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Nationalism

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Introduction

Nationalism is one of the most powerful forces in the modern world, yet its study has until recently been relatively neglected. As an ideology and movement, nationalism exerted a strong influence in the American and French Revolutions, yet it did not become the subject of historical enquiry until the middle of the nineteenth century, nor of social scientific analysis until the early twentieth century. Sustained investigation of nationalism had to wait until after the First World War, and it is really only since the 1960s, after the spate of anti-colonial and ethnic nationalisms, that the subject has begun to be thoroughly investigated by scholars from several disciplines.

There are several reasons for this state of affairs. To begin with, the field of nationalist phenomena, which includes the growth of nations and the national state, as well as ethnic identity and community, is vast and ramified. It spills over into any number of cognate subjects: race and racism, fascism, language development, political religion, communalism, ethnic conflict, international law, protectionism, minorities, gender, immigration, genocide. The forms that nationalism takes have been kaleidoscopic: religious, conservative, liberal, fascist, communist, cultural, political, protectionist, integrationist, separatist, irredentist, diaspora, pan, etc. The fluidity and variety of national sentiments, national aspirations, and national cultural values create another obstacle to systematic research, as do the many differences in national identities.

Then there is the problem of interdisciplinarity. The study of nations and nationalism cannot be confined to a single disciplinary perspective. Historians long dominated the field, but latterly they have been joined by anthropologists, political scientists, sociologists, social psychologists, students of linguistics, international relations scholars, geographers, philosophers, regional economists, international lawyers, and many others. The sheer variety of components of national identities and of possible causal factors has made it impossible for scholars of any one discipline to study more than a few aspects and examples of the subject.

Add to this the fact that other fields of enquiry, and other concepts and phenomena, long held the attention of most scholars—class, capitalism, the market, industrialization, the state, Marxism, parties, kinship, tribes, and communications—and we begin to grasp why the systematic study of nations and nationalism has only recently begun to develop.

Central Concepts

Perhaps the central difficulty in the study of nations and nationalism has been

the problem of finding adequate and agreed definitions of the key concepts, nation and nationalism.

The concept of the *nation* has, in fact, been contested on two fronts: in terms of rival scholarly definitions, and as a form of identity that competes with other kinds of collective identity. While it is recognized that the concept of the nation must be differentiated from other concepts of collective identity like class, region, gender, race, and religious community, there is little agreement about the role of ethnic, as opposed to political, components of the nation; or about the balance between 'subjective' elements like will and memory, and more 'objective' elements like territory and language; or about the nature and role of ethnicity in national identity. What is often conceded is the power, even primacy, of national loyalties and identities over those of even class, gender, and race. Perhaps only religious attachments have rivalled national loyalties in their scope and fervour. At the same time, national attachments can inter-mingle with, even slide into, other forms of collective identity, or alternate with them in terms of power and salience (Rustow 1967; Connor 1978).*

The situation is only a little improved when we turn to the other major concept, that of *nationalism*. Once again, there are important differences in ways of defining the concept, some equating it with 'national sentiment', others with nationalist ideology and language, others again with nationalist movements. There is also a difference between those who stress the cultural rather than the political aspects of nationalism. Here it seems that a synthesis is possible, in that the ideology and movement incorporate political and cultural dimensions (Hutchinson 1987: ch. 1; Smith 1971: ch. 7). That, at any rate, is how the founding fathers—Rousseau, Herder, Fichte, Korais, and Mazzini—saw the ideological movement of nationalism. In their view, and that of most subsequent nationalists, the movement brought together the vital aspirations of the modern world: for autonomy and self-government, for unity and autarchy, and for authentic identity (Kemilainen 1964).

Nationalism was, first of all, a doctrine of popular freedom and sovereignty. The people must be liberated—that is, free from any external constraint; they must determine their own destiny and be masters in their own house; they must control their own resources; they must obey only their own 'inner' voice. But that entailed fraternity. The people must be united; they must dissolve all internal divisions; they must be gathered together in a single historic territory, a homeland; and they must have legal equality and share a single public culture. But which culture and what territory? Only a homeland that was 'theirs' by historic right, the land of their forebears; only a culture that was 'theirs' as a heritage, passed down the generations, and therefore an expression of their authentic identity.

* Details of works extracted in this volume, but not included in the Select Bibliography, are to be found as sources at the end of the relevant extract.

Autonomy, unity, identity: these three themes and ideals have been pursued by nationalists everywhere since Rousseau, Herder, Fichte, Korais, and Mazzini popularized them in Western and Central Europe. They have also underpinned the more specific goals of nationalist movements, most of which have been founded and inspired by intellectuals. In most of these movements it has been possible to discern a pattern of mobilization, which has been described by Miroslav Hroch in the Eastern European case. Starting with an élite of intellectuals, the movement has subsequently fanned out to include the professional classes, who have often acted as political agitators, and finally has been broadened to other sectors of society—the masses of clerks, artisans, workers, and even peasants. Of course, not all movements have reached this final phase. Sometimes the middle sectors have been wary of involving the lower strata. Hence we cannot say, with Tom Nairn, that nationalism is always an inter-class and populist movement, though it usually seeks to present itself that way (Nairn 1977: ch. 2; Hroch 1985).

