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Tuan p.31, 148ff

Mongolia Tuan p.171-173; Chapman & Baker p. 244-5;

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East Asia consists of China, Japan, Mongolia, North and South Korea, and Taiwan. This is the most populous of all world regions, containing 4.5 billion people. The region is dominated in both demographic and territorial terms by China, which occupies 9.6 million square kilometers (3.7 million square miles; about 6.5 percent of Earth's land surface) and has a population of 1.3 billion (22%), about 22 percent of the world's population. A glance at **Figure 9.1** shows that East Asia is naturally bounded by mountain ranges and oceans. To the northwest are the Elburz mountains of northern Iran and the Tien Shan ('Mountains of Heaven') along the southern borders of the Central Asian countries. To the north are the Altay and Sayan Mountains that separate Siberia from Mongolia, and the Yablonovyy and Khingan ranges that separate southeastern Siberia from northern China. To the southwest are the Pamir Mountains and the Himalayas, while to the south and east are the coastal seas—the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Yellow Sea—of the Pacific Ocean.

East Asia is a region of tremendous contrasts in natural environments and history, while the human geography of the region has been subject to radical change during the modern era. China's vast and diverse domain has been restructured by a communist revolution that has itself been redirected several times in its objectives. Japan, on the other hand, has been transformed by no less than two dramatic 'economic miracles.' Traditional rural communities with a great variety of distinctive ways of life still characterize much of the region, while at the same time East Asia is one of the most rapidly urbanizing of all world regions. Japan is already highly urbanized (almost 80 percent of the population lives in urban areas), but the pace and scale of urbanization in China is truly phenomenal. Overall, only 34 percent of China's population lives in urban areas, but 25 years ago the figure was only 17 percent and 50 years ago it was 12 percent. China now has 53 cities with a population of 1 million or more, including 9 with a population in excess of 5 million.

Figure 9.1: map—political boundaries and major cities

PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT

A great deal of East Asia consists of juxtaposed plateaus, basins, and plains separated by narrow, sharply demarcated mountain chains. As a result, the land is often described in terms of a checkerboard of physiographic regions. The satellite photograph of East Asia (**Figure 9.2**) suggests a broad, three-fold physical division:

1. The Xizang (Tibetan) Plateau, in the southwest, an uplifted massif of about 2.5 million square kilometers (1 million square miles). With an elevation of between 4000 and 5000 meters (13000 to 16000 feet), the Xizang Plateau is often referred to as the 'roof of the world.' Within the Plateau are several mountain ranges—including the Himalaya Mountains—with peaks of 7000 meters (23000 feet) or more. The Himalayas contain the world's highest peak, Mount Qomolangma (Mount Everest), at 8848 meters (29017 feet).

Figure 9.2: satellite image of East Asia

2. The central mountains and plateaus of China and Mongolia, a checkerboard of mountain ranges, plateaus, basins, and plains. The most important of these plateaus and basins include the Mongolian Plateau, the Ordos Plateau, the Loess Plateau, the Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau, and the Tarim, Sichuan, and Zunghaer basins. Most of these have elevations of 1000-2000 meters (---- feet) above sea level and are bordered by uplifted mountain ranges of about 3000 meters (---- feet). This pattern is largely the consequence of the intersection of two sets of geological structures that underlie much of China: a series of roughly parallel anticlines that run SSW to NNE, and a less pronounced series of structural axes that run east-west (**Figure 9.3**).

Figure 9.3—map of physiographic regions/ landscapes

3. The continental margin of plains, hills, continental shelves and islands. The bulk of the population of East Asia lives in this continental margin, which includes the great plains of China: the Northeast China (Manchurian) Plain, the North China Plain, and the plains of the Middle and Lower Chang Jiang (Yangtze River) valley. Most of these plains lie below 200 meters (---- feet) in elevation. South of the Chang Jiang is hill country with elevations of around 500 meters (---- feet) and along the coast, including the Korean Peninsula, are uplifted hills and mountains of 750-1250 meters (---- feet). The Japanese archipelago of Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu forms the outer arc of East Asia's continental margin. Its backbone of unstable mountains and volcanic ranges that project from the shallow sea floor extends to the island of Taiwan and is part of the **ring of fire** that girdles the Pacific Ocean.

This broad division is the product of a long and complex geological history. The key to understanding the basic physiography of the region is the plate tectonics that have had a dramatic influence since Tertiary times. The entire Xizang Plateau was uplifted in the Tertiary period as the Indo-Australian shield moved northwards and pushed up against the Siberian shield, not only uplifting the Xizang Plateau but also causing the mountain-building episode that resulted in the Himalayas. Subsequently, the weathering of the newly-created mountains provided huge quantities of loess and fluvial deposits that now blanket the plains. To the east, the movement of the Pacific shield toward the Siberian shield caused the folding and faulting that has resulted in the mountains of the peninsulas and islands of the continental margin.

The geological uplift of the Xizang Plateau also had important consequences for geomorphic processes. It increased the gradient of the rivers that flowed off the borders of the plateau, enabling them to incise into the plateau and produce a great number of gorges and canyons of considerable length and depth. As geographer Yi-Fu Tuan has noted, the

canyons at the southeastern edge of Xizang, clothed in dense vegetation, provided an effective barrier between the Chinese and South Asian civilizations. The rivers are still incising rapidly, and the Xizang Plateau itself is still not stable: seismic disturbances continually occur along the Himalayan foothills, often bringing disaster to settlements there.

The physical environments of East Asia are, in fact, relatively hazardous. In addition to regular earthquakes along the Himalayan foothills, much of the North China Plain is subject to seismic activity. Here, earthquakes along fault lines beneath the loess have the effect of loosening the loess cover, causing major landslides. In eastern Shaanxi, a destructive earthquake occurs, on average, every 15-20 years. The most ruinous of these took place in December 1921, when over a quarter of a million people perished. Fifty-five years later, almost as many (242,000) were killed when an earthquake, 7.8 on the **Richter scale**, devastated the city of Tangshan, in Hebei province. (In Imperial China, natural disasters were thought to presage the death of an emperor who had lost the Mandate of Heaven; Mao Zedong, the communist leader of the People's Republic of China, died in September 1976, just two months after the Tangshan disaster.) Much of Japan, too, is subject to earthquake hazards, with several major fault lines running along the Pacific coast of Honshu, between Tokyo and Hiroshima (see "Geography Matters 9.1: Living with the threat of earthquake").

Geography Matters 9.1: Living with the threat of earthquake

Climate

The geological uplift of the Xizang Plateau during the Tertiary period is also key to understanding certain aspects of the climate of East Asia. The elevation of the Xizang Plateau cut off the moisture that was formerly brought in to the interior of East Asia from the Indian Ocean by monsoonal winds. This contributed to the gradual dessication of the Xizang Plateau, whose numerous lakes are now much reduced in size. Protected by mountain barriers and sheer distance from the coast, much of western and northwestern East Asia today averages less than --- millimeters (5 inches) of rain a year. On the Xizang Plateau, high elevations make for cool summers and extremely cold winters. Further north, in Xinjiang, Qinghai, Gansu, and Mongolia, summer temperatures may be extremely hot: the Turfan Depression, some 154 meters (--- feet) below seal level, is one of the hottest places in East Asia, with recorded temperatures in excess of 45° C (--- ° F).

To the east of this vast arid region are two distinctive climatic regimes. The northern regime is sub-humid. It is bounded to the west by the Lüliang Mountains and the Greater Khingan Mountains and extends southward as far as a latitude of about 35° N, encompassing the Northeast China Plain, the North China Plain, and the northern parts of the Korean peninsula and the Japanese archipelago. Winters here are

cold, and very dry. Summers are warm, with moderate amounts of rain from the southeasterly summer monsoon winds. Rainfall is, however, very variable, so that both drought and flooding are frequent occurrences. The southern regime is humid and subtropical. It extends west from the plains of the Middle and Lower Chang Jiang valley as far as the Sichuan basin and south as far as the southernmost coastlands of South China. Winters here are mild and rainy, and summers are hot with heavy monsoonal rains: overall, annual rainfall is 1200 millimeters (--- inches) or more higher than in the north.

In the arid and sub-humid regions of East Asia, drought is a critical natural hazard, causing widespread famine as a result of crop failures in drought years. In addition, the sub-humid parts of East Asia tend to be prone to flooding. This is in part because the irregular summer monsoon rains can produce a sudden deluge. In addition, the rivers that flow through the loess plains carry a tremendous amount of silt, which is then deposited in their more sluggish lower reaches, building up the height of the river bed, and making their course unstable. The Huang He (Yellow River) is the largest and most notorious of these rivers, having changed its course several times in the last two centuries. In between these events, the Huang He regularly bursts its banks, flooding the farms and villages of the densely populated North China Plain.

Landscapes

Many of the landscapes of East Asia have been heavily modified by humankind. The principal human impact has been through the clearing of land for farming. Over the millennia, as the population grew and pre-modern civilizations flourished, much of humid and sub-humid East Asia was cleared of its forest cover. At the same time, these landscapes were also modified by the Oriental passion for water control. Over the centuries, marshes were drained, irrigation systems constructed, lakes converted to reservoirs, and levees raised to guard against river floods. Even the topography was altered to suit the needs of growing and highly-organized populations, with hills and mountainsides being sculpted into elaborate terraces in order to provide more cultivable land. Only in the arid western parts of East Asia and the inhospitable Xizang Plateau—a broad region often referred to as ‘Outer China’ (**Figure 9.4**)—do contemporary regional landscapes reflect natural environments that are relatively unmodified by human intervention.

Figure 9.4: landscapes of East Asia

Outer China is an ‘outback’ region that contains barely 4 percent of the population of East Asia. Large areas are effectively uninhabited, and in the greater part of it population density does not exceed one person per square kilometer. The scenery is often spectacular, encompassing snow-clad mountains, vast swamps, endless steppes, and fierce deserts. In

broad terms, Outer China can be divided into three types of landscapes (Figure 9.4). The Xizang Plateau (**Figure 9.5**) is dominated by rugged mountains with intermontane basins of needle-leaf forests, alpine meadows, and marshes. Northwestern China and much of Mongolia is a territory of temperate desert of alkaline-saline plant communities, white *burtsa* scrub and dunes (**Figure 9.6**), though dense forests of tall spruce clothe the cool wet flanks of the Tien Shan and Altai mountains. Inner Mongolia is mostly a mixture of steppe and semi desert.

Figures 9.5 and 9.6 : photos of Xizang Plateau and Mongolia

The remainder of East Asia—‘Inner China’ plus the Korean peninsula, the Japanese archipelago, and Taiwan—can be divided broadly into the landscapes of the sub-humid regions to the north of the Qinling and Daba ranges and those of the humid and subtropical regions to the south (Figure 9.4). The natural landscapes of the northern part of Inner China, along with the northern part of the Korean peninsula and the northern half of the Japanese archipelago, are dominated by mixed temperate broad-leaf and needle-leaf forests on the hills and mountains, with a forest-steppe mixture on the loess plateaus. Higher elevations, and more northerly latitudes, are dominated by spruce, fir, and birch trees; lower elevations and more southerly latitudes are dominated by maple, basswood, and oak. As noted above, however, many of these natural landscapes have been heavily modified by humankind, and much of the forest has disappeared. Contemporary landscapes are dominated by dry-field farming, mostly of wheat and millet (**Figure 9.7**). To the south of the Qinling and Daba ranges, including Taiwan, the southern part of the Korean peninsula and the southern half of the Japanese archipelago, contemporary landscapes are dominated by a more intensive agriculture, with wet-field rice farming the dominant element (**Figure 9.8**). Historically, this area was dominated by evergreen broad-leaf forests of horsetail pine and yunnan pine, with tropical rain forests along the coastal margins.

Figure 9.7: photo of northern farming landscape

Figure 9.8: photo of southern farming landscape

EAST ASIA IN THE WORLD

East Asia has been the setting for some of the world’s most sophisticated civilizations and most extensive empires. Imperial China and imperial Japan were both very inward-looking, but both eventually came into conflict with European and American imperialism. Both empires subsequently experienced revolutionary changes—though of a very different nature—before the modern states of China and Japan emerged to play key roles in the contemporary world economy.

Ancient Empires

China has had a continuous agricultural civilization for more than 8000 years. The first organized territorial state was that of the Xia dynasty, a bronze-age state that occupied the eastern side of the loess plateau (in present-day Shanxi province) and the western parts of the North China Plain (northwestern Henan province) between 2206 and 1766 B.C.. It was succeeded by the Shang dynasty (1766 to 1126 B.C.), during which walled cities appeared. The first unified Chinese empire, though, was that of the Qin dynasty (**Figure 9.9**). Emperor Shih Huang-ti (221-209 B.C.) established an imperial system that would last for two thousand years. He abolished feudalism, replacing the feudal hierarchy with a centralized bureaucratic administration, and had the Great Wall built to protect China from 'barbarian' nomads. The stability brought about by the Qin dynasty was an important precondition for the success of the Silk Road (Figure 9.9) as an economic and cultural link among the civilizations of China, Central Asia, India, Rome and, later, Byzantium.

Figure 9.9: map of Qing dynasty, Silk Road and photo of Great Wall

The history of the Chinese empire is complex, with constantly shifting territorial boundaries and successive dynasties that tended to move from vigorous beginnings, with power concentrated around a strong center, followed by a slow loss of control as regional centers gained more power, and a final collapse as a forceful new dynasty was established. Sometimes, the empire was fragmented or subdivided for extended periods, but over two millennia the overall trend was for a larger and more consolidated continental empire.

