Re-ordering Europe’s Eastern Frontier: Galician Identities and Political Cartographies on the Polish-Ukrainian Border

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With the removal of the Iron Curtain, dramatic geo-political changes have reshaped the daily lives of eastern Europeans, especially those living near the borders of the former Soviet Union. The final delimitation of the border of Europe (here, defined as countries sharing membership in the European Union and other Western political/military institutions such as NATO) is, as yet, unfinished. The possibility of a new geo-political divide along the former Soviet border is encouraged by the differential rates of political and economic transitions amongst the countries of the region. This new border geography is being formed, however, against a historical backdrop that places current border regions not as peripheries but as centers of long-standing regional entities. Galicia, straddling the Polish-Ukrainian border, remains not just a regional memory as a former autonomous Habsburg province, but is rapidly being re-created as a post-1989 spatial-historical imagination and an entry-card into Europe.

As the ex-Eastern bloc states shake-off the spatial-symbolic stigmata of the Cold War order, their relationship to the broader European whole - the perennial question of “will we qualify as European?” - has come to dominate debates from Bialystok to Budapest. The question is certainly not new for, through time, the cardinal problem in defining Europe has centered precisely on the inclusion or exclusion of its Eastern borderlands. The designation of a European West has long been, in fact, predicated upon the notion of Europe as “not Russia” (O’Loughlin and Kolossov 2000). The search for Europe’s “natural” boundary which would, somehow, separate the civilized, modern West from the pre-modern East has always been crucial to this process of signification: civilizational divides fluctuate according to prevailing political and intellectual requisites (Delanty 1995, Heffernan 1999, Wolff 1994).

The momentous changes of 1989 have come to signify what was, above all, a “return to Europe”: a “reunion with European civilization from which the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were ‘unnaturally’ wrenched by years of Communist domination” (Shaw 1998: 124, Kundera 1983). Countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have progressively drifted into what is now often termed Central or East Central Europe, with the term “Eastern Europe” most often relegated to the ostensibly less-Western successor states to the USSR. The 1998 expansion of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) to encompass the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland has served only to accentuate what is the prime geo-
political divide emergent in the region today, the growing chasm between those states anointed as bona fide Europeans, slated for fast-track incorporation into Western security and economic structures, and “the others” - relegated to the margins of Europe, if not entirely denied the right to symbolic membership in the European family of nations. The process of geographical myth-making continues - only now carried out by self-appointed Central Europeans (Geremek 1999) as well as by Brussels bureaucrats and Washington policy-makers. More than a liberation - a return to some idealized, un-bounded Europe of years past - the opening of the Iron Curtain has thus given birth to a whole new set of territorializations, marking “some remarkably persistent geopolitical instincts of the European idea through the ages” (Heffernan 1999: 239).

Geographical designations are of no small consequence, however. Testimony to the enormous power vested within spatial narratives, Europeanness has come to denote a “way in” (Dahrendorf 1999a, 1999b), the étoile polaire for the ex-communist states. The processes of national construction (or, perhaps more accurately, re-construction) in the new European democracies post-1989 and their crafting of bounded territorialized communities have been indelibly marked by questions of these same communities’ past and present relationship to the broader European whole. In this chapter, we will focus upon the representational struggle occurring at what is (at least in the short-term) the probable future boundary of the European space, the Polish-Ukrainian border. We locate our examination within the emerging tension between the concurrent opening of country boundaries and accompanying idealization of shared spaces and multiple identities which contrast with the progressive re-bounding of rigid civilizational, strategic and economic divides. Our attention focuses on the contrast between post-1989 local re-imaginations of Galicia as a space of civilized multi-national co-existence - and the geopolitical and civilizational boundary-drawing exercises that cut through the region’s heart. In exploring this contradiction, we will examine the spatial ideology and iconography of the Galician representation, querying the ways in which its vision as a historical ethno-cultural oikumene is being proposed as an antidote to the new walls as a novel means of articulating territories and inhabitants into the European cosmos (O’Loughlin 2000). Within this chapter, we analyze the ways in which the re-signification of the border as a space – as Galicia – is being used to subvert the border-line and by extension, other borders that are symbolically coterminous with the confines of Central Europe, of Europe, of the West.
**Galician Dreams and Geopolitical Cartographies**

New geopolitics is characterized, above all, by the multi-scalar processes of territorial control and strategic re-considerations in the era of American hegemony. Rapid political change in the form of democratization and economic change consequent on globalization have rendered Cold War line-ups and imaginations anachronistic. Few regions have been altered as much as the “crush zone” between Europe and Russia. Rather than the coincidence of state borders with strategic zones and a world of division and order, we have entered an era of geopolitical transition that, at least for the short term, will continue to produce numerous territorial alternatives, regional posturings, ideological machinations, and vivid recall of historical antecedents. While geopolitical strategists try to influence the nature and locations of new dividing lines, local groups on the divide may not toe the strategic line nor fulfill their assigned roles. Existing *de jure* (political or administrative) borders often overlap with *de facto* (ethnic, linguistic, cultural or civilizational) territories and in a time of evolving political and cultural identities, cartographic claims abound. Earlier ethnic hatreds in 1918-21 and 1944-46 resulted tragically in the forced re-location (or ethnic cleansing) of millions in the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman empires. The winners, advised by political geographers such as Isaiah Bowman (Martin 1980) tried to reduce rival claims and ethnic mixing by imposing a cartographic order matching political and cultural territories using the principle of exclusivity. Though relatively few ethnically-mixed territories remain in the former Communist states of Europe, the geopolitical sea-change of the end of the Cold War has opened up opportunities for a return to the multi-ethnic local worlds of the early 20th century in which groups shared spaces while maintaining their own linguistic and religious traditions. In such a post-nationalist world, a search for pre-existing regional identities is underway from the large scale construction of a *Mitteleuropa* to the regional scale, characterized by cross-border economic development zones like Euro-Bug (along the Polish-Belarussian border), and local regional enterprises, like Galicia. If such cross-border and inter-territorial enterprises are successful, then a new geopolitics that is not state-dominated will have emerged from the ashes of the European civil wars and subsequent Cold War.
A glance at the “fragments of Europe” in Foucher’s (1993) book will offer convincing evidence of the frequent changes of borders of Poland and its neighbors. The maps in this chapter illustrate only some of the historical changes since 966, the traditional date of the establishment of a Polish state. Borders mark the territorial edges of identities, either from above (state-formed), outside (delimited by war victors) or internal (national claims). While national identities can adapt to new state borders, there is usually a time lag and historical claims persist long after geopolitical realities have redefined national borders. Further, because identities are constantly made and re-made, so too borders are claimed, counter-claimed and re-claimed. Borders can be lines of separation (Iron Curtain) or contact (as inside the European Union); every geographical boundary combines these functions to some extent. Borders thus structure the opportunities for conflict (rival territorial claims) or cooperation (trade). More than anything else, the nature of the border (guarded, open, strictly or poorly demarcated, partially open, etc) reflects the nature of the relations between the respective states. Borderlands, the zones of mixture, contact and conflict, have their own geographies that distinguish them from their states and render them uncomfortable categories to cultural cartographers concerned with heartlands, domains and cores. As Applebaum (1994, ix), speaking of the zone between Kaliningrad (Baltic Sea) and Odessa (Black Sea) wrote: “For a thousand years, the geography of the borderlands determined their fate.” Numerous attempts to make the borderlands uniform and homogenous failed until 1945, when Stalin’s brutality and map-making effectively ended a millenium of cultural, national and religious diversity in the frontier zone.

