Natural Hazards Observer
| November 2005 | Volume XXX | Number 2 |
Focus on Hurricane Katrina
Recovery by Design: The Ongoing Challenges Presented by Katrina and Rita
It has been a little more than a month since Hurricane Katrina changed the world as I know it. And then there was Hurricane Rita. I am having difficulty remembering what day or date it is. During this time period, I evacuated twice, changed graduate schools, searched for missing friends, worked on short- and long-term disaster recovery strategies, and refocused current work on Louisiana coastal issues. I have become a human rights watchdog, a guide for researchers and caregivers, and a consultant for religious groups and other nongovernmental agencies, long-term disaster response planners, reporters, grant writers, counselors, nonprofit disaster responders, pastors, and friends. This disaster is personal, and each day brings new and difficult challenges.
There is so much that needs to be done, so many critical human needs to be met, and yet so little time. It is commonly said that in a crisis situation time slows down or stops. But, during disaster recovery the future rushes in, forcing quick decisions to be made that do not adequately consider resilience and sustainability. In a disaster like this, one must think in multiple time frames of recovery (e.g., emergency short term and long term) simultaneously. Being in the midst of a disaster and recovery like this, both personally and professionally, is overwhelming on a good day.
As a researcher, a nonprofit disaster responder, and a local resident, the challenges were and are innumerable and varied:
- Communication was extremely difficult. Information and communications systems were nonexistent, did not work, or were dysfunctional. Cell phones, which worked only intermittently, were usually the only link for communication, but no electricity meant short-lived cell phones. This made consulting and communicating with colleagues regarding urgent information and action quite complicated.
- Outside groups (e.g., nongovernmental organizations, researchers, the media, and even curiosity seekers) expected those of us on the ground to help them with arrangements, coordinate information, and interpret the state of affairs.
- Unsolicited volunteers and goods flowed to the region creating ongoing logistical difficulties.
- Driving time doubled, and access to some regions was denied.
- Basic recovery and research tools were, and in some instances still are, hard to come by: laptops, cell phones, printers, physical space, electricity, and operating funds. In some cases these items were left behind to better accommodate other evacuees.
- Funding opportunities must be researched and corresponding proposals developed, a challenge that is especially difficult to meet during dislocation and relocation in the absence of the aforementioned tools.
- Recovery styles and motives vary by institution and are often at odds with best practices as well as with the wishes of the affected communities. Lack of identification of and respect for the local knowledge of poor communities as well as that of the small colleges and universities made the emergency response problematic and likely doomed the recovery and rebuilding phase before it even began.
- The political planning process is difficult to access and influence as it is monopolized by outside interests, contractors, and politicians.
- The political input of indigenous communities is diminished while community members are dispersed across the country.
The enormity of this disaster calls upon all resources to be used in the best and most appropriate manor. In Rising from the Ashes: Development Strategies in Times of Disaster, Mary Anderson and Peter Woodrow state that “the need for speed is a myth. Agencies believe that emergencies always require speedy response from the outside. More important than speed is timeliness. To be timely is to be there when needed. Timeliness requires that agencies look before they leap.”(1) We have seen many cases in this disaster where the rush of agencies and volunteers has hindered more than helped. At times, their needs to feel or look helpful seemed to take precedence over the needs of survivors and caregiving systems. The need to be needed seemed to drive the response.
Perhaps the most frustrating and difficult part has been knowing that the incident could have been partially mitigated and better managed, and still can be: the know-how was and is available. In the November 2004 Natural Hazards Observer, Shirley Laska detailed the scenario that we are living today.(2) Watching the hazard event unfold and the disasters become reality has been heartbreaking knowing that the hazards research, application, and activist communities have for decades been developing a knowledge base that could have altered outcomes and can still positively influence the future, if the powers that be would only listen.
For a successful recovery, some of the things that need to happen include:
- Time lines need to be adjusted for long-term sustainable recovery and vulnerability reduction;
- The knowledge and talent of local people and organizations must be respected and used;
- Guidance from local organizations and academic institutions needs to be respected and used;
- Preexisting environmental, economic, and social issues must be addressed; and
- A reading list for recovery policy makers and recovery managers need to be created and utilized.
We must heed the lessons we are learning from this event as it unfolds as well as from the events that came before it.
To do so, we must work together as a single hazards community. In her article “Knowledge Transfer between Researchers and Practitioners,” Alice Fothergill calls for acknowledging the distinct cultures of the research and practitioner communities, working within institutional restrictions and around them when necessary, supporting the efforts to create a new strata between the research group and the practitioner group, and supporting increased personal and professional interaction between the two groups.(3) It is time that we create more than a dialogue between researchers and practitioners. We must create a single disaster response community that no longer accepts two separate cultures—research and practice. Our stereotypes of each other must end.
Despite the obstacles, and as has been demonstrated in past emergencies, local people, grass roots organizations, and institutions did and are doing remarkable, creative, and wonderful things (e.g., 65 grassroots organizations have come together in a collaborative effort to rebuild Louisiana). Adopting a participatory research approach that also incorporates these valuable community resources into the process takes this community building a step further. In his article, “Participatory Research Democracy and Community,” Peter Park says of participatory research that “first, it directly addresses people’s practical problems that arise in their daily struggles for material, psychic, and social well being. Second, it is the people with the problem to solve who do the actual research. Third, the goal of participatory research is to actually bring about change by engaging in beneficial social activities.”(4) Kathleen Tierney echoed this sentiment when she stated that, “the strength and resilience of our society lies in community-based organizations, neighborhood associations, nongovernmental organizations, schools, workplaces, faith-based organizations, and the millions who volunteer to serve their communities in dealing with extreme events.”(5)
Among the many things to learn from this disaster, one key lesson is that the survivors, caregivers, and their communities need us all to be working together as one community, with different tasks but a single goal. In the world of disaster recovery, as we believe Park would suggest, there can be no clear distinction between researcher, practitioner, activist, and survivor. The survivors, their caregivers, and their communities must be heard. To the degree that we can learn to work together we will better hear their voice.
Kristina J. Peterson
Presbyterian Disaster Assistance
Center for Hazards Assessment, Response, and Technology (CHART)
University of New Orleans
(1) Anderson, Mary, and Peter Woodrow. 1989. Rising from the ashes: Development strategies in times of disaster. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
(2) Laska, Shirley. 2004. What if Hurricane Ivan had not missed New Orleans? Natural Hazards Observer 29(2): 5-6.
(3) Fothergill, Alice. 2000. Knowledge transfer between researchers and practitioners. Natural Hazards Review 1(2): 91-98.
(4) Park, Peter. 1997. Participatory research, democracy and community. Practicing Anthropology 19(3): 8-13.
(5) Tierney, Kathleen. 2003. The challenges we face: Reflections on the 2003 hazards workshop. Natural Hazards Observer 28(1): 1-3.