The first major dynasty to run through the cycle was the Han Dynasty, from 206 B.C. to A.D. 220. Han emperors extended the Great Wall westwards, allowing the Chinese to control more of the trade routes along the Silk Road. Another important economic development took place early in the 7th century, under the Sui Dynasty, when the northern and southern regions of Inner China were linked by the first of a series of Grand Canals. Its purpose was to bring the plentiful rice of the south to the Sui capital in the northwest (present-day Xi'an), and to the armies stationed in the northeast. Over the next several centuries, the canal system was enlarged and modified. By the fifteenth century, China's canal system was over 1000 kilometers (--- miles) in length. The imperial grain transportation system along the canals employed up to 150,000 soldiers to man its fleet and required the compulsory labor of many more to dredge and maintain the channels. (Canals of comparable scale only began to be cut in Europe—most notably in France—in the 18th century.) The infrastructure of China's canal system created a complementary relationship between the north and the south. The economic center of gravity was in the agriculturally prolific south, but the political center was almost always in the north. In 1279 the Mongols, under Kublai Khan, conquered China, establishing imperial rule for the first time over most of both Inner and Outer China. The Mongol dynasty, known as the

Yuan Dynasty, was expelled after less than a hundred years, and was succeeded by the Ming (1368-1681) and the Qing (1681-1911) Dynasties.

The Chinese concept of the centralization of power in an imperial clan spread to Japan in the sixth century A.D. and, as in China, a succession of dynasties maintained a rigid system in which a subjugated peasantry sustained a relatively sophisticated but inward-looking civilization. Japan's distinctive civilization was largely a result of the introduction of Buddhism, which arrived from India via China and Korea. Buddhist influence became so pervasive during the 7th and 8th centuries that the ruling elite established a new capital in A.D. 794 in order to make a clean break from the powerful temples in Japan's older cities. The new capital, Kyoto, was to be the residence of Japan's Imperial family for more than 1000 years, during which it became the principal center of Japanese culture (see Sense of Place Feature: Imperial Kyoto).

Sense-of-Place Feature: Imperial Kyoto

For the last 200 years of this period, just as an industrial system was developing in the western hemisphere, the Tokugawa Dynasty (1603 - 1868) strove to sustain traditional Japanese society. To this end, the patriarchal government of the Tokugawa family excluded missionaries, banned Christianity, prohibited the construction of ships above 50 tons, closed Japanese ports to foreign vessels (Nagasaki was the single exception), and deliberately suppressed commercial enterprise. At the top of the imperial social hierarchy were the nobility (the shogunate), the barons (daimyos), and warriors (samurai). Farmers and artisans represented the productive base exploited by these ruling classes; and only outcasts and prostitutes ranked lower than merchants.

In terms of spatial organization, the Japanese imperial economy was built around a closed hierarchy of castle towns, each representing the administrative base of a local shogun. The position of a town within this hierarchy was dependent on the status of the shogun which, in turn, was related to the productivity of their agricultural hinterland. As a result, the largest cities emerged among the rich alluvial plains and the reclaimed lakes and bay-heads of southern Honshu. Largest of all was Edo (known today as Tokyo), which the Tokugawa regime had selected as its capital in preference to the traditional imperial capital of Kyoto, and which, bloated by military personnel, administrators and the entourages of the nobility in attendance at the Tokugawa court, reached a population of around one million by the early nineteenth century. Kyoto and Osaka were next largest, with populations of between 300,000 and 500,000; and they were followed by Nagoya and Kanazawa, both of which stood at around 100,000.

Imperial Decline

The dynasties of Imperial China and Imperial Japan both eventually succumbed to a combination of internal and external problems. Internally, the administration and defense of growing populations began to drain the attention, energy and wealth of the imperial regimes. The imperial system itself also meant that cultural and social élites tended to be focused on the arts, humanities and self-promotion at the imperial court rather than on economic or social development. As the economy stalled under these constraints, peasants were required to pay increasingly heavy taxes, driving many into grinding poverty and thousands to banditry. By the early nineteenth century, both China and Japan had moved into a phase of successive crises—famines and peasant uprisings—presided over by introverted and self-serving leadership. As in feudal Europe (see Chapter 3), the peasantry began to flee the countryside in increasing numbers in response to a combination of rural hardship and the lure of the relative freedom and prosperity of the cities. Finally, the imperial courts of both China and Japan suppressed the spread of knowledge of modern weapons because they feared internal bandits and domestic uprisings. As a result, both empires relied on antiquated military technologies even as Europeans and Americans were racing ahead with new weapons developed through the new technologies of the Industrial Revolution.

This last point relates directly to the external problems that undermined both imperial regimes. European traders had been a growing presence in East Asia in the eighteenth century but had been restricted to a few ports. Initially, Europeans had bought agricultural produce (mainly tea) in exchange for hard cash (in the form of silver currency). Over time, this proved to be an unacceptable drain on European treasuries, and the British eventually provoked China into a military response by insisting on being able to trade opium (grown in India for export by the East India Company) for tea and other Chinese luxury goods. In 1839, the Chinese, having prohibited the sale of opium several decades before, destroyed thousands of chests of opium aboard a British ship. This was just the excuse the British needed in order to exercise their superior weaponry. The so-called Opium War (1839-42) ended with defeat for the Chinese and the signing of the Treaty of Nanking, which ceded the island of Hong Kong to the British and allowed European and American traders access to Chinese markets through a series of 'treaty ports' that included ----- -----. Shortly afterwards, in 1853, US Admiral Matthew Perry anchored his flagship in Edo Bay (now Tokyo Bay) to 'persuade' the Japanese to open their ports to trade with the US and other foreign powers. The Japanese quickly complied, and the lesson learned, on both sides, was East Asia's abject weakness in the face of superior western military technology. In both China and Japan, the neo-colonialist threat galvanized feelings of nationalism and xenophobia and precipitated a period of civil war among the feudal warlords that culminated in revolutionary change.

Japan's Revolutions

Japan was first to react to the humiliation of Western assertiveness. Japan's transition from feudalism to industrial capitalism can be pinpointed to a specific year—1868—when the Tokugawa dynasty was toppled by the restoration of the Meiji imperial clan by a clique of samurai and daimyo who were convinced that Japan needed to modernize in order to maintain her national independence. Under the slogan 'National Wealth and Military Strength,' the new élite of ex-warriors set out to industrialize Japan as quickly as possible. A distinctive feature of the entire process was the very high degree of state involvement. Successive governments intervened to promote industrial development by creating capitalist monopolies (called **zaibatsu**). In many instances, whole industries were created from public funds and, once established, were sold off to private enterprise at less than cost. Because early manufacturing was motivated strongly by considerations of national security, it was iron and steel, shipbuilding, and armaments that were prominent in the early phase of Japanese modernization. The latest industrial technology and equipment were bought in from overseas, and advisers (chiefly British) were bought in to supervise the initial stages of development. Meanwhile, the state indulged in high levels of expenditure on highways, port facilities, the banking system and public education in its attempt to 'buy' modernization. Similarly, the Japanese railway system was financed by the state under British direction before being sold to private enterprise.

The Japanese financed this modernization by harsh taxes on the agricultural sector. As a result, there began a sharp polarization between the urban and the rural economies, characterized by the impoverishment of large numbers of peasant farmers. Yet the more productive components of the agrarian sector were able to contribute significantly to Japanese economic growth. Improved technology, better seedstock and the use of fertilizers provided an increase of 2 per cent per annum in rice production during the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth century, thereby helping to feed the growing industrial workforce without great dependence on food imports. It is important to note that these increases in agricultural productivity were not absorbed by population growth, as has been the case for many late-developing countries. The Japanese demographic transition arrived later—after increases in agricultural productivity had helped to finance an emergent industrial sector but in time to provide an expanding labor force and market for industrial products.

Several other factors helped to foster rapid industrialization in Japan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. One was the cultural order that allowed the Japanese to follow government leadership and accept new ways of life: a recurring theme in modern Japanese economic

history. Another was the success of educational reforms: by 1905, 95 percent of all children of school age were receiving an elementary education. Third, Japanese sericulture (silk production) provided the basis for a lucrative export trade with which to help finance expenditure on overseas technology, materials and expertise. It has been estimated that between 1870 and 1930 the raw silk trade alone was able to finance as much as 40 per cent of Japan's entire imports of raw materials and machinery. Finally, and most important, were the spoils of military aggression (**Figure 9.10**). Naval victories over China (1894-95) and Russia (1904-05), and the annexation of Korea (1910) and Manchuria (1931) not only provided expanded markets for Japanese goods in Asia but also provided indemnities from the losers (which paid for the costs of conquest) and stimulated the armaments industry, shipbuilding, and industrial technology and financial organization in general.

Figure 9.10: map of Japanese colonialism

By the early 1900s, a broad base of industries had successfully been established. Most were geared towards the domestic market in a kind of pre-emptive import-substitution strategy. The textile industry, however, had already begun to establish an export base. Unable to compete with Western nations in the production of high-quality textiles, the Japanese concentrated on the production of inexpensive goods, competing initially with Western producers for markets in Asia. Their success was based on labor-intensive processes in which high productivity and low wages were maintained through a combination of exhortations to personal sacrifice in the cause of national independence, and strict government suppression of labor unrest.

Just as Japanese industry was becoming established, with a base in textiles and shipbuilding, the First World War provided a timely opportunity to expand productive capacity. With much European and American industry diverted to supply war materials, Japanese textile manufacturers were able to expand into Asian and Latin American markets. Meanwhile, with a great deal of merchant shipping destroyed by the hostilities, Japanese shipping industries took the opportunity to expand their merchant fleet. The profits from this commercial activity paid for the rebirth of the Japanese navy, which by 1918 had a dozen battleships and battle cruisers, with sixteen more under construction. The U.S. at the time had only fourteen battleships, with three under construction. Within 50 years of the Meiji revolution, Japan had joined the core of the world-system.

This pattern of progress was halted, however, by the stagnation of international trade that followed the stock market collapse of 1929 and the subsequent Depression. Once again, state intervention provided a critical boost. A massive devaluation of the yen in 1931 allowed Japanese producers to undersell on the world market, while a Bureau of Industrial Rationalization was set up to increase efficiency, lower costs, and weed out smaller, less profitable concerns.

Although these interventions helped to sustain Japanese industrialization and improve Japan's overall economic independence, they led directly toward crisis. Western governments—particularly the United States—began seriously to resist the purchase of Japanese goods. At home, the austerity resulting from devaluation and rationalization precipitated social and political unrest. The government response was to indulge in further military expenditure and to adopt a more aggressive territorial policy. In 1931 the Japanese army advanced into Manchuria to create a puppet state. In 1936 a military faction gained full political power and, declaring a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, set about full-scale war with China the following year. In 1939 Japan attacked British colonies in the Far East and by 1940 the Japanese had become heavily committed to an industrial empire based on war. By this time, as the rest of the world quickly realized, Japan had attained the status of an advanced industrial nation. The military leaders overplayed their hand, however, by attacking the United States. With defeat in 1945, Japanese industry lay in ruins. In 1946, output was only 30 per cent of the pre-war level; and the United States, having begun to weaken the power of the zaibatsu and to impose widespread social and political reforms, was shaping up to impose punitive reparations.

Japan's Postwar Economic Miracle

Within five years, the Japanese economy had recovered to its pre-war levels of output. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the annual rate of growth of the economy held at around 10 per cent, compared with growth rates of around 2 per cent per annum in North America and Western Europe. After beginning the postwar period at the foot of the international manufacturing league table, Japan had risen to the top by 1963. By 1980, Japan had outstripped, even in absolute terms, all of the major industrial core countries in the production of ships, automobiles and television sets, and only the Soviet Union was producing more steel (**Figure 9.11**). The Japanese, in short, have not only achieved a unique transition direct from feudalism to industrial capitalism, they have presided over a postwar 'economic miracle' of impressive dimensions.

Figure 9.11: graph of Japanese manufacturing growth

Explanations of this second economic 'miracle' have identified a variety of contributory factors. Once under way, the reconstruction of the Japanese economy was able to draw on some of its previously established

advantages: a well-educated, flexible, loyal and relatively cheap labor force, a large national market with good internal communications, a good geographical situation for trade within Asia, a high degree of cooperation between industry and government, and a mode of industrial organization—derived from the *zaibatsu*—big enough to compete with the multinational corporations of Western Europe and North America.

In addition, several new factors helped to transform reconstruction into spectacular growth. These included:

- Exceptionally high levels of personal savings (15-20 percent of personal disposable income through the 1960s and 1970s, compared with less than 5 percent in the United States), which helped to fund high levels of capital investment.
- The acquisition of new technology: between 1950 and 1969 Japan was able to acquire, for around \$1.5 billion in royalties and licenses, a body of thoroughly tested US technology that had cost the United States \$20 billion per year in research and development (R&D).
- New means of government support. On the one hand, a rigid and sophisticated system of import restrictions protected domestic markets from overseas competition. On the other hand, the growth of domestic industry was fostered by a multitude of tax concessions and by the provision of investment finance through the Japan Development Bank. Most important of all, however, was the orchestration of industrial growth by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). In particular, MITI identified key recovery sectors (e.g. steel, shipbuilding) and potential growth sectors (e.g. automobiles, electronics, computers) and facilitated their development by providing finance, ensuring protection from foreign competition, subsidizing technological development and arranging corporate mergers.