The Origins of Nationalism

Many historians would agree that, as an ideology and discourse, nationalism became prevalent in North America and Western Europe in the latter half of the eighteenth century, and shortly thereafter in Latin America. The dates that are often singled out as signalling the advent of nationalism include 1775 (the First Partition of Poland), 1776 (the American Declaration of Independence), 1789 and 1792 (the commencement and second phase of the French Revolution), and 1807 (Fichte's *Addresses to the German Nation*). This early ideological phase was permeated by neo-classicism, the conscious return in letters, politics, and the arts to classical antiquity and, above all, to the patriotism and solidarity of Sparta, Athens, and republican Rome, the models and exemplars of the public, and often heroic, virtues. It was quickly succeeded by more varied currents, generally subsumed under the rubric of romanticism, which emphasized the role of intellectuals and artists, humanity's yearning for the infinite, the centrality of human emotion and self-expression, the need to find one's own identity through a return to authentic experience, the importance of discovering one's roots and true nature and, in the case of national communities, of rediscovering their pristine origins and golden ages. In fact, we can see in neo-classicism an early, pre-romantic phase of these concerns: both Rousseau and Herder mingled their admiration for classical virtue with a love of nature and the simple life of authentic experience and sentiment (Kedourie 1960).

Nationalism, as an ideological movement, did not emerge without antecedents. For some, millennial Christianity prepared the way, for others it was the printing press and especially newspapers. It is also possible to trace some of the key nationalist motifs to the classical humanism of some Northern

Poland by the sixteenth century, broke the unity of Christendom even before the Wars of Religion and the Counter-Reformation, and forged an interstate system based on a complex web of alliances and balances of power. Commercial competition and wars between these states, as well as the later absolutism of Prussia, Austria, and Russia, increased the links between urban capitalism and the monarchies and forced rulers to mobilize and standardize their populations in terms of religion, education, and even language. Loyalty to the ruler was increasingly accompanied by patriotism, a sense of identification with a particular state and its territory and people. Though eighteenth-century wars continued to be fought largely by professionals, the younger generations were fired as much by love of country and people as by any sense of obedience to rulers (Tilly 1975; Introduction; Tivey 1980).

Varieties of Nationalism

It was in and during the American and French Revolutions that these various social, political, and intellectual developments found powerful and explosive expression in radical politics. The causes of the revolutionary movements in America and Europe were many and varied, but their emotional and intellectual content were increasingly nationalist, and their consequences led to a dramatic transformation of absolutism into the mass national state. After 1792 the French Revolution, with its tricolour, 'Marseillaise', assemblies, oaths, processions, fêtes, and the like, began exporting its patriotic ideals all over Europe, and in this respect Napoleon's conquests, and the strong reactions they provoked in England, Spain, Germany, Poland, and Russia, intensified and diffused the civic ideas of national autonomy, unity, and identity across Europe and throughout Latin America (Kohn 1967).

The period of royalist reaction from 1815 to 1848 brought into sharper focus the ethnic character of several of these nationalisms, together with what Hans Kohn has called the organic 'eastern' forms of nationalism, in contrast to the civic and rational 'western' versions current in France, England, and the United States—though not in Ireland. Perhaps the most obvious case was that of Greece, though it was also a complex one, being at once a 'rational' and westernizing movement of merchants and intelligentsia for a revived Hellas along the lines of ancient Athens, and a yearning for an ethno-religious revival of the Orthodox Byzantine empire in Constantinople among the clergy and peasant communities. In Poland, too, nationalism in the late eighteenth century had begun as an aristocratic aspiration for the return of lands lost in the partitions, to be followed by a romantic movement of intellectuals for the myth of redemption of a Catholic Poland. This vein was also mined by the Slavophile intellectuals in Russia, who harked back to pre-Petrine Muscovy and its Orthodox monastic ways, at a time when westernization and incipient capitalism had severed Russia from its feudal past. And in India, too, the same

Italian cities, notably fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century Florence, from Bruno Latini to Machiavelli. Certainly, a strong and consciously classical emphasis on civic virtue and solidarity became an important component of later civic nationalism, duly transposed to larger territories and populations. This in turn drew on ancient Greek and Roman models, notably the patriotism of the *polis* and its ideological contrast between Greek liberties and barbarian servitude. Perhaps more important was the legacy derived from ancient Israel by the Puritans after the Reformation. The parallel they drew between the election and persecution of the children of Israel and their own lot, their Old Testament interpretation of their sufferings at the hands of hostile state authorities, gave a powerful impetus to the growth of national sentiment among the middle strata in England and Holland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Through these theological channels, there flowed into modern nationalism the doctrine of ethnic election which, originating perhaps with the ancient Israelites, became widely diffused in the Middle East, Europe, and East Africa, though analogues can be found as far afield as Japan (Greenfeld 1992: ch. 2).

Social and political developments during this period were increasingly conducive to the rise of nations, national states, and nationalism. For one thing, a classically educated intelligentsia was, as McNeill points out, steeped in the peculiar virtues of civic patriotism. The eighteenth century also witnessed the new phenomenon of widespread alienation of the intellectuals from society and politics; in Germany Schiller was only the most eloquent to complain of the artificiality of society and the machine-like nature of bureaucratic politics. Such disenchantment was the product of both urban life and absolutism. The growth of free towns as centres of capitalism and the rapid expansion of population in Europe was matched by the failure of its élites to make use of the talents of the more educated sons who languished in dull provincial towns, a life of waste so vividly conveyed for nineteenth-century Russia by Turgenev and Chekhov. At the same time, urban wealth encouraged new generations to seek secular education, engage in various branches of scientific and humanistic learning, and enter the expanding professions. Yet, because the numbers of the educated were small enough to form reading publics who could communicate and associate with each other through salons, coffee-houses, and clubs, the possibility of concerted political action by radically minded circles of the intelligentsia gave these new ideas about the nation and autonomy a social base that could translate them into political movements (Barnard 1969; Anderson 1983: ch. 5; McNeill 1986: ch. 2).

