Berger Inquiry
The Canadian Parliament established the Berger Inquiry on March 21st, 1974 to review plans to build an oil and gas pipeline down the Mackenzie Valley. This section will review the history leading up to the Inquiry, summarize the conclusions of the Inquiry, and discuss the importance of the Inquiry as an evaluation of social, environmental, and economic impacts of the pipeline.
Brief History of Oil and Gas Development
Photos from Oil and gas have long been a part of the economy and environment of the Canadian arctic. Aboriginal groups have long used oil seepages as sealants for local construction, particularly in the production of canoes. Oil was collected and traded among native peoples well before the arrival of Western economy.
Early Western explorers noted the availability of oil, and prospecting in drilling began at an early age. The first well was sunk in 1922 at Norman Wells, striking an oil deposit that overwhelmed the drilling equipment and launched oil 75' into the air.[*]
Exploration and drilling continued at low volumes through World War II, during which the United States military constructed several large pieces of infrastructure through the Canadian northwest. The Alaska Highway was forged to expedite traffic between Alaska and the lower 48, and the Canol pipeline was built from Norman Wells to Whitehorse, Yukon to ensure oil availability for the war effort. The Canol pipeline was dismantled at the end of the war, but its right of way remains visible and continues to be used as a passageway.
Following WWII, oil and gas exploration moved steadily northward, with the first arctic island well, Melville Island, beginning production in 1961. The Mackenzie Delta received its first oil well in 1969, and the first natural gas well was built on the Delta in 1970 at Parson's Lake. Earlier, 1967 saw the discovery of large natural gas reserves in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, further exciting the development prospects of the arctic.
Oil and gas production in the arctic prior to 1970 was small, and the oil and gas recovered was generally shipped to southern markets for refining and distribution. This shipping was restricted by seasonal icing of the Arctic Ocean and the expense of sending large quantities of oil south. Pressure was increasing to build a pipeline to southern markets to take full advantage of the oil and gas reserves available.
The 1973 OPEC oil embargo brought pipeline interest to a peak, with several companies pushing for large pipeline projects. Canadian Arctic Gas Pipeline, Ltd. proposed a route from Alaska's Prudhoe Bay across northern Yukon to the Mackenzie Delta, and then south through the Mackenzie Valley to Alberta. Canadian Arctic was a consortium of large oil companies including Shell, Exxon, and TransCanada Pipelines. In addition, the Foothills Pipeline consortium pursued a competing pipeline, starting at the Mackenzie Delta and also running along the river valley to Alberta.
Beginning of the Berger Inquiry
Berger Inquiry Participants
- Canadian Arctic Gas Pipeline Limited
- Foothills Pipe Lines Ltd.
- Canadian Arctic Resources Committee
- Environment Protection Board
- Indian Brotherhood of the Northwest Territories
- Metis Association of the Northwest Territories
- Inuit Tapirisat of Canada
- Committee for Original Peoples Entitlement
- Yukon Native Brotherhood
- Northwest Territories Association of Municipalities
- Commission Counsel
Either pipeline required the Canadian government's approval, as the pipelines crossed large amounts of Crown owned lands. Control and regulation of these lands fell to the Ministry of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, and at their request Justice Thomas Berger was commissioned to investigate the "social, environmental and economic impact regionally" and propose terms and conditions appropriate to the construction, operation, and abandonment of a pipeline in the Yukon and Northwest Territories on March 21st, 1974.
Justice Berger's commission gave him a great deal of flexibility to pursue his charge. He was granted the ability to compel testimony and evidence, hold hearings throughout Canada, and receive support through a Commission Council of neutral government experts in all areas of concern for the Inquiry. Berger showed a keen interest in ensuring that all stakeholders would have a say, and established a fund that supported any group that desired participation in the inquiry, but did not have the financial wherewithal to participate fully. 14 groups became full participants in the Inquiry, attending all meetings, and pursuing a process of discovery in which each participant was required to fully share any and all information they had regarding pipeline construction. In addition, Berger's commission held hearings in all 35 communities along the Mackenzie River Valley, as well as in cities across Canada. Hearings were split into formal meetings where expert testimony was presented, and informal hearings where anyone could speak out, further increasing the accessibility of the commission. All hearings were also translated and reported to native cultures throughout the region.