Paasi (1986, 1996), in his examination of the institutionalization of regions, argues that one of the first steps in the formation of the conceptual shape of any regional entity/identity is precisely the establishment of a distinct set of territorial symbols, the most important of these being the name. Naming creates a togetherness, a shared representation of belonging and joins personal histories to a collective history. As representations of space, regions are mythical constructions, often later legalized with state symbols, governmental agency-making, borders, and other symbols of political control. Galicia, too, was born of myth – and from myth would rise again. In the post-communist era, with myths debunked and historical antecedents in short supply, that of Galicia Felix (happy Galicia) would prove particularly attractive, for a
number of reasons. The years after 1989, in fact, would see Galicia cropping up on store signs and adorning a variety of products. Yet beyond its role as simple marketing tool, the use of the “Galician” denominative also began to proliferate among a variety of public and private institutions, as well as countless historical preservation associations and literary and cultural groups, while portraits of the Emperor (re)appeared on the walls of numerous provincial bars, offices, restaurants and coffeehouses.

Naming, however, also acts to situate territories and their inhabitants in geo-political, civilizational, historical, and cultural space. Galicia’s name thus not only evokes a series of nostalgic associations of home and tradition and offers other spatial cues within a set of broader geographical containers and wider geopolitical representations. Galicia, as Austro-Hungarian, as Western European, as not-Eastern, certainly as not Russian, is thus located within the values of western liberal thought. In contrast to the alien values of the Eastern steppes, Galicia is historical and embodied with European tradition, and “before and beyond” the Communist occupation, 1945-1991. As always, the names that we grant to our social world, to ourselves and to the institutions to which we belong are hardly accidental but emerge, rather, from a complex negotiation of meanings that attempts to make sense of the local, national and inter-national spaces in which we are located.

The Galician resurgence has not limited itself to nominative acts, however, and in recent years has begun to take on an increasingly political tone in opposition to the formal politics of the Polish state. What of the political or identitarian uses of Galicia? The emergence and consolidation of new sets of local-global economic networks and their associated place-selling strategies are hardly a novel phenomenon, though rare in eastern Europe. Turning to Paasi (1986, 1996) again, we stress here the importance of making a distinction between “regional identity” as the identity of the region itself (in our case, the identity of Galicia) and the potentially endless identities of the regional actors/inhabitants that may or may not coincide with the regional identity. Regional identity is best conceived, in fact, as a shared or dominant territorial idea or representation of the region - and thus irreducible to the singular identities of regional actors/inhabitants. A shared geographical representation induces coherent behavior and, over time, acts to consolidate the region (Dematteis 1989). And one thing is certain about the Galician ideal; lots of people seem to believe in it.

Galicia is a powerful, still-living myth in the culture of two nations, the Polish and the Ukrainian. Certainly, it
is not a unitary or homogeneous myth - yet in both cultures it is viewed, overwhelmingly, as an ideal past, as a
lost Arcadia and by extension, “as the path towards their future” (Sowa 1994, 6).

Sowa (1994) identifies two guiding elements of the present-day Galician myth. The first is the
idealization of the lost time/space of the local - of the familiar Galician village or shtetl (small Jewish
settlement) but also of the urban magnificence of turn-of-the-century Cracow and L’viv (Lwów); the second,
lies with the ideal of social and ethnic peace and the pacific co-existence of the “many peoples, many
nations” inhabiting these lands since time immemorial. Both, however, are predicated upon a unitary/unified
Galicia and thus upon a negation of the border that now cuts through it (Sowa 1995, Wiegandt 1988,
Wyrożumski 1994) (See Figure 3). To reclaim the past, Galicia must thus be re-conceptualized as a border
space a limes of co-existence.

Proponents of nostalgia for Habsburg Galicia do not see their yearnings running counter to the
respective contemporary national aspirations, just as the Galician conservatives’ love of Austria during the
period of provincial autonomy 1869-1918 was never conceived in opposition to Polish, Jewish or Ruthenian
national aspirations (Szul 1996). The role assigned to Galicia in the post-1989 period draws heavily on the
spatial-representational equation, Galician = Austrian = European. Adopting one shared
geographical/territorial representation, Galicia thus grants its believers access to another, highly valued,
shared geographical representation that is the European one. And it is by re-imagining Galicia as a historical,
cultural, and traditional liminal border-land that its proponents attempt to usurp the power of the border-line.
This distinction closely recalls, in fact, Michel de Certeau’s (1984) differentiation between spatial imaginaries
that are cartographic and those that are narrative, emerging from practices and stories and thus,
fundamentally, subversive. Unlike the cartographic, bounded spatial imaginaries of nation-states, narrative
identities (such as the Galician one) do not rely upon binding actors in(to) space; they do not rely upon the
setting up of boundaries of inclusion/exclusion. Rather, to cite de Certeau, such forms of identity “establish
an itinerary”; “guide”; “pass through”; “transgress”, establishing a space that is “topological, concerning the
deformation [and combination] of figures, rather than topical, defining places” (DeCerteau 1984: 129).
Topological spaces oppose the unitary metric of the border-line, within which “diverse scales are brought
together through networks of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ ties in defining geographical variation in social phenomena” (Agnew, 1993; 264).

**Making the Galicia Myth**

The image of the Galician borderlands as an outpost of “Western civilization” - the boundary of Europe beyond which lay the chaos of the East – had begun to be elaborated by the 16th century. It was then that the multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multilingual “melting pot” first became codified as a distinct political project, with the evolution of the Polish state from a medieval monarchy into the Polish-Lithuanian (“Jagiellonian”) Commonwealth. Established at the Union of Lublin in 1569, and bringing together the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland, it would henceforth be ruled by a common Diet as well as a common sovereign (Figure 1), its enormous territory reaching from the Baltic to the Black sea. And it is in Jagiellonian Poland that the country’s distinct location vis à vis European “civilization” would first be questioned, attempting in some way to find a place for this land located at the borderland of East and West. This ambivalent location has, in fact, driven Polish geo-visions since Commonwealth times, a Piast (westward-oriented) Poland opposing the vision of Jagiellonian (eastern) Poland. As Gerner (1999) notes, however, the post-1989 era has seen Poland opting for what he terms the Jadwiga model – looking both West and East.