Politically, too, the failure to reunite Europe on the model of the Roman empire, and the rise of competing absolutist states, meant that the territorial and economic basis for national states had been well prepared as far back as the later fifteenth century, if not earlier. The disentangling of 'England' from 'France' at the end of the Hundred Years War (1337–1453), and the rise of separate ethnically based states in Spain, Switzerland, Holland, Sweden, and

note of romantic yearning for a return to an idealized ethnic and religious past which was being eroded by westernization and capitalism was to be found in late nineteenth-century intellectuals like Tilak and Aurobindo and in movements like the Arya Samaj (Kohn 1960; Taylor and Yapp 1979; Kitro-milides 1989).

All these were movements of intelligentsia and opposition groups calling for the vernacular mobilization of 'the people' against a variety of evils: autocracy, bureaucracy, capitalism, and western ways. But such was the chameleon-like character of nationalism that it could be appropriated by the autocrats, bureaucrats, and capitalists. The classic instances are Germany and Japan. In Germany the 1848 revolutions of the intellectuals were divided and crushed; the Prussian chancellor, Bismarck, swiftly appropriated and tamed German linguistic nationalism in the service of a Prussian-led *Kleindeutschland* and a Lutheran Prussian monarch. Popular German nationalism accordingly migrated into Pan-German expansionism and the *volkisch* fantasies of an academic proletariat who dreamed of German conquest and agricultural settlement in the East, in the footsteps of Teutonic Knights and medieval German merchants. It was from these fringe groups of intelligentsia that the Nazi movement developed, even if its racism was to leave far behind the original linguistic bases of German romantic nationalism (Mosse 1964; Breuilly 1982).

In Japan the Meiji Restoration of 1868 put a swift end to the declining Tokugawa era and instituted a modern bureaucratic state under the aegis of the restored emperor. The reformers quickly realized the importance of mass public education as the key to a civic nationalism on the French model, and, using the imperial authority, proceeded to inculcate the virtues of a specifically Japanese culture mixed with western arts and technology. The Japanese nationalist model proved highly successful, both in terms of modernizing Japanese society and of establishing a strong nation-state, unlike the Ottoman attempt at reform in the mid-nineteenth-century Tanzimat period, which foundered on the multi-ethnic character and the economic and military weakness of the empire. In the West, too, state-based nationalism spilled over easily into imperialism and colonialism; French, British, Dutch, and Portuguese annexations during the nineteenth century were as much the products of nationalist interstate competition being transposed across the seas as of any desire to exploit markets and export capital (Lewis 1968; Yoshino 1992).

State-based nationalisms were not confined to the 'official' ideologies of empire. They were also characteristic of the twentieth-century 'anti-colonial' movements that sought to oust imperial rulers and set up new states in the ex-colonial territories. Thus Arab nationalisms in the Middle East and North Africa accepted the imperialist territorial units and applied western civic concepts of the nation (*watani*) to these often artificial divisions. At the same time, they drew on romantic popular notions of ethno-religious ties stemming from shared myths of Arab origin and the Islamic golden age of the Caliphates, even

though several early Arab nationalists were Christian and many Arab states could boast separate pre-modern histories and traditions. Pan-Arabism also drew on ethnic, religious, and political antagonism to Zionist claims in Palestine; the latter similarly combined a westernized (even socialist) civic and territorial anti-colonialism with a pan-Jewish ethno-religious nationalism of the diaspora harking back to the ancient kingdoms of Israel and subsuming wide differences among Jewish communities, particularly after the immense demographic losses of the Holocaust (Haim 1962).

In India and Africa similar fusions and tensions could be found: on the one hand, a civic, territorial, anti-colonial nationalism, and, on the other hand, various ethnic and pan cultural movements, among which Hindu nationalism and pan-Africanism have exerted the most powerful influence. Pan-Africanism, indeed, combined a search for a specifically African history with elements of racial consciousness and pride, in the face of western cultural devaluation and political subjection; from Blyden to Senghor and Nkrumah, the 'natural' spiritual and social heritage of Black Africans has been counterposed to a materialist, atomist West (Kérouie 1971: Introduction; Geiss 1974).

For several historians and political scientists, the injection of racism brought nationalism to its mid-twentieth-century apogee. They have tended to see in fascism and especially in Nazism the logical culmination of nationalist ideas and practices; common to both were a belief in heroic struggle, the idea of the Volk, racial imperialism and agrarian settlement, the appeal to collective will and brutal instincts, and obedience to charismatic leaders. These are the nationalisms of late development, and they mark the evolution of the inner 'subjective' tendencies inherent in nationalism as it interacts with a modern political economy. For other scholars, fascism and Nazism were products of a specific phase of modern European history; they were essentially totalitarian movements, tied to a particular period of industrialization and democratization. Though they had nationalist harbingers and historical links with specific nationalisms, fascist movements and Nazism owed more to social Darwinian ideas of racial struggle and eugenics and to doctrines of state power and authoritarian militarism, which flourished especially among the lower middle classes in the wake of the Great War and the failures of orthodox nationalisms and parliamentary democracy after 1918 (Smith 1979; Hobsbawm 1990).

On a more general level, the early twentieth century confirmed for many the intimate connection between nationalism and war. This was already apparent in September 1792: the battle of Valmy, fought for the first time by a mass citizen army of conscripts, the *levée en masse*, was seen as a war in defence of *la patrie en danger*. Since that time, many nationalists have seen in heroic struggle both a test of collective fitness and the true route to independence from oppression. This was given a further European dimension in the resistance to Napoleon, by philhellenes in the Greek War of Independence (1821–30), by the Italian Risorgimento, and by the Hungarian uprising of 1849.

veritable flood of scholarly and political explanations (Hechter 1975; Esman 1977; Smith 1981).