Conclusions of the Berger Inquiry
The Berger Inquiry released its first report on June 9th, 1977, and followed with a second volume several months later. In all the Inquiry cost $5.3 million dollars (Canadian), and produced over 40,000 pages of text and evidence, comprising 283 volumes. The main reports, volumes one and two, can be found here and in the here.
Berger Inquiry Videos
The principle recommendation of the Berger Report was that no pipeline should be built through the northern Yukon, and that a pipeline through the Mackenzie Valley should be delayed for 10 years. Below we will briefly summarize the conclusions of the Berger Report, and refer the reader to appropriate chapters within the full report.
Environment
The Berger Report determined that the northern Yukon was too susceptible to environmental harm, and that no pipeline should be built in this area. In addition, Berger recommended that no energy corridor be built in the Mackenzie Delta region. Further south through the Mackenzie Valley, however, Berger saw no significant risk of environmental harm. In addition, Berger suggested that a number of sanctuaries and protected areas should be created throughout the Yukon and Northwest Territories to protect threatened species. Porcupine Caribou should be protected in the northern Yukon, white whales within the Mackenzie Bay, several bird species throughout the Mackenzie Valley, and Berger suggested a large reserve contiguous with Alaska's National Wildlife Reserve (ANWR).
The complete environmental conclusions can be found in Volume 1, chapters 4-7, and Volume 2, chapters 7-10.
Economics
Berger also found that the economic effects of the proposed pipelines were much less than promoters had suggested. He found that large-scale projects based on non-renewables rarely provide long-term employment, and that those locals that did find work during construction would fill low and un-skilled positions. In addition, pipeline development would erode and undermine the local economies based on hunting, fishing, and trapping and that a pipeline may actually increase economic hardship in the area. Finally, it was Berger's conclusion that the economy of the region would not be harmed by failing to build the pipeline.
Berger's economic conclusions can be found in Volume 1, chapter 9, and Volume 2, chapters 2-5.
"I discovered that people in the North have strong feelings about the pipeline and large-scale frontier development. I listened to a brief by northern businessmen in Yellowknife who favour a pipeline through the North. Later, in a native village far away, I heard virtually the whole community express vehement opposition to such a pipeline. Both were talking about the same pipeline; both were talking about the same region - but for one group it is a frontier, for the other a homeland."
-- Thomas Berger, V1 Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Commission Report.
Social
The title of the Berger Report, Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland, reflects that the area was the social and cultural home of a large number of people, in addition to an area of increasing economic importance to southern markets. The pipeline process had previously not taken native culture seriously, and that any development needed to conform to the wishes of those who lived there. More starkly, Berger predicted that the "social consequences of the pipeline will not only be serious -- they will be devastating." (Volume 1, Letter, p.23.)
Berger was particularly concerned about the rights of natives to have some say in development plans. At the time, there were several ongoing negotiations over native land claims in the area, and Berger suggested that the pipeline should wait for those land claims to be settled. By and large, the local population would not accept development activity without some internal control. In addition, land claims were just a part of broader native rights issues that needed to be settled between the government and the First Nations. In Berger's view, rapid development in the north would preclude settlement of these important issues due to the influx of non-native populations and growing business interests.
More in-depth study of the social impacts of these pipelines can be seen in Volume 1, chapters 1, 10 and 11, and Volume 2, chapters 3 and 4.
Lysyk Inquiry
Concurrent with the Berger Inquiry, Kenneth M. Lysyk headed the Alaska Highway Pipeline Inquiry, and reached many of the same conclusions. Lysyk concluded that most of the economic benefits of the pipeline would go outside of the Yukon, but that there was large conditional support for the project if native land claims were settled and the pipeline companies agreed to pay to mitigate negative social impacts of the project. The Highway Pipeline did not pose particular environmental concerns, as the right-of-way was already in place. Lysyk also suggested that an inter-province planning and regulatory agency was needed to oversee pipeline construction, and finally reported that the pipeline should be delayed for four years while the remaining land claims were settled.