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## Engendering Social Capital: Women Workers and Rural–Urban Networks in Indonesia’s Crisis

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**Summary.** — Recent approaches to social capital have cautioned against the view that social networks are resources to be called upon in times of crisis. We contribute a feminist perspective to this argument and call attention to the gendered power relations of social capital and social networks. We draw on field studies that examine women migrants’ rural–urban networks in two regions of Indonesia during the 1997–99 economic crisis period. Our findings direct attention toward the gender-specific limitations of social capital as a resource for development, and identify some ways in which the costs and benefits of social capital are organized by gender.

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*Key words* — social capital, gender, Indonesia, Asia, social networks, economic crisis

### 20 1. INTRODUCTION

21 During Indonesia’s most recent economic  
22 crisis (1997–99), urban poverty and unemploy-  
23 ment, coupled with the possibility of reverse  
24 migration, prompted a renewed interest in the  
25 social networks that link rural and urban re-  
26 gions of the country. Policy makers and lenders  
27 viewed rural areas as a source of solutions for  
28 urban economic hardship and as a “sink” for  
29 the social unrest that was widely regarded as an  
30 “urban” issue (Booth, 2000; Cameron, 1999;  
31 Manning, 2000; World Bank, 1998). Ministers  
32 in the Suharto administration argued that ag-  
33 riculture “should be the backbone for future  
34 growth,” a view echoed by the World Bank  
35 when in June 1998 it offered a US\$400 million  
36 loan to rejuvenate the rural sector of the  
37 economy (McBeth, 1998a), and provided funds  
38 for a national “social safety net” program  
39 (Ananta & Siregar, 1999). The Indonesian  
40 government made efforts to “whisk the unem-  
41 ployed off to the countryside as quickly as  
42 possible” in order to curtail the rising political  
43 tensions that their presence in urban areas  
44 seemed to be stimulating (Manning & van Di-  
45 erman, 2000; McBeth, 1998b). In addition,

state agencies strengthened the mechanisms 46  
aimed at preventing new migrants from enter- 47  
ing the capital city, and encouraged rural-re- 48  
turn migration by offering travel discounts to 49  
migrants returning from Jakarta to their rural 50  
home villages for the Muslim *Lebaran* holiday 51  
(McBeth, 1998b).<sup>1</sup> Overall, these policy shifts 52  
reflected the view that migrants’ rural–urban 53  
social networks could provide a safety net for 54  
them during this period of crisis (World Bank, 55  
1998, 2000b). 56

Recent research on social networks in Indo- 57  
nesia has examined the role of social capital in 58

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59 low-income people's approaches to coping with  
60 resource shortage (Grootaert, 1999; Narayan,  
61 1999; World Bank, 2000a). In this literature,  
62 social capital is generally conceived in gender-  
63 blind terms that give little attention to gendered  
64 intrahousehold issues of power and hierarchy  
65 (but see Hendityo & Gill, 1999 for an impor-  
66 tant exception). In this paper, we argue for a  
67 more complete picture of social capital, specif-  
68 ically one that includes attention to the gen-  
69 dered and intergenerational conflicts and  
70 hierarchies within social networks, and the  
71 broader context of gender difference within  
72 which social networks are forged. In addition,  
73 we illustrate the importance of examining these  
74 issues *in specific circumstances*, as social net-  
75 works provide distinct advantages and demand  
76 particular contributions from women in differ-  
77 ent contexts. To this end, we analyze two sep-  
78 arate case studies that reveal the shifting and  
79 dynamic nature of female migrant networks in  
80 Indonesia. We examine the tensions that have  
81 arisen in the two networks over young women's  
82 factory work and remittances, and the kinds of  
83 complex social relations that are forged  
84 through distinct processes in the two networks  
85 during the recent economic crisis. Attention to  
86 the gendered power dynamics of the social  
87 networks reveals the ways in which network  
88 relationships are themselves sites of struggle,  
89 contest, and negotiation. The focus on these  
90 tensions extends recent scholarship that exam-  
91 ines the "downside" of social capital (see Por-  
92 tes, 1998 for a review; Portes & Landolt, 2000),  
93 and these findings orient attention to the gen-  
94 dered costs and benefits of participation in so-  
95 cial networks.

96 There is substantial debate surrounding the  
97 precise definition of social capital. Neverthe-  
98 less, the concept is generally agreed to refer to  
99 the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue  
100 of membership in social networks or other so-  
101 cial structures (Bourdieu, 1977; Coleman, 1988;  
102 Portes, 1998, p. 6). The concept has become  
103 important in development studies for several  
104 reasons. First, social capital is understood as  
105 those aspects of social relations that can be  
106 converted into other forms of capital (i.e.,  
107 economic or cultural), and analysis of it is  
108 thought to thereby help explain how individu-  
109 als can improve or maintain their positions in  
110 society (Bourdieu, 1977; Portes, 1998). Second,  
111 the concept is argued to have much to offer in  
112 directing attention towards aspects of devel-  
113 opment other than economic growth (Bebb-  
114 ington, 1999). Third, the concept is viewed as

useful because of its perceived role in helping to  
115 conceptualize the role of civil society in ad-  
116 dressing problems beyond the reach of the  
117 market and the state (Grootaert, 1999; Ostrom,  
118 1996; Uphoff, 1993). Finally, social capital is  
119 thought to be helpful in explaining migration  
120 patterns that do not conform to the expecta-  
121 tions of neo-classical migration theory (Palloni,  
122 Massey, & Ceballos, et-al. 2001). 123

124 Until recently, interest in social capital in  
125 Southeast Asia was rather limited. Existing re-  
126 search focused on business networks and the  
127 economic advantages pertaining to specific  
128 groups, such as the Southeast Asian Chinese  
129 *guanxi* (family) networks (Smart, 1993). Simi-  
130 larly, much earlier work by Geertz (1963) noted  
131 that kinfolk of successful entrepreneurs in Bali  
132 regularly requested jobs and loans, and thereby  
133 limited the economic expansion of their family  
134 businesses. But, the recent Asian economic  
135 crisis has prompted interest in the kinds of so-  
136 cial capital relevant to the poor: particularly the  
137 role that family and community cohesion can  
138 play in securing successful development alter-  
139 natives where the state has failed (Grootaert,  
140 1999; Narayan, 1999). In this view, social net-  
141 works, including migrant networks such as  
142 those that we discuss here, are the kinds of  
143 grassroots associational forms through which  
144 social capital is generated, and through which  
145 people may be cushioned from the worst im-  
146 pacts of unemployment and a collapse in in-  
147 come levels.

