Note: The footnotes from The Nature of Geography are being added to this file in the order in which the chapters are converted. The file is not yet complete.

¹ Since the above sentence was first written, a new answer has already been given: "geophysics" [222, 252 ff.]; although I am later informed that that was not
the intention.

² References are given only to sources that I have directly examined, in order that it may be clear that in other cases I have depended on secondary commentators.

³ For over a century there was uncertainty as to the authenticity of the various published versions of Kant's lectures on physical geography, but the extraordinarily painstaking research of the Kantian philosopher, Adickes, appears to have finally established the facts, which we may briefly summarize [14; 15; cf. Gedan in 40, 509 ff.]. Although Kant himself never prepared his lectures for publication, he had at least one full manuscript copy, from which however he evidently departed frequently in "dictating" his lectures. Further, there have been preserved a few original records by students as well as a larger number of handwritten copies prepared in what Adickes describes as "a special branch of industry" in Königsberg--copies put together from various students' records, often those of different years mixed together, to be sold to other students. From such sources, a certain Gottfr. Vollmer issued in 1801, three years before Kant's death, the first volume of a six-volume set purporting to be Kant's geography. Since it has been shown that, though this was based on Kant's lectures, those form not more than a fifth of the total material presented, without differentiation, this edition must be dismissed (unfortunately Peschel based his consideration of Kant's work on Vollmer's production). Kant himself denounced it and requested F. T. Rink to prepare an. "authorized edition" from various manuscripts that Kant had on hand. Unfortunately he had become too senile to examine what Rink produced and published in 1802. By comparing this edition with more than twenty other handwritten manuscripts, of the types described above, Adickes concludes that its authenticity is in general beyond doubt, but that it is based on sources separated nearly twenty years in time. The greater part of the first volume (§ 1-52, omitting §§ 11 and 14) was based on a full and fairly reliable record of Kant's lectures of 1775, on which Kant himself had made marginal corrections. The remainder of the first volume (Teil), and all of the second were taken from Kant's own manuscript, which however dates from not later than 1759. Further, all of the notes and references, as well as sections 11 and 14, were added by Rink, who also presumed to improve at many points on the literary style; although in most cases he accomplished the reverse, he does not appear to have changed the meaning significantly.

Adickes feels that, had Kant been able to realize what was being done, he would not have permitted Rink to publish the second portion, based as it was on outdated material which Kant evidently omitted or corrected in his verbal lectures. The first part however (§§ 1-52), represents approximately Kant's lectures in the latter years. (All the more significant references used in this paper are taken from this first part; quotations are corrected in language, without altering the meaning, according to suggestions from Adickes, taken from an original manuscript--probably, he thinks, the very manuscript that Rink had used.)

It has long been known, from the publication of Kant's program for his course for the year 1765-6, that he planned to revise his outline materially, to contract greatly the "physical geography" in order to devote approximately two thirds of the time to "moral" and "political" geography, but Adickes concludes, from the study of students' manuscripts of later years, that he did not find the time to do this, that, in general, the outline remained much the same as it had been.

In the various editions in which Rink's version of Kant's lectures have been republished, editors have corrected a number of his more obvious errors; without significantly altering the meaning in most cases. Probably the most nearly satisfactory edition is to be found in the publication by the Academy of Sciences in Berlin [40]. Adickes' suggestions for the preparation of a more authentic edition of Kant's lectures from the available manuscripts have apparently not been taken up.

For geography today, Adickes is no doubt correct in assuming that Kant's work is of little more than historical interest. Among geographers it has been examined in detail particularly by Gerland, whose course of twelve lectures on Kant's work in geography and anthropology, given in 1901, was later published [12]. One section of Kant's study, however--namely his concept of the relation of geography to other sciences--is of fundamental interest to us today, as will be seen later in this paper. We may note in particular, therefore, that Rink's presentation of this section is substantiated in the manuscript sources that Adickes studied.

⁴ Unless otherwise indicated the historical data concerning this period are taken from Wisotzki's chapter on "Die reine Geographie," which is arranged in chronological order [1, 193-266]. In no case is the reader to assume the adjective "first." Conclusions concerning historical priority are not only dangerous but do not concern us here; we need only establish what ideas had been developed before the end of this period.

