Abstract
As a global economic power without offensive military force, Japan has enjoyed long-term prosperity since the end of the Asia-Pacific War. The postwar central government dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has succeeded in rebuilding a socioeconomically homogeneous nation-state. This success is partially based on the effective globalization of Japanese capital, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. Since the beginning of the 1990s, however, Japan has started suffering from the counter-impacts of the globalization: competitive economic environment in the Asia-Pacific region, weakened domestic socioeconomic stability, and increasing political unrest. Along with these crises, new conservatism is gaining power. As conservatives criticize the lack of national consciousness among the Japanese, the current (LDP-led) coalition government attempts to reinforce Japanese national identity. Controversial issues in this context have been the reevaluation of the Asia-Pacific War, the revision of the Japanese Constitution, and the official use of the national flag and anthem. An important recent change, however, is that the coalition government emphasizes territorial defense against potential military tensions in North East Asia. In this sense, the recent political reformation of Japanese national identity can have a strong territorial implication. The author argues that, if national identity is formed on territory as well as history, it can be stronger, materialized, and problematic.

Keywords: globalization, reterritorialization, Japan.
 
 

Introduction
At the end of the twentieth century and in the era of globalization in which people, goods, capital, and information flow beyond state boundaries, we have found that globalization shows some contradictory aspects. While globalization weakens the premise of the nation-state, it seems to stimulate the rise of nationalism. Logically speaking, the decline of the nation-state leads to the decrease of the importance of nationalism. Cultural fragmentation promoted by globalization, however, brings about the opposite results (Anderson 1996:137). Furthermore, existing nation-states are apparently striving to maintain their national coherence in opposition to globalization. Although traditional theories of the nation-state are becoming obsolete in this complex context (Williams 1989), 'the end of the state' thesis (e.g. Ohmae 1995) is still premature. Thus, it seems necessary to reconstruct the theory of the nation-state in the era of globalization so that it can explain the dynamic relationship between globalization and the nation-state (Marden 1997). Among recent studies in this field of research, Peter Taylor's arguments about the functions of the nation-state capture such a relationship (Taylor 1994; 1995). Examining the validity of Taylor's arguments, this paper applies his theses to the Japanese state in order to explain the implication of the recent policy change of the Japanese government, that is, the rise of new conservatism.

I.  Taylor's theses on the nation-state
In the context of globalization, Taylor attempts to formulate a new theory of the nation-state from the modern world-system perspective (Taylor 1994; 1995). Taylor (1994) illustrates the functions of the modern nation-state from two theoretical viewpoints. First, Taylor applies Sack's (1983) general definition of territoriality to these functions. He argues that territory is directly linked to sovereignty to mould politics into a fundamentally state-centric social process and that the domination of political practice in the world by territoriality is a consequence of this territorial link between sovereign territory and national homeland (Taylor 1994:151). Second, Taylor uses the container metaphor originated in the concept of the state as a 'power container' (Giddens 1985). This is due to the fact that the ability to contain social relations is a prime function of territoriality (Taylor 1994:152).

Taylor's container metaphor consists of two theses: 'filling the container' and 'a leaking container?' For the 'filling the container' thesis, Taylor argues, "[T]he state has acted like a vortex sucking in social relations to mould them through its territoriality" (Taylor 1994:152). He presents four kinds of containers constructed through this filling process: power, wealth, culture, and social containers. These containers correspond to the basic functions of the modern nation-state (cf. Johnston 1993:121) and have become its solid foundation. For the 'a leaking container?' thesis, Taylor suggests that the territorial integrity of these containers is/will be in question as seen in 'the end of the state' thesis. Each container, Taylor argues, is seeking different territoriality in the context of globalization. While the state as a power container is expected to remain, a wealth container tends to extend to a new larger economic block and a cultural container faces fragmentation. As a result, Taylor adds, there is a serious social confusion in this triple territoriality.

Although Taylor's container metaphor is so concisely theorized that it can be operationalized for empirical research, it contains some shortcomings. First, as Soja (1989:144) criticizes, Giddens' container metaphor itself is problematic in that it makes spatiality passive to "the forceful play of human agency and social process set free from 'environmental' determinism." By the 'filling the container' thesis, Taylor implies the basic action (i.e. political processes) of the nation-state but he seems to consider the container a static entity. Cultural fragmentation as a symptom of a leaking container also put the nation-state in a position passive to the change. Second, with the exception of cultural fragmentation at the sub-state level, Taylor's approach is basically state-centric. This state centrism tends to neglect actual political processes operating in different domains within the nation-state (see Agnew 1987; 1994). Third, although Taylor suggests that there can be serious social confusion in the triple territoriality, he does not clearly explain how the nation-state will react to it. Finally, Taylor (1994) does not necessarily address the effect of interstate relations on the territoriality of the nation-state.