148 While such contributions have focused on  
149 the positive dimensions of social capital, there  
150 is also growing recognition of the potential  
151 "costs" of the processes through which social  
152 capital is generated (World Bank, 2001). Rela-  
153 tions of solidarity and trust may bring unwel-  
154 come obligations and claims (Portes &  
155 Sensenbrenner, 1993), and economic mobility  
156 may be hindered as community norms con-  
157 strain both individual freedom and the devel-  
158 opment of ties outside close-knit networks  
159 (Fernandez-Kelly, 1995; Portes & Landolt,  
160 1996). Furthermore, processes of solidarity  
161 formation also necessarily imply processes of  
162 social exclusion, which can lead to disadvan-  
163 tages for those who are located outside of  
164 particular networks (Geertz, 1963; Portes,  
165 1998; Putzel, 1997). The growing recognition of  
166 the potentially negative aspects of social capital  
167 has begun to draw researchers back to issues of  
168 power and inequality, and more broadly, as  
169 Fine (2001) would have it, to social theory. We  
170 argue here that a renewed and more explicit 170

171 engagement with such issues is particularly  
172 critical when gender is brought into the frame  
173 of analysis.

174 The downside of social capital takes gender  
175 differentiated forms, and gender-specific ex-  
176 pectations of network participation can work  
177 to women's relative disadvantage. Social capital  
178 that exists within a broader context of gender  
179 inequality can exacerbate women's disadvan-  
180 tages, as women remain excluded from the  
181 more powerful networks of trust and reciproc-  
182 ity that exist among men (Burt, 1998; Mo-  
183 lyneaux, 2002; Mayoux, 2001; Neuhouser,  
184 1995; Smith, 2000; Smith-Lovin & McPherson,  
185 1993; World Bank, 2001). In contributing to-  
186 ward these gender-focused approaches to social  
187 capital, we consider issues of gendered power  
188 relations *within* social networks. Rather than  
189 looking at gender differences *per se*, we focus on  
190 the ways that women contest, accommodate  
191 and negotiate the gendered demands made  
192 through the social networks that connect them  
193 with their peers and their village-based families.  
194 As Mayoux (2001) has shown in her gender  
195 analysis of microfinance initiatives, we also il-  
196 lustrate the limitations of a gender-blind con-  
197 cept of social capital. In so doing, we ask how  
198 this focus on gender can lead to a reconceptu-  
199 alization of the concept of social capital itself,  
200 one that is more analytically attuned to issues  
201 of equity and inclusion (Young, 2000), and  
202 thereby more broadly relevant to the develop-  
203 ment needs of both women and men.

204 Our analysis is based on two separate field  
205 studies, both of which investigate the female  
206 migrant networks linking rural origin sites with  
207 industrial destination sites in different regions  
208 of Indonesia. The first study (Elmhirst, 1997)  
209 examines women migrants from the village of  
210 Tiuh Indah in North Lampung, southern Su-  
211 matra, who work in factories in Tangerang,  
212 West Java. The migration of young women  
213 from this relatively remote village began in the  
214 early 1990s and by 1997 involved nearly all  
215 young women from the village in the 17–24 age  
216 cohort. The second study (Silvey, 1997) was  
217 similarly focused on young factory working  
218 women in Indonesia, specifically those from  
219 origin sites throughout Sulawesi and Central  
220 Java who lived and worked in an industrial  
221 manufacturing zone on the outskirts of Ujung  
222 Pandang, South Sulawesi (Kawasan Industri  
223 Makassar, KIMA). Both studies were origi-  
224 nally undertaken as in-depth field-based pro-  
225 jects in 1994–95, and both included follow-up  
226 interviews with a subsample of respondents in

the summer of 1998 (see Elmhirst, 1997, 2002; 227  
Silvey, 1997, 2000 for more thorough discus- 228  
sions of respective methodologies). 229

230 Based on these studies, we examine the ways  
231 that the operation of these women migrants'  
232 social networks shifted in 1998, as Indonesia's  
233 national economic downturn began to affect  
234 low-income people's everyday lives. By mid-  
235 1998 in Indonesia, the convergence of political  
236 and macroeconomic upheavals had altered the  
237 context of migrants' social networks and re-  
238 worked the ways in which different individuals  
239 were able to command social, cultural and  
240 economic resources through their networks  
241 (Booth, 2000). The gendered and intergenera-  
242 tional hierarchies in the social networks that  
243 linked city and village brought specific costs for  
244 particular groups of women as gender-specific  
245 demands and pressures were placed upon them  
246 in return for the resources they sought. To ex-  
247 plore the different outcomes of social capital for  
248 women, and indeed for particular groups of  
249 women, we consider the ways that ideologies of  
250 gender run through, and are potentially re-  
251 worked by, network dynamics.<sup>2</sup> In so doing,  
252 we bring insights on gendered power relations  
253 developed within the feminist household liter-  
254 ature to bear on conceptualizations of rural–  
255 urban social networks and the social capital  
256 argued to be generated within them.

## 2. RURAL–URBAN NETWORKS AND 257 CRISIS IN INDONESIA

258 While the economic crisis has brought re-  
259 newed attention to rural–urban networks in  
260 Indonesia, and to social capital in particular,  
261 awareness of the important role of the linkages  
262 between city and village in livelihood sustain-  
263 ability is not new. Indeed, since the early 1970s,  
264 evidence has been growing of linkages between  
265 rural and urban areas, in terms of the circula-  
266 tion of people, resources and information  
267 (Leinbach & Watkins, 1998; McGee, 1991;  
268 Prothero, & Chapman, 1985; Trager, 1988).  
269 Socio-spatial networks have facilitated access  
270 to employment, as well as access by rural  
271 households to cash, and access by city-based  
272 migrants to agricultural produce. Indeed, in  
273 times of relative economic prosperity in Indo-  
274 nesia, circular mobility and occupational mul-  
275 tiplicity have been found to be fundamental to  
276 low-income people's subsistence and occasional  
277 prosperity in Indonesia (Breman, van den  
278 Muijzenberg, & White, 1997; Rigg, 1998). 279

280 Implicit in much of the research on rural–  
281 urban networks is the notion of social capital,  
282 and the observation that migrants can provide  
283 and exchange social and economic support  
284 through rural–urban networks. According to  
285 Bourdieu's (1977) concept of social capital,  
286 such networks are not a natural given, but are  
287 established and reaffirmed through symbolic  
288 and material practices and transactions. Spe-  
289 cifically, social networks are constructed  
290 through investment strategies oriented to the  
291 institutionalization of group relations (Portes,  
292 1998, p. 3), in this case, the support networks  
293 linking those in the city with those in rural ar-  
294 eas.

295 Social capital can be understood as signifi-  
296 cant within various dimensions of migrants'  
297 rural–urban linkages in Indonesia (Hetler,  
298 1989; Hugo, 1982; Jellinek, 1987). In the case of  
299 the networks of trust and reciprocity that make  
300 up rural–urban linkages, relationships are  
301 generally those of kinship (between parents and  
302 their children) and common origin (between  
303 peers). Migration networks exhibit "circular  
304 and cumulative causation" (Massey, 1990, p. 4)  
305 partly as a result of the information about job  
306 vacancies that is circulated among potential  
307 migrants (Hugo, 1982), and partly because as  
308 the networks grow, their capacity to support  
309 new rural–urban migrants increases (Fuller,  
310 Kamnuansilpa, & Lightfoot, 1990). Based on  
311 observations such as these, most research on  
312 rural–urban linkages in Indonesia has tended to  
313 emphasize the benefits for low-income people  
314 of their embeddedness in such networks (He-  
315 tler, 1989; Hugo, 1982; Jellinek, 1987; McGee,  
316 1991; Papanek, 1975; Rigg, 1997; White, 1993).