Perhaps the most distinctive attribute of the Commonwealth noble republic was its distinctive form of “multiethnic civic nationalism”, based upon a vision of a common political destiny and cemented by an attachment to republican libertarian values. The nation of the Commonwealth was conceived as a political, not an ethnic, community, and it was this formula that made it an attractive form of belonging to the gentry of the entire Commonwealth, irrespective of ethnicity and language (Walicki 1997), a civic nationalism which drew its strength from a common vision as defenders both of a Catholic West and of Enlightenment values on the very borderlands of civilization (Kristof 1994, Walicki 1997). The national vision of the Commonwealth was hardly a multicultural one in present-day terms, however. For all the idealization of the vibrancy of varied ethnicities, traditions and cultures, the “noble” Commonwealth identity was conceived as largely homogenous, with the Polish culture providing the basis for unification (Walicki 1997). While
Commonwealth laws extended membership in the Polish nation to non-Polish nobles, resulting in a great number of patriotic and culturally creative Poles (Bobrzyski 1987, Walicki 1997), at the same time, the notion of being a Pole became indelibly bound to noble status, thus severing the ties between Polish gentry and Polish peasantry into what historians have termed “two Polish nations” (e.g. Wereszycki 1990).

By the first half of the 18th century faced with growing domestic economic crises, under increasing pressure from the neighboring monarchies, with simmering unrest among the gentry and a growing impotence of the Polish monarch faced with an increasingly anarchic parliament, the Commonwealth saw its legitimacy challenged from within as well as from without. Two subsequent partitions – in 1793 and 1795 – erased the Polish state off the European map, with the only political unit bearing the name of Poland reduced to the minuscule Kingdom of Poland, a semi-autonomous unit of the Russian Empire (Figure 2). The uprisings that characterized the early years of the partitions would continue to be framed by a romanticized idealization of the old multiethnic and multi-religious Commonwealth, a Poland “of the borderlands where no differences would exist among the peoples of which it is composed - Polish, Lithuanian, German, Samogitian, Ruthenian.” (Walicki, 1997) Yet as leading Romantic historian, Joachim Lelewel (1864) mourned, the national germ would soon enter the discourse of the Polish national(ist) insurgency – particularly in the Russian and Prussian-dominated territories. There remained, however, a place where Polish national feeling would be channeled into the idealization of another institutionalized multi-national co-existence; where the multi-ethnic koiné of the Eastern borderlands would be preserved as ideal and practice, only now with better postal service: it would be the home of the Emperor’s peoples, Habsburg Galicia (Figure 2).

Although during the early decades of the partitions, Polish cultural life and national(ist) organizing efforts in the Habsburg territories were relatively underdeveloped, following Austria’s defeat by Prussia and the subsequent Ausgleich with Hungary in 1867, a significant shift occurred in the Austro-Polish relationship (Estreicher 1951, Kann 1977, Shedel 1983, Wandycz 1982). For the first time, Polish interests were acknowledged by Vienna in administrative fashion, with the granting of virtual autonomy to the Poles of Galicia. In the post-1866 period, this crownland was granted more privileges than any other province in the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy (Kann 1977, Shedel 1983). A Polish-dominated school board was added
to an already Polish-controlled provincial Diet, “thus giving Poles the means of ending the former policy of Germanisation and setting up a Polonised school system.” (Wandycz 1982, 85). In 1869, an Imperial decree established Polish as the language of the bureaucracy and of the courts within Galician provincial boundaries and, in 1870-1871, Polish was restored as the official language of instruction in the crownland’s two universities in Cracow and L’viv (Lwów). Politically, the viceroyalty was made a Polish monopoly and, in 1871, a Polish Landesminister for Galicia was made a permanent fixture of every Austrian cabinet. Poles began to be appointed to important ministerial posts in subsequent Habsburg cabinets, including those of prime minister. As Poles rose in the ranks of the Imperial bureaucracy, the Galician elite became a vital incubator of Polish national feeling, understandably so, as Poles’ status within the Habsburg realm stood in increasingly sharper contrast to the condition of their co-nationals in the Russian and Prussian empires.

It was simple pragmatism that proved most important in effecting a reconciliation between Galician Polish elites and the Empire (Wandycz 1982). The failure of the 1863 insurrection was seen as the convincing factor that turned the Polish leadership towards a settlement with Austria. “Austria threatened the Polish element far less than did Russia and Prussia and if the Poles were to breathe, they must form a kind of lung, some area relatively free for the development of their national culture, and in Russia and Prussia this was impossible” (Estreicher 1951: 444). It was this recognition, that would lead to the famous declaration of loyalty to the Habsburg Emperor issued by the Galician Diet on December 10, 1866, which described Austria as the defender of Polish national interest and the guardian of Western civilization in the Polish tradition: “Without fear of deserting our national ideal, believing in the mission of Austria and trusting in the durability of the changes announced by the monarch as his firm purpose, we declare from the bottom of our hearts that with thee, most illustrious lord, we stand and we will stand.” Allegiance to the Emperor as good Austrians placed Galician Poles on equal standing with the other peoples of the Empire and located them firmly within the Austro-German (and thus European) politico-cultural sphere. Perhaps even more importantly, however, such self-identification marked the difference of Galician Poles from the Slavic world that lay across the Imperial boundary. As Shedel (1983: 26) notes, the bulk of Polish political leaders “saw their national future in terms of some kind of relationship with Austria. Outside of their own conflict with the Ruthenians,
Galicia’s Poles had only slight interest in the problems of other Slavs. Particularly because of its Russian origins, Pan-Slavism captured the imagination of very few Poles.

Habsburg officials were well aware of the Poles anti-Russian sentiments. As Count Friedrich Beust, the Habsburg prime minister remarked, “by holding out the prospect for the reconstitution of the Polish state under Habsburg protection, hatred for Russia can become a pragmatic love for Austria” (cited in Wandycz, 1982). In fact, in subsequent years, Polish national leaders, such as the head of the Austrian Polish Social Democratic Party, Ignacy Daszyński, painted Galicia as a "Polish Piedmont", aiming to achieve Polish unity under the benevolent Habsburg umbrella (see Buszko 1989). The Galician Polish elites’ relationship with the Imperial project was also predetermined by their aristocratic origins. Before and after 1863, as Wandycz (1982: 83) has stressed, “the leading representatives of the Poles were conservatives, usually of gentry background, who felt little sympathy for radicalism or genuine democracy.” A conservative-aristocratic vision of Poland’s relationship vis-a-vis Austria that was also, however, the fruit of a rather distinct reinterpretation of the Polish past elaborated in the late 1860s by the so-called "Cracow Historical School" (Orton 1982, Buszko 1989). Arguing that the blame for the dismemberment of the Polish state lay primarily with the Poles themselves, as their political institutions and policies had bred anarchy, the historians of the Cracow School (led by Jozef Szujski, the first Chair of Polish History at the Jagiellonian University) rejected previous insurrections as disastrous for Polish interests and became the leading Polish proponents of loyalty to the Emperor. The Cracow school influenced a generation of political leaders thus tracing the outlines of a distinct Galician conservatism guided by “sober deliberation”, recourse only to legal means, “adherence to traditional verities” and loyalty to Austria as the rightful, legal heir to the crown of the old Polish Commonwealth.

