrary forces. Hence the passions of the irascible also seem to be at odds with those of the concupiscible: for in many cases when concupiscence is inflamed, it allays anger (iram), and when anger is inflamed, it allays concupiscence.

From this it is also clear that the irascible serves as the champion and guardian of the concupiscible: when it rises up against what impedes the agreeable things that the concupiscible has an appetite for, and against what inflicts the harmful things that the concupiscible flees. For this reason, all the passions of the irascible begin from the passions of the concupiscible, and reach their end there. Anger, for example, is born from the occurrence of sorrow and, once vengeance occurs, ends in joy. For this reason, too, battles between animals are over the objects of concupiscence—namely, over food and sex, as is said in De animalibus VIII.

Ad 1. The concupiscible power concerns both the agreeable and the disagreeable. But the role of the irascible is to resist the disagreeable, which it combats.

Ad 2. Just as in the case of the apprehensive powers there is an estimative power in the sensory part, one that perceives things that do not make an impression on the senses (as was said above [78.4c83]), so too in the case of sensory appetite there is a power with an appetite for things agreeable not because they please the senses, but rather because they are useful to the animal for its defense. This is the irascible power.

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780.1c, 81.1 ad 1.

8See, e.g., Anonymous, De potentiis animae et obiectis (c. 1230), pp. 159, 164; Bartholomew of England, De proprietatibus rerum III.6 (p. 26).

9In fact, see IX 1, 608b19–610a35; VI 18, 571b7–572a5.
Ad 3. Speaking absolutely, hatred pertains to the concupiscible. But because of the combativeness caused by hatred, it can pertain to the irascible.

Article 3. Do the irascible and concupiscible obey reason?  

It seems that the irascible and concupiscible do not obey reason:

1. The irascible and concupiscible are parts of sensuality. But sensuality does not obey reason, which is why it is signified by the serpent, as Augustine says in De trinitate XII [xii.17, xiii.20]. Therefore the irascible and concupiscible do not obey reason.

2. That which obeys a thing does not clash with it. But the irascible and concupiscible clash with reason, according to the Apostle in Romans 7.23: I see another law in my members, clashing with the law of my mind. Therefore the irascible and concupiscible do not obey reason.

3. Just as the appetitive power is lower than the rational part of the soul, so too is the sensory power. But the sensory part of the soul does not obey reason: for we do not hear or see when we want to. Likewise, therefore, the sensory powers of appetite, the irascible and concupiscible, do not obey reason either.

On the contrary. Damascene says that "what obeys and can be persuaded by reason is divided into concupiscence and anger" (iram).

Reply. There are two ways in which the irascible and concupiscible obey the higher part containing intellect (or reason) and will: first with respect to reason, second with respect to will.

They obey reason with respect to their very acts. The explanation for this is that in other animals sensory appetite is naturally moved by the estimative power—just as a sheep, when it judges the wolf to be hostile, is afraid. But in place of the estimative power, human beings have a cogitative power, as was said above [78.4c98], which some call particular reason inasmuch as it compares individual intentions. So in the human case sensory appetite is naturally moved by it. But particular reason is naturally moved and directed by universal reason; thus singular conclusions are reached syllogistically from universal propositions.

In this way it is clear that universal reason commands sensory appetite, distinguished into the concupiscible and irascible, and this appetite

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10ST 1a2ae 9.2 ad 3, 10.3, 17.7; QDV 24.12, 25.4; SCG II.30; InNE I.20; QDV 22.9 ad 3 & 6.
11De fide orthodoxa II.12.
obeys it. And because the deduction of universal principles into singular conclusions is not the work of simple intellection but of reason,\textsuperscript{12} so the irascible and concupiscible are said to obey reason rather than intellect. And this is something anyone can experience for himself: for by adducing certain universal considerations, one calms (or else incites) one's anger, fear, etc.

Sensory appetite is also subject to will. This is so with respect to execution, which occurs through the motive power. For in other animals movement follows immediately at the appetite of the concupiscible and irascible—the sheep, for example, afraid of the wolf, immediately flees—because they have no higher appetite to clash [with sensory appetite]. A human being, however, is not immediately moved by the appetite of the irascible and concupiscible, but waits for the command of will, the higher appetite. For in all capacities ordered toward movement, the second mover acts only in virtue of the first. Thus a lower appetite is sufficient to produce movement only if the higher capacity consents.\textsuperscript{6} And this is what the Philosopher says in \textit{De anima} III [434a12–14]: that a higher appetite moves a lower appetite just as a higher sphere moves a lower one. So in this way the irascible and the concupiscible are subject to reason.

\textbf{Ad 1.} Sensuality is signified by the serpent in view of what is proper to sensuality with respect to the sensory part. But ‘irascible’ and ‘concupiscible’ refer to sensory appetite more with respect to their act, toward which they are drawn by reason, as was said [c20].

\textbf{Ad 2.} As the Philosopher says in \textit{Politics} I [1254b2–6], “one finds in animals both a despotic rule and a politic one. For the soul dominates the body by a despotic rule, whereas the intellect dominates appetite by a politic, royal rule.” For a rule is called despotic when someone rules over slaves who have no ability, in any respect, to resist the command of the ruler, because they have nothing of their own. A rule is called politic and royal, however, when someone rules over free subjects who, even if they are subject to the governance of a leader, still have something of their own through which they can resist the ruler’s command.

In this way, then, the soul is said to dominate the body by a despotic rule, because the body’s limbs can in no way resist the soul’s commands. Instead, the hand and foot and all the other limbs that are by nature moved voluntarily are moved immediately at the appetite of the soul. But intellect (or reason) is said to rule the irascible and concupis-
cible by a politic rule, because sensory appetite has something of its own, and so it can resist the command of reason. For the sensory appetite is naturally moved not only by the estimative (in other animals) and by the cogitative (in humans), which is directed by universal reason, but also by the imaginative power and by sense. Thus we experience that the irascible or concupiscible clash with reason as a result of our sensing or imagining something pleasant that reason forbids, or something unpleasant that reason demands. So the fact that the irascible and concupiscible clash with reason in some respect does not preclude their obeying it.

Ad 3. The external senses require for their actions the external sensible objects that make an impression on them, and their presence is not under the control of reason. But the internal powers, both appetitive and apprehensive, need no external objects. So they are subject to the command of reason, which can not only incite or calm the feelings (affectus) of the appetitive power, but can also form the phantasms of the imaginative power.

Question 82
Will

Next we must consider the will. Here there are five questions:

a1. Does the will have appetites for anything of necessity?
a2. Does it have appetites for all things of necessity?
a3. Is it a loftier capacity than intellect?
a4. Does it move the intellect?
a5. Is the will distinguished into the irascible and the concupiscible?

Article 1. Does the will have appetites for anything of necessity?

It seems that the will has appetites for nothing of necessity:

I. Augustine says in City of God V [10] that if something is necessary it is not voluntary. But everything that the will has an appetite for is voluntary. Therefore nothing that the will has an appetite for is necessarily desired.

1QDM 6 [Appendix 2], 16.4 ad 5; ST 1a 19.3, 41.2 ad 5, 60.1–2; 1a2ae 10.1; QDV 22.5; De principiis 4; II Sent. 25.1.2; III Sent. 27.1.2.