The 'economic miracle' achieved by Japan was remarkable not only for its overall success in terms of economic performance but also because it represented a unique pathway to development: one that was able to combine economic growth with income distribution. Real wages rose substantially while income inequality was reduced to one of the lowest levels in the world. Equally remarkable was the interdependence of government and industry, characterized by some as "Japan, Inc." Orchestrated by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the state bureaucracy guided and coordinated Japanese corporations, organized in business networks (known as **keiretsu**), helping them through trade policies, technology policies and fiscal policies to compete successfully in the world economy. Also important was the exceptional degree of social stability and management-labor cooperation during this phase of tremendous change. This stability and cooperation was, like the interdependence of government and industry, a reflection of Japanese nationalism and people's commitment to rebuilding the nation. The same sense of national identity and purpose helped to foster people's adherence to traditional values and lifestyles, their willingness to work many more hours than their European and American counterparts, and their willingness to defer consumption, thus providing a pool of savings that could be invested in Japanese industry.

Revolutionary China

Revolution came to China in 1911, when the Qing Dynasty was overthrown and replaced by a republic under the leadership of Sun Yat-Sen's Nationalist Party (or Kuomintang). The overthrow of the imperial government in 1911 was the outcome of a long economic decline and a series of military defeats. A rising generation of intellectuals believed that the 'dead hand' of imperial bureaucracy had retarded Chinese responses to the West, and searched for new philosophies from abroad—including capitalism, communism, liberal democracy, and socialism—as possible solutions to China's many problems. But before any progress could be made the country fell into disarray, with contending warlords struggling for power. In the 1920s, an alliance of China's fledgling Communist Party and the Nationalist Party, now led by Chiang Kai-shek, flourished for a while; but it ended abruptly in 1927 when Chiang Kai-shek, fearful of the growing power and ambitions of the Communist Party, attempted to quash their organization. The Communists organized a retreat to the countryside in what became known as the Long March (1934-35). They traveled over ----- kilometers (6000 miles) from the southeast, through the rugged interior, to the plains of Yanan in northern China. During the march, in which over 100,000 people perished, Mao Zedong emerged as the leader of the Party. Mao devised a new strategy, aimed at gaining the support of China's rural peasantry—who comprised 85 percent of China's population—as the major source of support for revolution. This approach was in direct contradiction of the preferred

strategy of Soviet advisors, who had insisted that the key to revolution, as in Russia, must be the urban proletariat.

Japanese military advances into China in 1937 caused the Communists and the Nationalists temporarily to set aside their differences and resist the Japanese, but with the defeat of the Japanese in World War II the Communists and the Nationalists resumed their internal conflict. It was the Communist forces who had fought hardest and suffered most against the Japanese, and their experience proved crucial in fighting the Nationalists. Having won the support of the vast peasantry, Mao Zedong's troops surrounded China's cities until, one by one, they fell to Communist control. By October 1949, the Communist Party had control over all of China except for the island of Taiwan, where the Nationalist leadership had retreated, under U.S. protection.

Meanwhile, the end of World War II brought about an important geopolitical change to Korea. Under the sponsorship of Soviet troops that had moved south from Manchuria into the northern part of Korea, Kim Il Sung, an anti-Japanese Marxist-Leninist nationalist, was given power. Almost immediately, U.S. troops occupied the southern part of the country. Like East and West Germany, Korea was suddenly divided into two. The 38th parallel was agreed upon as the border, and both Soviet and U.S. military forces withdrew. But, in June 1950, just a few months after Mao Zedong's victory in China, Kim Il Sung's troops carried out a major attack on South Korea, seizing the capital Seoul and quickly extending control over almost the whole country. This led the United Nations to intervene, and U.S. forces rapidly rolled back the North Korean forces all the way to the Chinese border. This, in turn, prompted China to become involved on behalf of the North Koreans, and there followed a devastating war. Casualties were horrendous, with hundreds of thousands killed and much of the country destroyed. The 38th parallel was finally restored as the border in 1953, but the two Koreas have remained bitter rivals and China's relations with most Western countries, especially the United States, were so seriously damaged that they did not recover until the 1970s. North Korea, meanwhile, has remained locked in a timewarp of self-imposed isolation (see *Sense of Place: North Korea*).

Sense-of-Place Feature: North Korea

Back in China, Mao Zedong faced the task of re-shaping society after two millennia of imperial control. The first years were tentative, with land reform and the formation of agricultural collectives the principal objectives. In 1958, in what became known as the Great Leap Forward, Mao launched a bold scheme to accelerate the pace of economic growth. Land was merged into huge communes and an ambitious Five Year Plan was implemented. This included the expectation that farmers would help to industrialize the countryside by building their own 'backyard

furnaces.’ The impact of the Five Year Plan on the landscape was dramatic. Whereas pre-Communist China had an average farm size of --- hectares (3.5 acres), the new agricultural communes averaged ---- square kilometers (75 square miles) in size, with between 30,000 and 70,000 workers. Instead of a patchwork of fields, each with a different crop and presenting a rich palette of browns, yellows, and shades of green, there now appeared vast unbroken vistas, planted with crops dictated by the central planners.

China’s planners, however, were only concerned with increasing overall production. They paid little or no attention to whether a need for the products existed, whether the products actually helped to advance modernization, or whether local production targets were suited to the geography of the country. The attempt to industrialize the countryside failed completely. Lacking iron ore, let alone any knowledge of how to make steel, peasants tore out metal radiators, pipes, and fences and sacrificed pots and pans in their zeal to produce steel. Almost none of the final smelted product was usable. Meanwhile, several years of bad weather, combined with the rigid and misguided objectives of centralized agricultural planning, resulted in famine conditions throughout much of China. It is estimated that between 20 and 30 million people died from starvation and malnutrition-related diseases between 1959 and 1962. When the central economic leadership ordered all peasants to eat in large, communal mess halls, the Great Leap Forward fizzled out. For people who valued family above all else, being deprived of time alone with their families for meals was the final disillusionment.

In an attempt to restore revolutionary spirit and to re-educate the privileged and increasingly corrupt Communist Party officials, Mao Zedong launched what he called a ‘Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution’ in 1966. The Cultural Revolution brought a sustained attack on Chinese traditions and cultural practices and a relentless harassment of ‘revisionist’ elites, the latter being defined broadly as anyone not belonging to the rural peasantry. Millions of people were displaced, tens of thousands lost their lives, and the whole country was plunged into a terrifying climate of suspicion and recrimination. Only with the death of Mao Zedong and the subsequent arrest of the politically extreme ‘Gang of Four’ (which included Mao’s wife) in 1976, did the Cultural Revolution come to an end. China’s new leader, Deng Xiaoping, charted a more pragmatic and liberal course, gradually achieving stability and economic growth and opening China to Western science, technology, and trade.

In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, though, there remained little faith in Communist Party doctrine, while traditional values had been severely eroded. The result was that Western values of materialism, democracy, and individualism began to spread into the ideological vacuum. To combat the threat to established order, China’s leadership

therefore launched a series of mass campaigns: first against 'spiritual pollution,' then a repressive campaign (following the violent crackdown against protesters who challenged the legitimacy of the Communist Party in Beijing's Tiananmen Square in 1989), followed by a campaign against corruption and another to promote civil and respectful behavior. Nevertheless, China's leadership was able to keep the country on the path of economic liberalization, with the result that China's economy has been growing at double-digit rates for much of the past 20 years.

Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping (from 1978 to 1997) China embarked on a thorough reorientation of its economy: dismantling central planning in favor of private entrepreneurship and market mechanisms, and integrating China into the world economy. Saying that he did not care whether the cat was black or white, as long as it caught mice, Deng Xiaoping elevated economic growth above the class struggle and established an "open door policy" that allowed China to be plugged in to the interdependent circuits of the global economy. As a result, China has completely reorganized and revitalized its economy. Agriculture has been decollectivized, with communist collective farms having been modified to allow a degree of private profit taking. State-owned industries have been closed or privatized, and centralized state planning has been dismantled in order to foster private entrepreneurship. In the 1980s and early 1990s, when the world economy was sluggish, China's manufacturing sector grew by almost 15 percent each year. Almost all of the shoes once made in South Korea or Taiwan are now made in China. More than 60 percent of the toys in the world, accounting for \$9 billion in trade, are made in China. Since 1992, China has extended its "open door" policy (that is, allowing trade with the rest of the world), permitted foreign investment aimed at Chinese domestic markets, normalized trading relationships with the United States and the European Union, and petitioned for membership of the World Trade Organization.

East Asia in Today's World

Today, economic and cultural globalization is both cause and effect of the changing geography of East Asia. New technologies in freight movement, telecommunications, finance, and electronic media are changing long-established patterns of production, trade, and culture. A good example of the latter is provided by Star TV, a satellite service that has done more than anything both to propagate Asian versions of popular culture and to bring Western culture into Asia (see Geography Matters 9.2: Star TV). Meanwhile, East Asia is rapidly becoming very important to patterns of global economic development. Japan's role as one of the established nodes of the tri-polar world-system (see Chapter 2) means that East Asia is well situated within the world economy. Japan itself is the world's second most powerful single economy and has developed extensive linkages not only within East Asia but also

throughout the Pacific Rim. The **Pacific Rim** is a loosely-defined region of countries that border the Pacific Ocean. In addition to Japan's established strength, East Asia has three of the so-called '**Asian Tigers**,' newly-industrialized territories that have experienced rapid economic growth that has lifted them from the periphery of the world-system to the semiperiphery. These are Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan (the fourth Asian Tiger is Singapore, in Southeast Asia: see Chapter 10). All of them, as we shall see, have developed specialized roles within the world economy and have become highly interdependent with places and regions throughout the Pacific Rim and in Europe.

Geography Matters 9.2: Star TV

China, while still a peripheral state in terms of per capita incomes, levels of industrialization, technological sophistication, and patterns of trade and investment, has the potential not only to dominate East Asia but also to play a key role in the world economy. Indeed, many observers predict a "Pacific Destiny" for the twenty-first century. In this scenario, China will be the hub of a world economy whose center of gravity is around the rim of the Pacific rather than the North Atlantic. China certainly has the potential to join the core of the world-system. It has a vast territory with a comprehensive resource base and a long history of political, cultural, and economic integration. It has the largest population of any country in the world (1.3 billion in 2000), and an economy that has been growing very rapidly.

China's increased participation in world trade has created an entirely new situation within the world economy, causing a deflationary trend in world prices for manufactures. Not only does the Chinese economy's size make it a major producer, but its huge labor force guarantees that its wage levels will not approach Western levels for a long time. Overall, China's economy is already the third largest in the world after the United States and Japan. Nevertheless, China's economy will remain largely agrarian for some time yet. The task of feeding, clothing, and housing its enormous population will also constrain its ability to modernize its economy to the point where it can challenge for a dominant position within the world economy. Meanwhile, a great deal of social and political reform remains to be accomplished before free enterprise can truly flourish. Finally, China must resolve a major feature of its contemporary human geography before it can emerge as a world economic power. This is the dramatically uneven development that has been a consequence of its economic reforms. The positive spiral of cumulative causation has affected only the larger cities and coastal regions, while the vast interior regions of the country have become increasingly impoverished. This, ironically, is the very geographical pattern of spatial polarization that motivated Chinese communists to revolution in the 1930s and 1940s. Today, it is a source of potential unrest

and of political instability among the central government, the provincial governments of the interior regions, and the provincial governments of the coastal regions. In the short term, China mostly needs to make room inside itself: to develop its internal market and moderate its growth. In some respects, China has been following such a strategy, with a big program of infrastructure investment. Recently, China has also been trying to boost domestic demand by easing credit. But it remains to be seen whether the Chinese government can continue to control the situation. Managing things is not easy when capitalist energy is turning life upside down and creating vast new wealth amidst a poor society based on different principles.

THE PEOPLES OF EAST ASIA

The most striking demographic characteristic of this world region as a whole is the sheer size of its population. With a total population of some 1.47 billion in 2000 and almost 14 percent of Earth's land surface, East Asia contains about **XX** percent of its population at an overall density of only 11 persons per km² (28 per sq. mile). As **Figure 9.12** shows, the bulk of the population is distributed along coastal regions and in the more fertile valleys and plains of Inner China. Population densities in Outer China are very low: less than 1 person per km² in most districts—the same as in the far north of Canada. In contrast, population densities throughout Inner China, and in Japan, North and South Korea, and Taiwan are very high: between 200 and 500 per km² **---** to **---** per sq. mile) on average.

Figure 9.1:2: dot map of population distribution in East Asia

Crowding and Population Policy

Such high densities are in part a reflection of the very high levels of agricultural productivity in these regions, and in part a reflection of past population growth rates. High densities often mean overcrowding, especially in areas where farmland is especially valuable and where the topography restricts settlement. The most striking examples of crowding are from Japan, where mountainous regions preclude urban development in much of Honshu, the main island. The great majority of Japan's 127 million people live in crowded conditions in the towns and cities of the Pacific Corridor, where space is so tight and expensive that millions of adults live with their parents because they cannot afford places of their own. The average dwelling in metropolitan Tokyo is about **---** square meters (620 sq. ft.). (In metropolitan Los Angeles, median dwelling size is **-----** [1652 square feet]; in metropolitan New York, it is **-----** [2168 square feet].) These levels of crowding are reflected not only by crowded streets and tiny homes (**Figure 9.13**), but by people's compartment and social organization. Japanese daily life is filled with rules, and many of them have evolved because of space shortages. In many Tokyo neighborhoods, for example, trash is picked up four times a week, mainly because people

have no place to store it. The trash itself must be sorted carefully into burnable and non-burnable loads, and put out in government-approved see-through bags so that it is easy to spot violations.

