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Francisca AntmanFrancisca Antman
Ethnic Attrition and the Observed health of Later Generation Mexican Americans, (with Brian Duncan and Stephen J. Trejo), American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 106(5): 467-71, 2016.

Abstract
Numerous studies find that U.S.-born Hispanics differ significantly from non-Hispanic whites on important measures of human capital, including health. Nevertheless, almost all studies rely on subjective measures of identify immigrants U.S.-born descendants. this can lead to bias due to "ethnic attrition," which occurs whenever a U.S.-born descendant of a Hispanic immigrant fails to self-identify as Hispanic. In this paper, we show that Mexican American ethnic attritors are generally more likely to display health outcomes closer to those of non-Hispanic whites. This suggests that conventional estimates of Mexican American health are likely to be biased away from suggesting patterns of assimilation and convergence with non-Hispanic whites.


Oleg BaranovOleg Baranov
A Practical Guide to the combinatorial Clock Auction, (with Lawrence Ausubel), The Economic Journal, forthcoming. 

Abstract
The Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) is an important recent innovation in auction design that has been utilised for many spectrum auctions worldwide. While the theoretical foundations of the CCA are described in a growing literature, many of the practical implementation choices are omitted. In this paper, we review and discuss the most critical practical decisions for a regulator implementing the CCA. Topics include: implementation of reserve prices; accommodation of technological choice; activity rules; price incrementing policy; incorporation of competition policy objectives; and bidding language and pricing rule. We illustrate our discussion with examples from recent CCA spectrum auctions.


Oleg BaranovOleg Baranov
“Efficient Procurement Auctions with Increasing Returns,”
(with Lawrence Ausubel, Christina Aperjis and Thayer Morrill), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, forthcoming

Abstract
For procuring from sellers with decreasing returns, there are known efficient dynamic auction formats. In this paper, we design an efficient dynamic procurement auction for the case where goods are homogeneous and bidders have increasing returns. Our motivating example is the procurement of vaccines, which often exhibit large fixed costs and small constant marginal costs. The auctioneer names a price and bidders report the interval of quantities that they are willing to sell at that price. The process repeats with successively lower prices, until the efficient outcome is discovered. We demonstrate an equilibrium that is efficient and generates VCG prices.


Martin BoileauMartin Boileau
Corporate Cash Holdings and Credit Line Usage, (with Nathalie Moyen), International Economic Review, 57(4): 1481–1506, November 2016. 



Abstract
We investigate the factors driving the unprecedented rise in corporate liquidities since the 1970s. We find that an economy wide reduction in the cost of holding liquidities and an increase in risk best explain the rise in cash holdings and the widespread use of credit lines. The structural estimation results shed light on two widely-acknowledged motives for holding cash. The precautionary motive and the liquidity motive translate risk exposure into cash holdings. Our results however do not suggest that firms have become more prudent over time. It is higher liquidity needs that has forced firms to hold more cash and use more credit lines.


Jeronimo CarballoJeronimo Carballo
"Roads, exports and employment: Evidence from a developing country,"
(with Christian Volpe Martincus and Ana Cusolito), Journal of Development Economics 125, March 2017.

Abstract
Domestic road programs are often justified on the basis of their presumed positive effects on firms' exports and accordingly on firms' employment. In this paper we evaluate this policy claim for Peru, a developing country whose regions were exposed to an asymmetric infrastructure shock. In so doing, we take advantage of detailed geo-referenced data on firm-level trade for the period 2003–2010 as well as on recent and historical road infrastructure. In particular, to identify the impacts of interest, we first exploit the dimensions of this dataset to account for regional-sectoral and even firm-level confounding factors through extensive sets of fixed effects. In addition, we conduct placebo exercises and carry out instrumental variable estimations whereby we instrument recent changes in the road network with the pre-Columbian Inca road network. Estimates concur in suggesting that improvements in transport infrastructure had a significant positive impact on firms' exports and thereby on firms' job growth.