The historians of the Cracow School also sought to re-frame the nation’s present and future place within Habsburg Europe. To this end, key institutions were needed, such as the Polish Academy of Learning (Akademia Umiejetnosti), founded in Cracow in 1872 and chaired by Szujski from its inception. Just as in other nationalizing projects of the late 1800s, the Academy not only designated a national scientific and cultural community but, also, its activities acted to legitimize the existence of a distinct, historical Polish culture as well as to locate it within a European cultural heritage of knowledge and learning; as Galician historian
Marceli Handelsman wrote, the Academy was “the only recognized representative in Europe of our tattered and suffering nation” (cited in Buszko 1989). It is thus due to the rights conferred by the Empire, that the Polish elite under Habsburg occupation would fast become Polish-speaking “Austrians”, with Galician loyalty to the Imperial project translating the Polish nobility and political leaders into fully fledged Europeans (Wiegandt 1988). The Polish elite under Habsburg occupation quickly became Polish-speaking “Austrians.”

The bureaucracy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire created a kind of a shared belonging in an “imagined community” based in the “interchangeability” of imperial subjects (Anderson 1983: 56).

Important to understanding the distinct place and time that was Habsburg Galicia, however, is its self-representation as an Arcadian space of felicitous co-existence of peoples, cultures and languages at the borders of the Empire - "Galicia Felix." Galicia was, then, both a mirror, a reduced representation of the multi-lingual, multi-cultural Habsburg co-existence - a part reflecting the unity of the greater whole – and also a vital, emblematic “piece” necessary to the construction of the vision of the Empire and the Emperor’s “peoples”. The Galician adhesion to the Habsburg ideal was not unique. Numerous observers from Kann (1973) to Le Rider (1995) to Magris (1963; 1986) have, in fact, stressed that the most fervent “Austrians” were to be found precisely on the peripheries of the Empire: in Bohemia, Galicia, or on the shores of the Adriatic. To understand the myth of Galicia, then, we turn to an examination of the Habsburg myth itself.

**The Habsburg Myth:** Myth-making, following Barthes (1957), can be considered as the ways in which a civilization or society attempts to render the plurality of social, political and cultural realities into a unity, reducing the chaos of the world into an order, fragmented and accidental existence into essence and historico-political contradictions into a harmonious whole. In the Habsburg case, however, the myth-making took the form of “the sublimation of a concrete society into a picturesque, safe and orderly fairy-tale world” (Magris 1963: 15). The myth which not only derived from an ideal time-space, but was one upon which that time-space was actively built in practice, the “good old days when there was still such a place as Imperial Austria” (Musil, 1953). Musil in Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften (1953), describes the Empire as having a" paper-white arm of government holding the provinces in firm embrace. And what provinces! There were glaciers and the sea, the Carso and the cornfields of Bohemia, nights by the Adriatic restless with the chirping of
cicadas, and Slovakian villages where the smoke rose from the chimneys as from upturned nostrils, the village curled up between two little hills as though the earth had parted its lips to warm its child between them."

The Empire was thus an ideal beyond time - beyond History (with History coming to equal progress and modernity). As the rightful heir of the spirit of the Holy Roman Empire, it embodied both the universalism of European culture and the role of mediator between East and West, with its paternalistic myth of the “peoples” running counter to the national ideal that was heir to the French Revolution. Emperor Franz Josef’s invocation of Meine Völker (my peoples) thus denoted not merely a symbol but, rather, the very ideological basis of the Imperial project in its struggle against the emergent ideal of the modern territorial nation-state. The Habsburg vision, in fact, offered an alternative vision of governance and community in the heyday of nationalism, opposing “an organic pluricultural, pluriethnic and multinational totality, cemented by the legitimacy of the ruling house and a web of geopolitical alliances” (Le Rider 1995, 54) to the emergent Prussian statist ideal, with its particularism, its romanticization of the one and only (German) Volk, and its idealization of the ties of blood, soil and belonging (Blut und Boden). The Habsburg Empire would ask of its subjects “that they not only be Germans, Ruthenians, or Poles, but something more, something above”; it required “a true sacrificial nation” (Werfel, 1936; 19). The supra-national ethnico-cultural Oikumene that strove to transcend the nation both as an exclusive territorial ideal, as well as the exclusive claimant of identity, “an indefinable Stimmung binding Bohemia and Galicia, Hungary and Moravia, bringing together all origins into a harmonious unity”; … (the land where “everyone was born zwölfstimmig” (Magris 1963, 55, 70) – with twelve tongues and twelve souls. The Habsburg project of “unity in diversity” is perhaps best embodied in the monumental work entitled Der Österreichisch-Ungarische Monarchie in Wort und Bild, the first volume of which was published in 1886 and which was completed in the first decade of the 1900s. Within this encyclopaedic endeavour, each province of the Empire was the subject of historical, ethnographic, geographical and statistical monographs, highlighting their distinctive regional characteristics while also, however, stressing the “common soul” bringing together the “Emperor’s peoples” (Kann 1973, Le Rider 1995).
In Galicia, the souls and tongues were at least three, Yiddish, Polish and Ukrainian. In the eastern part of the province (now in Ukraine), Jews and Poles predominated in the urban areas whilst Ukrainians were mostly of rural stock. And just as the Habsburg myth writ large would combine the cosmology of a universal, multi-cultural and multi-lingual family with an idealisation of regional particularisms—the many homes of the many peoples under the Emperor’s benevolent gaze—so too in Habsburg Galicia—and its later mythologization—the almost visceral memory of home would become inseparable from a broader European-federalist vision. A key component of the myth is its vision of modern history as the break-up of the universal, Latin and unitarian Europe, a parable of decline, tracing a progression into chaos from Erasmus to Luther to Frederick II, from Napoleon to Bismarck to modern dictatorships. As in the Habsburg myth, Galicia’s imaginary came to symbolize a “being beyond history”, an ideal chronotype of “tam i kiedys” (“there, once upon a time”) countered to the determinate “here and now” (Wiegandt, 1988). To its inhabitants and narrators during the years of Habsburg rule—as well as its subsequent bards—Galicia represents the antithesis to the traditional Polish national(ist) historicism and romantic-messianic tradition, that of the high-moral vision of Poland as the “Christ of nations”. Habsburg Galicia emerges, rather, as a lost private homeland, where “one could be what one wanted to be”, where the prevalent definition of belonging was tutejszy (one from here) (Wiegandt 1988, Applebaum 1994).