317 Since the beginning of the economic crisis  
318 (1997–99), attention to social capital has been  
319 focused on trying to understand and support  
320 low-income people's coping mechanisms  
321 (Grootaert, 1999; Hendityo & Gill, 1999). The  
322 period of retrenchment involved the collapse of  
323 the Indonesian rupiah and very high inflation  
324 (Booth, 2000; Cameron, 1999; Manning, 2000).  
325 Between December 1997 and January 1999,  
326 food prices rose by 133% (Booth, 2000, p. 148),  
327 and there were considerable price increases for  
328 other key household items (Soesastro & Basri,  
329 1998). According to analysis of the National  
330 Labor Force Survey (SAKERNAS) data, the  
331 greatest impact was in real wages, which fell by  
332 35% during the first year of the crisis (Manning,  
333 2000, p. 128). The IFLS also found increased  
334 churning in the labor market, with people  
335 moving in and out of jobs at much higher rates

Table 1. Rural and urban agricultural and nonagricul-  
tural employment, 1997–98 (% change)

	Agricultural (%)	Nonagricultural (%)
Rural (1997–98)	+11.0	-9.6
Urban (1997–98)	+45	-0.3
Total (1997–98)	+13.3	-4.7

Source: BPS, SAKERNAS (1997 and 1998), as cited in  
Hugo (2000, p. 124).

than in earlier periods, and particularly high 336  
rates of movement into self-employment or 337  
small-scale family businesses (Booth, 2000). In 338  
particular, in the first year of the "crisis," ag- 339  
ricultural employment saw a pronounced in- 340  
crease, particularly in urban, and the shifts was 341  
likely linked to increased reliance on networks 342  
(Hugo, 2000, p. 122) (see Table 1). Taken to- 343  
gether, these data may imply that family sup- 344  
port networks were relied upon as safety nets in 345  
the face of severe livelihood pressures (Man- 346  
ning, 2000). 347

Overall, rural areas, and agricultural prod- 348  
ucers in particular, appear to have suffered 349  
less than their urban counterparts during the 350  
crisis (Cameron, 1999). But not all rural areas 351  
fared equally well. Indeed, in South Sulawesi, 352  
farmwork, particularly cocoa production for 353  
export, became especially lucrative for the small 354  
percentage of land-rich households in 1998 as 355  
the local value of foreign exchange increased 356  
dramatically (Hugo, 2000, p. 118). But by 357  
contrast, in North Lampung, rice production 358  
was hit severely by drought: a household survey 359  
conducted in April 1998 showed that fewer 360  
than a third of all households were able to meet 361  
subsistence needs through agriculture (survey 362  
by Elmhirst, 1998, see Table 2). In these dif- 363  
ferent contexts, social networks, and the gen- 364  
dered organization of social capital, operated in 365  
distinct ways. In the following section, we focus 366  
on gender-specific positive aspects of partici- 367  
pation in these different networks for women, 368  
and in so doing, contribute to understanding 369  
the range of ways in which rural–urban net- 370  
works served to augment declining household 371  
incomes (Booth, 2000; Cameron, 1999; Man- 372  
ning, 2000). Further along in the paper, we also 373  
discuss the disbenefits particular to women that 374  
came into being in the context of their partici- 375  
pation in these networks. 376

Table 2. Ability to meet subsistence needs through agriculture in North Lampung

	Number of households				Total
	Land holding (ha)				
	>3 ha	1.01–3 ha	0.01–1 ha	No land	
1994	12	8	7	13	40
Percentage meeting subsistence needs	100	88	29	0	53%
1998	14	6	5	15	40
Percentage meeting subsistence needs	12	0	0	0	30%

Source: Table drawn from interview data from 1994 to 1998. Respondents were asked to state whether their farm income was sufficient to cover household needs.

### 377 3. TWO CASE STUDIES: TANGERANG AND MAKASSAR

379 In the empirical cases we discuss here, that  
380 which could be termed “social capital” emerges  
381 through the practices of migrants and the net-  
382 works that link them both to other city-based  
383 migrants from the same village, and to their  
384 rural families. In many ways both the West  
385 Java and South Sulawesi cases illustrate that  
386 social capital does in fact operate in the ways  
387 that literature on social capital suggests that it  
388 would (Dekker & Uslaner, 2001; Grootaert,  
389 1999; Lin, Cook, & Burt, 2001; Narayan, 1999).  
390 That is, social relationships established between  
391 city-based women migrants and their families  
392 remaining in rural areas appear to have enabled  
393 each to claim material and symbolic resources  
394 from one another. During the economic crisis,  
395 these networks took on a particularly impor-  
396 tant role in the context of intensified pressures  
397 on urban livelihoods, formal sector (factory)  
398 unemployment, and considerable labor market  
399 turmoil. In both cases, though in different ways,  
400 social networks provided safety nets for mi-  
401 grants facing uncertainty.

402 Prior to 1998, the agricultural economy  
403 provided support for migrants in both case  
404 study regions. In South Sulawesi, many mi-  
405 grants returned home to their villages on days  
406 that they were not required to work in the  
407 factory, and upon returning to their factory  
408 dormitories, many brought rice and other farm  
409 produce with them from their agriculture pro-  
410 ducing families (Silvey, 2001). Prior to 1998,  
411 this subsidization provided by the agricultural  
412 economy through kin networks could be con-  
413 ceived as an offshoot of the social capital em-  
414 bedded in rural–urban kinship networks. In  
415 1998, women migrants’ reliance on rural–urban  
416 kin networks in South Sulawesi further inten-  
417 sified, and many low-income single women

migrants returned to their origin villages out of  
418 necessity and in response to social pressure  
419 (Silvey, 2001). Their ability to fall back on the  
420 resources available to them in their kin net-  
421 work, then, can be seen as a positive outcome  
422 of their social capital in those networks.

423 In Tangerang’s linkages with rural North  
424 Lampung, rural–urban kin networks operated  
425 rather differently from those in South Sulawesi.  
426 In this case, the migration of young women,  
427 which began in the early 1990s, had been fa-  
428 cilitated and strengthened by the increasing  
429 institutionalization of a social network linking  
430 city and village. In recent years, these connec-  
431 tions had been formalized through the estab-  
432 lishment of formal social organization aimed at  
433 looking after the affairs of young migrants from  
434 the North Lampung village of Tiuh Indah now  
435 living in Tangerang. The *Ikatan Keluarga Buay*  
436 *Serunting* (literally, the family ties of Buay Se-  
437 *runting*, the ancestral founder of the village  
438 centuries ago), was set up in 1996 by a recent  
439 migrant from Tiuh Indah’s village elite, who  
440 retained close ties with his ancestral home while  
441 living in Tangerang for several years. As a  
442 source of social capital, the *Ikatan* organization  
443 forged and maintained both horizontal links  
444 (between migrants) and vertical (or hierarchical  
445 links) between city-based migrants and their  
446 village-based families. Membership in this or-  
447 ganization held a number of advantages to  
448 migrants: regular meetings facilitated contact  
449 with other migrants and thus access to infor-  
450 mation about work, lodgings and events in the  
451 village as those who have recently made trips  
452 home were able to carry letters and remittances  
453 between other migrants and their families.  
454 Semi-formalized networks of reciprocity oper-  
455 ated between migrants in the form of small  
456 loans of cash, food and other items. Gifts of  
457 rice and other foodstuff were delivered from the  
458

459 village to migrants *via* those involved in the  
460 network.