Yongmin ChenYongmin Chen
"Competition, Product Safety, and Product Liability"
(with Xinyu Hua), Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, forthcoming.

Abstract
A firm's incentive to invest in product safety is affected by both the market environment and the liability when its product causes consumer harm. A long-standing question in law and economics is whether competition can (partially) substitute for product liability in motivating firms to improve product safety. We investigate this issue in a spatial model of oligopoly with product differentiation, where reputation provides a market incentive for product safety and higher product liability may distort consumers' incentive for proper product care. We find that partial liability, together with reputation concerns, can motivate firms to make socially desirable safety investment. Increased competition due to less product differentiation lowers equilibrium market price, which diminishes a firm's gain from maintaining reputation and raises the socially desirable product liability. On the other hand, an increase in the number of competitors reduces both the benefit from maintaining reputation and the potential cost savings from cutting back safety investment; consequently, the optimal liability may vary non-monotonically with the number of competitors in the market. In general, therefore, the relationship between competition and product liability is subtle, depending on how competition is measured.


Yongmin ChenYongmin Chen
"Entry and Welfare in Search Markets"
(with Tianle Zhang), Economic Journal, forthcoming.

Abstract
The welfare effects of entry are studied in a model of consumer search. Potential entrants differ in quality, with high quality sellers being more likely to meet consumer needs. Contrary to the standard view in economics that more entry benefits consumers, we find that free entry is excessive for both consumer welfare and total welfare when entry cost is relatively low, and consumer welfare has an inverted-U relationship with entry cost. We explain why these results may arise naturally in search markets due to the search variety and search quality effects of entry, and discuss their business and policy implications.


Jonathan HughesJonathan Hughes
"When is Increasing Consumption of Common Property Optimal? Sorting, Congestion and Entry in the Commons,"
(with Daniel Kaffine), Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,January 2017.

Abstract
First-best pricing or assignment of property rights for rival and non-excludable goods is often infeasible. In a setting where the social planner cannot limit total use, we show common-property resources can be over or under-consumed. This depends on whether the external benefits of reallocating users to less congested resources outweigh the additional costs imposed by new entrants. Importantly, we show it may be optimal to encourage consumption of some common property resources. Our results have important implications for settings ranging from fisheries and forestry to recreational demand and transportation.


Jonathan HughesJonathan Hughes
"Strategic Policy Choice in State-Level Regulation: The EPA's Clean Power Plan,"
(with James Bushnell, Stephen Holland and Christopher Knittel), American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, May 2017.

Abstract
The EPA's Clean Power Plan sets state-level 2030 goals for CO2 emission rate reductions that vary substantially across states. States can choose the regulatory mechanism they use and whether or not to join with other states in implementing their goals. We analyze incentives to adopt rate standards versus cap-and-trade with theory and simulation. We show conditions where adoption of inefficient rate standards is a dominant strategy from both consumers' and generators' perspectives. Numerical simulations of the Western electricity system highlight incentives for uncoordinated policies that lower welfare and increase emissions relative to coordination.


Murat IyigunMurat Iyigun
Changing the Rules Midway: the Impact of Granting Alimony Right on Existing and Newly-Formed Partnerships, (with Pierre-Andre Chiappori, Jeanne Lafortune and Yoram Weiss), The Economic Journal, forthcoming.

Abstract
The  paper  analyzes  the  effect  of  a  reform  granting  alimony  rights  to  cohabiting  couples in Canada, exploiting the fact that each province extended these rights in different years and required different cohabitation length.  A theoretical analysis, based on a collective household model with a matching framework, predicts that changes in alimony laws would affect existing couples and couples-to-be differently.  For existing couples, legislative changes aimed at favoring (wo)men do benefit them, especially if the match quality is low.  However, for couples not yet formed, they generate offsetting intra-household transfers (in our model, of leisure) and lower intra-marital allocations for the spouses who are the intended beneficiary. Our empirical analysis confirms these predictions.  Among cohabiting couples united long enough before the reform, obtaining the right to petition for alimony led women to lower their labor force participation. These results, however, do not hold --and, in some cases,  are reversed -- for newly formed cohabiting couples.