The prevalent topos of the Galician myth, in fact, is that of the landscape of childhood, representing an ideal time/space but also a time/space of indeterminacy that was undefined and never fully definable (culturally, ethnically) borderlands, an “unstable geography”, as Günter Grass calls the Danzig (Gdansk) of his youth. It is the advent of the modern nation-state that would freeze this flux and enforce categorical choices, robbing the peoples of these borderlands of even the ability to name the places of their birth. The principal city of eastern Galicia, now L’viv (Ukrainian) can be variously found on maps, old and new, as Lemberg (the Austrian denomination), Lwów (Polish), or L’vov (Russian). Galicia is thus remembered as “the last Europe”, a multi-national cosmos swept away in the chaos of the two world wars and the consequent imposition of categorical choices of language, nationality and ideological bloc.
The particularity of the Habsburg order was also based in a distinct co-existence of “shared institutions and private homelands.” As Anderson (1983) notes, the ease with which the Empire was able to sustain its rule over immensely heterogeneous, and often not even contiguous, populations for long periods of time relied on the porosity and plurality of the imperial identity. This identity that demanded only partial allegiance and never strove to impose the bounded and historicized homogeneity of national belonging. The inhabitants of Habsburg Galicia could thus be both citizens of Europe as well as locals (tutejszy): versed in the common cultural signifying code that granted every absolvent of a Habsburg gymnasium, from the common postal clerk to Cabinet ministers, “a knowledge of all that which, through the ages, formed what we term “modern civilisation” (Wiegandt 1988, 27) but also in the “Geschäftsprache” of everyday life that in Galicia, most often indicated a fluid mix of Polish, Yiddish, Ukrainian and German, almost incomprehensible to outsiders.

The eternal Habsburg ideal of the reconciliation of difference was ensured by the Imperial bureaucracy that reached out into the corners of its territories – even into the remote shtetls of the Galician plains. The laws of the Empire, similarly, guaranteed individual and local freedoms, albeit under the Emperor’s watchful eyes. Wiegandt (1988) provides a wonderful anecdote of the “local” interpretation the 1867 constitution by one Galician postmaster Article 19 of the new constitution pronounced the equality of all peoples within the Empire and their rights to the protection and cultivation of their nationality and language. The official thus translated the proclamation to the small-town subjects: “Our Emperor tells us, writes in bold letters black on white, gold on silver: ‘people, be what you wish to be – of divine or human faith, peasant or noble, baptised or Jewish, Latin or Uniate, Turkish or Bosnian, Armenian, Gypsy, or – if it suits you, it suits me. Do not worry about your faith, nor that of anyone else; faith is like skin - none can be blamed for their own skin. I, the Emperor, like your skin. I ask you kindly only for one thing: do not bring shame to the Emperor. And do well, do your best, I know you are capable of it. That will be very nice, that will make me quite happy’. Signed, your Emperor, Franz-Josef.”

As many historical commentators have noted (Buszko 1989, Kann and David 1984, Wereszycki 1990), national belonging in Austrian Galicia was never all too clear. It was, as Wiegandt (1988, 39) terms it,
“faded... an “outline of official belonging [the Austrian one], within a chiaroscuro of variously fading and emerging shades of other “we’s”. What is key is that national or ethnic belonging did not constitute the primary focus of identification, and certainly not the most important one which guided everyday existence – and determined an individual’s life chances and her/ his place in Galician society. In fact, Habsburg Galicia was the quintessential liminal community, characterized by unstable belongings and identities combined and recombined daily in an endless tangle of shifting configurations (Chelbowczyk 1975), reconfigurations and re-representations that could take place from one conversation to the next – depending on the interlocutor. Belonging, when delimited, was traced along class and religious divides – peasant, noble, Uniate, Jewish - although it was the attribute of “tutejszy” which traced the sharpest confines, with only those “not from here” considered as “Others” though if Imperial subjects, still envisioned as part of a broader commonality that included all the Emperor’s “peoples”. Despite the official pronouncements from Vienna and the rosy-colored Habsburg myth, not all inter-ethnic relations were peaceful in the Habsburg provinces. In eastern Galicia, for one, Greek Catholic “Uniates” struggled to maintain their rites and customs while promoting a Ruthenian (Ukrainian) nationalism identity in the face of Polish opposition, at times with Imperial support as a counter-weight to Polish regional supremacy (Himka, 1999a). Himka’s work (1983, 1988) also highlights the grassroots origins of Ukrainian nationalism in the Galician villages of the late 19th century, and the competing socialist movements of Poles and Ukrainians, as well as the ways in which Ukrainian nationalism, suppressed by Austrian and later Polish control up to 1939, could be perverted by the Nazis to perpetrate anti-Semitic acts of perversity against the Jews of Galicia, who historically had tended to support the dominant political nationality and to assimilate to the dominant national culture (Himka, 1999b). In the district of Chelm, just north of the Galician border, Jews had been the most significant “Others” for Poles, to be superceded by Ukrainians after the end of Communism (Hann, 1997).

**Jewish Galicia:** The Galician chiaroscuro of identities and its theorization by elite intellectuals (but also its practice in daily life) would have been inconceivable without its significant Jewish presence (Applebaum 1994, Le Rider 1995, Magris 1963, 1986) – just as the Habsburg *koinè* with its enormous intellectual contribution to
modern European culture, is inconceivable without the Jewish cultural elite which represented "its intellectual content, a condensed version of its spirit, creators of its spiritual unity" (Kundera 1983).2

The Jewish presence in Galicia is age-old: as Poland expanded eastwards in the 15th and 16th centuries, Jews were encouraged by the monarchy to settle in the eastern territories of the republic, in the lands of present day Belarus, Lithuania and Ukraine. With the partitions of Poland, most of the areas of heaviest Jewish presence fell under Russian rule. Tsarist authorities were fast to discipline the Jewish population by placing stringent restrictions on the movement of Jews to other parts of the Russian Empire, constraining them to remain in the ex-Polish lands which came to be known as the Pale of Settlement, or simply the "Pale" (Magosci 1993, 107). Along with the provinces of the Pale, Galicia came to represent the heartland of Ashkenazi Jewry. Of the estimated 7.5 million Jews living in Eastern Europe in the early years of this century, over 70% lived in the Pale and Galicia. Jews made up 30% of the population of both Cracow and L'viv (Lwów) and over 50% in a number of other key Galician towns such as Brody, Sanok, Ivano-Frankivs'k (Stanislawów) and Ternopil (Tarnopol). With the outbreak of pogroms in the Russian Empire in the 1880s and early 1900s, many other Jews sought refuge in neighboring Galicia and Bukovina (Rozenblit 1992).