Subsequently, Taylor (1995) criticizes his container metaphor by stating, "[T]reating the state as a container neglects precisely the 'international'-the relations between states" (Taylor 1995:1). Admitting that the state-as-container begins with a defense imperative against other states, Taylor argues that the metaphor does not extend to any notion of either a collectivity of states or plurality of nations. Since the concept of territoriality does not necessarily address the issue of the mosaic of territories that have resulted from boundary behavior based on territoriality, Taylor formulates the 'multiple theory' which helps to understand the multiplicity of states, nations, and territories. He argues that nation, state, and territoriality as basic elements of the nation-state should be understood as internationality, interstateness, and interterritoriality. This 'multiple theory' makes it easier to understand the interconnectedness of the modern world-system.

In terms of globalization, Taylor contrasts interstateness with trans-stateness. He argues that trans-stateness is becoming eminent as both contemporary capital and its antisystemic opponents are promoting trans-state processes in the wake of US hegemony. For Taylor, the demise of interstateness goes side by side with the rise of trans-stateness in an era of globalization. However, as seen in Taylor (1994), how the nation-state will react to this threatening trend is not clearly shown. Rather, the nation-state seems to accept it passively in Taylor's arguments. This issue will be discussed in the next chapter.

II.  Reterritorialization of the nation-state
With regards to the reaction of the nation-state to globalization, Taylor makes the following comment:
 

Despite the politics of the 1980s, the state and its society are not so easily dismissed. There are signs that what we may term a 'new centre politics' is emerging. ... [W]e can expect the new centre politics to be an alliance of state elites and the people in an explicit recognition of the social container versus the anti-territoriality of new right off-shore economy and new left globalism. Despite the many leakages reported above, states should not be written out of world politics just yet (Taylor 1994: 160-61).

This "new center politics" can also be considered as a reaction to trans-state processes promoted by contemporary capital and its antisystemic opponents (Taylor 1995:13). Taylor regards this politics as a possible outcome of social confusion in triple territoriality. In order to examine the content of this new center politics using the case of Japan, this paper reconceptualizes it from a territorial point of view.

The process of globalization is commonly understood as 'deterritorialization' in Anglophone political geography. Deterritorialization evokes challenges posed to the status of territory and our territorially embedded understandings of geography, governance and geopolitics, states, places, and social sciences, by planetary communication networks and globalizing tendencies (Ó Tuathail 1998: 82). As the flip side of deterritorializtion, 'reterritorialization' is referred to as the process in which capitalism and state power seek to produce rigid identities and assert fixed geographies (Ó Tuathail 1994:395). Deterritolialization and reterritorialization are not independent of each other but simultaneous processes. In the global context after the Cold War, Ó Tuathail (1994; 1996:225-256) employs the term of reterritolialization to conceptualize and criticize the nature of the discourses of politicians and public intellectuals such as Samuel Huntington. For Ó Tuathail, Huntington's thesis of the clash of civilizations (Huntington 1993) "uses the assumptions, goals, and methods of Cold War strategic culture to reterritorialize the global scene in a way that perpetuates the society of security and politics as Kulturekampf" (Ó Tuathail 1996:246).

In terms of international immigration and globalization, Sassen (1996:59-60) contrasts 'economic denationalization' with 'political renationalization': Econoimic globalization denationalizes national economies while immigration is renationalizing politics. Sassen argues that the nation-state lifts border controls for the flow of capital, information, and services to further globalization but that it claims its older splendor in asserting its sovereign right to control its borders against immigrants and refugees. This renationalization can be considered a kind of reterritorialization at the level of the nation-state. In sum, Taylor's new center politics can be reconceptualized as an action of the nation-state to reterritolialize itself. Using Taylor's above-mentioned theses and the concept of reterritorialization, the next chapter will examine the recent policy changes of the Japanese state in terms of globalization and territoriality.
 

III.  Japan in the era of globalization

 1. Power container: Japan's ambiguous territoriality
As a result of the defeat in the Asia-Pacific War, Japan lost its colonies such as the Korea Peninsula and Taiwan. The territory of Japan was reduced to its pre-colonial area: Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu, and other outlying islands. In terms of defense, according to the Potsdom Declaration of 1945, Japan was completely disarmed. Instead, the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ) led by the US military force 'indirectly' governed Japan. However, according to the GHQ recommendation, the Police Reserve Force (Keisatsu-yobitai) was formed in 1950 as a small size of ground force when the Korea War took place. In 1952 when Japan restored its full sovereignty, the Police Reserve Force was reformed into the Security Force (Hoantai) with its new maritime unit. In 1954, the Security Force was reorganized into the Self-Defense Forces (Jieitai, SDF) consisting of the Ground, Maritime, and Air SDFs.

Although the construction of the SDF reflected the defensive rearmament of Japan, it was rather a result of the development of the Cold War in East Asia. While the Japanese Constitution (Article 9) enacted in 1946 prohibits Japan from having any military force, the development of the Cold War required the US to rearm Japan and station its military force within or near Japan. This is the purpose of the conclusion of the Peace Treaty with Japan and the Japan-US Security Treaty in 1951. However, because the rearmament of Japan was constitutionally regulated and because the Cold-War containment policy of the US was deployed in East Asia, the power container of Japan came to have a rather complicated nature. The territorial security of Japan virtually depended more on the US military force stationed in Japan and Okinawa than on the SDF.