⁵ It is hardly possible to separate the works of the two Forsters, Johann Reinhold (1729-98) and Georg F. (1754-94), since their most important journeys were made together, much of the work of the father was published in Germany by the son, and the latter depended on his methods of study on the father, who was still living when George Forster died at the age of forty. Though Germans, they had lived for some years in England, where the father held a professorship in natural history for two years, and both accompanied Captain Cook on his voyage of 1772-75, but they returned to Germany a few years later. J. R. Forster's Observations made on the voyage with Cook were written in English and published in England, but the German translation made by his son proved far more influential [41; the English writers Dickinson and Howarth mention only the German edition, 10, 172]. Most students have concluded that the elder Forster was the more important pioneer [cf. A. Dove, 16]; Plewe feels that personal feelings motivated Humboldt to refer repeatedly to the work of his friend, George Forster, at the expense of his less agreeable father [8, 22-26; but note also Humboldt's letters to J. R. Forster, 17].

⁶ Kant was writing, of course, long before Darwin provided biological science with a unified system. Gerland however thinks Kant's consideration of Linnaeus in error [12].

⁷ Bucher [51, 34, 37, 44, 89 f., 116 ff.]; Wilhelmi, who had published his work anonymously, was unknown by name to Bucher; the authorship is taken from Wisotzki [1, 243-7].

⁸ On the basis of Bucher's earlier discussion, Bürger lists him with Zeune as one of the two forerunners of Humboldt and Ritter to present the concept of unity of areas, but fails even to mention his later complete and emphatic reversal, even though that is clearly presented by Wisotzki, on whom he appears in part to depend [11, 11 f.].

⁹ Bucher's critique also included, among other points, a vigorous attack on the use of the Mercator projection both for world maps and for those of areas in mid-latitudes, as found in a number of texts of the period [51, 53-56]. Likewise, we may mention as timely, his arguments against combining history and geography in a common course of instruction [237-42].

¹⁰ The expression is taken from Wisotzki, who however speaks only of Ritter [1, 257]. In the judgment of most other writers, including Peschel, Richthofen, Hettner, and Penck, Humboldt's importance to geography was equal to or greater than that of Ritter; see particularly Penck [137, 158-76].

¹¹ Compare, for example, Ritter's statement of the comparison of history and geography in his lecture of 1833 [50, 152 f.], with the statement to be found in Humboldt's lectures given at Berlin, 1827-8 [52, 14]; it is possible however that both statements may be independently derived from Kant. It would make an extremely interesting subject for a dissertation to investigate in detail the common elements in the work of the two founders of geography. Döring's brief statement is based on an exhaustive study of Humboldt but on only a brief examination of Ritter's writings [22, 160-63].

¹² Unless otherwise indicated, the biographical data are taken from the authoritative work by Kramer, based in part on Ritter's diary [24]; it has been abstracted by Fr. Ratzel in his critical sketch of Ritter's life and work [26]. The account given here is disproportionately long in order to correct erroneous impressions common in nearly all English accounts. Dickinson and Howarth [10, 150-61], though recognizing Ritter's importance, have apparently been misled in various important respects, possibly by the biography by the American writer, Gage [cf. Kramer, 24, II, 35].

¹³ Many of the secondary sources present a very different picture of the relation between Humboldt and Ritter, even indicating that there was essentially no personal relationships. I have found, however, no refutation of Kramer's statement; and possibly even some support in the references of each of the principals to the other in private letters to third parties [cf. 20, II, 131; 19, III, 40, 62, 89]. One gathers from these however that the relationship was very largely, if not entirely, limited to their single field of common interest, geography. Undoubtedly, as Ratzel suggests, the praise which each rendered to the work of the other was expressed in exaggerated tones--"as though both were hard of hearing"--but this was considered in good format that time, and there appears to be no basis for questioning their essential sincerity. On the other hand, the great difference in temperament, social and religious background, and non-professional activities made it hardly possible, as Ratzel notes, for a close personal friendship to develop between them [26, 423 ff.].