461 Both networks, the stronger rural–urban  
462 *Ikatan* in Tangerang and the stronger rural–  
463 based agricultural community in South Sulaw-  
464 esi, were able to offer something to the young  
465 women that the other could not. In Tangerang,  
466 parents were more supportive of their daugh-  
467 ters' continued factory employment in 1998, in  
468 part because the *Ikatan* network assuaged  
469 negative feelings about their daughters' moral  
470 and material well-being in the city, and, impor-  
471 tantly, because parents relied on the remit-  
472 tances sent by their daughters from the city. At  
473 the same time, the agrarian crisis in Lampung  
474 in 1998 meant parents were unable to offer  
475 support in any practical sense, and thus for the  
476 migrant daughters, rural return migration was  
477 not a feasible or attractive option. In South  
478 Sulawesi, by contrast, young women workers  
479 facing poverty and unemployment were able to  
480 utilize the networks linking city and village, and  
481 they drew upon the relatively secure farm in-  
482 comes of their parents. But unlike the Lampung  
483 case, the strength of rural–urban ties was in-  
484 sufficient to mitigate the negative connotations  
485 for young women's morality that factory work  
486 continued to hold among kin and peer net-  
487 works in South Sulawesi (see below) (Silvey,  
488 2000).

489 In addition to women migrants' kin net-  
490 works, peer networks were important sources  
491 of what could be termed social capital in both  
492 cases. Specifically, women migrants in both  
493 KIMA and Tangerang shared rooms to spread  
494 the costs of rent, provided food for one another  
495 on a regular basis, assisted one another in  
496 finding employment, and also lent each other  
497 small amounts of money. Indeed, in these ways,  
498 women's peer networks were central to the  
499 growth and maintenance of the low-wage fac-  
500 tory labor force. From the perspective of social  
501 capital theorists, women's peer networks can be  
502 understood to have enhanced young, single  
503 women's ability to migrate to industrial re-  
504 gions. In both cases, women maintained links  
505 with their peers within the city and also with  
506 those who had yet to migrate. Beyond these  
507 forms of social support, links between women  
508 in both city and village provided important  
509 conduits of information about job vacancies,  
510 contacts with personnel managers from partic-  
511 ular factories, wage levels and employment  
512 rights. These contacts supported migrants as  
513 they negotiated their way around an unfamiliar

urban environment and crisis-stricken econ- 514  
omy. 515

516 Taken together, these studies suggest differ- 516  
ent ways in which social networks have been 517  
sources of support for women migrants, and 518  
both cases could be interpreted as examples of 519  
communities drawing on their social capital as 520  
a resource in a time of need. Yet the gendered 521  
consequences of participation in social net- 522  
works are more complex than such conven- 523  
tional readings of social capital would suggest. 524  
Indeed, because the networks were formed in 525  
the context of ideologies stressing particular 526  
modes of behavior and cultural expectations 527  
for young women, there were specifically gen- 528  
dered, negative outcomes of this process. These 529  
issues are explored in the next section as we 530  
crack open the black box of networked social 531  
capital, and situate our studies in the context of 532  
the broader gender politics of economic change 533  
(Nagar, Lawson, & Hanson, 2001). 534

#### 4. WOMEN MIGRANTS' NETWORKS: 535 ENGENDERING THE DOWNSIDE OF 536 SOCIAL CAPITAL

538 Glimpses of power relations that are evident 538  
in many discussions of social capital suggest 539  
that much greater attention needs to be paid to 540  
the wider socioeconomic and cultural context 541  
in which social capital is produced and under- 542  
stood (Bebbington & Perreault, 1999; Foley & 543  
Edwards, 1999; Moser & McIlwaine, 2000), 544  
and to the micro-sociological dynamics of net- 545  
works that produce gender-specific meanings of 546  
social capital (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994; Mat- 547  
tingly, 2001; Menjivar, 2000). Fine's (2001) 548  
trenchant critique of social capital is a timely 549  
reminder that utilizing the concept is not a 550  
substitute for analyses of power, inequality and 551  
conflict in contemporary capitalist societies.<sup>3</sup> 552  
As he puts it, "as soon as social capital is per- 553  
ceived to have effects, especially if they can be 554  
negative, it raises questions of power and con- 555  
flict over outcomes that ought to be the starting 556  
point for analysis in the context of other sour- 557  
ces of power" (Fine, 2001, p. 124). In the ab- 558  
sence of critical analysis of the power relations 559  
(the dynamics of hierarchies of class, gender or 560  
familial seniority at both macro- and micro- 561  
sociological scales) within rural–urban net- 562  
works, such networks tend to be seen as "re- 563  
sources:" a picture that is doubtful when 564  
considered alongside very detailed analyses of 565  
power and domination within place-based 566

567 communities and households in Indonesia (cf.  
568 Hart, Turton, & White, 1989; Hefner, 1990; Li,  
569 1999; Wolf, 1992).

570 As part of its relative neglect of power rela-  
571 tions in general, the social capital literature has  
572 tended to elide issues of gender inequality  
573 (Mayoux, 2001). As Mayoux (2001) points out,  
574 gender issues have been analyzed only insofar  
575 as there are observed differences in men's and  
576 women's networks (Burt, 1998; Emibayer &  
577 Goodwin, 1994; Neuhouser, 1995; Smith, 2000;  
578 Smith-Lovin & McPherson, 1993) or in terms  
579 of the negative impact of gender inequality on  
580 social capital (Molinas, 1998; World Bank,  
581 2001) (for a recent exception, see Curran &  
582 Saguy, 2001). Yet within this body of literature  
583 overall, Mayoux (2001, p. 440) continues,  
584 "There is no discussion of how gender in-  
585 equality structures the ways in which different  
586 types of social capital can operate to the dis-  
587 benefit of women." In order to grasp more fully  
588 the operation of social capital, understanding  
589 these gender dimensions is important.