In 1945, the US military force occupied Okinawa, which was one of the prefectures in Japan. As a result of the Peace Treaty with Japan and the Japan-US Security Treaty in 1951, the US military force continued to govern Okinawa until 1972. Many US military bases have been constructed in Mainland Okinawa rather than in Japan since the end of the Asia-Pacific War (see Figure 1; see Figure 2). The constitutional pacifism denying the possession of an aggressive military force and the separation of Okinawa from the jurisdiction of Japan have led to the construction of a weak sense of territorial self-defense among the mainland Japanese. The loss of the colonies and the fact of being an island country have also contributed to the weak sense of international boundaries and territorial sovereignty. The results of the public opinion surveys by the Defense Agency (1997) indicate that the Japanese public does not necessarily regard the role of the SDF as maintaining territorial security (see Figure 3) and that they tend to believe that the Japan-US treaty has been useful (see Figure 4). In terms of these public opinions, Japanese conservative media and intellectuals criticize these points as a lack of territorial consciousness against foreign invasion (e.g. the Sankei Shimbun 1997; Takubo 1999: 38-41).

Considering potential threats from North Korea such as the launch of a missile and the potential tension between China and Taiwan, we can say that the Cold War has not yet ended in East Asia. The survival of the Cold War in this new context requires Japan and the US to maintain and redefine rather than devalue the Japan-US security relations. The maintenance of 100,000 US troops in East Asia leaves the ambiguous territoriality of Japan as a power container almost intact. The New Guideline for the Japan-US military cooperation published in 1997 also intentionally avoids defining the geographical areas surrounding Japan where a military emergency may take place (Shuhen-chiiki). In addition, since the Gulf War, the political discourse about the SDF has tended to emphasize the SDF's global role in PKOs rather than the internal reinforcement of the SDF (e.g. Ozawa 1994). In spite of Japan's advanced military technology and equipment which are comparable to other western countries, these issues make it difficult for the Japanese public to have a clear image about who protects the territory of Japan.

In sum, compared to Taylor's argument, the territoriality of Japan as a power container has been ambiguous since the end of the Asia-Pacific War. The complicated interstateness among Japan, the US, Russia, and other East Asian countries makes the container metaphor inappropriate. However, the launch of a Taepodong missile from North Korea in 1998 has urged the Japanese government to prepare the plan to possess a military satellite and promote the TMD initiative. In 1999, the Maritime Safety Agency and the SDF exercised a warning attack against two unidentified, allegedly North Korean, ships violating Japan's territorial waters. This action which was unusual for Japan made the Japanese public realize the reality of territorial defense. These incidents can be considered territorial behavior of the state as a power container and may contribute to the creation of a clearer sense of territory among the Japanese.

2. Wealth container: globalization and crisis
The miraculous economic growth of Japan after the Asia-Pacific War resulted not only from domestic economic recovery but also from its strong capacity of international trade. Through economic growth, Japan has been deeply integrated into the world economy and accumulated economic power comparable to the US. While Japan, the US, and Europe have constituted a global economic triad, the rivalry among these three cores has been eminent (O'Loughlin 1993a). Especially, the Japan-US trade relations have often become confrontational (O'Tuathail 1992; 1993). This global rivalry has led to the formation of hemispheric economic blocs in the West Pacific and the Americas (O'Loughlin 1993b).

According to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI 1999), economic globalization has firmly tied Japan to other East Asian economies1 by creating an economic division of labor and interdependency between Japan and these economies. The major actor of this process is the FDI of Japan-based transnational corporations. Since 1990, the Japanese FDI has been actively spreading over East Asian emerging markets. Since the second half of the 1980s, East Asia has been the biggest destination of Japan's export. East Asia has been becoming an important bloc for Japan's economy. The Economic Research Institute (ERI) of the Economic Planning Agency (ERI 1996) also points out that rapid economic growth in East Asia has strengthened intra-regional linkages in trade, investment, finance, capital, and labor.

However, the following problematic aspects of political economy in East Asia have been observed (ERI 1996): the incomplete integration of financial and capital market, the lack of structural coordination for the increase of economic efficiency, insufficient deregulation, inappropriate governmental intervention, and the too strong impact of the Japan-US macro-economic relations on East Asia. It can be said that these fragile aspects of East Asian economy as well as strong economic interdependency in the region directly or indirectly caused the Asian currency and financial crises in 1997 (Poon and Perry 1999). As ERI (1996) suggests, it will be necessary for countries in the region to exchange information about macro-economy and policy orientations and to coordinate intra-regional rules for trade, investment, and financial services in order to prevent the discrepancies of policy operation among the countries.