¹⁴ In Leighly's recent discussion of "Methodological Controversy in Nineteenth Century German Geography," this phrase is mistranslated to describe geography as "the science of space-filling terrestrial objects" [222, 251]. The phrase, to be sure, is not ascribed to Ritter, but appears in the discussion of Gerland's thesis, as "a windy definition that had long been current." As no specific page reference is given, it is only after searching through Gerland's essay--more than fifty pages of fine type--that one finds that Gerland had quoted Ritter's phrase correctly [76, xvi], though without mentioning its authorship, supposing, no doubt, that any reader would recognize it as one of the best known quotations from Ritter. On the other hand, it is only fair to add, Gerland is in part responsible for the misunderstanding: his supposed "disposal" of Ritter's concept is based on the misconstruction represented by Leighly's translation--i.e., that translation correctly represents Gerland's misinterpretation of Ritter's meaning.

Although Leighly's paper appears in general well-documented, the general absence of specific page references makes it very difficult to find the original statements given in translation or paraphrase. As a number of errors in interpretation have been made, it seems necessary to note these, in footnotes, at the appropriate places in our historical survey. (See Supplementary Note 3.)

¹⁵ Ritter's most complete tribute to Humboldt is to be found in the address he gave at the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of Humboldt's return from America [Zeitschr. f. allegm. Erdk., Berlin, 1844, 384 ff.; republished in part in 20, I, 469 ff.]. The festive occasion may have excused the somewhat excessive strain of the laudation.

¹⁶ Leighly's comment that Fröbel's attack on Ritter's teleology "evidently touched a tender spot" [222, 245], is a conclusion for which this writer finds no evidence. Any, who care to, may readily judge for themselves, as Leighly quotes most of Ritter's reply on this point, omitting only the meat of it, namely, the direct reply to Fröbel's analogy of cows and men which he had quoted in full [244]. It is appropriate to call attention to a lengthy statement that the same Fröbel wrote a quarter of a century later: "If nature--and history...--must be studied according to physical forms of judgment, it does not follow that one may not also regard nature, as well as the moral world, according to ethical forms of judgment. It would put a ridiculous restraint on reason to deny it this right...There is of course nothing new for philosophy in all this; but many of our younger natural scientists, who take pride in not being philosophers, commit the error of believing that that against which they close the eyes of the mind therefore does not exist" [62, I, 79 f.].

¹⁷ Leighly's translations of these two statements are likely to mislead the reader [222, 242 f.]. The omission of a major phrase in the first quotation--an omission not indicated--seriously changes the meaning, as may be seen by examining the following quotation of the original in full (the parentheses indicate the parts omitted).

"In den Gesamterscheinungen der Natur und der Geschichte treten die Einwirkungen dieser tellurischen Anordnung des Planeten und seiner Verhältnisse überall hervor, da er (zum Schauplatz der Natur und ihre Kräfte wie) zum Träger der Vö1ker von Anfang an eingerichtet ward, als Heimath, Wohnort und temporäre Entwicklungsanstalt für dos Menschengeschlecht, (das ohne diese Bedingung nicht gedacht werden kann)." In other words if anyone should say "geography studies nature as well as man," he could be quoted as saying: "geography studies man."

In the second quotation the phrase "from the beginning of time" is transferred from the middle of the sentence to the position of emphasis at the beginning. Since this construction is no less common in German than in English we must assume that Ritter did not intend to give the phrase that emphasis. (The originals may most readily be found in Ritter's republication of his essays [50, 104 and 243], unchanged from their original form as they appeared in the less readily available publications to which Leighly refers.)

¹⁸ Ritter's statement is not entirely clear in the original, and minor differences in translation into English are possible. The translation given above was checked by two German students. The omissions in Leighly's quotation [222, 243] make the translation grammatically impossible, as is shown by the following reproduction of the original in which the parts he omits are enclosed in parentheses. Ritter stated that his purpose in the Erdkunde was: "die (allgemein) wichtigsten, geographisch-physikalischen Verhältnisse der Erd (oberfläche in ihrem Naturzusammenhange, und zwar ihren wesentlichen Zügen und Hauptumrissen nach) darzustellen, (insbesondere als Vaterland der Völker) in dessen mannigfaltigstem Einflusse auf körperlich und geistig sich entwickelnde Menschheit" [49, I, v]. Granted that the original statement is long-winded and somewhat difficult to translate, the omissions reduce it to a grammatical ruin, from which one can form a complete statement only by ignoring grammatical forms and cases. The result is a simpler statement than Ritter's, but it is not Ritter's. Grammatically it is clear that the main part of the statement is given by "die...geographisch-physikalischen Verhältnisse der Erdoberfläche in ihrem Naturzusammenhange darzustellen." Even if one may overlook the dictates of grammar, no one familiar with the writings of Ritter would suppose that he could state his purpose in geography without the use of some form of the word "Zusammenhang"--in later parts of his introduction it is repeated two or three times per page on consecutive pages; it was no less important, as we will see, in Humbolt's conception of geography.