Recent events in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have only deepened this unease, raising once again the spectre of a Europe wracked by more than localized ethnic conflicts. The Bolshevik strategy to supersede nationalism through the merging of nations in a socialist society unravelled with astonishing rapidity once the central control of the party and its security organs was loosened. The break-up of Yugoslavia and the Soviet empire may not have been caused by ethnic nationalisms, but ethnically defined nations have certainly become their heirs, and the conflict in Bosnia and the anxious relations with significant Russian and other minorities in several of the former Soviet republics are likely to add to international destabilization. The 'dark side' of nationalism, too, has been revealed in the rapid rise of ultra-nationalism, neo-Nazism, and anti-Semitism among a vociferous minority in both Western and Eastern European states. This has led to questions about the civic-political or ethnic-linguistic character of nationalism, and the social conditions which give rise to these different types (Bremmer and Taras 1993).

At the same time, in a multipolar world following the end of the Cold War, the transformations, instability, and populist nationalism within Russia, the long-standing conflicts in the Middle East, the renewed ethno-religious violence in the Indian subcontinent, the risings of indigenous peoples, from the Aborigines and Mohawks to the Chiapas Zapatistas, and the deep antagonisms in East and Southern Africa, have placed 'the national question' once again firmly at the centre of world affairs. Issues of ethnic secession and irredentism, of sovereignty, identity, and self-determination, have again become the cockpit for international suspicions and rivalries, and the greatest burden and brake on international co-operation. This has led to sustained discussion about the causes, and conditions of success, of ethnic secession in a world that has seen the creation of at least fifteen new states since 1990. Though other issues vie for world attention—poverty, crime, disease, gender, ecological problems—ethnic conflicts and nationalisms remain the most ubiquitous, explosive, and intractable problems at the end of the twentieth century, and the greatest challenge to the framing of an international order based on justice and parity (Horowitz 1985; Mayall 1990).

Can we realistically forecast any diminution, let alone supersession, of nationalism? A number of scholars have discerned signs that we are moving into a 'post-national' era, dominated by the globalizing forces of an international division of labour, transnational companies, great power blocs, an ideology of mass consumerism, and the growth of vast networks of communications. In the face of these massive 'movements of history', ethnic conflicts and nationalism are becoming a secondary concern and increasingly irrelevant. They may trouble the surface of world developments for a time, but they will soon disappear as people come to appreciate the massive problems of

In Latin America the Liberator Bolivar and San Martín also exemplified the generous spirit of freedom through military revolt from Spain, while the 'primary resistance' of Africans in the Gold Coast, Southern Africa, and the Sudan furnished the myths of national awakening for later generations, including later anti-colonial guerrilla wars in Algeria, Kenya, and Angola (Humphreys and Lynch 1965; Rotberg and Mazrui 1970; Howard 1976).

The links between war and nationalism were amply underlined by the central part played by nationalism in the two world wars. Historians still differ over the extent to which Balkan nationalism was a major causal factor in the Great War, but it clearly dominated the aftermath of Germany's defeat, especially as a result of the role assigned to national self-determination in President Wilson's Fourteen Points of 1918. Even if Wilson's vision was severely curtailed, it did provide a standard for many of the successor states and their ethnic minorities in the interwar period, as well as for the ill-fated League of Nations. The Second World War also served to underline the centrality of nationalism. This was apparent in the European and non-European resistance movements against German and Japanese attempts to create empires; and in Bolshevik Russia Stalin appealed to neo-Slavophile Russian nationalism in the Great Patriotic War. The United Nations, paradoxically created in the aftermath of the co-operation of the many national resistance movements, has also experienced major problems over the application of the principle of national self-determination enshrined in its charter to non-colonial, stateless, and ethnically defined units which are raising the banner of national independence (Wiberg in Lewis 1982).

The Revival of Nationalism

The horrors of Nazism and the world wars were thought to have rendered ethnic ties and national ideals obsolete, largely because of their associations with discredited racist ideas. To many it came as something of a surprise, therefore, that in the wake of the spate of anti-colonial movements in Africa and Asia during the 1940s and 1950s, and of the Black movement in America, the affluent, stable, democratic western states should experience something of an 'ethnic revival'. Perhaps this revival was really only a survival, making its reappearance in the revolutionary 1960s; perhaps, too, it owed much to the examples of liberation movements inspired by Mao, Fanon, and Che Guevara and to the close links forged by 'national communism' between the two great revolutionary ideologies in Yugoslavia, China, Vietnam, Kampuchea, the Yemen, Somalia, and Angola. In either case, the appearance of movements demanding ethnic autonomy (sometimes outright independence) in Quebec, Scotland, Wales, Flanders, Brittany, Corsica, Euzkadi, Catalonia, and other 'ethno-regions' in old-established western states undermined many common assumptions about modernization and democracy and unleashed a

disciplines, and have therefore had to exclude many important problems, areas, and issues that would have been included in a larger volume (Rex and Mason 1986; Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989).

In what follows, we have sought to present the key texts in the study of nations and nationalism. Wherever possible, we have tried to balance different viewpoints. Inevitably, but with regret, space has compelled us to compress many of the selected texts. Given the variety and conflict which abound in the field, particular emphasis has been laid on the rival theoretical approaches to ethnicity and nationalism, and the problems of definition. These debates are briefly described, and contextualized, in the introductions to these sections. The later sections deal in more detail with some of the empirical issues outlined above, including the rise of nations in Europe, nationalism and nation-building in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, relations between nationalism and the international community, and the transcendence of nations and nationalisms. We have tried to avoid the temptation to be 'radical' and fashionable, since one decade's fashions are the next's *bêtes noires*. Instead, we have aimed for a broad selection of the most influential and profound studies of the complex issues in this field. In this way, we hope to provide students embarking on courses in this field, as well as more advanced students, with an informed, critical, and balanced introduction to the theoretical and empirical problems in the study of nations and nationalism. An introduction is no substitute for deeper immersion in the texts themselves and in the problems they raise. But we hope that this introduction will stimulate students to undertake this exploration of a field which is both fundamental to our grasp of modern society and politics and richly rewarding for a more profound understanding of humanity.

planetary survival. Against these forecasts must be set the current proliferation and intensity of ethnic conflicts, and the continuing dangers they pose for regional and global peace and security. There is also the continuing impact of nationalist ideals, which can be, and are being, applied to their own situations by large numbers of politically unrecognized or unsatisfied *ethnies* (ethnic communities), using the new channels of mass communications; and the persistent interstate rivalries, often bolstered by gross economic inequalities, which can so easily use (and be used by) mass nationalist legitimizations (Richmond 1984; Hobsbawm 1990: ch. 6).