In terms of the possibility of building an economic bloc in East Asia, there will still be many obstacles to it. Murphy (1996) argues that a tremendous number of cultural, social, and political discontinuities must be overcome to build a closely tied economic bloc in East Asia in rivalry with the NAFTA and the EU. Poon and Perry (1999:190) point out that the strong protection of national sovereignty in industrializing Asia predominates over any tendency toward regional economic integration. The fact that Asian crises are dealt with primarily by the IMF and the World Bank and not by the regional core, Japan, also indicates that there is no effective coordinate measure organized within the region. Although MITI (1999) emphasizes the role of Japan in facilitating a multilateral trade system, bilateral trade rules, and intra-regional policy coordination, the leadership role of Japan in the political economy of East Asia is considered weak (MacIntyre 1999) or still a possibility (Rumley, Chiba, Takagi, and Fukushima 1996). It is still true that East Asian countries will not welcome the political dominance of Japan in the region.

Therefore, the wealth container of Japan has been definitely expanded to East Asia but it has not been secured because of the economic instability and sociopolitical discontinuities in the region. In order to secure the wealth container of Japan in East Asia, it becomes necessary for Japan to maintain its economic relations to the region, which determines the nature of interstateness between Japan and other East Asian countries. This situation has always conditioned Japan's diplomatic stance towards East Asia as seen in the issue of Japan's responsibility for the Asia-Pacific War. The memory of the War is still alive among many East Asians, which Japan cannot neglect in diplomatic negotiations. For Japan, the maintenance of its wealth container is necessarily related to how to reconstruct its power container without breaking its wealth container. The very ambiguous definition of "security emergency in surrounding areas" (Shuhen-jitai), which implies potential enemies in East Asia but specifies no geographical areas in the New Guideline, reflects this politically and economically ambivalent territoriality of Japan in East Asia. In order words, the reconstruction of a power container can conflict with the maintenance of wealth container.

3. Cultural container: fragmented or not?
Although there are no official statistics describing the ethnic construction of Japanese society, Japanese society is not ethnically homogeneous. The general perception of Japan as ethnically homogeneous was historically constructed mainly through the process of losing the former colonies and denying the Japanese nationality of people from the colonies after the Asia-Pacific War (Tanaka 1995). Within Japanese nationals, there are three major ethnic groups: Okinawan, Ainu, and naturalized former foreigners. The populations of the first two groups are roughly estimated to be 1.2 million (the current population of Okinawa Prefecture) and thirty thousand (Shogaku-kan 1998) respectively. The naturalized former foreigners do not constitute a single ethnic unit but include Koreans as a major sub-group. The registered foreign population in Japan has been increasing since the late 1980s and was more than 1.5 million in 1998 which is about 1.25% of the total population in Japan (the Statistic Bureau 2000). In 1998, the major ethnic groups in this category were Korean (638,828), Chinese (272,230), Brazilian (222,217), and Filipino (105,308). The recent rapid increase of the foreign population is caused by ethnic groups (called 'new-comers') other than Koreans (called 'old-comers') most of whom have lived in Japan since the end of the Asia-Pacific War. This phenomenon is definitely an outcome of globalization of the labor force.

The loss of the former colonies and the denial of Japanese nationality for people from the colonies as well as the occupation of Okinawa by the US military force contributed to the social construction of the ethnically homogeneous territoriality of Japan. Although being democratized and respecting basic human rights, the Japanese government still maintains the blood-based nationality law. This law has long contributed to neglect of basic human rights for the non-Japanese living in Japan. The increase of the foreign population since the late 1980s, however, inevitably addresses many kinds of human right issues related to employment conditions, health insurance, education, marriage, political participation, and other social interactions between foreigners and Japanese. In combination with the governmental slogan of "the internationalization of Japan" since the 1980s, social recognition of these issues has been significantly enhanced. On the other hand, the Ministry of Justice (1994) reports that the crime conducted by foreigners is constantly increasing in number.

While the value of multiculturalism has been recognized in Japan, socioeconomic disparities among different localities in Japan have been more apparent. The economically and demographically uneven development of Japan has put local traditional industries and local cultures sustaining them in serious crisis. The reaction to this local socioeconomic deterioration has led to a variety of movements to revitalize localities through local initiative (e.g. Hiramatsu 1990) as well as state promotion (e.g. the Takeshita cabinet in 1987). Since Japan has been exposed to capitalist development in the course of modernization since the late nineteenth century, local reform movements such as these have often been seen. These movements are not necessarily radical reactions to westernization or globalization although they tend to protest the excessive influence of industrialization and consumerism. Therefore, these local movements do not necessarily have a fragmenting impact on the territoriality of Japan.

The most influential local protest in recent years came from Okinawa when a twelve-year-old girl was raped by the three US soldiers. The former prefecture governor, Masahide Ota, attempted to mobilize Okinawans against the Japan-US security relations which have been oppressive to them. Based on his strong belief in anti-militarism and pacifism, Ota seized opportunities such as lawsuits and a prefectural referendum in order to express Okinawans' oppositions to the Japanese government. This was not a reaction to globalization but a result of deepened democracy and decentralization in Japanese localities. Although the continuous economic downturn in Okinawa finally replaced the leftist governor by a more conservative candidate in 1998, Ota's protest made the Japanese government rethink how to deal with the resentment of Okinawa. As long as Okinawa's strong opposition exists, the Japanese government can not maintain its power container effectively. In addition to the increase of the foreign population, protest from Okinawa may have a fragmenting impact on the cultural, as well as power, container of Japan.