¹⁹ Humboldt's active work on this question is of some significance in the history of both Europe and America. Though a nobleman and privy councilor to two successive kings of Prussia, Humboldt retained through life "the ideas of 1789" acquired in his young manhood from the French Revolution, and stimulated again in 1804 by his six weeks' visit to the United States, nearly half of which was spent with Thomas Jefferson, then president [20, I, 393, ff., II, 293, 295]. Fifty years later, discouraged with the political situation in Europe, and looking on the United States as "the bulwark of a rational freedom," but fearful that the curse of slavery might destroy it [19, I, 16], he permitted his name to be used in support of Fremont's presidential campaign of 1856 [20, II, 295 ff.]. Greatly disappointed in the outcome of that election, he was on the other hand successful in the following year in introducing a law prohibiting slavery in Prussia; further, he courageously continued the general attack on negro slavery by publishing an open letter essentially supporting the views of Fröbel, at that time still politically suspect. (Their disagreement was over the scientific arguments; on the issue itself they agreed, [cf. Fröbel, 28, 1, 303].)

In the 1840's Humboldt took a vigorous and effective part in opposing the enactment of restrictive laws against the Jews. The present commentator, writing at the moment in the Germany of 1938, can only regret that Humboldt's statement of nearly a century ago is still pertinent: "the history of the Dark Ages shows to what aberrations such interpretations give strength" [20, II, 291 ff.].

²⁰ Even before his travels to America, Humboldt was drawn into close personal relationship with Goethe thanks to the close friendship between the latter and Humboldt's brother Wilhelm. The publication of some twenty letters that passed between Alexander v. Humboldt and Goethe during the period 1795 to 1827 gives some indication of the interchange of ideas that took place during Humboldt's various visits with Goethe [18, 289-314]. Humboldt dedicated the first part of his travel descriptions Das Naturgemälde de Tropenwelt, to Goethe; in his letter of Feb. 6, 1806, he speaks of a long-held plan to express his "respect and gratitude" in this way.

²¹ Ritter repeatedly used the word "compendium" (in the same form in German) to indicate the antithesis of his work--notably in his reply to Fröbel (both in German and Latin) [55, 508, 513]. In paraphrasing Ritter's statement of his purpose in that article, Leighly not merely omits two of the three different but coordinate purposes listed in a single sentence, but actually has Ritter call his own work by the very word that Ritter had used to indicate what his work was not [222, 245].

²² In Leighly's presentation of Ritter's defense of his work, the sole reference to this list of exhibits is the following sentence; "In his reply, Ritter reminded Fröbel that he, Ritter, had long used in his lectures the analytic procedure Fröbel recommended" [222, 245]. The later reference to these "unpublished lectures" as having little influence in the post-Ritterian period [248] is an error; they were published three years after Ritter's death, as Allgemeine Erdkunde, a volume frequently referred to in German literature [61].

²³ Humboldt outlined parts of the first section of the outline in detail; other parts and the whole of the second section, he evidently left for Berghaus to work out. Since the English group which had requested the work--which they planned to have translated into Hindu--later cancelled the project, it was never completed [19,
111, 34-204, passim].

²⁴ This statement can be made only tentatively, since the writer does not pretend to be familiar with the nineteen volumes of Ritter's Erdkunde. It appears to be justified by the outline and by a glance through parts of the text, as well as by the statements of other students. But this does not mean that Ritter did not present small details concerning his regions; for example, note the descriptions of villages and farmhouses--a beginning of Siedlungsgeographie--in the mining district of the Altai [49, II, 847].