All these problems are to be found in the debates on ethnic immigration into western states and on the unification of Europe. The vast population movements this century which have strained many economies have also rendered the borders of western states porous and are helping to redefine their sense of national identity; how far the influx of *Gastarbeiter*, asylum-seekers, and immigrants has furthered an everyday practical process of national reconstruction which is negating the more traditional, national, 'pedagogical' narratives of the nation in the old metropolitan centres, as some cultural critics suggest, is a question for further investigation. As for Europe, rapid economic integration has undoubtedly produced strong political and institutional drives for greater continental centralization; but these have recently been resisted by significant sections of the population in some European states, and the trend towards European Union enlargement, while still popular in Eastern Europe, has occasioned increasing doubts in Scandinavia. On the cultural level, while there are some shared European traditions, and while there is evidence of a growing élitist identification with 'Europe', the degree to which a European identity has emerged at the cost of national identities or commands a popular following in most European states remains largely uncharted, as have the meanings which different populations attribute to any such larger identity. Once again, placing the unification of Europe on the political agenda has only served to heighten the salience of *national* identity as a popular political issue (McNeill 1986; Bhabha 1990: ch. 16; Smith 1991: ch. 7).

These are only some of the main empirical issues raised by a study of nations and nationalisms. There are, of course, many others in a rapidly expanding field. There has not been space to include them all. Undoubtedly, more could have been said about issues of ethnicity and gender, about race relations, about post-modernist discourses of the nation, about post-colonialism and immigration, as well as about the whole field of ethnic conflict regulation and various forms of power-sharing between élites of ethnic communities in a polyethnic state. These are vital and pressing issues, but they are well treated elsewhere, and could easily divert attention from the central debates on nations and nationalism. Instead, we have concentrated on what we think are the main lines of general and theoretical debate, as they have developed over several

Thus, a nation is not a casual or ephemeral conglomeration, but a stable community of people.

But not every stable community constitutes a nation. Austria and Russia are also stable communities, but nobody calls them nations. What distinguishes a national community from a state community? The fact, among others, that a national community is inconceivable without a common language, while a state need not have a common language. The Czech nation in Austria and the Polish in Russia would be impossible if each did not have a common language, whereas the integrity of Russia and Austria is not affected by the fact that there are a number of different languages within their borders. We are referring, of course, to the spoken languages of the people and not to the official governmental languages.

Thus, a *common language* is one of the characteristic features of a nation.

This, of course, does not mean that different nations always and everywhere speak different languages, or that all who speak one language necessarily constitute one nation. A *common language* for every nation, but not necessarily different languages for different nations! There is no nation which at one and the same time speaks several languages, but this does not mean that there cannot be two nations speaking the same language! Englishmen and Americans speak one language, but they do not constitute one nation. The same is true of the Norwegians and the Danes, the English and the Irish.

But why, for instance, do the English and the Americans not constitute one nation in spite of their common language?

Firstly, because they do not live together, but inhabit different territories. A nation is formed only as a result of lengthy and systematic intercourse, as a result of people living together generation after generation. But people cannot live together for lengthy periods unless they have a common territory. Englishmen and Americans originally inhabited the same territory, England, and constituted one nation. Later, one section of the English emigrated from England to a new territory, America, and there, in the new territory, in the course of time, came to form the new American nation. Difference of territory led to the formation of different nations.

Thus, a *common territory* is one of the characteristic features of a nation.

But this is not all. Common territory does not by itself create a nation. This requires, in addition, an internal economic bond to weld the various parts of the nation into a single whole. There is no such bond between England and America, and so they constitute two different nations. But the Americans themselves would not deserve to be called a nation were not the different parts of America bound together into an economic whole, as a result of division of labour between them, the development of means of communication, and so forth.

Take the Georgians, for instance. The Georgians before the Reform inhabited a common territory and spoke one language. Nevertheless, they did not, strictly speaking, constitute one nation, for, being split up into a number

JOSEPH STALIN

2 The Nation

What is a nation?

A nation is primarily a community, a definite community of people.

This community is not racial, nor is it tribal. The modern Italian nation was formed from Romans, Teutons, Etruscans, Greeks, Arabs, and so forth. The French nation was formed from Gauls, Romans, Britons, Teutons, and so on. The same must be said of the British, the Germans and others, who were formed into nations from people of diverse races and tribes.

Thus, a nation is not a racial or tribal, but a historically constituted community of people.

On the other hand, it is unquestionable that the great empires of Cyrus and Alexander could not be called nations, although they came to be constituted historically and were formed out of different tribes and races. They were not nations, but casual and loosely-connected conglomerations of groups, which fell apart or joined together according to the victories or defeats of this or that conqueror.

of disconnected principalities, they could not share a common economic life; for centuries they waged war against each other and pillaged each other, each inciting the Persians and Turks against the other. The ephemeral and casual union of the principalities which some successful king sometimes managed to bring about embraced at best a superficial administrative sphere, and rapidly disintegrated owing to the caprices of the princes and the indifference of the peasants. Nor could it be otherwise in economically disunited Georgia. . . . Georgia came on the scene as a nation only in the latter half of the nineteenth century, when the fall of serfdom and the growth of the economic life of the country, the development of means of communication and the rise of capitalism, introduced division of labour between the various districts of Georgia, completely shattered the economic isolation of the principalities and bound them together into a single whole.