590 We extend Mayoux's point by revisiting in-  
591 sights into intrahousehold power relations de-  
592 veloped within a feminist literature on factory  
593 working women in Indonesia (Mather, 1983,  
594 1985; Saptari, 1995, 1999; Wolf, 1992). Such  
595 studies have questioned representations of the  
596 household as a corporate structure, drawing  
597 attention instead to the "gendered micropolitics  
598 of negotiation, cooperation and contestation  
599 that make up intra-household relations in par-  
600 ticular contexts" (Hart, 1995, p. 61; see also  
601 Kabeer, 1994). The debate is well-rehearsed,  
602 but broadly suggests that rather than being a  
603 harmonious decision-making and resource-  
604 pooling unit, households are organized along  
605 age- and gender hierarchies, and thus individ-  
606 uals within households have differentiated  
607 power, status, and access to resources (Hart,  
608 1995). We apply these insights to this consid-  
609 eration of the gender dynamics within social  
610 networks (see also Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994;  
611 Mattingly, 2001; Menjivar, 2000), and to this  
612 analysis of the gender-specific organizations of  
613 social capital. Specifically, for each case study,  
614 we are concerned not only with the benefits but  
615 also the simultaneous costs, or the "downside"  
616 (Portes & Landolt, 2000) to women of their  
617 participation in social networks. In the fol-  
618 lowing sections, we organize our discussion in  
619 order of three themes: unwelcome claims on  
620 women's labor and remittances; normative  
621 constraints on women's mobility and behavior;  
622 and the role of social networks in perpetuating

women's exclusion from more powerful net- 623  
works. 624

(a) *Unwelcome claims on women's labor and remittances*

Social capital in a network can provide a 627  
safety net in a time of intensified need, and it 628  
can simultaneously place unwelcome claims on 629  
the labor and remittances of group members. In 630  
our case studies, these unwelcome claims were 631  
directed in particular ways at young female 632  
group members. Specifically, in rural Maros, 633  
South Sulawesi in mid-1998, interviews in 634  
households with female rural-return migrants 635  
revealed that these young women faced dis- 636  
proportionately heavy labor demands within 637  
their households of origin, while their young 638  
male counterparts and elder household mem- 639  
bers "free rode" on the reproductive and pro- 640  
ductive work of the other household members 641  
(Silvey, 2001). Such "free-riding" (Portes, 1998, 642  
p. 16) is part of what makes the safety net ef- 643  
fective for the older and male household 644  
members, yet this intrahousehold distribution 645  
of work and resources is relatively disadvanta- 646  
geous for the young female household mem- 647  
bers. Thus, while the rural household "safety 648  
net" did operate to support its members in 649  
aggregate, it did so with gender- and age-spe- 650  
cific costs and benefits (Silvey, 2001). Specifi- 651  
cally, young women were expected to carry out 652  
the majority of the childcare, elder care, mar- 653  
keting, cooking, water collection, and cleaning 654  
work, activities from which the household as a 655  
whole benefited (Silvey, 2001). 656

The women who returned to their rural ori- 657  
gins from KIMA in 1998 did not welcome the 658  
domestic labor loads that their families ex- 659  
pected them to shoulder. As one woman in 660  
Maros put it, "He just sits around, because he 661  
is unemployed. We all have to help out because 662  
it is a monetary crisis, but for me (the work- 663  
load) is double. Also, he keeps smoking ciga- 664  
rettes. . . , and that costs money that we don't 665  
have." From this woman's perspective, the 666  
claims on her labor were unwelcome, and the 667  
household division of resources was unfair. Her 668  
opposition to the situation, which had emerged 669  
since her stint of factory work, had not led to 670  
lasting observable changes in household divi- 671  
sions of labor, but it does point to the contested 672  
nature of household roles and relationships. 673  
Her opposition thus illustrates the struggles 674  
over domestic divisions of labor within this 675

676 social network, and the gendered character of  
677 these specific unwelcome claims.

678 In Tangerang, women migrants from North  
679 Lampung also faced unwelcome claims. Spe-  
680 cifically, parents based in the rural origin site  
681 began to expect their daughters to send remit-  
682 tances during 1998, as they faced their own  
683 income shortfalls. Whereas in 1995 daughters  
684 had been "assumed out" of the household  
685 economic equation, by 1998 this position shif-  
686 ted toward a recognition by parents that fac-  
687 tory income should be more than "pocket  
688 money" for the young women and could be  
689 used to serve other household members. This  
690 process was facilitated as the rural-urban net-  
691 work became increasingly institutionalized.  
692 Over time, the connections that parents had  
693 with their daughters *via* the head of the *Ikatan*  
694 meant they were more knowledgeable about  
695 factory wage levels and therefore about the  
696 amount of money young women might have  
697 available for the family. Workers were thus less  
698 able in 1998 to "underreport" their earnings to  
699 their parents and to maintain financial auton-  
700 omy than they had been in 1995. More directly,  
701 the head of the *Ikatan* arranged a rotating  
702 credit savings scheme (*arisan*) which was ad-  
703 ministered in such a way as to facilitate remit-  
704 tances of daughters' earnings from the city to  
705 their families in the village. The *Ikatan* pres-  
706 sured women to send remittances despite  
707 women's own intensified need for their incomes  
708 within the Tangerang economy in 1998. One  
709 woman expressed her experience of the short-  
710 fall and her origin family needs thus: "Though  
711 we are happy to help our families, at this time it  
712 is very difficult. . . We need to pay for this, for  
713 that here in Tangerang. Before, my parents did  
714 not ask for anything, they did not know. Now  
715 money is needed for my brother's school, for  
716 things that are needed. . ." Notably, there was  
717 little expectation that sons who were factory  
718 workers would contribute toward family fi-  
719 nances. Indeed, most returned to the village  
720 where few demands were made upon their la-  
721 bor: "They just sit around, talking and smok-  
722 ing," observed one young woman.<sup>4</sup>

723 In this way, the social capital of the *Ikatan*  
724 network that served to re-solidify the bonds  
725 between families and their migrant daughters,  
726 also engendered heightened material demands  
727 on young women. This is important because for  
728 the young women themselves, these unwelcome  
729 claims were a gender-specific cost that they  
730 were required to pay as part of their member-  
731 ship in the *Ikatan*. For parents, a greater ca-

732 pacity to request and control remittances was a  
733 positive outcome of the increased social capital,  
734 and for the household in aggregate, the conse-  
735 quences were positive. But for the women  
736 themselves the increased social capital of the  
737 network cost them some control over their in-  
738 dependently earned incomes.

739 While there were differences between the two  
740 networks in terms of the employment and res-  
741 idence outcomes for young women, in both  
742 cases, women were pressured through gender  
743 norms as daughters to provide for their families  
744 during the crisis (i.e., in Tangerang to send re-  
745 mittances and in Maros to carry out heavy  
746 domestic work back in the village). The social  
747 capital in their networks *simultaneously* pro-  
748 moted increases in aggregate family income,  
749 improved the household's ability to meet its  
750 domestic needs, *and* placed gender-specific  
751 burdens on women. These claims on women's  
752 labor and their remittances were rationalized  
753 through gender-specific normative constraints  
754 that reflect and contribute to the persistent in-  
755 equalities in women's and men's positions  
756 within household divisions of labor and re-  
757 sources, and more broadly in the labor market.