Jews made up a vital part of Galicia's multi-national, multi-cultural koinè and numerous outstanding Jewish political figures and scholars, such as Isaac Deutscher, Karl Radek, and Martin Buber were born or raised in Galicia. Significant portions of both Zionist, as well as Jewish socialist, movements can, in fact, trace their origins to Galician Jewish intellectuals. Galician Jews were, as Le Rider (1995) notes, the quintessential Habsburg citizens of the "shtetl and the world": a widely diverse community which brought together conservative Hasidim and the progressive intelligentsia, those advocating Polonization and ardent Germanophiles, or those, following in the footsteps of Emil Byk's Shomer Israel movement (founded in L'viv in 1867) who declared with pride 'We are Austrians' (Wrobel 1994, 115). The opposition of a "good" Austria to a "barbaric" Russia formed a common theme in Galician Jewish prose, as did the paternal figure of the

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2 On the role of Jewish cultural and intellectual elite in fin de siècle Vienna see Schorske (1980), Janik & Toulmin (1973); also the 1998 volume (drawing on the exhibition of the same name) LeVie del Mondo: Berlino, Budapest, Praga, Vienna e Trieste. Intellettuali Ebrei e Cultura Europea dal 1880 al 1930.
benevolent Franz Josef who watched over Galicia’s Jewry: A contemporary writer remarked: “This is Austria, and not Chisinau (Moldova, the site of a horrifying Tsar-inspired pogrom in 1903). And thank god, such things will never happen here as long as the Emperor looks over us” (Stryjkowski 1966, 45). It was Jewish artists and intellectuals, such as Emil Franzos, Joseph Roth, Manes Sperber, Bruno Schultz, and Andrzej Kusniewicz who first raised the cry of alarm at the dismemberment of the Galician Babel, as the Habsburg Dream slid into a nightmare of language laws, ethnic registers and violent national revindications. (Prager 1995, Wrobel 1994), the worst of which would culminate in the pogroms of 1918-21 and in the Holocaust, 1939-45.

**Borders and Geopolitical Games**

The institutional attempts at the delimitation of the Galician space along national and ethnic lines - and the beginnings of the slow death of the Habsburg ideal of “unity in diversity” - date to the 1896-7 Austrian electoral reform that would, for the first time ever, demarcate constituencies along ethnic lines, through the construction of ethnically or linguistically separate voters' registers (the famed nationale Kataster). The primacy of ethnic divides tended not only to de-emphasize (and, to some extent, delegitimize) the traditional role afforded to the provinces and to the Imperial government but also, perhaps even more importantly, “reduced the position of the individual as citizen of the state, stressing, instead, the individual's role as a member of an ethnic group” (Stourzh 1991, 19). As Jacques Le Rider (1995) notes, from the Emperor’s Meine Völker, a historical organic pluri-cultural unity cemented together by dynastic right, the citizens of Austria would now become “nationals”, with the structuration of public bodies along ethnic lines producing the entirely new need to attribute ethnic membership to individuals: “constrained by the nationalism of others to become a nation”, as Joseph Roth (1985) would note of the period in his collection of essays “Juden auf Wanderschaft”.

Individuals were now supposed to delimit their belonging to one collectivity, the Volksstamm a trend that had a number of consequences. First, it tended to put a premium on persons who not merely belonged clearly to one or the other nationality, but on those who were “nationally minded.” (Stourzh 1991) and thus
deemed particularly qualified, for example, to serve on provincial school boards. Not only; the Imperial state was now “objectively” able to attribute ethnic membership to persons on the basis of evidence gathered through official questionnaires. The venerable Habsburg census began to include a linguistic questionnaire only in 1880. According to the 1880 census, Poles made up 51% of the Galician population, while Ukrainians/ Ruthenians accounted for 43%. As Wereszycki (1990, 141) notes, however, the Polish figure included the bulk of Galicia’s significant Jewish population who, for the purposes of the census (in which nationality was determined by language – Polish, German or Ukrainian) were identified as Poles. The modern ideal of a nation bound to a distinct territorial base thus slowly supplanted previously dominant Austro-Marxist conceptions of freely-chosen nationality within which nationality could attach to persons, wherever they lived and whoever they lived with, at any rate if they chose to claim it (Hobsbawn 1990).

The shape of the newly-independent Poland was determined at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Added to the former Polish Kingdom were the former Prussian provinces of Posen (Poznan) and parts of West Prussia; the city of Gdansk/ Danzig was granted the status of an independent city-state, while plebiscites were scheduled for parts of East Prussia and Upper Silesia to determine the areas’ national status, German or Polish. The final settlement of Poland’s eastern boundary proved most problematic, particularly in Galicia, where Polish leaders disputed Ukrainian claims to territories east of the San River. With the collapse of Habsburg rule on November 1st, 1918, local Ukrainian leaders proclaimed the birth of the West Ukrainian People’s Republic, which claimed all Galician lands east of the San as well as northern Bukovina and Carpathian Rus. The Republic encountered stiff opposition from Galician Poles and conflict soon precipitated into a Polish-Ukrainian war that lasted until the summer of 1919 when the Ukrainian forces were driven out of Galicia (Kozlowski 1990). As Magocsi (1993, 127) notes, the Allied powers were concerned above all with the threat of Bolshevik revolution from the East and thus acquiesced to Polish demands to occupy Eastern Galicia in temporary fashion. The Treaty of St. Germain (September 1919) granted only those territories west of the San to Poland, leaving the final disposition of Eastern Galicia unresolved. In December 1919, British statesman Lord Curzon suggested two possible boundaries through Galicia, one of which served as the southernmost extension of what he proposed should be Poland’s eastern frontier along the so-called
Curzon Line (Figure 3). Should Eastern Galicia become an independent Ukrainian republic, then the first Curzon variant would be accepted; should such a republic not be recognized, then the second variant, which was further east and included L’viv (Lwów) would serve as Poland’s border (Figure 3). In fact, neither of these variants nor any subsequent proposals were accepted by Poland, whose annexation of all of East Galicia was recognized in March 1923 (Magosci 1993, 127). The Curzon Line thus came to identify the maximum territorial reach of Soviet political influence in Europe and in the years to come provided “both a reference in the discussion on state boundaries in Eastern Europe and a political rationale for the new Soviet boundary” (Kordan 1997: 705).

Although the inter-war Polish state vociferously asserted its claims to what it pronounced as its national territories (and despite the increasingly national(istic) attacks of certain political forces such as Roman Dmowski’s National Democrats), Poland remained a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural state; in 1931, ethnic Poles made up only 69% of the population. The Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and its charismatic leader and military hero, Józef Piłsudski, actively combated the conception of an ethnically-based Polish nationalism as intolerant, xenophobic and counter to Poland’s very nature: in the independent, democratic Poland to come, the legacy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as a historico-political community should, the PPS stressed, be preserved at all costs. Piłsudski’s vision, in fact, accurately reflected European liberal conceptions of the principle of nationality. As Hobsbawm (1990, 44) notes, it hardly mattered to Piłsudski that, prior to liberation, most Polish-speaking peasants did not feel themselves to be national Poles: “It is the state which makes the nation and not the nation the state” Piłsudski proclaimed. The territorial claims to the lands of Eastern Galicia advanced by the PPS drew, therefore, more on the federalist ideals of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Habsburg Empire, than any nationalist claims to a national territory. Piłsudski, who envisioned the state as the active shaper/constructor of the nation to come understood the powerful symbolic potential of the Eastern territories - but did not advance ethnically-based claims to their Polish belonging.