Compared to the first half of the 1990s, it seems that the Japanese government shifted its policy toward the foreign population to a more "inclusive" one in the second half. The legal systems in Japan have been very exclusive to foreigners since the systems did not necessarily assume that so many foreigners would settle in Japan. Laws such as the Family Registration Law, the Foreign Registration Law, and the Nationality Law include provisions discriminatory against foreigners. These discriminatory provisions have been criticized not only by foreigners but also by Japanese. However, in the second half of the 1990s, the Japanese government gradually started to revise these provisions. The following reforms have been considered or carried out: the employment of foreigners as local public officials, the provision of local suffrage to foreigners with permanent visas, the compensation for the former soldiers who have been deprived of their Japanese nationality, the abolition of the provision to take foreigners' finger prints, and the extension of residential eligibility for foreigners with stable living conditions.

It is true that sociocultural homogeneity is gradually decreasing but, as mentioned above, the Japanese government still has the ability to control the fragmenting impacts of globalization and sub-national protest. Rather, the strong sociocultural homogeneity tends to provide a basis of the political discourses that admire the cultural superiority of the Japanese in a global competitive environment (e.g. Ishihara 1991, see also Dower 1993:330-331). This kind of cultural representation of Japanese business practice is called "techno-orientalism" (Morley and Robins 1995:147-173) or interpreted in terms of the geo-economic confrontation between different global powers (Ó Tuathail 1992; 1993). This cultural representation of Japan as a "different modernity" is fundamentally driven by the imperative to appreciate Japan's economic competitiveness against the US and Western global hegemony (for other Asian countries, see Ong 1999:193-201). As Taylor (1994:152) argues about state's remaining life, this ability to restore a cultural container can be exercised to reterritorialize Japan against anti-territorial politics.

4. Social container: confusion and reterritorialization

1. Political turmoil
The second half of the 1990s was a crucial period for Japan's territoriality. After the bubble economy burst in 1990, social uneasiness drastically increased by two catastrophes in 1995: the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (5,504 died, 43,177 injured) and the sarin attack by Aum Shinrikyo (12 died, 3,800 injured). The Earthquake gave the Japanese a warning of the fragility of the state land and the lack of swift state crisis control. The sarin attack impressed problematic internal security on the Japanese. In combination with the declining economy and increasing unemployment accelerated by financial crises, conservative politics is clearly emerging at the end of the 1990s.

Before explaining the contents of this fin-de-siecle new conservatism, we can look at the political turmoil in the Japanese Diet. As Table 1 shows, the postwar composition of the political parties in the House of Representatives consists of one major party and several minor ones. After 1955 when the Liberal Democratic Party (Jimin-to, LDP) and the Social Democratic Party of Japan (Shakai-to, SDPJ) were formed, these two parties constructed a major conservative-reformist cleavage in Japanese politics. The amendment of the Japanese Constitution (Article 9) and the constitutionality of the SDF were the major issues distinguishing these parties. Until 1993, the LDP had maintained its dominant position over the SDPJ by securing about 50% of the seats in the House. The postwar politics of Japan had reflected this so-called "the Year 55 Regime"(Gojyugonen-taisei) consisting of the conservative, state-developmentalist and protectionist ideology of the LDP and the reformist, worker-oriented, and pacifist ideology of the SDPJ.

As the tendency of a multi-party system became strong from the 1960s to the 1970s, the voter's support for the LDP started decreasing (see Table 1). Since Japan completed its rapid economic growth in the 1970s, the LDP has often had difficulties in maintaining its dominance in the House. Although the LDP has never received more than 50% support from voters since 1972, the LDP has sometimes succeeded in holding a majority in the House by winning, for instance, independent Diet members over to itself (see Table 2). In the House of Representatives election of 1993, however, the LDP met with a crushing defeat. I would argue that this was caused by five reasons (cf. Curtis 1999:65-98). First, Japan had already passed the economic developmental stage based on heavy industries. Second, the Japanese society had changed from the producer-oriented to the consumer-oriented one. Japanese value system was much more diverse than decades ago. Third, because of the repeated political scandals, the LDP could not attract voters. Fourth, according to these contextual changes, new anti-LDP parties such as the Japan New Party (Nihon-shinto, JNP) and the Japan Renewal Party (Shinsei-to, JNP) were created by the Diet members from older parties including the LDP. Finally, the Japanese mass media tended to criticize the long-term single party dominance of the LDP.

The result of the Diet election of 1993 was quite striking. The LDP's polling score drastically dropped by nearly 10 points. The LDP was forced to be out of office for the first time since 1955. Another fact to note was that the SDPJ (currently the Social Democratic Party or Shamin-to, SDP) could not stop its decline of support from voters (see Table 1). Since the demise of the Soviet Union, socialist political agendas have been out of date in Japan. This "deconstruction" of the Japanese party politics in 1993 put complete end to the Year 55 Regime. In the House of Representatives election of 1996, the LDP could not regain its dominance mainly because the New Frontier Party (Shinshin-to, NFP) which was a coalition of the JPR, Komei-to (Komei), the JNP, and the Democratic Social Party (Minsha-to, DSP) was created as a substantial rival party to the LDP. The result of the 1993 election foresaw that the LDP would never be dominant in the Diet and that a new two-party system would emerge.