Daniel KaffineDaniel Kaffine
"When is Increasing Consumption of Common Property Optimal? Sorting, Congestion and Entry in the Commons,"
(with Jonathan Hughes), Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, January 2017.

Abstract
First-best pricing or assignment of property rights for rival and non-excludable goods is often infeasible. In a setting where the social planner cannot limit total use, we show common-property resources can be over or under-consumed. This depends on whether the external benefits of reallocating users to less congested resources outweigh the additional costs imposed by new entrants. Importantly, we show it may be optimal to encourage consumption of some common property resources. Our results have important implications for settings ranging from fisheries and forestry to recreational demand and transportation.


Jin-Hyuk KimJin-Hyuk Kim
“Non-performance Pay and Relational Contracting: Evidence from CEO Compensation,” (with Jed DeVaro and Nick Vikander), The Economic Journal, forthcoming.

Abstract
CEOs are routinely compensated for aspects of firm performance that are beyond their control. This is puzzling from an agency perspective, which assumes performance pay should be efficient. Working within an agency framework, we provide a rational for this seemingly inefficient feature of CEO compensation by invoking the idea of informal agreements, specifically the theory of relational contracting. We derive observable implications to distinguish relational from formal contracting, and using ExecuComp data, find that CEOs' annual cash and equity incentive payments positively correlate with the cyclical component of sales and respond to measures of persistence as relational contracting theory predicts.


Xiadong LiuXiadong Liu
Endogenous Network Production Functions with Selectivity, (with William Horace and Eleonora Patacchini), Journal of Econometrics,190, 222-232.

Abstract
We consider a production function model that transforms worker inputs into outputs through peer effect networks. The distinguishing features of this production model are that the network is formal and observable through worker scheduling, and selection into the network is done by a manager. We discuss identification and suggest a variety of estimation techniques. In particular, we tackle endogeneity issues arising from selection into groups and exposure to common group factors by employing a polychotomous Heckman-type selection correction. We illustrate our method using data from the Syracuse University Men's Basketball team, where at any point in time the coach selects a lineup and the players interact strategically to win games.


Richard MansfieldRichard Mansfield
"Task-Specific Experience and Task-Specific Talent: Decomposing the Productivity of High School Teachers"
(with James Cook), Journal of Public Economics, August 2016.

Abstract
We use administrative panel data to decompose worker performance into components relating to general talent, task-specific talent, general experience, and task-specific experience. We consider the context of high school teachers, in which tasks consist of teaching particular subjects in particular tracks. Using the timing of changes in the subjects and difficulty levels to which teachers are assigned to provide identifying variation, we show that a substantial part of the productivity gains to teacher experience are actually subject-specific. Similarly, while three-quarters of the variance in the permanent component of productivity among teachers is portable across subjects and levels, there exist non-trivial subject-specific and level-specific components. Counterfactual simulations suggest that maximizing the test-score contribution of task-specific experience and task-specific talent can increase student performance by as much as .04 test score standard deviations relative to random assignment of teachers to classrooms.



Scott J. SavageScott Savage
Market Structure and Broadband Internet Quality, (with G. Molnar), Journal of Industrial Economics, forthcoming.

Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of the number of firms and their product-type on broadband Internet quality. We estimate a model that relates the actual speeds delivered in census block groups to the number of wireline and wireless Internet service providers (ISPs), cost and demand conditions, and correction terms for the endogeneity of market structure. Model estimates show four main findings. Wireline speeds are often higher in markets with two or more wireline ISPs than with a single wireline ISP. Excluding the correction terms from the analysis understates this effect. Increases in wireline speeds are larger in the upstream direction, and there is no relationship between wireline speeds and the number of wireless ISPs.