#### (b) Normative constraints on women through network relations

760 In literature that examines the thickening of  
761 social capital (for a review see Bebbington &  
762 Perreault, 1999), the resources accessible  
763 through network relations increase alongside  
764 strengthening trust and norms of reciprocity.  
765 Yet for young women in the two case studies,  
766 stronger networks included heightened parental  
767 control over behavior. In both cases, the young  
768 women's linkages with their origin site kin  
769 networks were characterized by a series of  
770 gender specific tensions around sexual morality.  
771 The closer knit the families, and the stronger  
772 the rural-urban networks, the greater the nor-  
773 mative pressure on the young women to con-  
774 form to prevailing notions of appropriate  
775 female behavior cast in terms of chastity.

776 In KIMA, in the context of crisis, the nor-  
777 mative proscriptions on women's mobility and  
778 their continued employment in KIMA were  
779 produced within a range of social networks  
780 linked across scales and across rural and urban  
781 sites. Specifically, women's continued embedd-  
782 edness in their family networks meant that ru-  
783 ral-based families could exert moral social  
784 pressure on their daughters to return home  
785 (Silvey, 2000). This pressure took on additional

786 weight because women's own peer networks  
787 and the broader networks of the state also  
788 stressed the moral importance of women's role  
789 in maintaining the family (Brenner, 1998).  
790 Thus, the potential empowerment available to  
791 women through the social capital of their peer  
792 network was undermined by their continued  
793 reliance on their families for their subsistence  
794 needs, and by their own, their peers', and their  
795 families' embeddedness in the broader cultural  
796 system valorizing women's domestication.

797 In Lampung, institutionalization of the net-  
798 work through the *Ikatan* meant parents and  
799 community leaders were able to exercise  
800 heightened control over young women's beha-  
801 vior: a critical concern among Lampung  
802 people who prided themselves on women's  
803 sexual piety and submissiveness compared to  
804 what they regarded as the "looser" morals of  
805 other ethnic groups in both Lampung and  
806 Tangerang (Elmhirst, 2000, 2002). The *Ikatan*  
807 leader regarded himself as a parental figure,  
808 guiding the practices of those now in his charge,  
809 as he elaborated:

Parents are happy to know that there is someone they trust, a relative [i.e. someone from the same blood line], who can look after their daughters. When these girls come to the city, they are very young, very inexperienced. It is important that they are taken care of, to ensure they do not make mistakes or find themselves in trouble.

817 This level of control was enacted through  
818 regular meetings at which young women were  
819 reminded of their familial obligations, and the  
820 need to ensure that they did not bring shame on  
821 their families.

822 The close ties *among* migrant women within  
823 the organization meant gossip regarding mis-  
824 demeanors could be quickly circulated, finding  
825 its way back to parents in the village, and in  
826 this way the *Ikatan* engendered considerable  
827 self-policing among young women. In addition,  
828 this peer pressure inculcated particular spend-  
829 ing behavior among young women, encourag-  
830 ing them to buy goods that would be useful in  
831 setting up their future home when they returned  
832 to the village to marry. While such expenditure  
833 was of advantage to young women, the addi-  
834 tional beneficiaries were their future husbands,  
835 their future husbands' families and indeed, their  
836 own families, as less money would need to be  
837 raised to set up the couple's new home. Indeed,  
838 while it appears that women are acting in their  
839 own self-interest as they subscribe to social

norms and save for their marriages, the benefits  
that accrue to others within their own network  
come at the expense of the women's labor,  
savings, and social conformity. This does not  
indicate that women themselves do not also  
benefit from these relations. Rather, these  
young women's options regarding the specific  
ways in which they are able to participate in  
these networks are constrained by gender  
norms.

849  
850 Thus, in both cases, through their respective  
851 social networks, parents asserted their own  
852 normative gender frameworks by building on  
853 the social pressures that inhere within a close-  
854 knit social group, in these cases the networks  
855 that spanned rural and urban areas. This find-  
856 ing corroborates those of Moser's (1996) study  
857 of household responses to crisis in four com-  
858 munities. Put succinctly, she argues that  
859 household relations are an asset in times of  
860 shortage, but they tend to be associated with  
861 inequalities. Moser (1996) and others (cf. El-  
862 son, 1992; Tinker, 1990) have also pointed out  
863 that women pay gender-specific costs during  
864 periods of shortage. The case studies in Tan-  
865 gerang and KIMA again illustrate these costs,  
866 and underscore the analytical shortcomings of  
867 a gender-neutral conception of social capital.  
868 Gender-based analyses also reveal the impor-  
869 tance of different degrees of power and access  
870 to resources within women's and men's often  
871 separate social networks, as the following sec-  
872 tion elaborates.

### (c) *Women's exclusion from more powerful networks*

875 Bebbington (in press, italics added) writes in  
876 an analysis of the utility of the concept of social  
877 capital: "a social relationship is a resource that  
878 can facilitate access to other resources and ex-  
879 clude others from such resources."<sup>5</sup> Such in-  
880 clusion and exclusion takes gender-  
881 differentiated forms. Women's inclusion in  
882 particular relationships (i.e., the peer networks  
883 that facilitate their migration and factory work,  
884 or the *Ikatan*) can play a part in producing  
885 women's exclusion from other, potentially more  
886 powerful networks. In KIMA, for instance,  
887 women's involvement in factory work tended to  
888 exclude them from the more lucrative and in-  
889 dependent street vending of prepared foods in  
890 the informal sector. In part, norms against  
891 women's participation in this sector were based  
892 on a broadly shared moral ideology opposed to  
893 women's autonomous presence on the streets

894 after dark. Their participation in peer networks  
895 within which such norms were circulated  
896 played a part in perpetuating their occupational  
897 exclusion. In addition, their participation in  
898 factory work constrained them not only so-  
899 cially, but also spatially and temporally from  
900 participation in the informal sector, and limited  
901 their capacity to build linkages with other net-  
902 works, such as labor activist groups (see  
903 Elmhirst, in press).<sup>6</sup>

904 In KIMA, women factory workers' peer  
905 networks included relatively low levels of  
906 "heteroplexity," which meant that their social  
907 relations with people from diverse class, ethnic,  
908 or religious groups were limited (Fernandez-  
909 Kelly, 1995). This lack of diversity within their  
910 network was central to their continued exclu-  
911 sion from other types of jobs, and thereby  
912 contributed to the continued segregation of the  
913 labor market along gender lines (see also  
914 Hanson & Pratt, 1995). In addition, the spatial  
915 organization of KIMA served to reinforce  
916 women's social segregation in that KIMA was a  
917 site clearly demarcated and distant from other  
918 public spaces, and the resident population was  
919 composed almost entirely of factory workers,  
920 local informal sector vendors, and public  
921 transportation drivers. Finally, in KIMA there  
922 was a temporal dimension to women factory  
923 workers' exclusion from "bridging" ties, those  
924 relationships considered by social capital theo-  
925 rists to be crucial to increasing one's access to  
926 other forms of capital (Woolcock & Narayan,  
927 2000). Specifically, because women worked ex-  
928 tremely long hours (often 10–12 h per day, six  
929 or seven days per week, depending on produc-  
930 tion needs), they were not left with much time  
931 or energy outside of the factory to pursue social  
932 relations beyond their immediate peer net-  
933 works.