Figure 9.13: photo of crowding/tiny homes

In China, crowded towns and cities are more often a reflection of high rates of the rural-urban migration of low-income households than of a sheer lack of space. China certainly does not lack space; and until relatively recently China's population was officially regarded as being too small rather than too large. Mao Zedong wanted a large population with which to fully exploit China's large territory. When Ma Yinchu, an eminent economist and the president of Beijing University, cautioned the leadership in 1957 about the rapid growth of China's population, he was dismissed from his post and became a 'non-person' for the next 22 years. Between 1961 and 1972, China's population grew by 210 million people as a demographic transition took effect. Improved medical care and public health had reduced death rates, while birth rates remained high, encouraged by the political leadership. In 1970, the average family size was 5.8 children, and China's population had been growing at 2.6 percent per annum for the previous decade.

By the mid-1970s it had become clear that China's communal mode of production could not sustain such a large population. Increasingly, population growth was seen as a threat to the country's chances of economic development. In response, China's Communist Party instituted an aggressive program of population control. A sustained propaganda campaign (**Figure 9.14**) was reinforced in 1979 by strict birth quotas: one child for urban families, two for rural families and up to three for families from ethnic minorities. The policy involved rewards for families giving birth to only one child: work bonuses and priority in housing. The only child was later to receive preferential treatment in university admission and job assignments (an aspect of the policy that was later abandoned). Families that had more than one child, on the other hand, were to be penalized by a 10 percent decrease in their annual wages, and their children would not be eligible for free education and health-care benefits.

Figure 9.14: photo of population policy poster

In China's major cities, the one-child policy has been rigorously enforced, to the point where it has been almost impossible for a woman to get away with a second pregnancy. Who is allowed to have a child, as well as when she may give birth, is rigidly controlled by the woman's work unit. Workers are usually organized into groups of between 10 and 30 individuals. If any woman in the group gives birth to more than one child, the entire group can lose its annual bonus. Neighborhood committees and 'granny police' also watch over the families in their locale, adding social pressure and acting as distributors of birth control devices. Abortions are freely available for unsanctioned and unwanted

pregnancies. In terms of reducing population growth, the policy has been very successful. The average family size in China in 1999 was 1.8 children, while the overall annual growth rate of the country's population between 1994 and 1999 was 1.0 percent. China, like Japan, Taiwan, and North and South Korea, has completed its demographic transition, and now has low birth rates as well as low death rates. Without such an aggressive population policy, China's population today would have been more than 300 million larger.

Nevertheless, the policy has not been without problems. In addition to the personal and social coercion involved, the one-child policy has led to the problem of spoiled children—"little emperors" who are the center of attention of six anxious adults (the parents plus two sets of grandparents). One aspect of this is an increasing incidence of obesity in Chinese children. Being fat used to be considered a hedge against bad times, but is now coming to be seen not only as unhealthy but also as symptomatic of the cultural shift that has produced so many spoiled children. More serious is the practice of aborting female fetuses in response to the one-child policy. There has long been a cultural bias toward male children in China. Boys are not only considered inherently more worthy than girls but are also seen as insurance against hard times and providers for their parents in old age. In the past, this bias took the form of abandonment of girl children and even infanticide. Today, such practices are much less common but widespread selective abortion means that, for every 100 female babies born in China, according to the 1999 census figures, there are 111.3 baby boys. In Jiangxi province, the *China Women's News* reported in 1999, the ratio of newborn boys to girls was 117.1 per 100 and, in some parts, as high as 120 per 100. One consequence of this is that within a few years there will be 50 million Chinese men who will have no prospect of finding a wife, simply because there will not be enough women to go around. Today, China's population policies are beginning to be relaxed. Not only has the rate of growth of China's population slowed satisfactorily, but the sharp reduction in birth rates over the past two decades will mean that for the next three or four decades there will be a pronounced aging of the population, creating a top-heavy situation in which more and more elderly will have to be supported by fewer and fewer younger workers.

Migrations and Diasporas

Internal migration within East Asia has for decades been dominated by the movement of people from peripheral, rural settings to the towns and cities of more prosperous regions. In China, however, migration has been strictly controlled for much of the past 50 years. In the immediate aftermath of the Communist revolution, there was a great deal of local movement as people were reorganized into communes. Then, in the late 1960s, the Cultural Revolution brought about the forced migration of millions of younger city dwellers: a program of 'reverse urbanization'

that was designed to purge the cities of ‘decadent’ and ‘revisionist’ thinkers and to inculcate a proletarian revolutionary zeal among the young men and women sent out to live and work in villages. According to Maoist thinking, cities tended to harbor materialist and counter-revolutionary values. Even after Mao’s death and the end of the Cultural Revolution, Chinese authorities remained opposed to urbanization, seeking to keep rural labor forces in place and to prevent the kind of overurbanization typical of peripheral countries. Regulations aimed at restricting rural-urban migration include raising housing costs for migrants and fining employers who hire transient workers without permission.

The gradual liberalization of the Chinese economy has inevitably led to increased rural-urban migration, however. Between 1975 and 2000, the percentage of the Chinese population living in urban areas increased from 17.3 percent to 34.3 percent. Given the overall growth of population during that period, this meant an additional 277.7 million urban dwellers. In order to prevent the country’s few big cities from swelling to unmanageable proportions, the Chinese government created several hundred buffer cities—smaller settlements with populations of less than 500,000 people. By 2000, satellite photos showed that China was losing at least 500,000 hectares (1,235,000 acres) of arable land each year to housing, roads and factories through the expansion of these smaller towns and cities. Meanwhile, several megalopolitan areas had emerged in spite of the state’s policy of giving priority to the development of smaller towns and cities (**Figure 9.15**). These megalopolitan areas include the Bo Hai Bay area centred on Beijing, Tianjin, Qingdao, Shenyang and Dalian; the Yangtze River Delta around Shanghai, Nanjing, Hangzhou and Ningbo; and the Zhu Jiang (Pearl River) Delta around Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. (Chongqing, with a registered population of over 30 million people, is an artificial megacity, created through merging Chongqing administratively with the settlements of the Three Gorges basin.) Faced with these realities, and wishing to accelerate urbanization in a bid to take advantage of economies of scale, the government finally reversed its long-standing policy against creating megacities in 2000.

Figure 9.15: map of major metropolitan regions in East Asia

In Japan, levels of urbanization have increased dramatically since World War II. In 1950, almost half of Japan’s population was dispersed throughout the country in farming households in rural areas. During the period of postwar economic recovery and growth, rural-urban migration occurred very rapidly as manufacturing industries expanded, mainly along the Pacific Corridor from Tokyo to northern Kyushu. As in the United States, there was a brief phenomenon of **counterurbanization** during the 1970s, as some businesses sought to escape the congestion and inflated land prices of metropolitan areas, and as some people sought out quieter and more traditional settings in which to pursue alternative

lifestyles. This counterurbanization, however, was selective, affecting only a few places and regions. By 1990, some 46.8 of Japan's total land area was officially designated as 'depopulated' and eligible for special funding. With less than 7 percent of Japan's population, these rural areas were left with declining economies and aging populations. Japan's cities, on the other hand, grew at a terrific pace—partly through migration, and partly through natural increase of their younger populations. By 2000, nearly 80 percent of Japan's population was urbanized, the Pacific Corridor having become a megalopolitan region with several major metropolises (Figure 9.15). South Korea has experienced a similar pattern of rural-urban migration, with Seoul the focus of a shift that has seen overall levels of urbanization increase from 21.4 percent in 1950 to 86.2 percent in 2000. Even North Korea, with a strictly controlled communist regime and poor levels of productivity, experienced a steady increase in urbanization: from 31.0 percent in 1950 to 62.8 percent in 2000.

Diasporas

East Asia is a world region that is distinctive insofar as it has few immigrant populations of any significant size. Dislike of—and disdain for—foreigners of all kinds has long been a strong cultural trait within East Asia, while the communist regimes of China and North Korea have resulted in tightly closed borders for several decades. On the other hand, there has been considerable emigration from East Asia. The Chinese diaspora dates from the thirteenth century, after the conquest of China by the Mongols in 1279. Some Chinese took refuge in Japan, Cambodia, and Vietnam, but it was the Yuan (Mongol) Dynasty itself that promoted the basis for a wider Chinese diaspora through its trading colonies in Cambodia, Java, Sumatra, Singapore, and Taiwan. Under the Ming and Qing Dynasties, Chinese communities developed around additional trading colonies, including several in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand.

After defeat in the Opium War (1840-1842) and the opening up of trade with Western powers, many more Chinese emigrated, creating the basis for the modern Chinese diaspora. The Industrial Revolution and the opening up of the world economy through imperialism and colonization provided many opportunities. Between 1845 and 1900, 400,000 Chinese are estimated to have emigrated to the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Over the same period, an additional 1.5 million emigrated to Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam), working in mines, on road- and railroad-building, and as farm laborers; and another 400,000 emigrated to the West Indies and Latin America, mainly Chile, Cuba (after 1847), and Peru (after 1848). Chinese immigration to the United States began with the California gold rush of the 1850s. By 1860, there were 35,000 Chinese in the United States, concentrated in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle, and Portland; and scattered in the mines, railway construction projects and ranches of

California. Other significant concentrations of Chinese immigrants developed in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. But intense discrimination against the Chinese—who were (wrongly) blamed for everything from outbreaks of cholera to the moral corruption of nineteenth-century cities—led to a decade of federal restrictions on Chinese immigration, beginning in 1882. It was only after World War II that Chinese immigration to the United States once more became a significant flow. Today, the Chinese diaspora is the largest in the world, and one of the most prosperous. The past quarter-century has seen a great increase in Chinese emigration to the United States, Canada, and Western Europe (**Figure 9.16**). In 2000, the Chinese population of the United States was 1.6 million [UPDATE FROM 2000 CENSUS].

Figure 9.16: map of Chinese diaspora

The Korean and Japanese diasporas are much smaller, but have become important elements of the contemporary geography of both East Asia and North America. Few people from Korea had left the country before Japanese colonization in 1910, but during the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945) significant numbers of Korean workers emigrated to settle in Manchuria, Sakhalin, and Japan itself. Following World War II, the Soviet occupation of Sakhalin stranded the Korean population there, while in Japan the Korean population has remained a discriminated minority, even after three generations. After the mid-1970s, a second burst of emigration occurred—this time from South Korea, with the destination of the emigrants focused on Hawaii and North America, mainly Los Angeles and Vancouver. Japanese emigration to its colonies in East Asia in the 1930s and 1940s was reversed with the Japanese defeat in World War II. The remaining component of the Japanese diaspora is in North America. Japanese immigration to the United States dates from the 1880s, when federal restrictions were placed on Chinese immigration. Today, the Japanese-American population numbers [886,000] [UPDATE FROM 2000 CENSUS], with concentrations in Honolulu, San Francisco and Los Angeles.

Ethnicity

Although East Asia has few immigrant populations of any significant size, there are some important ethnic variations. According to China's census of 1995, its population contains 56 different ethnic groups. The dominant group consists of Han people, who make up over 91 percent of the population. The Han people originally occupied the lower reaches of the Huang He and the surrounding North China Plain. They spread gradually inland along river valleys, into present-day Korea, and toward the humid and sub-tropical south. With the Ming Dynasty, Han colonialism and imperialism established them as the dominant group throughout the jungle lands of the south and southeast (as far as present-day Vietnam), and in Taiwan. Most recently, in the nineteenth century, they spread north into Manchuria. Today there are more than a billion

Han in China. The remaining 55 minority groups add up to less than 110 million people. They are mostly residual groups of indigenous peoples, such as the Miao, the Dong, Li, Naxi, and Qiang, and are found in the border regions, removed from central authority in Beijing, relatively remote and economically backward.

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising to find that tensions exist between several of the larger minority groups and the dominant Han. Perhaps the best-known case is that of the Tibetans, who came under the rule of the Han as recently as 1950, when the Chinese People's Liberation Army marched into Tibet as 'liberators.' In 1959 the Tibetans rose in an attempted revolt and their spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, fled into exile. In 1965, Tibet was granted the status of an autonomous region, called Xizang, but by that time large numbers of Han had flooded in, often taking positions of authority, leaving Tibetans as disadvantaged, second-class citizens. There were serious anti-Chinese disturbances in 1988, since when the volatile situation has continued to simmer. Today in Xizang, all Buddhist monasteries are rigidly controlled by the police and Communist Party officials, and expressions of devotion to the Dalai Lama are banned.

Another region of tense inter-ethnic relations is that of Xinjiang, a vast territory that occupies one-sixth of China. Its multi-ethnic population totals only 15 million, including an estimated 8 million Uighurs and a sizeable number of Han colonists who arrived after 1950. The majority of Xinjiang's population is Muslim, but their agitation for greater autonomy and respect for Islamic values has been ruthlessly suppressed by the Chinese authorities. In 1962, minority factions rebelled against the Chinese, calling for the establishment of an independent East Turkestan Muslim Republic. Tens of thousands of nomadic peoples fled across the mountainous border with the Soviet Union, and for several decades now there has been on-going feuding in the frontier region. In recent years, separatist sentiments in Xinjiang have been fueled by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the realignment of Central Asia's newly independent Muslim states that share borders with Xinjiang. Protests and bombings increased sharply in the 1990s, and the traffic of weapons, political literature and insurgents has prompted the Chinese to increase surveillance in Xinjiang and, intermittently, to close its borders with Pakistan and neighboring central Asian states.