²⁵ Previous to his full treatment of this concept in the chapter of the Kosmos,entitled "Begrenzung und wissenschaftliche Behandlung einer physischen Weltbeschreibung" [60, I, 49-78], Humboldt had stated it briefly in two studies published in Latin, the first in 1793 [42]. The most complete presentation of his geographical methodology is provided by Döring's dissertation, a painstaking, thorough, and well-arranged treatment, consisting in large part of quotations or accurate paraphrases that I have found to be reliable [22]. The first volume of the Kosmos presents Humboldt's outline of systematic geography. A brief survey of his geography is provided by the recent publication of his lectures given at the University of Berlin in the winter of 1827-28 [52]. Although I have no information as to the literalness of this publication, the concepts, expressions, and statements presented are unquestionably correct reproductions of Humboldt's views as found in his writings.

²⁶ Note however the recent republication of his "Notes on the Southern Appalachians" in which Ralph H. Brown finds material of value for the historical geography of that region [65]. Mention may also be made here of his memorial address for Ritter, which I have not seen: Carl Ritter. An address to the Amer. geogr. and statist. soc., Princeton, N. J., 1860. (See Supplementary Note 10)

²⁷ Wagner discussed the importance of regional geography as early as his methodological report of 1882. In his report of 1891, he devoted some ten pages to the subject [80, 385-95], after first making a passing reference to it, with a footnote referring to his earlier discussion [375]. It is in reference to this report that Leighly states that "regional geography...was just coming into Wagner's view in 1891" and that he had noted it then "only in passing" [222, 256].

²⁸Penck found this to be an unfortunate "act of reverence" toward the original manuscript, but Hettner had the additional reason that his work is a "general geography" minus the study of the seas, and the term "Vergleichende Länderkunde" is therefore proper. [Penck, 90, 1, 38-40; II, 31-2; Hettner, 363, IV, foreword.] That Hettner's terms should have led to complete misunderstanding by one American student [cf. 222, 256 f.] might be regarded as an additional point to Penck's objections, though, as the latter recognizes, there is no difficulty in understanding what Hettner intends if one reads beyond the title. In any case it is not for us to enter into a discussion of terminology in a foreign language.

The terms used in this paper, now fairly common in American geography, and readily adapted in all languages of Latin origin, do not supply suitable terms when translated into German. Fortunately the English language is not limited to words of any particular linguistic origin.

²⁹ Hettner wrote in 1898 that the position established by Richthofen might be called "in gewisser Hinsicht eine Rückkehr zu Ritter" [2, 317]. Leighly's quotation of this as simply "a return to Ritter," without the qualifying phrase [222, 258], is incomplete, particularly in view of Hettner's detailed explanations of what was involved in his qualification [2, 308 f., 313, 315]. What other evidence there is to be found in this or other writings by Hettner that he was responsible for a transfer of Ritter's "holistic view" to regional study is not indicated by Leighty, nor is this writer able to find any. If the holistic view of regions is present in American geography today, as Leighly implies, it could be traced through Sauer to Schlüter.

³⁰ Bürger is able to list Richthofen and Hettner as contributing to the development of these concepts only because he does not distinguish clearly between different uses of these terms [11, 26, 76]. Both Richthofen and Hettner consider the sum total of interrelated factors at any one place as a total mechanism which will not clearly be comprehended if any important part is ignored. For Hettner, further, this total is unique at every spot of the earth (Erdstelle) and thereby that place "is stamped as an individual" [161, 217]; but I find no justification in the context there or elsewhere, for Bürger's addition of the phrase, "as a Landschaft." On the contrary, in his direct discussion of this concept, which Bürger lists in his bibliography, Hettner clearly indicates that only the spot, not an area, has individuality [269]. It may be added that in one of his earlier studies (not cited by either Bürger or Leighly) Hettner compares the relation of localities to the whole earth surface--with obvious hesitation--to the relation of organs to a great organism, but not in order to indicate that the locality was in fact a specific unit or that the earth was really an organism; since he drops these terms in his later treatment of the same theme, we may ignore them.

³¹ It is an indication of the fact that German geography is entering a new period in which we may expect notable changes that due caution prevents me from indicating the sources of this suggestion. They include both geographers and non-geographers.