The same must be said of the other nations which have passed through the stage of feudalism and have developed capitalism.

Thus, a *common economic life, economic cohesion*, is one of the characteristic features of a nation.

But even this is not all. Apart from the foregoing, one must take into consideration the specific spiritual complexion of the people constituting a nation. Nations differ not only in their conditions of life, but also in spiritual complexion, which manifests itself in peculiarities of national culture. If England, America and Ireland, which speak one language, nevertheless constitute three distinct nations, it is in no small measure due to the peculiar psychological make-up which they developed from generation to generation as a result of dissimilar conditions of existence.

Of course, by itself, psychological make-up or, as it is otherwise called, 'national character', is something intangible for the observer, but in so far as it manifests itself in a distinctive culture common to the nation it is something tangible and cannot be ignored.

Needless to say, 'national character' is not a thing that is fixed once and for all, but is modified by changes in the conditions of life; but since it exists at every given moment, it leaves its impress on the physiognomy of the nation.

Thus, a *common psychological make-up*, which manifests itself in a common culture, is one of the characteristic features of a nation.

We have now exhausted the characteristic features of a nation.

A nation is a *historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.*

It goes without saying that a nation, like every historical phenomenon, is subject to the law of change, has its history, its beginning and end.

It must be emphasized that none of the above characteristics taken separately is sufficient to define a nation. More than that, it is sufficient for a single one of these characteristics to be lacking and the nation ceases to be a nation.

It is possible to conceive of people possessing a common 'national character' who, nevertheless, cannot be said to constitute a single nation if they are economically disunited, inhabit different territories, speak different languages, and so forth. Such, for instance, are the Russian, Galician, American, Georgian and Caucasian Highland Jews, who, in our opinion, do not constitute a single nation.

It is possible to conceive of people with a common territory and economic life who nevertheless would not constitute a single nation because they have no common language and no common 'national character.' Such, for instance, are the Germans and Letts in the Baltic region.

Finally, the Norwegians and the Danes speak one language, but they do not constitute a single nation owing to the absence of the other characteristics.

It is only when all these characteristics are present together that we have a nation.

['The Nation', in *Marxism and the National Question*, from *The Essential Stalin: Major Theoretical Writings 1902-1952*, ed. Bruce Franklin (Croom Helm: London, 1973), 57-61.]

The stultifying aura of conceptual ambiguity that surrounds the terms 'nation,' 'nationality,' and 'nationalism' has been extensively discussed and thoroughly deplored in almost every work that has been concerned to attack the relationship between communal and political loyalties.¹ But as the preferred remedy has been to adopt a theoretical eclecticism that, in its attempt to do justice to the multifaceted nature of the problems involved, tends to confuse political, psychological, cultural, and demographic factors, actual reduction of that ambiguity has not proceeded very far. Thus a recent symposium on the Middle East refers indiscriminately to the efforts of the Arab League to destroy existing nation-state boundaries, those of the Sudan Government to unify a somewhat arbitrary and accidentally demarcated sovereign state, and those of the Azerin Turks to separate from Iran and join the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan as 'nationalism.'² Operating with a similarly omnibus concept, Coleman³ sees Nigerians (or some of them) as displaying five different sorts of nationalism at once—'African,' 'Nigerian,' 'Regional,' 'Group,' and 'Cultural.' And Emerson⁴ defines a nation as a 'terminal community—the largest community that, when the chips are down, effectively commands men's loyalty, overriding the claims both of the lesser communities within it and those that cut across it or potentially enfold it within a still greater society . . .,' which simply shifts the ambiguity from the term 'nation' to the

is visible and matters and the will to be modern and dynamic thus tend to diverge, and much of the political process in the new states pivots around an heroic effort to keep them aligned.

A more exact phrasing of the nature of the problem involved here is that, considered as societies, the new states are abnormally susceptible to serious disaffection based on primordial attachments.⁷ By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the 'givens'—or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed 'givens'—of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves. One is bound to one's kinsman, one's neighbor, one's fellow believer, *ipso facto*; as the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself. The general strength of such primordial bonds, and the types of them that are important, differ from person to person, from society to society, and from time to time. But for virtually every person, in every society, at almost all times, some attachments seem to flow more from a sense of natural—some would say spiritual—affinity than from social interaction.

In modern societies the lifting of such ties to the level of political supremacy—though it has, of course, occurred and may again occur—has more and more come to be deplored as pathological. To an increasing degree national unity is maintained not by calls to blood and land but by a vague, intermittent, and routine allegiance to a civil state, supplemented to a greater or lesser extent by governmental use of police powers and ideological exhortation. The havoc wreaked, both upon themselves and others, by those modern (or semi-modern) states that did passionately seek to become primordial rather than civil political communities, as well as a growing realization of the practical advantages of a wider-ranging pattern of social integration than primordial ties can usually produce or even permit, have only strengthened the reluctance publicly to advance race, language, religion, and the like as bases for the definition of a terminal community. But in modernizing societies, where the tradition of civil politics is weak and where the technical requirements for an effective welfare government are poorly understood, primordial attachments tend, as Nehru discovered, to be repeatedly, in some cases almost continually, proposed and widely acclaimed as preferred bases for the demarcation of autonomous political units. [...]

It is this crystallization of a direct conflict between primordial and civil sentiments—this 'longing not to belong to any other group'—that gives to the

term 'loyalty' as well as seeming to leave such questions as whether India, Indonesia, or Nigeria are nations to the determination of some future, unspecified historical crisis.