The dominance of Han peoples within China is reflected in the geography of language. 'Mandarin,' the language of the old imperial bureaucracy, is spoken by Hui and Manchu people (as well as the people of Taiwan), together with almost all Han people, though significant regional variations still remain in the Mandarin dialects that people use. The other 53 ethnic minorities in China have their own languages. Chinese writing dates from the time of the Shang Dynasty (1766 to 1126 B.C.), with tens of

thousands of characters, or ideographs, each representing a picture or a sound of a word. The Communist government has facilitated literacy by reducing the number of characters in use and by simplifying them. It has also adopted a new system, **pinyin**, for spelling Chinese words and names using the Latin alphabet of 26 letters. Previously, Chinese words and names had been translated into a Latin-based version using a Western system, known as the Wade-Giles system. Older textbooks, reference books and atlases, for example, refer to Beijing as Peking, to Guangzhou as Canton, to the Huang He as the Yellow River, to the Chang Jiang as the Yangtze, and so on.

Cultural Traditions

Traditional East Asian societies were centered around family, kin networks, clan groups, and language groups, with a strong bureaucracy enforcing social order. Society was rigidly hierarchical, and individuals were subsumed within the family unit, the village, and the domain of the local lord. In these environments, important social values were those of humility, understatement, and refined obsequiousness, with particular deference being shown to older persons as well as those of superior social rank.

Chinese culture found religious expression in Confucianism. Unlike most religions, Confucianism has no place for gods or an afterlife; also distinctive is Confucianism's emphasis on ethics and principles of good governance, and on the importance of education as well as family and hard work. Confucianism proved to be ideally suited to imperial China, and it remains the most widely recognized religion, even after several decades of discouragement from the Communist regime. Other religions that are important in China include Tibetan Buddhism (in Xizang), and Islam (in large parts of Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang). For most Chinese, however, folk religions are far more important than any organized religion. Animism—the belief that non-living things have spirits that should be respected through worship—continues to be widely practiced, as does ancestor worship—based on the belief that the living can communicate with the dead and that the dead spirits, to whom offerings are ritually made, have the ability to influence people's lives. The costs of offerings, burning paper money, and using shamans and priests to perform rituals that will heal the sick, appease the ancestors, and exorcise ghosts at times of birth, marriage, and death can be financially burdensome.

Japanese indigenous culture found expression in Shinto, which does not have a distinctive philosophy but, rather, a belief in the nature of sacred powers that can be recognized in every individual existing thing. The traditions of Shinto may be thought of as the traditions of Japan itself. Seasonal and other festivals elicit widespread participation in present-day Japan, regardless of people's religious affiliation. These traditions usually

entail ritual purification, the offering of food to sacred powers, sacred music and dance, solemn worship, and joyous celebration. Buddhism is also important in Japan. It was introduced to Japan in the sixth century A.D. from Korea. During the Nara period (A.D. 710-784), Buddhism was vigorously promoted, leading to the first important blossoming of distinctive Japanese art and architecture. Later, between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries, Zen Buddhism was introduced from China, adding new painting styles, new skills in ceramics, and the custom of tea drinking.

Throughout East Asia there is widespread adherence to **geomancy**—not a religion but a belief that the physical attributes of places can be analyzed and manipulated in order to improve the flow of cosmic energy, or *ch'i* (pronounced *chee*), that binds all living things. Geomancy involves strategies of siting, landscaping, architectural design and furniture placement to direct energy flows, and is often known as **feng shui** (pronounced *fung shway*). The oldest school, known as the Land Form (or simply Form) School, dates back to the Tang dynasty (A.D. 618-907). From its origin in the jagged mountains of southern China, the Form School used hills, mountains, rivers and other geomorphological features as a basis to evaluate the quality of a location. Subsequent modifications introduced the idea that specific points of the compass exert unique influences on various aspects of life. For example, the south, with its orientation toward the sun's path and away from cold north winds, was declared a most auspicious direction, conducive to longevity, fame and fortune; while influence over career and business success was attributed to the north. In East Asia today, *feng shui* practitioners focus most on the layout and interior design of homes and offices. The principles and beliefs are complex, but some of the key ideas are as follows: Water and mirrors enhance *ch'i* flow. Narrow openings or hallways cause *ch'i* to flow too quickly, negating its beneficial effects. Straight lines are a frequent cause of high-velocity *ch'i* that can be dangerous to health and well-being. The numbers 8 (representing "prosperity") and 9 (representing the fullness of heaven and earth) are good; but 4 is bad ("death"). The placement of furniture and other objects, as well as the use of certain colors (purple is popular) and motifs (birds are favored), are all believed to enhance *ch'i* flow, and therefore success, family relationships, and health. Ideally, each room should include some representation of each of the five fundamental elements (fire, metal, water, wood, and earth).

There are also important regional variations in cultural traditions within East Asia. In addition to variations in religious adherence that are associated with different ethnic groups, there are some striking regional differences in diet, dress, and ways of life. Within China, for example, there are fundamental differences between the cuisines of Inner and Outer China, and between the north and south within Inner China. In

Outer China, milk-based dishes—yogurt, curds, and so on—are common, while herds of sheep, goats, cows, horses, camels, and yaks also provide meat dishes. Inner China, by contrast, has little stockraising and, consequently, few milk-based dishes; and its principal meat dishes derive from scavengers like ducks, poultry, and pigs. Within Inner China, the humid and subtropical south has developed a cuisine that is based on rice, while in the sub-humid north it is noodles that form the staple diet.

While these traditions remain an important dimension of the geography of East Asia, they are being increasingly drawn into the globalization of culture. Chinese art and artifacts were popularized in Europe and North America as early as the nineteenth century; Chinese and Japanese cuisines have been introduced to cities throughout the rest of the world; the simplicity of Japanese architecture and interior design has influenced Modernist design; religions such as Tibetan Buddhism and Zen Buddhism have a small but growing following in both Europe and North America; and *feng shui* has recently found adherents in many Western countries. On the other hand, the cultural traditions of East Asia are themselves being modified, hybridized, and displaced by the globalization of culture. This is perhaps most striking in terms of the growth of Western materialism and consumer culture in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (see Day in the Life Feature: Miki Takasu) but, as in most other world regions, globalization is rapidly diffusing new ideas, values, and social practices as well as consumer products to every corner.

Day in the Life Feature: Miki Takasu

REGIONAL CHANGE AND INTERDEPENDENCE

Over the past 20 years, places and regions throughout most of East Asia have been increasingly linked to the circuits of the global economy. The economic, social, cultural, and political outcomes of these changes have already been profound, even though the dynamics of change are still very much in motion. These outcomes have also been uneven in their impact. East Asia is a world region with a legacy of three very different economies: a huge rural economy based on 18th and 19th century agriculture; a large, urban 20th century industrial economy; and a small but rapidly-growing economy based on advanced technologies. As more and more places and regions in East Asia are drawn into the agricultural-, manufacturing-, and information-based circuits of the global economy, long-standing spatial patterns become blurred, new regional patterns emerge, and places develop new forms of interdependence. East Asia is a world region whose dominant motifs are its dynamism, its distinctive pathways to modernization, and the contradictions and disjunctures that have resulted from rapid economic and social change.

Japan: Government, Industry, and Regional Development

One consequence of Japan's distinctive pathway to modernization was that Japan was able to prosper while keeping social institutions and cultural traditions more or less intact. Japan's economic and environmental landscapes, though, have been dramatically rearranged. In some ways, the changes wrought on the Japanese landscape parallel those that took place in response to the industrialization of Western Europe and North America. Existing urban centers (the castle towns, in Japan's case) grew at various rates according to their adaptability as regional industrial, commercial or administrative centers; while new kinds of specialist settlements—ports, mining towns, heavy manufacturing towns and transport centers—emerged and grew rapidly to become major nodes of urbanization. Similarly, the expansion and diversification of the industrial economy imposed a progressive spatial division of labor. The logic of **agglomeration** and **economies of scale** made for regional specialization. Examples of this specialization include the concentration of the silk industry in central Honshu, the gravitation of the cotton industry towards the port cities that serve the Asian market, and the location of heavy industry around deposits of raw materials in Hokkaido and northern Honshu. Within this overall transformation, one distinctive feature to emerge was the large company town. This was a reflection of the unique role of zaibatsu in Japanese industrialization. The early leaders among the zaibatsu—Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo—inevitably came to dominate their host cities (which included Omuta, Niihoma, Nobeoka and Nagasaki); while later-established zaibatsu, as well as some of the corporate giants spawned by postwar growth, sponsored new company towns in newly-industrializing regions: the city of Hitachi, northeast of Mito, for example.

A particularly striking feature of the geography of industrialization in Japan, however, is the sheer intensity of development that has been crammed into the relatively limited amount of suitable land. The megalopolitan Pacific Corridor between Tokyo and Kobe is the embodiment of this development, and it has inevitably brought serious problems: crowding, congestion, environmental pollution and ground subsidence (see p. 000). Meanwhile, the concentration of economic activity in the Pacific Corridor has resulted in a relative lack of development elsewhere. Japan is thus characterized, like Europe and North America, by a center-periphery pattern. In the Japanese case, the periphery consists of northern Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku. Like peripheral regions within older core nations, they have experienced the **backwash effects** of metropolitan development: selective out-migration, restricted investment (both public and private), and limited employment opportunities. In addition, much of the periphery has a climate that most Japanese find severe, thus compounding feelings of deprivation and remoteness.

In sharp contrast to the careful strategic planning of production and technology that is the focus of the interdependence between Japanese industry and government, Japanese urbanization is unplanned and chaotic. As a result, the intense development in the Pacific Corridor has not only given rise to environmental concerns but also sky-rocketing real estate prices and chronic traffic congestion. Inevitably, the high costs of operating in Japan have begun to weigh on Japanese corporations, straining their allegiance to the nationalist project of economic development. Many of the larger Japanese corporations have moved production facilities elsewhere in East and Southeast Asia in search of lower production costs and expanding markets. MITI has attempted to counter the consequent loss of Japanese capital and technology by developing a Technopolis Program (**Figure 9.17**) that seeks to establish the infrastructure necessary to lure Japanese capital into investing in domestic high-tech industries, but MITI no longer has direct influence over Japanese corporations, nor do these corporations decide their strategies primarily within the framework of Japan's economic interests.

Figure 9.17: map & photo of Tsukuba Science City

This decoupling of the systematic interdependence between Japanese government and industry means that places and regions in Japan are becoming much more interdependent with places and regions elsewhere. It also means that it is increasingly difficult to sustain the distinctive system of life-long tenure for workers in large corporations that has characterized Japanese employment practices for decades. Not surprisingly, people's willingness to work long hours and defer consumption in the cause of national economic development has also declined. This unraveling of Japan's successful system of economic development has been reflected in a series of recent economic and political crises. It is also beginning to be reflected in shifting values and lifestyles. Traditional patriarchal values and nationalistic bureaucratic indoctrination have little meaning for the generation that has grown up in affluence, and whose lifestyles and preferences are now beginning to be inscribed into Japan's human geography.

China: Reform and Regional Inequality

At the heart of China's reforms since 1978 has been the dramatic decentralization of decision-making from the central government to the level of local enterprises. The idea was to move away from the rigid and rather myopic process of five-year plans and centrally-determined prices and production quotas in order to facilitate more efficient decision-making based on local conditions and needs. Although the state retains the right to set overall economic strategy, local factories and enterprises are now encouraged to respond to market forces. Today, most enterprises, both private and collective, contract with one another rather than the central government, and deal directly with consumers. After

they have fulfilled their contracts and paid their taxes, they are free to pay incentive bonuses and to invest any remaining profits in improved equipment or expanded production facilities. Some 70 percent of China's GNP is now generated by these non-state enterprises.

The first economic reforms concentrated on privatizing peasant agriculture, giving priority to rural land reform. Today, the collectivized farm economy has almost completely disappeared from China, replaced by a contract system in which individual households are responsible for planning and carrying out production on their own land. This has increased farm production and rural incomes tremendously: the "10,000 yuan" household (about \$2000 per year), a measure of exceptional wealth in China (average household income in 1999 was \$-----), has now become a realistic goal for many peasants.

It has, though, been the impact of reform in some of China's urban-industrial regions that has been most striking. Deng Xiaoping sought to bring 'world standards' to bear on the economy in a controlled way through the establishment of a few Special Economic Zones (SEZs). These zones (**Figure 9.18**) were experimental, as the Communist leadership in Beijing looked for ways to maintain political control while absorbing foreign capital, technology and management practices. They were set up as carefully-segregated export-processing zones that offered cheap labor and land, along with tax breaks, to transnational corporations. They have been only partially successful, however, since transnational corporations can obtain similar conditions in a wide range of peripheral countries, often under more favorable and predictable political circumstances. What the transnational corporations really want is to penetrate the Chinese market; but the Chinese government remains wary of the potential damage to its fledgling domestic industries.