934 In Tangerang, the control exercised by the  
935 *Ikatan* organization served both to support  
936 women in their entry into the urban industrial  
937 workforce, and concomitantly to strengthen the  
938 ties that bonded women to their rural-based  
939 families (on bridging versus bonding ties, see  
940 Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). But, participa-  
941 tion in such a specific social network has meant  
942 young women have been unable to scale up  
943 their concerns and participate in those wider  
944 social networks that embrace various forms of  
945 labor organization and that support workers'  
946 interests in Tangerang (Elmhirst, in press). In  
947 part, this reflects similar processes to those ev-  
948 ident in the KIMA case: the temporal and  
949 spatial constraints associated with participation

within their immediate kin- and peer-based 950  
networks have prevented young women from 951  
making contact with more powerful networks 952  
of labor activism. 953

954 There were however other factors more spe- 954  
cific to the Tangerang situation that led to the 955  
exclusion of this particular group of Lampung 956  
women from activist networks. First, while 957  
there was no evidence to suggest that the *Ikatan* 958  
leader was employed by factories to curtail la- 959  
bor activism in the way that Mather (1985) 960  
found, young women who did become involved 961  
in strikes were ostracized from the *Ikatan* and 962  
thus lost the potential benefits of membership 963  
(Elmhirst, in press). Second, most young 964  
women from Lampung regarded activist net- 965  
works as having little relevance to their needs. 966  
Activists and Lampung women moved in dif- 967  
ferent social circles, rationalized their situations 968  
in different ways and articulated their concerns 969  
through different vocabularies (Elmhirst, in 970  
press). Drawing on the resources offered 971  
through the *Ikatan* meant foregoing other 972  
sources of social and political support, such as 973  
involvement in the labor movement. This 974  
choice between networks that was required of 975  
women is an aspect of sociability that does not 976  
feature in discussions of social capital in In- 977  
donesia. Yet it is precisely this sort of tradeoff 978  
that differentiates the potential benefits of so- 979  
cial capital accessible to women and men. 980

981 Overall, the Tangerang and KIMA case 981  
studies confirm the finding that women tend to 982  
be more involved in kin-based "bonding" net- 983  
works than they are in public "bridging" net- 984  
works (Neuhouser, 1995; Smith-Lovin & 985  
McPherson, 1993). Thus, women are often tied 986  
to more powerful networks only indirectly, 987  
through their relationships with men. In both 988  
networks we examine here, women's peer net- 989  
works and kin networks primarily tie them— 990  
*via* bonding social capital—either to their peer 991  
networks, which in these cases are ill-equipped 992  
to support their entry into more powerful net- 993  
works, or to their families, which place unwel- 994  
come gender-specific claims and normative 995  
constraints on them. While women's participa- 996  
tion in these networks does provide them with 997  
access to some material resources, the gender 998  
norms within these networks continue to play a 999  
role in producing the persistent disadvantages 1000  
that women face within household divisions of 1001  
labor, decision-making power *vis-a-vis* one's 1002  
own sexuality and spatial mobility, and within 1003  
the labor market and activist networks more 1004  
broadly. 1005

## 1006 5. CONCLUSION: SOCIAL CAPITAL, GENDER, AND DEVELOPMENT

1008 This examination of the concept of social  
1009 capital has been informed by two bodies of  
1010 literature that have remained largely separate  
1011 until now. First, we have built on feminist  
1012 studies of factory working women in Indonesia  
1013 (Mather, 1983, 1985; Saptari, 1995, 1999;  
1014 Smyth & Grijns, 1997; Tjandraningsih, 1999;  
1015 Wolf, 1992). This research is important for our  
1016 discussion both because it calls attention to the  
1017 power dynamics that characterize social net-  
1018 works, and because it highlights the complexity  
1019 and site-specificity of struggles around what  
1020 could be termed social capital. Second, we draw  
1021 on the body of scholarship that examines rural-  
1022 urban linkages in Southeast Asia (Hetler, 1989;  
1023 Hugo, 1982; McGee, 1991; Prothero, & Chap-  
1024 man, 1985). This work provides analysis of the  
1025 geography of rural-urban networks, and it  
1026 underscores the importance of these networks  
1027 for migrants in times of economic uncertainty.  
1028 Integrating the insights of these two distinct  
1029 research streams, and discussing the intersec-  
1030 tions with data from our own field studies, has  
1031 permitted investigation of the gendered nature  
1032 of migrants' rural-urban linkages in Indonesia,  
1033 and by extension the gender dimensions of  
1034 networked social capital.

1035 The differences in women's and men's posi-  
1036 tions in social networks, and the gender differ-  
1037 entiated consequences of social capital,  
1038 underscore two central points. First, decision-  
1039 making among family and community mem-  
1040 bers regarding gender norms influences not  
1041 only conceptions of femininity and masculinity,  
1042 but also the selectivity of migrants, return-mi-  
1043 grants, and their related roles in social safety  
1044 nets. This suggests that social hierarchies within  
1045 networks are likely to lead to differentiated  
1046 access to resources and differentiated work and  
1047 service obligations. Second, social networks are  
1048 by definition relational and dynamic, and  
1049 therefore so too will be the forms and conse-  
1050 quences of social capital exchanges for women  
1051 and men within these networks. As the women  
1052 in our case studies have begun to challenge the  
1053 gender norms embedded in household hierar-  
1054 chies, they potentially reshape their position  
1055 within the kin network, and thereby their gen-  
1056 der-specific relationship to the network's social  
1057 capital. These tensions serve as a reminder that  
1058 "social capital" includes many "types of social  
1059 relations, combinations whose relative impor-  
1060 tance will, in all likelihood, shift over time"

(Woolcock, 1998, p. 35). Yet the gendered na- 1061  
ture of these tensions also reflects broader 1062  
power relations within which women remain 1063  
distinctly disadvantaged overall. In both cases, 1064  
women are pressured through gender norms to 1065  
participate in networks that exact high costs 1066  
from them. 1067