The violent national struggles, 1914-20, and the subsequent national re-partitioning of the Habsburg lands did not succeed, however, in fully purifying the East Central European spaces - and certainly not those
of Galicia. That task was to be accomplished by Nazi Germany first and completed by post-war planners later. By 1945, the “Final Solution” had eliminated 5.4 million of Eastern and Central European Jews, erasing almost all traces of the vibrant Aszkenazim communities in Galicia and the Pale (Himka 1999b). Another 9-10 million people - Roma, Poles, Ukrainians, Belorussians and Russians - were killed in the Nazi sweep. The multi-national dream of the Habsburgs - Karl Renner’s ideal of “freely chosen nationalisms” barely alive after the strife of World War I and the interwar years - would die at Auschwitz. The Allied post-war project for the re-ordering of the Eastern borderlands of Europe, though clothed in the rhetoric of peace and political stability, in epistemological terms lay perfectly in line with the “pure cartography” of politics put into practice by Nazi geopoliticians (Raffestin, Lopreno & Pasteur, 1995).

By the war’s end, it became common dogma to assert that it was the presence of large numbers of ethno-linguistic minorities within the states of East-Central Europe that constituted one of the major factors that contributed to political instability during the inter-war years (Magosci, 1993). The apparent solution would lie with “bringing some logic to the map of Europe” (Kordan 1997) and though substantial tensions existed on the specific details, there was little fundamental disagreement among the members of the victorious Grand Alliance on the necessity of sorting out the demographic mixture of the East. To clean up the Eastern European space, populations needed to be realigned to conform to the new state borders: between 1944 and 1948, no less than 31 million people were uprooted and moved from their homes as part of organized population transfers and forced resettlement (Magosci 1993, 164). The new boundary between Poland and the Soviet Union – designated by the Curzon Line – cut clear across the province, and its “enforcement” necessitated a massive population exchange between - as well as within - the two countries. The new border was, as Kordan (1997: 705) notes, considered “diplomatically convenient”, most importantly since it “satisfied Soviet geostrategic demands” but also since it “resolved once and for all the vexing Polish Question which for so long threatened the victorious Grand Alliance and promised to compromise Allied post-war relations.” Simply put, the line was “just and right”, as Winston Churchill proclaimed following the Yalta conference.
From the Soviet perspective, however, for the new border to be “just and right” certain complicating demographic issues had to settled. First, there was the problem of the large Polish population which now found itself on the “wrong” side of the border, in the USSR; similarly, a sizeable Ukrainian population was “separated” from its now ordained “ethnolinguistic homeland” in the Ukrainian SSR. The solution was to be found in a program of forced population transfer that swept through communities on both sides of the new border, uprooting and resettling over 1.4 million individuals, including 810,000 Polish inhabitants of former Eastern Galicia and Volhynia, and 630,000 individuals identified with the Ukrainian ethnolinguistic community coming primarily from the borderlands of Podlachia, Chelm, Jaroslaw and the Lemko region (Kordan, 1997). In the Soviet Union, ethnic Poles and Jews who were citizens of Poland prior to 1939 and wished to leave were allowed to register for resettlement along with members of their immediate family: 882,000 registered for the patriation. (Kordan 1997, 707). Those fleeing were predominantly Polish urban dwellers from the key historical centers of Polish settlement in Eastern Galicia, Lviv (Lwów), Ternopil (Ternopol), Ivano-Frankivsk (Stanisławów) and Drohobych. Although the Polish anti-Communist underground, Airmia Krajowa (Home Army) appealed to the Galician Poles to oppose resettlement efforts, and attempted to organize local resistance, such resistance was limited and sporadic (Albert 1989, Magosci 1993, Kordan 1997). On the Polish side of the border, between October 1944 and September 1946, 497,680 Ukrainians registered for patriation, settling primarily in the Ternopil’, Ivano-Frankivsk and L’viv oblasts (Kordan 1997). Hoping to conclude the operation in relatively rapid time, by December 31 1945, Polish and Soviet authorities abandoned the relatively passive character of the resettlement efforts engaging the aid of special Polish and Soviet internal security forces. Within the course of a single year (July 1945-July 1946) some 400,000 were uprooted and deported (Kordan 1997). The violence of the campaign spurred on popular resistance - channeled into support for the Ukrainian nationalist insurgency - the “Ukrains’ka Povstan’ka Armiia” (UPA) which had been operating underground in Galicia since 1943 against both German and Soviet forces. To extirpate resistance, a definitive solution took the form of a concerted operation of the Polish, Soviet and Czechoslovak military forces aimed at relocating the entire remaining population: the “Akcja Wisła”, carried out between April 29th and July 31st 1947. Villages throughout the borderlands were emptied
and 139,467 persons were deported in the two month period and dispersed throughout the newly acquired territories in western and northeastern Poland. The Habsburg dream of mixed populations living under the benevolent gaze of the Emperor was finally put to flight.

Galicia and Contemporary Geo-strategic Orders

In our introduction, we alluded to the ways in which the dreams of Galicians and the present re-territorializations of these “lands between” meld into a much broader re-configuration of Europe after the demise of the Cold War geopolitical order. It is here, in fact, at the Polish/Ukrainian borderlands that a new geopolitical “crush zone” - a new “iron curtain” of belonging - is fast taking form (for preliminary theorizations of this emergent divide see Huntington 1996, Kolossov and O’Loughlin 1999, O’Loughlin 2000). Ukraine is, increasingly, finding itself on the eastern side of the new divide. In Spring 1999, Poland announced a new, highly restrictive visa regime for Ukrainian (and other ex-Soviet) citizens, “to conform with future EU norms.” As the Polish Foreign Ministry justified; “These measures are being implemented only to stop criminal flows, and are certainly not meant to regiment the flows of goods and law-abiding people. We have a very good relationship with the Ukraine”. As expected, Ukrainians, both government and citizen groups, reacted vociferously. The Ukrainian National Committee for the Defense of National Borders recently declared a new set of rules regimenting foreigners’ stay and movements in border areas. According to the new ordinance, the term “border area” would no longer apply merely to the 5km strip of territory along the Ukraine’s national boundary, but would now comprise the entire territory of all border rayons (counties). All foreigners present in or passing through these areas should, at all times, be in the possession of a legal document attesting “their necessity to be in that particular place”. Such documents could be obtained only with the permission of the Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior in Kiev (Rzeczpospolita, 1999).

Although Poland is, in many senses, on the “right side” of the new divide, the international community’s - as well as the Polish state’s - recent boundary-drawing exercises are not passing by uncontested. To the tune of “Huntington go home!”, numerous Polish commentators have, in fact, assailed the tracing of a civilizational watershed along the country’s eastern borderlands. Popular commentator
Ludwik Stomma (whose 1997 editorial coined the above battle-cry) for one, labelled Huntington a fanatic and a fascist, “severing the world into pieces” and called upon Polish national leaders to restrain themselves from facile enthusiasm for a Western “club” that operates on the principle of exclusion. “I want no part of a West that ends somewhere before Lwów and Nowogrodek”... no part of a West ... based on the principle of division: proposing a world view based solely in fear. And fear – fear of the other – always breeds hate”.