The SEZs did, however, signal China's openness to capitalist investment and trade, a signal to which investors from Hong Kong, Taiwan, responded positively and enthusiastically. Networks of business connections quickly sprang up in the coastal cities and regions adjacent to Hong Kong and Taiwan. Once the business networks were in place, capital flowed in from all over the globe. The surge of investment in coastal China has been led by ethnic Chinese within networks that stretch across the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia and around the Pacific Rim. Common language and a common culture ease the flow of money, managers and trade. Taiwan and China are officially still on a war footing, and all economic relations are carried on through Hong Kong. But in 1992 China became the biggest single destination for Taiwanese foreign direct investment. Pressure is mounting on the Taiwan government to allow direct trade and investment with the mainland. Meanwhile, there has emerged an important new web of interdependent trade and investment that links coastal China with Singapore, Bangkok,

Penang, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Los Angeles, Vancouver, New York, and Sydney.

Figure 9.18: map of special economic zones etc

The coastal regions that have been infused with capital and business know-how from the Chinese diaspora have now become the nodal points for reforming the Chinese economy as a whole. Their dramatic success has influenced managers and bureaucrats elsewhere. Much of the investment is in joint ventures or corporate alliances between foreign firms and local enterprises operated by local governments and cooperatives. Throughout coastal China the industrial structure increasingly resembles that of its more prosperous East Asian neighbors; Chinese manufacturing output is now dominated by a large number of small firms with mixed state and private (often foreign) participation rather than by giant state companies as in the past. Guangdong represents the most striking example of industrial transformation. The province's industrial output, largely of goods such as clothes, shoes and toys, rose at rates of up to 15 per cent per year during the 1980s and 1990s. Exports from the province, funneled mostly through Hong Kong, accounted for almost two-thirds of Guangdong's output and fully one third of China's total exports in 1990 (see Geography Matters 9.3: "Made in China"). With 63 million people the province experienced a growth in GDP of around 12.5 percent per year in the 1980s. ----- ADD recent material on Guangdong -----

Geography Matters 9.3: "Made in China": The Changing Geography of the Clothing Industry

Regional Problems

The euphoria engendered by the recent economic transformation of coastal China should be tempered somewhat by recognizing the problem of regional inequality that it has created. The visible polarization of wealth, which had been virtually eradicated in the first 30 years of Communist rule, has returned to China with the return of capitalism. Development along the south and east coasts is creating a significant disparity in growth and incomes between coastal and interior regions that will grow greater as the advantaged regions build up their external links, and the central government may well have to intervene to prevent spatial polarization from generating internal political conflict.

The nine interior provinces and the autonomous regions have remained, for the most part, appallingly poor, the average income of their population of 285 million people having already fallen to less than 65 percent of the national average. Of the more than \$300 billion in foreign investment that China attracted in the 1990s, only \$9.9 billion went to these regions. Meanwhile, within coastal China the emergence of a crassly ostentatious wealthy class has begun to breed the kind of social

and political problems that the Communist fought a revolution to eliminate. Street crime has become a serious problem, white-collar crime and corruption are on the rise, and social tensions are increasingly in evidence.

A second regional problem is the poor condition of transport infrastructure. The transportation system in the interior is poorly developed and the railways, in particular, are in need of modernization and expansion (China has one of the world's smallest railway networks relative to population and arable land). The basic infrastructures for energy and water supplies are also woefully deficient throughout the interior regions. The central government has recognized these problems, and has announced plans for a "Second Opening" of China, with 2500 kilometers (2500 miles) of new railway lines and 20,000 kilometers (20,000 miles) of new highways by 2010, including a new Sichuan-to-Guangxi expressway. A massive public works program aimed at hydro-electric facilities, irrigation and drainage, and improved waterways has been the cornerstone of the central government's approach to the economic development of the interior. The Three Gorges Dam on the Chang Jiang (see Geography Matters 9.4: The Three Gorges project") has become emblematic of this strategy, and of China's ambitious determination to modernize. It has also, unfortunately, become emblematic of the problems of graft, corruption, and disregard for the social and environmental consequences of large-scale infrastructure development.

Geography Matters 9.4: The Three Gorges project

CORE REGIONS AND KEY CITIES

The core regions and key cities of East Asia are situated along the continental margin, where the bulk of the population lives. Within this continental margin are the most productive agricultural regions and the most prosperous cities. As we have seen, the core regions of Imperial China were the plains of North and Central China and the fertile countryside of South China. China's recent transition toward market economies has intensified the comparative advantages of these regions, especially around the principal ports and river towns with good connections to the wider world. In Japan, the highly populated Kanto Plain around Tokyo became the platform for a core region—the Pacific Corridor—that was engineered to be the geographic basis of Japan's postwar 'economic miracle.' Meanwhile, the geopolitics of the Cold War, coupled with significant flows of investment by transnational corporations, have helped Taiwan and South Korea to become prosperous core regions within East Asia. Between them, these core regions account for 60 percent of the population of East Asia.

North China Plain

The North China Plain covers an area of about 300,000 square kilometers (----- sq. miles, about the same as -----) and stretches from the Taihang Mountains and the Funiu Mountains eastward to the Bo Hai and the Yellow Sea, and from the Great Wall southwards to the Qinling Mountains (**Figure 9.19**). In this region of some 250 million people are more than 40 cities, including Beijing (population 12.03 million in 2000), Luoyang (1.57 million), Shijiazhuang (1.88 million), Tianjin (10.23 million), and Zengzhou (2.28 million). Population is especially concentrated along the principal rivers—the Huang He, the Huai He, and the Hai He—and the Grand Canal and the railways. The rivers are the agents that have nourished the plains, which are a region of relatively low rainfall; but they are also the agents of disaster, bringing occasional floods that are devastating in their impact. The Huang He is the most important river. Before entering the North China Plain it flows through the easily-eroded Loess Plateau, carrying a silt load of about 1.6 billion tons annually. It then suddenly drops onto the North China Plain and starts building a gigantic delta of about 250,000 square kilometers (----- sq. miles). The rapid build-up of silt on the riverbed makes its course unstable, with the result that it regularly bursts its banks.

Figure 9.19: map of N China plain

The North China Plain is a deeply humanized landscape that has been modified by thousands of years of human occupation. The capitals of the Shang and Qin Dynasties were established here, and the Mongol Yuan Dynasty established the imperial capital in Dadu, which was later renamed, under the Ming Dynasty, as Beijing (“Northern Capital”). The North China Plain is a region of monotonous flatness. The original vegetation was probably a deciduous broadleaved forest, dominated by oaks. Today, the only significant wooded areas are along streams and riverbanks, where willows, poplars, and elms grow, much as they have for centuries. The flat, rolling landscape is a mosaic of rectangular fields. Geographer Yi-Fu Tuan notes that in summer ‘a bird’s eye view emphasizes the intricacy and the extreme fragmentation of the landscape for the crops are then in varying stages of growth, each farmer having planted at a slightly different time, and the fields are a glorious palette of yellows, browns, and different shades of green.’¹ In contrast, the winter landscape of the North China plain is brown and parched, and on windy days the air is thick with the dust that blows easily from the loess silt.

Agriculture has for centuries been the basis of the region’s relative prosperity, and this is reflected in the high density of rural settlement. The large nucleated settlements of the North China Plain average about 1000 persons in size and are only about two kilometers (----- miles) apart (see **Figure 9.20**). They are connected to one another by footpaths and cart tracks, with a rural road network that leads to small market towns that serve the basic needs of between 20 and 40 villages.

¹ Tuan, Y-F, *China*. London: Longman, 1970, p. 151.

Figure 9.20: map of settlement pattern on N China plain

It was this rural infrastructure that formed the foundation of economic support for Imperial China. The cities that served as the main bureaucratic and mercantile centers of Imperial China have grown into the administrative, commercial and industrial centers that make the North China plain a core region within contemporary China. Oil fields beneath the North China Plain, together with coal and iron ore from nearby Shanxi, have provided the resource base for a phenomenal pace of industrialization since 1950. There are three important industrial sub-regions (Figure 9.19):

1. The Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan region, whose chief industries include steel and metallurgy, petroleum and chemicals, engineering, electrical equipment, electronics, and textiles. Altogether, this sub-region accounts for almost 10 percent of China's total industrial production.
2. The Jinan-Qingdao railway belt, whose chief industries include textiles, chemicals, porcelain, fertilizer, and steel.
3. The Shijiazhuang-Handan railway belt, located along the Beijing-Wuhan railway and along the foothills of the Taihang Mountains, whose chief industries include textiles, engineering, steel, porcelain, and light manufacturing.

Beijing

The popular image of Beijing is that of the Forbidden City (**Figure 9.21**), the grounds of the Imperial Palace of the Ming and Qing dynasties. Modern Beijing, however, is almost entirely built in the image of Chinese socialism. Mao Zedong's determination that Beijing would become a true 'producing city' resulted in the extraordinary growth of heavy and manufacturing industries, with the result that the city has been transformed into one of China's key industrial centers. Ring roads and radiating highways provide the framework for a system of ten suburban industrial nodes, while new highways link the city to the international port of Tianjin and to Tangshan, a center of coal mining and heavy industry. Meanwhile, Beijing's distinctive series of symmetrical walls-within-walls, which subdivided the imperial city into districts that were successively nearer to the centrally-located Forbidden City, were torn down in the 1950s to make way for the ring roads. The Forbidden City itself was renamed as the Palace Museum, and a huge area in front of the Tiananmen entrance ("Gate of Heavenly Peace") to the Palace was cleared to make the largest open square of any city in the world. Designed as a staging ground for vast spectacles, parades, and rallies organized by the government on national holidays, Tiananmen Square gained international notoriety in 1989 when army tanks and soldiers savagely repressed grassroots pro-democracy demonstrations, killing 155 people.

Figure 9.21: photo of Forbidden City

Today, Beijing is a vast metropolitan area with a large industrial base. As the capital of the country, it has a large white-collar service sector and has attracted a significant amount of foreign direct investment since Deng Xiaoping's 'open door' policy was initiated in 1978. A concentration of universities and research institutes, in conjunction with a special economic development zone, has attracted the beginnings of a high-tech sector in the northwest of the city. Compared to most other Chinese cities, Beijing is remarkably affluent, with some excellent hotels and restaurants, good recreation facilities, and strikingly high levels of automobile ownership and consumer goods.

Nevertheless, the city remains rather bleak and unattractive (**Figure 9.22**), and suffers from serious levels of air and water pollution. Geographer Jack Williams describes Beijing as "a vast, massive, gray city of arrow-straight wide boulevards and huge government buildings, punctuated by seemingly endless rows of drab apartment blocks in socialist style, replacing the charming *hutong*, or narrow alleys with their specialty shops and traditional courtyard houses . . . a city ill-suited to its human residents, unwalkable, inconvenient, and of a scale deliberately designed to dwarf humans. Beijing [is] not a city for people, but rather a city primarily designed to express the government's power and control of China. There are interesting parallels not only with Moscow but also with Hitler's Berlin and Mussolini's Rome in the 1930s."² With the gradual opening-up of China, more attention has been paid to historic preservation and beautification. With an eye to international tourism, a few shopping streets have been reconstructed in the image of "old China," while most of the city's surviving temples, palaces, parks, and monuments have been renovated and spruced up.

Figure 9.22: photo of boulevards/housing in Beijing

Central China

Central China—the middle and lower reaches of the Chang Jiang (**Figure 9.23**)—is a hearth area of Han China and of Chinese agricultural civilization. From the middle period of imperial China (A.D. 589 to 1279), Central China gradually exceeded the North China Plain both in population and in economic development, and Hangzhou was for a while the capital of the nation. By the late seventeenth century, the middle reaches of the Chang Jiang had become the largest center of commercial food (mainly rice) production in China, while the Chang Jiang Delta flourished as a center of handicraft industries. Today, Central China accounts for almost a quarter of all cultivated land in China. It is one of the most densely populated regions of East Asia and contains China's largest city, Shanghai (population 14.17 million in 2000) and several other key metropolitan centers, including Wuhan (4.75 million), Nanjing (3.38

² Williams, J, "Cities of East Asia." In S. D. Brunn and J. F. Williams (Eds), Cities of the World, 2nd edition. New York: HarperCollins, 1993pp. 457-7.

million), Hangzhou (6.39 million), Nanchang (1.58 million), Hefei (1.57 million), and Suzhou (1.27 million).

Figure 9.23: map of Central China

Central China has developed around waterways. A series of lake basins stretch from the Three Gorges eastward to the sea for a length of more than 1800 kilometers (----- miles) and a total area of about 160,000 square kilometers (----- sq. miles: roughly equivalent to the size of -----). The Chang Jiang has long been the west-east 'Golden Waterway', while its tributaries, together with the Grand Canal, have provided important north-south routeways. The Chang Jiang is prone to flooding, however. The flood of 1887 was probably the most disastrous ever recorded in the world, with an estimated 7 million people losing their lives. In 1931 another disastrous flood claimed approximately 200,000 lives. More recently, floods in 1998 led to the loss of more than 3000 lives, the evacuation of 14 million people, and damage amounting to \$24 billion. Flood control is one of the major objectives of the Three Gorges Dam. Water dominates the landscapes of Central China (**Figure 9.24**). The large lakes that border the Chang Jiang occupy more than ----- square kilometers (7000 sq miles), while all along the river itself are smaller lakes and ponds, together with tens of thousands of kilometers of canals, irrigation ditches, and thousands of linear ponds. The countryside is characterized by the rectilinear patterns of the drainage channels and the canals that link the smaller settlements of the region (**Figure 9.25**). This "land of rice and fish" is extremely productive, the humid subtropical climate allowing for a triple-cropping system (two crops of rice, plus one of winter wheat or barley) in many locales.