This examination of the gender roles, norms, 1068  
and relationships in the two networks reveals 1069  
some of the place- and network-specific ways 1070  
that women and men are positioned within 1071  
social networks. The geographic particularities 1072  
take shape in distinct local religious and ethnic 1073  
contexts, which contribute to the particular 1074  
ways in which gendered networks and social 1075  
capital is interpreted and enacted.<sup>7</sup> Both case 1076  
studies recall the point that Chant (1996, p. 1077  
317) emphasizes in her study of Mexico and the 1078  
Philippines, that "while *gender roles* may well 1079  
be subject to some changes, particularly in re- 1080  
spect to women taking on activities tradition- 1081  
ally designated as male, *gender relations* seem to 1082  
be characterized by considerable continuity." 1083  
The two case studies, taken in tandem, illus- 1084  
trate that despite women's entry into previously 1085  
male-dominated migration streams and formal 1086  
sector work, their positions as daughters within 1087  
their kin networks remain largely unchanged. 1088  
In Sulawesi, while it is too early to tell if female 1089  
factory workers have gained any long-term 1090  
decision-making power within households or 1091  
autonomy from rural norms as a result of 1092  
having migrated and worked in the industrial 1093  
zone, in the short run, and in the context of the 1094  
crisis, their options appear to remain limited. 1095  
Among the women in the Lampung-Tangerang 1096  
network, the institutionalization of the *Ikatan* 1097  
has served to keep women in their social place, 1098  
and to expand the geographic territory within 1099  
which kin control can be exercised upon them. 1100  
At the same time, the connections afforded 1101  
through the *Ikatan* have empowered young 1102  
women in migrating to Tangerang in the first 1103  
place, in securing employment and in having a 1104  
relatively sophisticated knowledge of their 1105  
rights and entitlements as workers. Neverthe- 1106  
less, in maintaining such links with both peers 1107  
and family, women have had to eschew both 1108  
their financial autonomy and, importantly, 1109  
their participation in more powerful social 1110  
networks oriented toward the worker concerns 1111  
and wider agendas of social change. 1112

Studies of social capital must look *within* 1113  
social networks to understand the ways that 1114  
gendered power relations shape women's and 1115  
men's differential capacity to turn social capital 1116

1117 into other forms of capital. As Hart (cited in  
1118 Moser, 1993, p. 27) argues, "To come to grips  
1119 with intra-household bargaining and contesta-  
1120 tion we have to engage directly with questions  
1121 of ideology and meaning, and recognize how  
1122 struggles over resources and labour are simul-  
1123 taneously struggles over meaning." These  
1124 struggles over meaning cannot be identified for  
1125 a particular group once and for all. Indeed,  
1126 gender and development scholars would en-  
1127 courage researchers to "focus on context and  
1128 difference," and to generate understandings of  
1129 social capital that consider the "subjective ex-  
1130 periences of inequality" (Hart, cited in Moser,  
1131 1993) and social power. This would involve  
1132 moving away from conceptualizing "social  
1133 capital" as a resource or a type of capital, and  
1134 toward a recognition of the ways that such a  
1135 concept "embod(ies) an implicit universalism  
1136 that obscures unequal power relations" (Lowe  
1137 & Lloyd, 1997, p. 17).

1138 This examination of the gendering of social  
1139 capital suggests that recent, more nuanced ap-  
1140 proaches to approaches to social capital are on  
1141 the right track (Bebbington, & Perreault, 1999;  
1142 Woolcock, & Narayan, 2000). Yet it goes fur-  
1143 ther to suggest that what may be positive social

capital for men (e.g., a household safety net),  
1144 can be experienced as social constraint or a  
1145 burden by women in the same network. In  
1146 addition, it points out that the social capital  
1147 that provides particular gender-specific advan-  
1148 tages to women themselves may also simulta-  
1149 neously include disbenefits specific to those  
1150 very women. Questions about gender have the  
1151 potential to transform conceptual tools, be-  
1152 cause gender norms are not only part of the  
1153 context of social capital formation, but they are  
1154 also a key part of that which structures the  
1155 meanings of social capital for particular groups  
1156 and individuals. Rather than presume a pre-  
1157 given notion of social capital, women's and  
1158 men's normative conceptions of the value of  
1159 relationships and obligations require examina-  
1160 tion. Careful investigation of the locally spe-  
1161 cific, gender-differentiated network roles,  
1162 desires, workloads, relationships, and interpre-  
1163 tations of resources and scarcity, can form the  
1164 foundation upon which social capital theorists  
1165 can better contribute to understanding  
1166 women's empowerment, and thus to more eq-  
1167 uitable development outcomes more generally. 1168

## NOTES

1171 1. Subsequent migration research has found that  
1172 although rural-return migration increased in the early  
1173 months of the crisis (Manning & van Dierman, 2000),  
1174 migrants do not appear to have remained in rural areas  
1175 for long periods after their initial return (Manning,  
1176 2000). In South Sulawesi, however, because of the boom  
1177 in the cocoa production sector (Booth, 2000), return  
1178 migrants may have remained in their rural origins for  
1179 longer.

1180 2. Harriss and De Renzio (1997) have argued that  
1181 distinctions exist between the forms and operation of  
1182 social capital forged in several different arenas: (a)  
1183 family and kinship networks; (b) social networks,  
1184 groups, and organizations; (c) cross-sectoral linkages,  
1185 or networks of networks; (d) political capital, or  
1186 informal connections between state and civil society;  
1187 (e) institutional and policy frameworks; and (f) social  
1188 norms and values. Our focus in this article is limited  
1189 primarily to the operation of, and relationships between,  
1190 the first and second types: family and kin networks, as  
1191 well as social networks.

3. Bebbington (in press) argues that the concept is not  
1192 meant as a substitute for such analyses, and that the two  
1193 should not be placed in opposition to one another.  
1194 Indeed, he points out, social capital can be a useful  
1195 concept within political-economic research. While we  
1196 see this as a potentially fruitful direction in which social  
1197 capital research can go, we agree with Fine's point that  
1198 the concept has tended thus far to be employed in  
1199 relatively depoliticized terms that are not deeply engaged  
1200 with critical analysis of concerns. 1201

4. The experiences of young men under crisis and the  
1202 gender-specific costs to them of the retrenchments  
1203 (though not the focus of this analysis) are complex as  
1204 well and are certainly oversimplified in this one woman's  
1205 quotation. Future research aimed at unpacking the  
1206 household should examine men's roles and both the  
1207 constraining and enabling ideologies of masculinity that  
1208 are central to shaping gender relationships. Attention to  
1209 these issues is particularly important for understanding  
1210 the gender dynamics of Indonesia's recent economic  
1211 crisis period during which time some lost their formal  
1212 sector jobs at higher rates (both proportionally and  
1213 absolutely) than did women (Manning, 2000). 1214

- 1215 5. This is a noteworthy sentence for its capture of the  
1216 concept's normative ambiguity. To quote again, this  
1217 time with an ellipsis: "A social relationship is a resource  
1218 that... can exclude others from such resources." Why,  
1219 then, a resource? It seems that the concept of a social  
1220 relationship, with all of the contradictions implied  
1221 therein, can better capture the nuances and political  
1222 dimensions of the subject at hand.
- 1223 6. The role of gendered social networks in generating  
1224 or suppressing labor activism is explored in other  
research (cf. Elmhirst, in press; Saptari, 1999; Silvey, in  
press), but is beyond the scope of this article.
7. In recent years, sectarian violence, often represented  
as based in religion or ethnicity, has flared up in many  
parts of Indonesia. The sources of the violence are  
multifaceted and highly contested, and the emerging  
body of literature that examines the violence has begun  
to grapple with these questions (Acciaioli, 2001; Aragon,  
2001; Li, 2002).

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