

U.S. Hegemony at End of WWII

- All world powers in economic ruin at end of WWII, except the U.S.
- The U.S. economy had expanded during the war
- In 1945 the U.S. responsible for 50% of world's production (1990: 21%)
- Full hegemony blocked by ideological opponent: the USSR

Possible Alliances Post-WWII

1. Anti-Imperialism: USA and USSR vs. UK
2. Anti-Hegemony: UK and USSR vs. USA
3. Anti-Communism: USA and UK vs. USSR

Why did the third alliance form?

Who Caused the Cold War?

1. Orthodox School: USSR
2. Revisionist School: USA
3. Post-Revisionist School: USA & USSR
4. Critical Geopolitics: UK

Regionalism vs. Globalism

Regionalism

- The world is made up of a mosaic of diverse regions, need a complex foreign policy to deal with different places; not everywhere matters

Globalism

- Ideology supercedes regional complexity, regional variation is secondary; the whole world is a conflict zone

Which approach is typical of U.S. geopolitics?

Origin of Cold War Geopolitics

- Mackinder focused on Russia / Central Asia as the center of land power, naming it first the Pivot, and later the Heartland. He thought East Europe was the key to controlling the Heartland; the key enemy is thus...
- Spykman renames Mackinder's "Inner Crescent" the "Rimland" – the contact zone between land and sea powers. Control over the Rimland could neutralize the Heartland.
- The Rimland contains the majority of major (Berlin, Korea, Middle East, Vietnam) and minor conflicts.
- Critique Mackinder and Spykman.

Critique of Mackinder and Spykman

- Oversimplified and theoretically impoverished
 - Why should control of E. Europe lead to control of Heartland?
 - Why is the Rimland so important when Soviet subs are sitting off the U.S. coast?
 - Undifferentiated space: regions are based only on geographic location (but at least there is geography)
 - What of non-communist opposition to U.S. resulting from U.S. containment?
 - Islamic fundamentalism
 - Pan-Arab nationalism

Geopolitical World Order: Cold War

- A-geographical: triumph of globalism
- geography no longer matters: fight communism everywhere, nothing else mattered
- “I don’t see why we should let a country go Marxist just because its population is irresponsible”
- “He may be a son-of-a-bitch, but he’s our sob.”

- Containment: derived from assumptions about the USSR derived from George Kennan; but the containment adopted was not the containment Kennan advised

George Kennan

- Historian specializing in Russian studies
- Diplomat in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow: WWII
- History is key to understanding Russian psyche: fear of European invasion (Lithuanian and Polish invasions, Napoleon, Russian Revolution, Hitler - 20 million Russians died)
- Russians are paranoid, and they are expansionist, but the communist ideology does not drive foreign policy
- Feb 1946: the “Long Telegram” in which he advocated containment of Soviet expansion

Kennan’s “Long Telegram”

The very teachings of Lenin himself require great caution and flexibility in the pursuit of communist purposes. Again, these precepts are fortified by the lessons of Russian history: of centuries of obscure battles between nomadic forces over the stretches of a vast unfortified plain. Here, caution, circumstance, flexibility and deception are the valuable qualities, and their value finds natural appreciation in the Russian or oriental mind.

...the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.

Kennan’s Policy Prescriptions for the U.S.

1. Rebuild economies in Japan and Western Europe (Marshall Plan), don’t rely on purely military strategy
2. Use local troops
3. Don’t contribute to the Soviet Union’s paranoia
4. Reduce Soviet capacity to project power beyond its borders through:
 - a) Selective containment (3 perimeters: Western Europe, East Asia, and Middle East)
 - b) Divide international communism. Not monolithic political strategy - should be adapted to regional context.

The Truman Doctrine (1947)

- Truman convinces U.S. Congress to aid anti-communist governments in both Greece and Turkey
- Truman’s speech dealt not with geographic specifics of the conflicts, but with over-arching themes of freedom vs. totalitarianism, good vs. evil: “nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life”
- What does this sound like?
- Truman leaps from the local to the universal
- Sec of State Dean Acheson: Domino Theory

DOMINO THEORY

“like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the east.”

Soviet victory of one country would inevitably be followed by an attempt to subjugate neighboring countries. In this way, countries around the USSR would fall like dominoes unless supported by the power of the US.

