Fields:
Auction Theory · Market Design · Economics of Information · Game Theory · Industrial Organization
Current Research Interests:
Matching in auctions; auctions with default risk; prequalification in procurement auctions; reputation management in auctions; bankruptcy in eighteenth century England
Affiliations:
Visiting Research Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California
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Ph.D., Columbia University, 2005, is an assistant professor with research interests in auctions, market design, and industrial organization. She has worked on projects for the U.S. Department of Defense and the RAND Corporation. Her primary research line seeks to identify which mechanisms do the best job of allocating a contract when (1) the contracting parties care about factors other than price and (2) information about these factors is incomplete. She is currently investigating how changes to the legal rights of debtors in eighteenth century England affected the strategic behavior of borrowers, the prevalence of default, and the volume of loans made. |