Figure 9.24: photo of Central China's watery landscapes

Figure 9.25: map of settlements/canals in Chang Jiang delta

Since 1949, Central China has been developed as a core industrial region as well as a key food-producing region. The middle Chang Jiang plains contain one of the most important oil fields in China, and the region's energy resources will be significantly increased by hydro-electric power from the Three Gorges Dam. The industrial belt of the middle Chang Jiang includes three concentrations of heavy industry: steel, engineering, and shipbuilding in Wuhan; automobiles in western Hubei; and non-ferrous metallurgy and engineering in central Hunan. In the Chang Jiang Delta, an infrastructure of good rail and air connections has enhanced Shanghai's advantages as a deep-water international port, and the whole subregion has become an extensive industrial complex that is dominated by engineering, textiles, chemicals, and electronics.

Shanghai

Before the Communist revolution of 1949, Shanghai was one of the world's three largest manufacturing centers, the busiest international port in Asia. A cosmopolitan city, home to more than 60,000 foreigners,

Shanghai was known variously as the Queen of the Orient, the Paris of China, and the Whore of the East. Standing on the Huangpu River near the mouth of the Chang Jiang, it was a city of extremes, with rich merchants, manufacturers, traders, and financiers and impoverished masses who worked in the city's sweatshops, factories, and docks. It was also a city of gangsters, get-rich-quick artists, drugs and vice. Its growth had been the result of its role, organized by European merchants, as the principal entrepôt for trade in opium, silk, and tea. The British were the first to develop Shanghai in this way, after the end of the Opium War in 1842. By 1847 the French had arrived and by 1895 large sectors of the city had been parceled up into autonomous international settlements that were immune from Chinese law. The centerpiece of the city was the Bund, the riverfront development of monumental neoclassical buildings occupied by the major banks and trading houses (**Figure 9.26**). At the northern end of the Bund were the British Public Gardens (now called Huangpu Park), where signs at the entrance announced: 'No Dogs or Chinese Allowed.'

Figure 9.26: photo of the Bund, Shanghai

By the time of the Communist revolution, Shanghai had a population of well over a million. Shanghai's poor were strong supporters of the revolution, and their support was vindicated as the Communists eradicated the slums, eliminated child and slave labor, and rehabilitated hundreds of thousands of opium addicts. But the central government saw Shanghai not only as a case for rehabilitation but also as a means of redressing regional inequalities: the city that had drained the wealth out of China for the benefit of foreigners was to be used to transfer wealth to the rest of China. Shanghai was heavily taxed, having to give up 75 percent or more of its revenues to the national government. Meanwhile, very little was reinvested in the city, with the result that Shanghai developed a distinctly dour and shabby appearance, larger and more industrialized but with none of its former vibrancy.

All that changed dramatically in the 1980s, when the central government recognized the need for massive investments in the city's infrastructure. Favorable settings for investment were created through the establishment of a Shanghai Economic Zone and several Economic and Technological Development Zones. In addition, a 350 square kilometer (137 sq mile) area of farmland and swampland to the east of the Huangpu River was turned into the Pudong Industrial District (**Figure 9.27**), a massive, multi-billion dollar concentration of export-processing industries, commercial and financial office space, and scientific, research, and educational facilities. Today, Shanghai is once more a very vibrant city. Once more, it is a city of extremes, with grinding poverty and vice alongside luxury apartment buildings and flashy luxury stores. Its phenomenal growth has not only reinforced its status as China's largest city but has propelled

it to the role of a world city, a key node in the flows of capital, goods and information that underpin the global economy.

Figure 9.27: photo of Pudong district

Day-in-the-Life Feature: Shan Chujie

South China

Nowhere have China's "open door" policies had more impact than in South China. The first four Special Economic Zones—Shantou, Shenzhen, Xiamen, and Zhuhai—were all located here (**Figure 9.28**), deliberately building on the prosperity of Hong Kong, the British colony that was returned to China in 1997. South China occupies an area of about 350,000 square kilometers (----- square miles). It is dominated by low hills that are covered with a secondary growth of evergreen monsoon forest, leaving less than ten percent of the land for agriculture. Nevertheless, the cultivable land is very productive, the climate allowing for double-cropping of paddy rice and for cash crops such as sugar cane, mulberry trees, and hemp. In the Zhu Jiang (Pearl River) Delta, extensive areas are devoted to an especially productive farming system involving fish ponds along with rice paddies and fields of cash crops and vegetables.

Figure 9.28: map of South China

The coastline of South China provides many protected bays suitable for harbors, and a series of important ports have developed, including Quanzhou, Shantou, Xiamen and, either side of the mouth of the Zhu Jiang, Macao and Hong Kong. These ports were a precondition for South China's emergence as a core region, providing an interface with the world economy. The established trade and manufacturing of Macao—a Portuguese colony that was returned to China in 1999—and Hong Kong provided another important precondition for success. When Deng Xiaoping established his "open door" policy and set up the first Special Economic Zones, another important factor kicked in: capital investment from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Chinese diaspora. By 1993, more than 15,000 manufacturers from Hong Kong alone had set up businesses in neighboring Guangdong province, and a similar number had established sub-contracting relationships, contracting out processing work to Chinese companies. Today, the cities and special economic zones of South China's "Gold Coast" provide a thriving export-processing platform that has driven double-digit annual economic growth for much of the past two decades. Shenzhen (**Figure 9.29**) has grown from a population of just 19,000 in 1975 to 1.04 million in 2000, with an additional 2 million in the surrounding municipalities. The southern border of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone adjoins the even more prosperous territory of Hong Kong, but the northern border is walled off from the rest of China by an electrified fence to prevent smuggling and to keep back the mass of people trying to migrate illegally into Shenzhen and Hong Kong.

Figure 9.29: photo of Shenzhen

Hong Kong

In 1950, the prospects for Hong Kong looked bleak. Japanese occupation during the Second World War had prompted 1 million of its pre-war population of 1.6 million to disperse, along with many of the trading companies that had been based there. The Communist revolution in China, the conflict in Korea, and Japan's derelict state seemed to offer little prospect for the revival of a trading port. Yet today Hong Kong stands as a major world city, not only a thriving port city but a major manufacturing center and financial hub (**Figure 9.30**). Furthermore, it was able to grow into a metropolis of 6.1 million with few of the problems of infrastructure provision and illegal squatter housing that characterize the metropolises of the periphery.

Figure 9.30: photo of Hong Kong

One of the reasons for the transformation of Hong Kong was the arrival of refugee entrepreneurs from mainland China—and especially from Shanghai—in 1949. With their expertise and their capital, together with Hong Kong's cheap labor, they established a thriving cotton textile industry, producing inexpensive jeans, T-shirts, and leisure wear for the expanding markets in the United States and Western Europe. The British governors of Hong Kong assisted this economic revival by keeping taxes and regulations to a minimum, and by investing in the infrastructure of roads and port facilities. Meanwhile, in a rather unusual mixture of socialism with free enterprise, the government undertook a massive program of housing development. Squatter housing and slums were cleared, and hundreds of high-rise apartment blocks were built for the city's growing population, many of them with highly-subsidized rents. Following the initial success of the housing program in the city itself, the government followed another British town planning initiative, setting up several New Towns in the New Territories to the north of the city.

The revitalized Hong Kong proved attractive to investors, and the city's entrepreneurs moved from producing cheap apparel to subcontracting for designer wear and producing cheap electronics. As the Asian region began to prosper and markets expanded, Hong Kong became a major center for finance, banking, and tourism. In the mid-1990s, there was some nervousness about the fate of the city on its return to China with the expiry of the 99-year lease that the British had signed with China in 1898. Nevertheless, it did not stop the development of a major new airport, nor significantly stem the pace of development. In the event, China saw the wisdom of maintaining Hong Kong's as a capitalist dynamo, and agreed to create a Special Administrative Region for Hong Kong. This arrangement preserves Hong Kong's legal system, guarantees the rights of property ownership, gives residents the right to travel, permits Hong Kong to continue independent membership of international organizations, and guarantees the democratic rights of assembly, free

speech, academic research, the right to strike, and so on. The result is that Hong Kong continues to prosper, even after the 1998 financial crisis that affected most of East and Southeast Asia (and which sharply reduced the number of tourists from Japan and South Korea). Thousands of companies are located in Hong Kong for the purpose of doing business with China. Although most of its manufacturing has been transferred to neighboring Guangdong province, where wages are much lower, Hong Kong remains the world's largest container port, the third-largest center for foreign exchange trade, the seventh-largest stock market, and the tenth-largest trading economy. Considering its size and its history, these are extraordinary achievements.

Japan's Pacific Corridor

Japan is notably lacking in natural resources for large-scale manufacturing industries and the country's "economic miracle" of the 1960s was founded on the import of raw materials and the manufacturing and export of finished products. Japan's resurgent industries thus flourished best in coastal locations, close to deep-water ports. The Pacific Corridor, between Tokyo and Kobe (**Figure 9.31**), developed into the core region of modern Japanese industrialization because of it not only had several important deep-water ports but also large pools of skilled labor and relatively large amounts of flat land. The entire region has developed into a megalopolitan area, known as the Tokaido Megalopolis, that is comparable in size and scope to the megalopolitan area in the United States that stretches from Boston through New York and Philadelphia to Washington. The Tokaido Megalopolis contains more than 50 million people and accounts for more than 80 percent of Japan's total GDP. In 1999, Osaka alone accounted for a GDP that was greater than those of all but eight countries in the world.

Figure 9.31: map of Pacific Corridor

Transportation has been a key factor in the successful development of the Pacific Corridor. Though port facilities were a precondition for the region's success, internal connections within the region were poor, making it difficult for manufacturers and suppliers to exploit agglomeration economies, and restricting the movement of workers and consumers. In response, the Japanese government undertook a massive program of infrastructure investment. The showpiece of this program is the Shinkansen railway system (**Figure 9.32**). First opened in 1964 to coincide with the Tokyo Olympic Games, the "bullet trains" of the Shinkansen were for a long time the fastest in the world. The Shinkansen has turned the entire Pacific Corridor into a daily commuter belt, with trains carrying over 1400 passengers at 220 kilometers per hour, leaving at intervals of between 10 and 30 minutes throughout the day.

Figure 9.32: photo of Shinkansen

The Pacific Corridor's pre-war industrial base was dominated by cotton, silk, and other textiles, toys, glass and porcelain. These industries are still

present in the region but their importance has been dwarfed by the growth of iron and steel, heavy metal products and machinery, shipping and shipbuilding, petrochemicals, paper products, ceramics, automobile and truck manufacture, cameras, scientific instruments, and electrical and electronics goods of all kinds. Tokyo has grown into a world city of the first rank, with a banking and financial sector that compares to those of London and New York. The population of the Tokyo metropolitan area in 2000 was 28.03 million. Nearby Yokohama (population 3.31 million) is first and foremost a port city and manufacturing center. Nagoya (3.38 million) is a center of heavy engineering, chemical, textile, and machinery manufacture and has an important commercial port; Kyoto (1.70 million) is a major cultural and tourist center but also has important electronics industries, including the manufacture of Nintendo games; Osaka (10.61 million) is a deep-water port with an industrial base of comparable size and diversity to Tokyo's but without Tokyo's international banking and finance; Kobe (1.42 million) is a center of shipping, shipbuilding, engineering, and manufacturing.

Most of these cities were almost entirely flattened by fire-bombing toward the end of World War II, the exception being the old imperial capital, Kyoto. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to take advantage of building afresh in order to produce either more efficient or more livable cities. Growth has been so rapid, and Japanese land-use planning so weakly developed, that the entire region has the air of haphazard development. Tiny houses are wedged between tall hotels or modern offices, or in the shadows of busy elevated highways; factories and warehouses sit amidst private residences or next to gleaming office towers; and the sprawling mix is festooned with ugly power lines, punctuated by netted golf ranges, tall smokestacks and cranes, and decorated with giant billboards and neon signs (**Figure 9.33**).

Figure 9.33: photo of Japanese urban sprawl

Tokyo

The central city, or 'ward area' of Tokyo extends for approximately --- kilometers (--- miles) from the center of the city, covering an area of just under 600 square kilometers and containing a population of over 8 million. Situated at the head of Tokyo Bay, the heart of the city is marked by the extensive grounds of the Imperial Palace, around which are clustered the main railway station and the office towers of the central business district (**Figure 9.34**). The scarcity of land, together with the expense of building safe high-rise buildings in an earthquake zone, has driven growth outwards, with concentrations of offices, retailing, and industry along the major transport arteries and at nodal points where railways and subway systems intersect. The Tokyo metropolitan area extends for approximately --- kilometers (--- miles) from the center of the city, [AREA = 35,000 square kilometers] containing a population of 28.03 million.

Figure 9.34: photos of Tokyo

Geographer Roman Cybriwsky captures the magnitude of the city in his description of the view from Tokyo Tower:

Perhaps the most striking impression . . . is of the immense size of the city. . . . The built-up area extends for well over 50 kilometers in some directions, much further than one can pick out in detail, and seems almost limitless. What is more, almost all of this enormous territory is extremely densely built up. A great many of the buildings seen are high- or mid-rise structures, at least five or six stories tall, and there is almost no empty space between them. . . . The buildings push right up against the edges of open spaces and form high, thick walls that define their boundaries precisely and enclose them almost completely. . . .

One is also taken aback by the incredible profusion of geometric shapes and building sizes that constitutes the rising mass of the new Tokyo. Some of the new developments are quite large and stand out as megastructures that tower over their respective neighborhoods and impose on them a new authority. The Manhattan-like skyline of Shinjuku, seen in the middle distance to the northwest, is one example. . . .