Some of this conceptual haze is burned away, however, if it is realized that the peoples of the new states are simultaneously animated by two powerful, thoroughly interdependent, yet distinct and often actually opposed motives—the desire to be recognized as responsible agents whose wishes, acts, hopes, and opinions 'matter', and the desire to build an efficient, dynamic modern state. The one aim is to be noticed: it is a search for an identity, and a demand that that identity be publicly acknowledged as having import, a social assertion of the self as 'being somebody in the world.'⁸ The other aim is practical: it is a demand for progress, for a rising standard of living, more effective political order, greater social justice, and beyond that of 'playing a part in the larger arena of world politics,' of 'exercising influence among the nations.'⁹ The two motives are, again, most intimately related, because citizenship in a truly modern state has more and more become the most broadly negotiable claim to personal significance, and because what Mazzini called the demand to exist and have a name is to such a great extent fired by a humiliating sense of exclusion from the important centers of power in world society. But they are not the same thing. They stem from different sources and respond to different pressures. It is, in fact, the tension between them that is one of the central driving forces in the national evolution of the new states; as it is, at the same time, one of the greatest obstacles to such evolution.

This tension takes a peculiarly severe and chronic form in the new states, both because of the great extent to which their peoples' sense of self remains bound up in the gross actualities of blood, race, language, locality, religion, or tradition, and because of the steadily accelerating importance in this century of the sovereign state as a positive instrument for the realization of collective aims. Multiethnic, usually multilingualistic, and sometimes multiracial, the populations of the new states tend to regard the immediate, concrete, and to them inherently meaningful sorting implicit in such 'natural' diversity as the substantial content of their individuality. To subordinate these specific and familiar identifications in favor of a generalized commitment to an overarching and somewhat alien civil order is to risk a loss of definition as an autonomous person, either through absorption into a culturally undifferentiated mass or, what is even worse, through domination by some other rival ethnic, racial, or linguistic community that is able to imbue that order with the temper of its own personality. But at the same time, all but the most unenlightened members of such societies are at least dimly aware—and their leaders are acutely aware—that the possibilities for social reform and material progress they so intensely desire and are so determined to achieve rest with increasing weight on their being enclosed in a reasonably large, independent, powerful, well-ordered polity. The insistence on recognition as someone who

problem variously called tribalism, parochialism, communalism, and so on, a more ominous and deeply threatening quality than most of the other, also very serious and intractable problems the new states face. Here we have not just competing loyalties, but competing loyalties of the same general order, on the same level of integration. There are many other competing loyalties in the new states, as in any state—ties to class, party, business, union, profession, or whatever. But groups formed of such ties are virtually never considered as possible self-standing, maximal social units, as candidates for nationhood. Conflicts among them occur only within a more or less fully accepted terminal community whose political integrity they do not, as a rule, put into question. No matter how severe they become they do not threaten, at least not intentionally, its existence as such. They threaten governments, or even forms of government, but they rarely at best—and then usually when they have become infused with primordial sentiments—threaten to undermine the nation itself, because they do not involve alternative definitions of what the nation is, of what its scope of reference is. Economic or class or intellectual disaffection threatens revolution, but disaffection based on race, language, or culture threatens partition, irredentism, or merger, a redrawing of the very limits of the state, a new definition of its domain. Civil discontent finds its natural outlet in the seizing, legally or illegally, of the state apparatus. Primal discontent strives more deeply and is satisfied less easily. If severe enough, it wants not just Sukarno's or Nehru's or Moulay Hasan's head it wants Indonesia's or India's or Morocco's.

The actual foci around which such discontent tends to crystallize are various, and in any given case several are usually involved concurrently, sometimes at cross-purposes with one another. On a merely descriptive level they are, nevertheless, fairly readily enumerable.⁸

1) *Assumed Blood Ties*. Here the defining element in quasi-kinship, 'Quasi' because kin units formed around known biological relationship (extended families, lineages, and so on) are too small for even the most tradition-bound to regard them as having more than limited significance, and the referent is, consequently, to a notion of untraceable but yet sociologically real kinship, as in a tribe. Nigeria, the Congo, and the greater part of sub-Saharan Africa are characterized by a prominence of this sort of primordialism. But so also are the nomads or seminomads of the Middle East—the Kurds, Baluchis, Pathans, and so on; the Nagas, Mundas, Santals, and so on, of India; and most of the so-called 'hill tribes' of Southeast Asia.

2) *Race*. Clearly, race is similar to assumed kinship, in that it involves an ethnobiological theory. But it is not quite the same thing. Here, the reference is to phenotypical physical features—especially, of course, skin color, but also facial form, stature, hair type, and so on—rather than any very definite sense of common descent as such. The communal problems of Malaya in large part focus around these sorts of differences, between, in fact, two phenotypically

very similar Mongoloid peoples. 'Negritude' clearly draws much, though perhaps not all, of its force from the notion of race as a significant primordial property, and the pariah commercial minorities—like the Chinese in Southeast Asia or the Indians and Lebanese in Africa—are similarly demarcated.

3) *Language*. Linguism—for some yet to be adequately explained reasons—is particularly intense in the Indian subcontinent, has been something of an issue in Malaya, and has appeared sporadically elsewhere. But as language has sometimes been held to be the altogether essential axis of nationality conflicts, it is worth stressing that linguism is not an inevitable outcome of linguistic diversity. As indeed kinship, race, and the other factors to be listed below, language differences need not in themselves be particularly divisive: they have not been so for the most part in Tanganyika, Iran (not a new state in the strict sense, perhaps), the Philippines, or even in Indonesia, where despite a great confusion of tongues linguistic conflict seems to be the one social problem the country has somehow omitted to demonstrate in extreme form. Furthermore, primordial conflicts can occur where no marked linguistic differences are involved, as in Lebanon, among the various sorts of Batak-speakers in Indonesia, and to a lesser extent perhaps between the Fulani and Hausa in northern Nigeria.

