Natural Hazards Observer
| November 2005 | Volume XXX | Number 2 |
Focus on Hurricane Katrina
The Disaster That Was Katrina
When Hurricane Katrina came ashore on August 29, she ended decades of anticipation. There were few hazards in the United States more studied by scientists and engineers and there was ample warning that a strong storm could cause the city of New Orleans to flood. Hurricane Camille had demonstrated the vulnerability of coastal communities in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama 34 years earlier and the vulnerability of new development was widely recognized. Additionally, the risk to the residents of New Orleans and the delta country around the mouth of the Mississippi was covered by National Geographic (October 2004) and Scientific American (October 2001) magazines, as well as by the popular press. In other words, there were few surprises in terms of the damage and the number of people affected.
The failures of the emergency management system to respond quickly and effectively to a catastrophic disaster were also predicted. The scale of the Katrina disaster notwithstanding, the question of whether the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was prepared to deal with a catastrophic disaster was answered. Warnings from state and local emergency managers, scholars, policy analysts, political commentators, and former and current Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) officials that the agency responsible for coordinating the federal response was no longer able to do so were not heeded. FEMA had been stripped of functions and disconnected from the national networks of governmental and nongovernmental disaster relief organizations upon which the nation has historically depended during major disasters. Funding cuts; transfers of critical elements to other DHS units; changes in policy priorities; changes in plans and procedures and organizational structures without adequate involvement of the professional emergency management and disaster research communities and without adequate investments in training; and a flood of transfers and retirements of experienced FEMA personnel all contributed to the loss of emergency management capacity.
The “all-hazards” approach that had characterized emergency management during the pre-DHS years was discarded in favor of a counter-terrorism approach. The National Response Plan and other DHS documents, as well as the speeches of DHS leaders, mention all-hazards but are focused on terrorism, particularly terrorism involving so-called “weapons of mass destruction.” Decisions concerning the use of federal assets are made in Washington, rather than at regional or state levels.
The problems experienced with the Katrina response reflected the weaknesses of command and control structures. Classic bureaucratic processes can be very effective in dealing with routine tasks in a relatively stable task environment, but are notoriously slow in dealing with the nonroutine and are prone to failure when overloaded. A question that should be addressed is whether the centralization of decision making caused delays in critical decisions, such as the deployment of National Guard units, and mismatches between local needs and national actions. Clearly, officials at all levels, from the White House to the statehouses to the city halls, suffered from the lack of communication with local officials and affected areas. A more decentralized approach would have saved time and would have better directed resources where they were most needed. Officials might have looked less foolish had they had access to better information and had they a greater understanding of emergency management.
The hazard posed to New Orleans and adjoining parishes by the levee system should have been addressed decades ago. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had funding for at least some levee work, but the funding was cut. Officials had funding for an evacuation study, but the money was shifted to other purposes.
The evacuation of New Orleans should have happened much earlier than it did and should have included a larger percentage of the residents. The rule of thumb is that 80 percent of residents will evacuate. That percentage might be improved upon by removing as many obstacles as possible for those who do not have the wherewithal to evacuate on their own and/or stay because they will not or cannot leave a relative, a pet, or the possessions that represent their lives.
For some, particularly the elderly and poor whose worlds are very small, uncertain risk hardly outweighs the uncertainty of the outside world. Clearly, the Katrina disaster revealed the reality of poverty for many Americans and the international community. Statistics on the increasing number of poor in America were released only a few days before Katrina, and the disaster demonstrated that there is a large segment of American society that lives without the economic and social resources necessary to protect themselves and their families. Calls to stockpile water and food for four days seem ludicrous to those who barely have enough money to eat everyday.
Policy makers and disaster researchers do need to understand the looting and violence that kept responders out of New Orleans and terrorized those trapped in the city for days. Clearly, some were thieves and thugs while others were victims of the flooding looking for supplies. Fortunately, weeks after the worst of the flooding, there are indications that there were fewer looters than the media and authorities estimated. Explanation for the disappearance of hundreds of New Orleans police officers has not been found, although some likely were trying to save their own families.
The appropriate role for the military has become a major issue since the early days of the disaster. While the military provided essential security in the city and performed search and rescue, they were ill-equipped to provide daily assistance to victims. The U.S. Coast Guard is the exception. Military police, transportation, medical, and logistics units have clear roles in disaster response. Arguments that the military should become the nation’s disaster relief organization have raised a number of issues, beginning with their availability and their training.
The U.S. military is responsible for defending the nation from external threats and it is uncertain that we can depend upon their assistance at all times. The Posse Comitatus Act also limits the use of active and reserve units and federalized National Guard units in support of local law enforcement officials. The National Guard should be a primary resource for state officials, but the restructuring of the guard to support regular forces overseas has reduced the options for governors. Additionally, the deployment of National Guard troops leaves many state and local police, fire, and emergency medical services departments, as well as hospitals and other critical services, understaffed.
Recovery in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama may be very slow. Thousands of evacuees may not return to the devastated communities. Housing those displaced by flood waters and wind may involve years of support. Most victims lacked flood insurance and those who had it will not receive sufficient reimbursement to rebuild without federal assistance. The recovery effort will raise numerous issues, especially the issue of whether homes and businesses in the most vulnerable areas should be rebuilt at all. It is argued that some of the most seriously flooded areas, such as the 9th Ward in New Orleans, should be returned to marshland, and recommendations are being made that there should be greater restrictions on development on the beaches and that more stringent building codes should be adopted and enforced. In Mississippi, officials will have to address the vulnerability of floating casinos.
There are a lot of examples of good coastal zone management in the United States. In Florida, for example, studies document the reduction in property losses when building codes are strengthened—lessons were learned from Hurricane Andrew. More attention to vertical evacuation and other measures to reduce the vulnerabilities of populations in low-lying coastal areas can also be adopted. A major issue should be whether states should also impose surtaxes on property insurance (as Florida has done) to fund local mitigation programs. Lastly, Katrina will force greater attention to the need to deal with ecological damage from catastrophic disasters. Hazardous materials, sewage, and other debris have to be dealt with in order to restore marshlands, waterways, and woodlands.
Katrina was a man-made, nature-assisted disaster. The hazard along the Gulf Coast was created by our failing to preserve natural barriers to storm surge, failing to regulate development in the most hazardous areas, failing to adopt and enforce appropriate building standards and codes, and failing to prepare residents for a catastrophic storm. We have an opportunity now to remedy some of those problems by moving people a little further away from the Gulf waters, improving development regulation and construction, and educating residents so they can better protect themselves and their property. Hurricane Camille’s passage is still evident along the coasts of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, and Katrina’s passage will certainly leave scars and memories, as well. Hopefully, in the rush to rebuild, measures will be taken to assure that the next Camille or Katrina will leave fewer scars and less traumatic memories.
William L. Waugh, Jr.
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
Georgia State University