³² Attention should be called to the series of studies by different authors of the current situation in geography in various countries published in a recent number of the Geographische Zeitschrift (1938, pp. 241-315). Some discussion of points of view on the nature of geography will be found in those dealing with the United States [108], Netherlands [92], France [193], and especially Great Britain [101] and Japan [110]. The other studies do not take up this question directly but present a general view of the geographic work in Germany, Italy, Poland, and the Scandinavian countries [91; 94; 95; 96].

³³ Dickinson's study purports to be based on investigation of "current trends in geography in the United States, Germany, and France." But he greatly over-emphasizes Schlüter's importance in Germany in presenting his concept of geography as representative of that country. It is hardly a sufficient correction to speak of "Schlüter's concept...together with that of Hettner," without pointing out clearly that Hettner has repeatedly opposed almost all the specific aspects of Schlüter's concept that he describes in detail--almost nothing is said concerning the points on which they agree. The consideration of geography in the United States is limited exclusively to the work and concepts of the geographers of one university, a group that could certainly not be considered as representative.

⁴⁹ Since those who have proposed that geography, or a part of geography, be considered as a form of art have given no indication of having consulted either artists, students of art, or students of the theory of knowledge, it hardly seems necessary to list here the particular individuals whom I have consulted on this point. Among many available works may be mentioned two studies by philosophers, Cohen and Kraft, in which the distinction between art and science as different forms of knowledge is clearly presented [115; 166, 20 f.].

⁵⁰ The quite opposite views of Younghusband, which have been published in Germany in translation [235], and particularly those of Banse [246; 330] have aroused so much discussion that almost every German writer on methodology of the past ten or twenty years has taken the opportunity to criticise them. Since we do not consider this question in detail, we may list the principal references here: Friedrichsen [230, 233-7]; Krebs [234, 82 ff.] Hettner [152, 53-7; 161, 151-3; 167, 276; and, particularly. 265]; Gradmann [236, 132 f., 139-42]; Graf [156, 40-3, 90-3]; Hassinger [253] Penck [163, 49 f.]; Granö [252, 5 f.]; Kraft [166, 20 f.]; Waibel [266, 205-7]; Bürger [11, 104-12]; Vogel [271, 7]; and Schmidt [180, 81-94]. An apparently unrelated but parallel discussion introduced in this country by Leighly [220], has been considered by Platt [221, 13 f., 33-6]; by Crowe, in England [201, 2] ; and most thoroughly by Finch [223]. I do not know what basis Penck had for his prophetic remark of 1928: "Nicht einmal das Mittelalter hat seine Geographie zu den Künsten gezählt. Aber der Amerikaner stellt sie zu den 'Arts'" [163, 50].

⁵¹ The following statement on terminology is also of interest: "The description, of a single place on the earth is callled topography; chorography is the description of a region and its characteristics; the description of the whole world, geography." (The terms stem from Ptolemy [433]) The entire introduction is of great interest.

⁵² For all of these systematic sciences of nature, as distinct from either the history of nature or the space sciences, geography and astronomy, Humboldt in his statement of 1793 used the term "Physiographia"--one of the earliest appearances of this word, presumably [42]. He appears, however, to have abandoned it in his later writings.

⁵³ Prominent members of the present generation of German geographers find that Hettner represents an epoch that "is already historical." In contrast with his view of science, based on the "positivistic liberalism" of the nineteenth century, they believe that geography is entering a period in which there will be more emphasis on value concepts and on the creative influence of peoples and individuals, that the "Gleichörtliche" will be viewed "not in terms of the sum and functional cohesion of its parts, but ganzheitlich, in the sense of the Gestalt theory,"and that "nationale Erdkunde is the whole of geography, regarding with German eyes and from the German point of view, Germany and the world" [Schrepfer, 174, 69-71, 85]. Such views have been represented, somewhat violently, by Spethmann [251; 261], more respectfully, but nonetheless categorically, by Muris and Schrepfer. The incidental presentation, at a recent meeting of geographers, of the opposing views of the older and newer schools brought vigorous applause from different members of the audience. Because the new Weltanschauung involved is limited to German geographers, the writer has not considered it necessary to examine it in this study.