National Security Council Policy Paper 68 (1950)

- The USSR should be understood as an expansive communist power
- The real battle is not strategic, a battle over particular places, but ideological:
 - Capitalism vs. communism
 - Freedom and democracy vs. totalitarianism
- Advocated huge military build-up: 20% of GDP (what did we peak at?)
- A globalist vision

The Strategic Objectives of the USSR according to NSC-68

1. Provide for the security of the USSR
2. Maintain East Europe and China within the Soviet Bloc
3. Eliminate US influence in Eurasia and isolate the US
4. Eliminate the US as a competing world power
5. Spread communism throughout the world

Kennan Compared to NSC-68

1. Geopolitical strategy
 - a) deny the USSR key areas
 - b) "do not give an inch" to the USSR
2. The Soviet Union as a Threat
 - a) only a threat if upsetting the balance of power in the world
 - b) a constant military threat
3. Means to be used against Soviet Communism
 - a) focus on American economic means
 - b) focus on American military means
4. Capability of the USA to commit means
 - a) limited
 - b) unlimited

Kennan Compared to NSC-68 (slide 2)

- 5. The role of diplomacy and negotiations
 - a) important
 - b) not important
- 6. The role of perceptions of USA strength in Soviet foreign policy
 - a) US military aggression will antagonize USSR
 - b) US military aggression will intimidate USSR
- 7. Goals of American foreign policy vs. the USSR
 - a) act against the USSR within the framework of maintaining a power equilibrium in a world to ensure the security of the USA and the welfare of its people
 - b) 'frustrate the Kremlin design'
- 8. The use of local vs. American forces
 - a) local forces with American support
 - b) commit American Military forces

Ray Cline

- CIA advisor in the 1980s
- Blended regionalist and globalist perspectives
 - Some regions more important than others: regionalist
 - Communism a global threat: ideologically globalist
 - Index of power: globalist
- Suggested that democracy would hinder U.S. ability to respond strongly to a crisis

Ray Cline's Power Index

Power = (C + E + M) * (S + W)

Raw Power

- C= Population (weighted by education)
- E= Economics: GDP and production
- M= Military force conventional and nuclear power

Subjective Power


- S= Quality of strategy
- W= Quantity of willingness

4 Central Arguments in Cline's Geopolitics

1. Form an All-Oceans alliance against the USSR and focus American strategy on sea power and control of chokepoints
2. Ally with regional powers (Brazil, South Africa)
3. The Soviet threat is both geostrategic and ideological
4. A conception of power based on both objective (population, economy, military force) and subjective factors (national strategy and will)

12 IMPORTANT CHOKEPOINTS (1980s on)

1. Cape Horn
2. The Panama Canal
3. The Cape of Good Hope
4. The Suez Canal
5. The GIUK-Gap
6. English Channel and the Passage from the North Sea
7. The Baltic Straits
8. The Strait of Gibraltar
9. The Turkish Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles)
10. The Bab El Mandeb
11. The Strait of Hormuz
12. The Strait of Malacca



Saul Cohen (1973)

Tries to address regional homogenization with a more nuanced model: geostrategic and geopolitical regions

- 1. Trade Dependent Maritime World
 - 1. Anglo-America and Caribbean
 - 2. South America
 - 3. Maritime Europe and the Maghreb
 - 4. Sub-Saharan Africa
 - 5. Off-Shore Asia and Oceania

- 2. Eurasian Continental World
 - 1. Heartland and Eastern Europe
 - 2. East Asia

- 3. South Asia (?)

Cohen's Shatterbelts

- 1. Complex ethnic/cultural mosaic
- 2. History of local conflicts
- 3. Geostrategic importance to great powers
- 4. Global-local alliances: potential for major extra-regional conflict
- 5. 1992: emphasis on global resource (esp. oil)

Cohen's shatterbelts:

- 1. Middle-East (1973, 1982, 1992)
- 2. South-East Asia (1973, 1982)
- 3. Sub-Saharan Africa (1982)
- 4. Balkans, Caucasus, and Caspian Sea Region (1992)

Cohen's Multiple-Node World (1982)

- Cohen ranks countries in a five-tier system based on their relative power, and acknowledges interrelationships between states as altering geopolitical codes
- What shortcoming does this address in previous geopolitical theories?

- Compression Zones: shatterbelts that do not have the interest of the super powers (Congo, Burma/Myanmar)

**Geopolitical Codes of American Administrations
During the Cold War 1947-1987**

1. Kennan's Code, 1947-49 (regional)
2. Truman Doctrine, NSC-68 (global, military)
3. The Eisenhower-Dulles' New Look 1953-60 (global)
4. The Kennedy-Johnson Flexible Response Strategy, 1961-68 (regional)
5. Détente (Nixon, Ford and Carter), 1969-79
6. Reagan and the second cold war, 1980-87 (global, roll back communism)

**Eisenhower's Five Means to Counter the Soviet
Threat**

1. Nuclear Deterrence
2. Military Alliances
3. Psychological Warfare / Propaganda
4. Covert Action
5. Negotiations