On the other hand, many of the other new buildings are so slim that they remind me of credit cards standing on end, or even pencils on end. Many are just barely wide enough to have elevators or stairways, and in quite a few structures the elevators are tiny and the stairways are affixed to the outside.³

Within this vast metropolis are all kinds of industries and occupations. Tokyo is important in almost every sphere of urban economic activity, and overwhelmingly dominant, within Japan, in most. The metropolitan area accounts for more than 25 percent of Japan's population but handles more than 80 percent of the country's imports and exports (by value), and accounts for about 60 percent of the country's employment in business services. In addition to the many government agencies, half of all Japan's businesses, cultural organizations and media firms are located in Tokyo. Over one million college students study in the several dozen colleges and universities in the metropolitan area; and almost 90 percent of the foreign banks and transnational corporations have their offices in Tokyo. All this translates into an extremely high-energy environment. Crowds seem to be everywhere: even at 11pm on a weekday evening there is often standing room only on downtown subways. Throughout the central city, road traffic moves slowly, if at all.

If the modern city can be said to have an identifiable structure, then it is structured around the train and subway network that has evolved to cope with the millions of commuters who must pour into the central city each weekday. Where rail lines from the outer suburbs intersect with the circular Yamanote Line and the subway stations that serve the central city, nodes of office and retail development have sprung up, so that the CBD is encircled by a series of secondary (but still very large) business districts, each at a distance of between 3 and 5 kilometers (--- miles) from the CBD. Among the more important are Shinjuku, Shibuya, Ikebukuro,

³ Cybriwsky, R. Tokyo. New York: Wiley, 1998, pp. 35-37.

Shinagawa, and Ueno. Many commuters cycle from their neighborhoods to a suburban train station (Figure 9.34), and change at one of these secondary centers to catch a subway to work. At the end of the day, they will likely break their return journey at one of these secondary centers to shop in one of the lavish department stores, to eat, or to relax in a bar. All of these centers are vibrant with people and blazing with neon long into the night.

In contrast, the suburbs, though the housing is tightly packed, are relatively quiet. The suburbs are, however, very diverse in character. Some are effectively industrial towns in their own right; some are dominated by universities; some are dominated by company housing or public housing; and some are planned new towns with high-tech industries and research institutes. Some are exurban settlements, their residents taking advantage of the high-speed bullet trains that allow them to purchase larger homes amid paddy fields, orchards, or tea plantations, with mountainous backdrops. Two things are particularly striking about all of these suburbs in comparison to the suburbs of North American metropolises: first, the small size and high density of people's homes; second, the relative lack of spatial segregation along lines of income or class. Even at the scale of individual streets, housing is often very mixed, with very modest homes adjacent to those of more affluent families. In part, this is the result of the absence of the kind of land-use planning and zoning regulations that are common in North American cities. More important though, is a broader cultural difference: the refined understatement and strong sense of collective identity that have traditionally been valued within Japanese culture have not led people to ostentatious residential segregation.

Taiwan

Taiwan's growth as a core region within East Asia is a result of a special combination of factors. When the Communist revolution created the People's Republic of China in mainland China, the Nationalist government that established itself in Taiwan (then called Formosa) as the Republic of China took responsibility for orchestrating economic growth from the very beginning. Land reform was an important first step, along with the imposition of strict currency controls, the creation of government corporations in key industries, and strong trade barriers to protect domestic industries from foreign competition. An authoritarian regime was imposed on domestic society in order to suppress opposition to government policies. Economic aid from the United States, provided because of Cold War geopolitics, was also important in priming Taiwan's economy. By the early 1960s, Taiwan's political stability and cheap labor force provided a very attractive environment for export processing industries. Taiwan lost its full international diplomatic status since 1972, when U.S. President Richard Nixon's rapprochement with the People's Republic led to its entrance into the United Nations. In 1987, Taiwan's government lifted martial law, began a phase of political liberalization,

and relaxed its rules about contact with mainland China. Meanwhile, mainland China still claims Taiwan as a province of the People's Republic, and has offered to set up a Special Administrative Region for Taiwan, with the sort of economic and democratic privileges that it has given Hong Kong.

Taiwan's geopolitical problems, however, have not prevented it from achieving great economic success. With a land area of only 36,000 square kilometers (14,000 square miles), only 25 percent of which is cultivable, and a population of only 23 million, Taiwan would be the second smallest of China's provinces and seventh from the bottom in population. Yet Taiwan's per capita income in 1999, \$11,000, was 20 times that of mainland China. In 2000, Taiwan was the world's 12th largest exporter, with a total export trade of \$100 billion. Taiwan's economic growth rate over the past three decades has been phenomenal, averaging more than 8 percent per year. Sometimes referred to as "Silicon Island," Taiwan has some 1.2 million small and medium-size enterprises. Most make components, or entire products, according to specifications set by other, often well-known international firms, whose brand names go on the final product. Because Taiwan's firms tend to be small, they have been able to be flexible in responding to changes in technology. They have also been able to move quickly to take advantage of China's "open door" policy. Between 1990 and 2000, Taiwanese business people invested over \$100 billion abroad, the greater share of it in mainland China. In South China and in Fujian province, across the Taiwan Strait from Taiwan, Taiwanese enterprises operate what amounts to a parallel economy.

Taiwan's economic success as one of the newly-industrialized "Asian Tigers" is not without growing pains. In Taipei (population 2.89 million in 2000) and other cities, Taiwan's breathtakingly fast modernization has brought heavy pollution, acute housing shortages, and rampant corruption. The rapid acquisition of automobiles, scooters, and air conditioners has made the environment unbearable and transportation a nightmare. Growth has been so rapid that the government has been unable to solve the problems of water supply and waste disposal, and "garbage wars" over the issue of sanitary landfill placement have occasionally led to huge quantities of uncollected garbage. Within Taipei (see *Sense of Place: Taipei*), the capital and the industrial and commercial heart of Taiwan, these problems have been intensified by an influx of young people from other parts of the island, drawn by the educational and economic opportunities, and by the exciting sense of rapid change.

Sense-of-Place Feature: Taipei

South Korea

Like Taiwan, South Korea (**Figure 9.35**) has become one of the newly-industrialized "Asian Tigers" through a combination of an authoritarian

regime that orchestrated economic development through land reform, the protection of domestic industry, and the creation of state enterprises; massive inputs of foreign aid (again because of the country's geopolitical importance); and the presence of a disciplined and well-educated but low-wage workforce.

Figure 9.35: map of South Korea

As in Taiwan, South Korea has moved through successive stages toward an increasingly balanced and liberalized economy. The initial emphasis was on import substitution, developing domestic industries, with government protection, to produce goods for the domestic market. The second stage, between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, saw the growth of export-oriented, labor-intensive manufacturing. The South Korean government facilitated the development of these export industries by providing incentives, loans, and tax breaks to firms, and by encouraging the growth of giant, interlocking industrial conglomerates called *chaebol*. The success of this strategy was reflected in annual growth rates in the overall economy of more than 10 percent. In the late 1970s, South Korean economic planners decided to diversify the economy with greater emphasis on heavy industry, chemicals, automobile assembly, and shipbuilding. To do this, the government worked with the *chaebol*, which were best placed not only to maximize internal and external economies of scale but also to acquire new technology from transnational partners. By the mid-1980s, about a dozen *chaebol* had come to dominate the economy, employing the majority of the workforce, controlling the banking system, and dominating government economic policy. Manufactured goods accounted for 91 percent of total exports and more than half were in the form of ships, steel, and automobiles. During the late 1980s and 1990s, the economy diversified still further, with the manufacture of semiconductors and electronics, and the emergence of telecommunications and information processing. Giant South Korean conglomerates like Samsung and Hyundai became household names around the world, and the economy once again grew at more than ten percent each year. South Korea was hit particularly hard, however, by the Asian financial crisis of 1998: the preceding boom had led South Korean banks to make loans to their parent companies for investments throughout Asia and, when the bubble burst, many of the investments had to be written off. South Korea's economy had to be propped up with loans and guarantees from the International Monetary Fund, which in turn has required the liberalization of the economy, including curbs on the power and influence of the *chaebol*.

In spite of the shock of the 1998 crisis, South Korea remains a core region within East Asia. With a total export trade of \$--- billion in 19XX South Korea is the world's Nth largest exporter. In terms of wealth, South Korea had a GDP of \$--- and a *per capita* income of \$----- in 19XX, ranking Nth and Nth respectively. Seoul (**Figure 9.36**) has become one of the world's

largest metropolitan areas (it was 11th-largest in 2000, with a population of 12.2 million) and is a fast-paced city with a broad economic base. Other important centers are Pusan (population 4.2 million in 2000), an international port and major industrial center specializing in automobile production, electronics, chemicals, iron and steel, and shipbuilding; Inch'on (2.8 million), an entrepôt for Seoul and a center of electronics and iron and steel manufacture; Taegu (2.6 million), a textile manufacturing center; Kwangju (1.7 million), and Taejon (1.4 million). As in Taiwan, the pace of economic growth and urbanization has brought heavy pollution, acute housing shortages, and rampant corruption. Socio-economic inequality is also a characteristic feature of South Korea, both within the cities and between the country's sub-regions. The government has attempted to address the latter through spatial planning policies that have directed industrial growth away from Seoul, toward provincial towns and cities. Currently, the major priorities of domestic policy are aimed at keeping up with the need for basic infrastructure improvements in order to maintain economic efficiency, and keeping up with educational spending in order to be able to further develop a high-tech sector. Government spending on social and environmental issues remains minimal, however, so that there is little immediate prospect of a reduction in social inequalities or of improvements in the quality of life for the many millions who live in cramped housing and degraded environments.

Figure 9.36: photos of Seoul

DISTINCTIVE REGIONS AND LANDSCAPES

For many years now, blah blah blah

—'Inner China' plus the Korean peninsula, the Japanese archipelago, and Taiwan—can be divided broadly into the landscapes of the sub-humid regions to the north of the Qinling and Daba ranges and those of the humid and subtropical regions to the south

Geographer Yi-Fu Tuan—biggest factor = human vs unmodified

In comparison with other world regions, the distinctive regions and landscapes of Russia and Central Asia (though not the Transcaucasus) are vast and seemingly endless. Distinctive mid-sized regions comparable to, say, Alpine Europe or the American Midwest, have not emerged, while landscapes run virtually unchanged over thousands of kilometers across the two large and geologically stable shields of highly resistant crystalline rocks that provide platforms for extensive plains of sedimentary material and glacial debris. Nevertheless, there are several broad regions with distinctive natural and cultural landscapes. In the far north there are the zones of tundra and taiga. Farther south, the steppes have always been identified as a distinguishing feature of Russian geography, while in

Central Asia it is the deserts that frame the regional identity of the area and provide the settings for distinctive natural and cultural landscapes. Beyond Europe's core regions, major metropolitan areas, and specialized industrial districts, a mosaic of different landscapes has developed around the broad physiographic regions described at the beginning of this chapter. In detail, these landscapes are a product of centuries of human adaptation to climate, soils, altitude, aspect, and to changing economic and political circumstances. Farming practices, field patterns, settlement types, vernacular architecture, and ways of life have all become attuned to the opportunities and constraints of regional physical environments, with the result that distinctive regional landscapes have been produced.

The landscapes of mountain regions are the most natural. These are essentially physiographic sub-regions, with just a scattering of isolated settlement. The farmers in these mountain sub-regions depend on pastoralism, eked out with a little arable produce from valley floors. In the less mountainous parts of Scandinavia, as in much of Baltic Europe, with their short growing season and cold, acid soils, agriculture supports only a low density of settlement. Landscapes reflect a mixed farming regime of oats, rye, potatoes, and flax, with hay for cattle.

The more humid and temperate regions of 'Atlantic' Europe (Belgium, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) are dominated by dairy farming on meadowland, sheep farming on exposed uplands, and arable farming (mainly wheat, oats, potatoes, and barley) on drier lowland areas. Settlement density tends to vary according to the productivity of the land, and the traditional settlement form is mostly the *Haufendorf*, or nucleated village (Figure 3.35). The exceptions are those areas where the initial colonization was by Celtic peoples and environmental conditions support only low population densities (much of Brittany, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, for example). In these areas, dispersed settlement, in the form of hamlets and scattered farms, is characteristic.

Fig. 3.35: plan of *haufendorf*

In contrast, the traditional form of settlement throughout most of Mediterranean Europe is the very large nucleated village. This form of settlement is partly a product of traditional forms of land holding, and partly a product of past needs for people to cluster together for reasons of defense. The dry, warm climate of the Mediterranean is reflected in its landscapes, with agricultural regimes based on pastoralism, extensive arable farming (mainly hard wheat), and tree crops (especially olives).

It should be stressed that, within these broad divisions, marked variations exist. The mosaic of regions and landscapes within Europe is both rich and detailed. Physical differences are encountered over quite short

distances, and there are numerous specialized farming regions where agricultural conditions have influenced local ways of life to produce distinctive landscapes. Within these landscapes are towns and cities of regional importance whose characteristics owe a great deal to the life and traditions of their region. The following sections describe the attributes of Europe's most distinctive regions, together with representative examples of major settlements.

Mongolia

Blah blah blah

Xinjiang

Blah blah blah

Sense-of-Place Feature

Xizang

Blah blah blah

Guangxi

Blah blah blah

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Blah blah blah

KEY TERMS

Pacific Rim (p. 000)

ring of fire (p.000)

EXERCISES

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