4) *Region*. Although a factor nearly everywhere, regionalism naturally tends to be especially troublesome in geographically heterogeneous areas. Tonkin, Annam, and Cochín in prepartitioned Vietnam, the two baskets on the long pole, were opposed almost purely in regional terms, sharing language, culture, race, etc. The tension between East and West Pakistan involves differences in language and culture too, but the geographic element is of great prominence owing to the territorial discontinuity of the country. Java versus the Outer Islands in archipelagic Indonesia; the Northeast versus the West Coast in mountain-bisected Malaya, are perhaps other examples in which regionalism has been an important primordial factor in national politics.

5) *Religion*. Indian partition is the outstanding case of the operation of this type of attachment. But Lebanon, the Karens and the Moslem Arakenese in Burma, the Toba Bataks, Ambonese, and Minahassans in Indonesia, the Moros in the Philippines, the Sikhs in Indian Punjab and the Ahmadiyahs in Pakistani, and the Hausa in Nigeria are other well-known examples of its force in undermining or inhibiting a comprehensive civil sense.

6) *Custom*. Again, differences in custom form a basis for a certain amount of national disunity almost everywhere, and are of especial prominence in those cases in which an intellectually and/or artistically rather sophisticated group sees itself as the bearer of a 'civilization' amid a largely barbarian population that would be well advised to model itself upon it: the Bengalis in India, the Javanese in Indonesia, the Arabs (as against the Berbers) in Morocco, the Amhara in—another 'old' new state—Ethiopia, etc. But it is important also to point out that even vitally opposed groups may differ rather little in their

general style of life: Hindu Gujeratis and Maharashtrians in India; Baganda and Bunyoro in Uganda; Javanese and Sundanese in Indonesia. And the reverse holds also: the Balinese have far and away the most divergent pattern of customs in Indonesia, but they have been, so far, notable for the absence of any sense of primordial discontent at all.

[The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States', in Clifford Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (Free Press: New York, 1963), 107-13.]

ANTHONY GIDDENS

6 The Nation as Power-Container

A 'nation', as I use the term here, only exists when a state has a unified administrative reach over the territory over which its sovereignty is claimed. The development of a plurality of nations is basic to the centralization and administrative expansion of state domination internally, since the fixing of borders depends upon the reflexive ordering of a state system. We can follow Jones in recognizing four aspects of the transformation of frontiers into borders.¹ These he calls allocation, delimitation, demarcation and administration.

The first refers to a collaborative political decision taken among states about the distribution of territory between them. Delimitation concerns the identification of specific border sites.² Demarcation in Jones's scheme—written as a guide for policy-makers and not just an academic study—refers to how borders are actually marked on the physical environment. Many borders, even within the heart of Europe today, are not demarcated. That apparent modern equivalent of the walls built by traditional states, the Berlin Wall, is an anomaly because it symbolizes the failure of a modern state to exert the level of administrative control over its population which its governing authorities deem proper and necessary. The border between East and West Germany must be one of the most highly 'administered', in Jones's terms, in the world. That is to say, a high degree of direct surveillance is maintained along it. Traditional states sometimes constructed frontier posts, demanding payment, and occasionally documentation, of those who travelled through. But where these existed they were usually, in fact, at divisions between provinces rather than between states as such. The coupling of direct and indirect surveillance (customs officials and frontier guards, plus the central co-ordination of passport information) is one of the distinctive features of the nation-state.

A nation-state is, therefore, a bordered power-container—as I shall argue, the pre-eminent power-container of the modern era. [...] [A]mong other

things it involves processes of urban transformation and the internal pacification of states. These are phenomena that go together with the creation of generalized 'deviance' as a category and with processes of sequestration. All traditional states have laid claim to the formalized monopoly over the means of violence within their territories. But it is only within nation-states that this claim characteristically becomes more or less successful. The progress of internal pacification is closely connected with such success—they are, as it were, different sides of the same process.

The objection may be raised that there are very many instances, even in current times, of states whose monopoly of the means of violence is chronically threatened from within by armed groups; that insurgent movements, often poorly armed and organized compared with state authorities, have sometimes challenged and overthrown those authorities; and that there are diffuse levels of violence in minor contexts of even the most politically quiet societies (crimes of violence, domestic violence and so on). None of these, however, compromise the point at issue, which concerns a comparison between nation-states and traditional states. There are circumstances in which civil war, involving chronic confrontations between armed movements or coalitions of more or less equal strength, have been quite protracted. However, not only are such circumstances highly unusual, the very existence of 'civil war' presumes a norm of a monopolistic state authority. By contrast, conditions which in a modern state would be defined as examples of 'civil war', that is, divisive 'internal' armed struggles, have been typical of all class-divided societies for very long periods. Again, armed groups or movements today are almost always oriented to the assumption of state power, either by taking over an existing state's territory or by dividing up a territory and establishing a separate state. Such organizations do not and cannot 'opt out' from involvement in state power one way or another as frequently happened in traditional states. Finally, I have no wish to underplay the importance or extent of violence that takes place in small-scale contexts in modern societies. But I am principally concerned with the means of violence associated with the activities of organized armed forces, not with violence as a more blanket category of doing of physical harm to others.

Collecting together the implications of the foregoing observations, we can arrive at the following concept of the nation-state, which holds for all variants and is not intrinsically bound to any particular characterization of nationalism. [...] The nation-state, which exists in a complex of other nation-states, is a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries (borders), its rule being sanctioned by law and direct control of the means of internal and external violence.³

[A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, II: *The Nation-State and Violence* (Polity Press: Cambridge, 1985), 119-21.]