However, this political turmoil did not necessarily proceed in the expected way. After 1993, although Japanese prime ministers were elected from non-LDP parties, the cabinets led by these prime ministers did not last long (Table 3). This is due to the fact that it was extremely difficult to shape any policy without the support from the still predominant LDP and to coordinate opinions in the coalition government which consisted of parties with different orientations. The Murayama (the then-SDPJ chairman) cabinet was a coalition with the LDP, which finally led to the LDP's restoration of power in 1996. In spite of its second most predominant position in the House in 1996, the NFP also suffered from internal conflicts and was dissolved into the LDP, the Liberal Party (Jiyu-to, LP), Komei, and the Democratic Party of Japan (Minshu-to, DPJ) in 1997. In sum, this second round of political turmoil put the LDP back in power. In 1999, the LDP came to occupy 53% of the seats in the House without any strong opposition party (Table 2). As Table 3 shows, since 1996 the cabinets led by the LDP have been quite stable.

The fact that the LDP, which received only 35.7% support from voters, occupies 53% seats in the House of Representatives implies that there is a serious gap between public political preferences and politics shaped by the LDP which has restored its dominance in the Diet without election. In addition to this, the LDP has strengthened its foundation by building the coalition government with the LP and Komei in 1999. By this coalition, the governmental parties now occupy more than 70% of the seats in the House (55% seats in the House of Councilors). This proportion is large enough to control discussion and pass bills in the Diet. In terms of this dominance of the governmental parties, it would be instructive for us to look at the recent political and ideological orientation of the Obuchi cabinet.

2. Politics of national identity and reterritorialization
In combination with the catastrophes and economic decline in an era of globalization, the absence of a stable, clear political orientation in Japan seems to create social psychology which seeks Japanese identity. Nishikawa (1992: 94-115) argues that nationalistic return has been seen roughly every twenty years since the Meiji Restoration in 1869. According to Nishikawa, the 1980s can be considered the rising period of westernization after the nationalistic return since the 1960s. Whether Nishikawa's thesis is empirically feasible, it has been pointed out in social psychology that the Japanese tend to be selective in accepting or rejecting the influence of different cultures (Kozakai 1996). Considering the end of the Cold War and the development of globalization in the late 1980s and early 1990s, we can predict that nationalistic return may emerge in Japan after the period of openness.

A recent example of this nationalistic return is the debate over the existence of "comfort women" during the Asia-Pacific War. The Japanese government officially admitted in 1992 that Japanese military forces were involved in forced prostitution in occupied areas and apologized for that in 1993. According to this governmental recognition, school history textbooks in Japan began to describe the cruel acts committed by Japanese military forces. However, a group of scholars and teachers advocating "the liberal view of history" (Jiyushugi-shikan) strongly opposed this description by insisting that existing historical facts could not prove the military involvement in the forced prostitution and that such a "masochistic" description of national history could not cultivate sound Japanese identity in school education (e.g. Fujioka 1996). The group organized its revisionist movement through publication and media and succeeded in attracting a great deal of public attention including strong critiques of the movement (e.g. Komori and Takahashi 1998, see also Takagi 1998).

Such historical revisionism over the assessment of the Asia-Pacific War is not necessarily new in Japan. Rather, what is new in this movement is that it emphasizes the survival of the Japanese in global political economic competition. The major purpose of the movement is to stop ideologically denying the modern history of Japan as Japanese leftists have been doing and to make students proud of their nation's past in order to compete with foreign countries (Fujioka 1997). In this particular context, these competing countries can be the US and East Asian countries which Japan invaded. This argument is similar to what Shintaro Ishihara (former LDP member, currently the governor of Tokyo Metropolis) makes against the US in his controversial The Japan That Can Say No (Ishihara 1991). The movement attempts to restore and reinforce Japanese identity by rewriting the history of Japan so that the Japanese can become proud of themselves in a competitive global environment.
In spite of the group's repeated appeal to revise the school textbooks approved by the Ministry of Education, the Japanese government has not openly accepted their appeal. This is mainly because the overt rejection of the existence of "comfort women" could cause serious diplomatic conflicts with other East Asian countries, which is not good for maintaining Japan's wealth container. Instead, the Japanese government has taken advantage of different opportunities to reinforce national identity. With regards to national identity, one of the most controversial issues in Japan is how schools should treat the national flag (Hinomaru, the Rising-Sun Flag) and anthem (Kimigayo, the Age of the Emperor). School staff unions, which regard the national flag and anthem as the symbols of emperorism and militarism, have strongly opposed the attempt of the central and local governments to utilize them for constructing national identity. Students and parents have sometimes protested the use of these national symbols as ideological coercion. This antagonism has often caused serious conflicts between teachers and principals and between students and schools. Although the Japanese government had not regularized the national flag and anthem, three factors recently changed the government's attitude toward this issue.