Back in Galicia, the Cracow City Council (Rada Miasta Krakowa) (as well as a number of other local/ regional actors and institutions) have also become increasingly vocal on matters that are, usually, the province of national policy-making bodies, most visibly that of foreign policy. In particular, since 1990, Galician actors have taken an increasingly active role in shaping Polish state policy towards Ukraine, while also cultivating a broad dialogue and exchange program with cities in Western Ukraine and organizing trips and exchanges. In fact, a number of associations active in promoting dialogue with “the lands of Eastern Galicia” (now Western Ukraine) operate in Cracow, from the Fundacja Sw Włodzimierza Chrzciciela Rusi Kijowskiej (promoting Ukrainian culture in Poland and publishing an almanac entitled “Between Neighbors” under the auspices of the Jagiellonian University) to the Zwiazek Wysiedlonych, disseminating historical documents and raising awareness about the post-World War II resettlement activities on both sides of the border as well as organizing exchanges and trips for those resettled and their families to “home places” such as Belz, Sokol and Krystynopol.

Such local “scale-jumping” strategies (see Smith 1993) of empowerment had been put into practice quite successfully by Galician economic actors ever since the Iron Curtain came down, with local entrepreneurs and Chamber of Commerce leaders rapidly launching themselves and their regions into international trade and capital investment networks, long before national bodies regulating this activity had been set up. Trade and traffic across Poland’s Eastern borders, however, continue to be severely hindered by lengthy delays, with waiting times for trucks lasting up to 24-36 hours at Kukuryki on the Belarussian crossing (Warsaw Voice, 9 May 1999). Ukraine has consistently appealed to Poland to keep the border open, allowing the 6 million Ukrainians, most of whom are chelnoki (shuttle traders) to continue to have access to Polish market-places and kiosks (Turek, 1998) and Warsaw seems to want to keep a special status for Ukrainians
whilst instituting ever stricter visa controls for Belarussians and Russians (Pidlutsky, 1998). Recent imposition by the Czech Republic of visa controls on Ukrainians, that Poland, Slovakia and Hungary are expected to imitate, will lead to further feelings of isolation in Ukraine (Sych, 2000). A key element of Ukrainian foreign policy is, in fact, the future acquisition of associate membership in the EU, hoping to thus benefit through a lowered tariff regime. At present, however, customs and other border controls act as significant barriers on the Polish-Ukrainian border. Traders often have to wait up to four days travelling east at the Ukrainian border crossings and trade is severely hindered by bribery and petty regulations (Korshak, 1999). L’viv, 60 kilometers from the Polish border, received only 20,000 foreign tourists in 1998 (Gorchinskaya, 1999) despite the city’s designation as a UNESCO world heritage site and its wealth of Habsburg era buildings, streetscapes and low prices, redolent of Prague in 1989 before mass tourism invaded that other Imperial jewel.

Although the Cold War-era Soviet border is no more, the barbed-wire fences and restrictions on the free movement of goods and people remain, now more than ever, with the now-post-Soviet border fences forcing trans-border traffic into a few bottlenecks that function as centers of corruption, bribery and scandal (Warner, 1998). Although the geopolitical imaginations of – and policy prescriptions for – the “New Europe” embrace the iconography of unbounded spaces, “free of past dividing lines”, the reality on the ground is vastly different. Post-Soviet fears have, in fact, made the Polish-Ukrainian border highly contested, the NATO expansion process being a case in point. Alongside a variety of discourses of “righting past wrongs” and admitting “worthy” and “historically democratic” nations under the Alliance’s umbrella, the prevalent thrust of the expansion rhetoric would centers precisely upon the importance of re-instituting a proper/just/moral European order. NATO pundits claim “one Europe for all”, a Europe without divides, without the rigid frontier lines signed by Cold War geopolitics, or now the EU’s increasingly exclusionary “Euro-curtain”. In fact, Alliance leaders would stress on numerous occasions the open and “un-accomplished” nature of the NATO expansion process, noting that the enlargement “would not be a one-time event, but a process that will continue after the first round” (see Bia³asiewicz, 1999).

U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright has also been busy singing the praises of the demise of “a system of interstate relations in which everyone had to choose a side”: with the collapse of the bipolar order,
states (like Poland and the Ukraine) would finally be “free” to pursue a “multi-vectored” foreign policy, oriented towards both the East and the West. In a March 1998 speech in Kyiv, Albright declared: “I think that the most important feature of our new era is that we are trying very hard to erase the dividing lines in Europe ... We believe that the era of the zero sum - where if one side wins, the other side loses - is over” (cited in Clover 1999). Just weeks later, agreements codifying NATO’s new walls began to be drafted.

Conclusions

The story of the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands cannot be reduced to a dichotomy between dreams of pacific co-existence and rigid civilizational or security water-sheds. Just as the U.S. foreign policy community lauds the open spaces of the New Europe, it busies itself in constructing new walls; so too are Galician dreams being seized upon by the Polish state to promote and justify a series of geopolitical positionings that are anything but inclusive. Polish Ostpolitik has, in fact, been assailed by many Ukrainian leaders as replicating the worst of the past, with Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek’s (1999) recent statements regarding Poland’s role in guiding the Ukraine to a free market economy and liberal democracy - and thus “into the west” - sounding to some Ukrainian commentators like “the sound of the returning pary” (Polish nobility or landed gentry).

The Galician ideal of the multicultural border-space - what Le Rider (1995) characterizes as the secret of its “always unaccomplished identity” - is precisely the cartographic chaos of East Central Europe that so frightens policy makers and amateur geopoliticians alike. The tracing of borderlines is always an inherently violent act - operating both a material, as well as symbolic violence, enforcing a simplification of territory, identity and belonging - as well as of the ways to represent these elements (Ara and Magris 1982, Zanini 1997). The foremost scholar of the Habsburg myth, Claudio Magris (1986, 1999), in fact, takes de Certeau’s (1984) distinction a step further. There are endless stories possible about border-spaces, he notes; the border-line, however, has – and can only have - but one story – a singular, undisputed narrative determined by sheer force. There are many stories of Galicia, some certainly more relevant than others (“relevant” as shared geographical representations/ territorial ideologies that organize action – see Dematteis,
Some are shared geographical representations/territorial ideologies that organize action. All exist, however, in opposition to the cartographic reality of the Polish-Ukrainian border.

One border narrative is the project for the Carpathian Euroregion, promoted by the Council of Europe and the Soros Foundation with the aim of “promoting cross-border cooperation and harmonization, especially in the fields of cultural and educational matters, among the border territories of the Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary” (Carpathian Euroregion 1995) The Euroregion, first proposed in 1992, brings together the Polish border provinces of Przemysl and Krosno, and the Ukrainian oblasts of Chernovtsy, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Zakarpatska, along with a number of Slovakian and Hungarian border counties and, as noted above, specifies a whole series of agreements and co-operation agreements in fields as varied as environmental protection, economic development and trade, tourism and cultural and historical preservation. In the discourses of the Euroregions, fluidity of borders is seen as a sign of Europeanization and of progress towards a natural state. The extent to which Euroregionalization matches the vision and hopes of its promoters will be a good indicator of the relative importance of the Habsburg ideal and the national agenda in the post-Cold War of Eastern-Central Europe.

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