⁵⁴ Fortunately Hettner's style is unusually easy for the non-German student. I regret that that is not always the case in the translations, which for the present purpose must necessarily be literal. Many students will no doubt welcome his three-page summary outline of his position, written in 1905 [126, 683 ff.] and his recent summary statement in the introduction to Vergleichende Länderkunde [363, I, 1-7].

⁵⁵ We omit here several pages in which Hettner considers the study of the earth body as a whole and finds that a "science of earth" cannot logically be developed as a single branch of knowledge. See Sec. III B.

⁵⁶ The difficulty in translating Ritter's phrase--"die irdisch erfüllten Räume der Erdoberfläche"--has been noted previously. A further confusion was introduced by a number of writers in repeating it as "die dinglich erfüllten Räume"--presumably to avoid the repetition with Erdoberfläche. Ritter's concept, as his discussion made clear, included as "earthly," non-material phenomena of man that could hardly be considcred as "things" [50, 156-8; cf. Kraft, 166, 5]. (See Supplementary Note 25.)

⁵⁷ There are notable differences in the relative importance and character of development between systematic, or general, geography (as distinct from regional geography) and the corresponding work in the field of history. The reasons for this difference, which we will consider later (Sec. XI G) do not, as might appear, cast doubt on the logical similarity here discussed.

NOTES 58-97 NOT YET CONVERTED.

⁹⁸ The use of the term "historical sciences" to refer to the sciences that study man--whether because they grew out of history or because they find much of their material in history--appears illogical and is misleading. The science which studies the history of the earth is "historical" both in name and in character.

⁹⁹ It may be that Colby uses the word "phenomena" in a different sense from that used here and so only appears to have come to an opposite conclusion. One cannot be sure, since he intentionally does not discuss either his question or the answer which he only suggests.

¹⁰⁰ Schluter concluded that only on its physical side was geography einmalige, wheras on its human side it was more nomothetic-this, in the same article in which he emphasized that geography was not two sided, but many-faceted [148, 218, 145-6]! Graf also finds Schluter self-contradictory, though for a different reason. He himself comes to just the opposite conclusions in regard to the natural science and social science side of geography, but his argumjent is admittedly based on the particular philosophy of the sciences which divides the natural from the social sciernces on the basis of nomothetic versus idiographic-in other words, an argument in a circle [156, 106; note also Hettner's review and later discussion, and Kraft, 166, 11-13].

¹⁰¹ As indicated in answers received to a questionaire distributed to a wide group of American geographers by the Geographic Section of the Committee on Research in the Earth Sciences of the National Research Council. A general acknowledgement may be made here for a number of suggestions that have been taken from those answers and utilized in this paper.

¹⁰² It may be noted that Hettner, who repeatedly and vigorously refutes the concept of geography as the study of distributions, the "Where" of things, has apparently not considered the line of reasoning here followed, since he assumes that classification of phenomena in geography should be genetic [161, 223], just as he claims that the genetic principle is essential in a logical system of regions. The fact that Hettner, whose "methodological masterpieces" underlie the thought throughout this paper, should not have come to the conclusion stated above has caused me to re-examine it repeatedly and critically, but, as yet at least, without finding any error in the reasoning or in the conclusion.

¹⁰³ In an informal talk to a group of colleagues at the University of Minnesota, on "What I think about Knowing."

¹⁰⁴ It may be admissable to add that a logical corollary of this situation is to be found in the character of membership of this Association. The relatively large number of specialists from other fields, included as geographers, does not represent the normal overlapping along an actual border line between sciences, but rather the fact that geography, by cutting through the systematic sciences, in a sense includes all of them.

¹⁰⁵ In a paper read before the association at the recent meetings, 1938. Specifically Platt notes that the first publication cited by Pfeifer as containing "proposals made by Sauer" [footnote 12] actually consisted of proposals, presented without distinction of authorship, of both its co-authors (as well as of other unnamed members of a seminar group at the University of Chicago): W. D. Jones and C. O. Sauer: "Outlines for Field Work in Geography," BULL. AM. GEOGR. SOC., 47 (1915), 520-5.