First, in February 1999, the JCP changed its policy and admitted the necessity to publicly discuss the regularization of the national flag and anthem. Second, since the negotiation of the coalition government with the LP and Komei progressed satisfactorily, Prime Minister Obuchi became confident that the national flag and anthem would be regularized in the Diet (the Mainichi Shimbun August 9, 1999). Finally, a high school principal in Hiroshima Prefecture committed suicide due to the fact that he was caught in a dilemma between the local education board and the school staff union. This incident could be used to justify the necessity to regularize the national symbols in order to "avoid" further conflicts. As a result, sixty days after the bill was proposed to the Diet, the national flag and anthem were regularized with no penalty provision in August 1999. The bill was approved by 406 to 86 in the House of Representatives and by 166 to 71 in the House of Councillors. This indicates the strong support for the national symbols among politicians. In addition, the framework of the coalition government contributed to smoothing the discussion of the bill (the Mainichi Shimbun August 9, 1999).

Rewriting the national history and regularizing the national symbols does not directly relate to the territoriality or reterritorialization of Japan (Yamazaki 1997; cf. Takagi 1998). Whether or not the reconstruction of national identity in Japan has any spatiality can be examined by looking at other incidents. Although the Japanese government has made a clear claim about the northern territories to the former Soviet Union and Russia, it has rarely conducted territorial behavior to defend its territory since the end of the Asia-Pacific War. There are only a few exceptions to this. In 1953 and 1987, warning shots were fired against a Russian boat and military aircraft respectively (the Asahi Shimbun March 24, 1999; the Sankei Shinbun March 25, 1999). In 1999, the Maritime Safety Agency and the Maritime SDF fired warning shots against the two unidentified, allegedly North Korean, boats violating Japan's territorial waters.

The latest "maritime defense action"(Kaijo-keibi-kodo) can be considered a reaction to the launch of a "Taepodong" missile from North Korea in 1998 and a demonstration to emphasize the importance of the New Guideline for the Japan-US security cooperation (the Asahi Shimbun March 24, 1999). As mentioned in the section of power container, the Japanese government has not necessarily taken a decisive stance toward territorial violations. This often frustrates conservative politicians and intellectuals. They tend to ascribe this governmental indecisiveness to the lack of territorial consciousness among Japanese politicians as well as the Japanese (e.g. the Sankei Shimbun 1997; March 25, 1999; Takubo 1999). If this type of territorial behavior as state crisis control is tied into the issue of weakening national identity, Japan will be literally reterritorialized as a nation-state.

As a governmental reaction to domestic crises such as the sarin attack by Aum Shinrikyo, three new laws to cope with organizational crimes were enforced in August 1999. These laws allow the police to intercept telecommunication. A law was also enforced to code residents and computerize information about the residents in the same General Assembly. These laws reinforce the surveillance function of the state (see Giddens 1985). The LDP, the LP, and Komei approved these bills while the DPJ, the SDP, and the JCP opposed them (the Mainichi Shimbun August 12, 1999). Due to the fact that state surveillance spatially spreads over the territory of Japan, it can be said that the cooperation of these three rightist and centrist parties contributed to reterritolializing Japan through surveillance.

Finally, we need to look at Okinawa again in this context of reterritorialization. Governor Ota's protest against the Japanese government led the Japanese government to conspicuous supports for the new conservative governor, Inamine, who defeated Ota. In addition to a great amount of new subsidies for Okinawa, the government decided to have the 2000 G8 summit in a small town of Nago in Okinawa. This can be regarded as "compensation in advance" from the government. Because of this decision, Nago City could not help accepting a new US base removed from other part of Okinawa. In commemoration of the summit, Prime Minister Obuchi also decided in 1999 to issue a new two-thousand yen bill on which the gate of Shuri Castle, a cultural symbol of Okinawa, will be printed. At the end of 1999, the Emperor made a comment before his ten-year anniversary for the throne referring to his sorrow for the history of Okinawa. The national event, the national currency, and the national symbol all refer to Okinawa as part of Japan. In order to maintain the status quo of Japan's power container, the Japanese government seems to have realized that it must firmly integrate Okinawa into the national territory of Japan.
From the above-mentioned recent incidents, I would argue that in Japan, social confusion caused by the triple territoriality - power, wealth, and cultural containers - has led to strong new conservative politics based on reterritorialization of Japan as a nation-state. As Taylor (1994) argues, the Japanese state led by the conservative and tactical LDP still retains power enough to drive away leftist anti-territorial parties and to make the LP, a neo-liberalist party, harmless to the LDP's territorial politics. In addition, the recent split of the LP into two, the LP and the Conservative Party (Hoshu-to, CP) and LP's divorce from the coalition government (April 2000) clearly indicates the current conservative orientation of Japanese politics. Taylor's new center politics by state elites is, therefore, embodied by the above-mentioned policies of the LDP-led coalition government.
 

IV.  Conclusion
In Japan, the three different territorialities are deeply interconnected and cannot be examined separately. However, under the political economic situations of globalization, new conservative politics is clearly emerging. As I have argued, constitutional regulation on the possession of aggressive military force and the Japan-US security relations obscure the territoriality of Japan as a power container. This leads to a weak sense of territorial defense and consciousness among the Japanese and frustrates conservative politicians who believe it important for Japan to make military contribution in the international society. In terms of a wealth container, although Japan has established and maintains its economic sphere of influence in East Asia, its economic decline and lack of political leadership in the region make it difficult for Japan to secure its hegemonic influence as a core country. One of the impediments is the historical relationship between Japan and other Asian countries and sociopolitical discontinuities among these countries. Under a competitive economic environment in the world, cultural discourses over Japan's global position tend to be politicized in such a way that Japanese national identity can be strengthened to pursue national interests. I argue that Japan's sociocultural homogeneity can contribute to reinforcing this type of cultural representation of Japan and Japanese. Recent arguments over rewriting Japan's modern history and the regularization of the national flag and anthem support this interpretation. In this situation, sociocultural homogeneity in Japan will function to facilitate national integrity rather than diversity as seen in the governmental policies towards Okinawa.
In combination with the above-mentioned nature of Japan's triple territoriality, internal and external socioeconomic unrest in the late 1990s has significantly stimulated political discourses over state crisis control. The recognition of the destabilized world seems to direct conservative politicians toward politics to strengthen state power. They tend to regard the current "crises" of Japan as a question about how to reconstruct Japan as a state. With regards to the regularization of the national flag and anthem, Hirom Nonaka, who was the then-Chief Secretary and most active in this politics, stated, "As the twentieth century ends, we need to seriously reflect on and examine the course of our history in the century. From doing these, we need to think of the new model of the state" (the Mainichi Shimbun August 9, 1999). The article describes Nonaka's intention as being "strongly motivated to resituate Japan as a state."

Due to the interconnectedness of the triple territoriality, the sociospatial fix of "leaking" Japan cannot be implemented by a patchwork of individual policies. There must be an overarching, comprehensive framework of the different policies. I argue that this framework will be amendment to, or the autonomous reformulation of, the Japanese Constitution which conservative politicians have regarded as being imposed on Japan by the US after the Asia-Pacific War, as overrestricting the exercise of military force, and as overemphasizing individualism at the expense of a sense of duty. Therefore, the sociospatial fix of the territoriality of Japan can be interpreted as the restoration of lost sovereignty, lost military power, and lost national identity and the restrengthening of Japan for the chaotic future. The recent decline of leftist parties and the conservative reorganization of the government parties may also accelerate arguments for the amendment as the restoration of state autonomy and a way to overcome internal and external difficulties in the era of globalization

The coalition government occupying more than 70%2 of the seats in the House of Representatives has already proceeded in this direction by establishing the Investigative Committees of the Constitution in both Houses in January 2000. In order to propose a bill to amend the Constitution, it is necessary to have approval from more than two-thirds of the members in both Houses. This is another important implication of the coalition. The amendment to the Constitution has been the LDP's earnest ideological wish since the end of the Asia-Pacific War (Kato 1998). Recent political circumstances, however, do not limit the wish to the LDP. Only two leftist parties, the SDP and the JCP, explicitly oppose the amendment. Their seats in the House of Representatives are only 40 out of 500. The rest of the parties support either the amendment or discussion for the amendment (the Mainichi Shimbun May 2, 2000).

Why is such new conservatism emerging now in Japan? Japan is the first country that has achieved modernization through westernization in Asia and that colonized other Asian countries after that. On one hand, Japan has tended to have cultural tensions with the West, particularly the US which succeeded in subjecting Japan to its hegemony after the Asia-Pacific War. On the other hand, Japan cannot completely engage Asia because of its past imperialism in Asia and because of its present socioeconomic differences from other Asian countries. As Huntington (1996) argues, this ambivalent geopolitical position of Japan in the modern world system tends to isolate Japan from the rest of Asia as well as the West. I argue that this Japan's ambivalent, middleman-like position may contribute to containing, or reterritorializing, Japan as a nation-state in the era of globalization.

In sum, new conservatism in Japan is a political consequence of Japan's inability to image the new space where it can be situated. Conservative politicians in the coalition government do not seem to realize that territorial sovereignty, military power, and national identity are all relative to other nation-states in the modern world system. To the contrary, I argue that what is necessary is to resituate Japan not in closed containers but in the dynamic web of internationality, interstateness, and interterritoriality (Taylor 1995). Although the metaphor of containers explains Japan's current politics very well, we need to transcend the container metaphor to see what the real dynamics are in the modern world system.
 

Notes
1. In this paper, East Asia is referred to as Japan, China, NIEs (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) and the ASEAN (Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Laos, Myanmar, and Singapore) according to the definition of MITI (1999).

2. Before the LP split into two and left the coalition government in April 2000, the coalition government occupied more than 70% of the seats in the House of Representatives. After the split, the coalition government consisting of the LDP, Komei, and the CP occupies 67.2% of the seats which is still enough to propose a bill to amend the Japanese Constitution in the House of Representatives.
 

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