¹⁰⁶ This is the word that Sölch introduced as term for a unit area [237]. As he defined it the concept is independent of size; the chore is simply an area of land determined by the relative degree of homogeneity of all geographical factors--"geofactors." A chore established on any particular scale could be divided into smaller chores each of which would presumably show a higher degree of homogeneity ; the limit of such a process is, of course, the perfectly homogeneous unit which can only be a point. In adopting this term Penck has used it in a different meaning, according to which the "chores" appear as the smallest land units, indivisible cells, so to speak, which he adds up to form larger "forms." We do not follow this usage, not only because it changes the meaning of a term s the inventor defined it, but also because there can be no smallest units. As Penck himself elsewhere has recognized, we may continue the process of division indefinitely and our subdivisions are no less (and no more) real units than those we divided.

¹⁰⁷ In a critical comment on these studies, Platt speaks of the misunderstanding of methods and purposes on the part of writers who have not been eye-witnesses of the type of field work involved nor participants in discussions current during the past fifteen years among those experimenting in that work [224, 125]. To explain this difficulty, it is important to remind ourselves of the major distinction in attitude toward methodological discussions between American geographers, as a group, and the Germans. In marked contrast with the latter, American students seldom regard such problems as appropriate for research studies prepared for publication. On the contrary, such problems are more often regarded as matters of opinion, on which individuals may express their personal views in more or less informal symposia and, particularly, in oral discussions "out-of-meeting." Only in the "mature" pronouncements of the association's presidents do such views commonly attain formal presentation--and then usually long after they have been most influential. The few exceptions, it is significant to note, have been contributed by students influenced by the German attitude. Since these have come largely from one institution, the development of current methodological thought in American geography may well appear to a foreign student to be largely the development of thought in California [e.g., Dickinson, 202]. Both Broek and Pfeifer attempted to escape this limitation, but were hampered by the fact that the methodology of other American students appears, in publication, only in reports of fragmentary statements in symposia or in even more fragmentary explanations included in their actual research studies. There is no literature available, comparable to that in Germany, in which one may directly trace the development of the methodological views of American geographers; the task is therefore exceedingly difficult for any students remote from the actual course of development-which in large degree, unfortunately, include the group on our Pacific Coast. Probably a more reliable source than the few methodological treatises is to be found in such thorough studies of the general development of American geography, as that of Colby [107].

¹⁰⁸ In the previous discussion are considered the significance of an area in itself merely in terms of its relative importance in the actual world. Finch reminds us however that an area may have a special significance to our science of the world if it includes some unanswered questions, if it has some peculiar association of features [223, 23]. I find it particularly desirable to add this criterion since it would seemto offer the only justification for an American geographer to have occupied himself with such a small, remote area as Upper Silesia representative of almost no other areas near it [355; 356].

¹⁰⁹ J. Sölch, in personal communication

¹¹⁰ This statement may possibly account for Pfeifer's conclusion that James "questioned even whether the 'microscopic method' represented any advance at all" [109, 115 ff ], a conclusion that is certainly not consistent with the general view expressed in such statements as "the detailed study of the small area becomes significant in so far as it contributes to the more accurate generalization of any detail on chorographic (mesochoric) or geographic (macrochoric) maps"; or the conclusion: "topographic (microchoric) studies are vital parts of the chorographic (mesochoric) or geographic (macrochoric) investigations" [286, 85 f.]

¹¹¹ By way of illustration, Platt notes that Finch has contributed not only the extremely minute study of Montfort [285], but also systematic studies covering the agriculture of the world [with Baker, 343], to which might be added the many essentially research studies included in the more recent text written with Trewartha [322]; Whittlesey not only surveyed a small district in Wisconsin ["Field Maps for the Geography of an Agricultural Area," Ann. Assn. Am. Geogrs., 15 (1925), 187-91], but has endeavored to establish the major agricultural regions of the world [319] Furthermore, we may add, the latter finds as a major difficulty in interpreting the findings of such a world survey, the lack of detailed studies of small, representative, districts, such as Dicken has offered for the Mexican highlands [340] and Platt has presented for several districts in Hispanic America. Finally, in his most recent study, Platt has shown directly the relation of microgeographic work to the broader purposes of reconnaissance [224].