CONFLICT RESOLUTION CONSORTIUM SEMINAR REPORTER -- Volume II Spring 1991 TABLE OF CONTENTS Consortium Seminars - The Moral Responsibilities of Unchallenged Military Supremacy - Is the Cold War Really Dead? - Nonviolent Direct Action: An Empirical, Cross-National Analysis - Controlling Weapons of Mass Destruction: Can Proliferation be Stopped Before Wars Start? Non-Consortium Seminars - Conflict and the Environment: Impact and Relationship - Imperialism and the Gulf War - Strategies for Overcoming Obstacles to Environmental Solutions CONSORTIUM SEMINARS MORAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF UNCHALLENGED MILITARY SUPREMACY - David Hawkins, Department of Philosophy, Boulder - Gary Stahl, Department of Philosophy, Boulder - Guy Burgess, Conflict Resolution Consortium, Boulder April 16, 1991 Co-Sponsored by Conflict and Peace Studies, UC-Boulder and Conflict Resolution Consortium By the end of the Persian Gulf War, Coalition Forces had unleashed unparalleled military destruction upon a largely isolated nation. Just a few years ago, superpower rivalry would have made such a campaign unthinkable. Now it is not only thinkable, it is being widely touted as the cornerstone of a "new world order." This seminar asked the speakers to discuss what moral responsibilities might exist to limit the use of such military power in the future, and whether repeat performances of the Gulf War might be avoided by appealing to different moral principles. Although the foci of their presentations were very different, the three speakers, Gary Stahl, David Hawkins and Guy Burgess, fundamentally agreed that the moral principles used to justify the Gulf War were lacking. Gary Stahl focused on the usage of military superiority. War as an institution was developed as a means to contain violence and make peace possible. Military supremacy is concerned with means to control violence, not with the ends of what kind of peace and for whom. Furthermore, in Stahl's view, certain ends are precluded by military means; certain goals cannot be pursued. Stahl argued that military power generates a kind of moral order that has a distorting effect -- it devalues people and values military capabilities. Reliance on and usage of military superiority takes us away from human ends -- for instance a just and lasting peace. Stahl concluded his remarks with a quote from Nietzsche: "Rather perish than hate and fear. Twice perish than be hated and feared." David Hawkins focused on the meaning of the term "military superiority" within a historical context. He began by pointing out that there may not be such a thing as military superiority since guerrilla warfare has not been adequately challenged by any conventional notion of superiority. Military superiority is usually taken to mean the ability to devastate the opponent utilizing military power that the opponent cannot withstand. The primary vehicle for this kind of superiority in this century has been the airplane. Originally used as means for reconnaissance of enemy positions, the airplane became viewed, by Billy Mitchell in World War I, as an offensive weapon capable of striking behind enemy lines at the sources of the enemy's military power. Thus, the airplane gained strategic importance. However, in those strikes on sources of military power, the factories that made the bullets, guns, etc. were often located in urban centers. Therefore killing civilians was unavoidable. In World War II aerial bombing of urban centers was accomplished on a large scale in Bremen, Dresden, Hamburg, and in the 20 million bombs of jellied gasoline that were dropped on Japanese cities. The culmination of this logic of total war, of this mode of military superiority, was, of course, the atomic bomb which is a pure anti-civilian weapon. For Hawkins, it was Billy Mitchell who established our present mode of military superiority and the moral responsibility behind it of destroying urban centers and the people in them to achieve nationalistic goals. Guy Burgess focused on what he viewed as a new kind of military superiority in the recent Gulf War. This kind of superiority is new in that it was achieved at little cost in U.S. lives or dollars. It was, at least in terms of media coverage, a "video game war." It was too easy. As a result, the American public and perhaps civilian and military decision makers have learned an erroneous and dangerous lesson: now that the Cold War is over, military force works well to solve international conflicts and can be waged at relatively low cost. This is a major change from the anti-military and anti-war sentiment that persisted after Vietnam and represents the apparent elimination of political constraints against the use of military force. In addition, international balance of power and technological constraints appear to have diminished as well. The Soviet Union no longer threatens to counter the U.S. in its military adventures; our military superiority over supposedly well-armed troops is crushing. While this circumstance may indeed be transitory, and may have occurred before, it is still intoxicating. The American public appears to be disregarding the moral constraints against the use of such overwhelming force. Rather, they appear to be reveling in it. (Desert Storm T-Shirts, fight songs, and computer games make war fun--just like a football game.) The only "moral" constraints that appeared to be operating in the Gulf War, Burgess asserted, were: a) limiting the number of civilian casualties, and b) limiting the risk to American lives. While those ends may have been accomplished over the short term, the long term picture is not good. Our military muscle will just encourage other nations--in the Middle East and elsewhere--to arm themselves to the hilt in order to defend themselves against U.S. bullying. Over the long run this will put the U.S. and civilians worldwide at increased risk and may increase, rather than decrease, the risk of war. If we had any moral concerns about the Gulf War, we at least should have used our technological superiority to help rebuild Iraq's critical infrastructure (for instance, sewers and water treatment plants) and provide medical aid after the war. We also should try to work to control the culture of violence that can lead to further wars. For instance, we should have stepped in earlier to prevent Iraq's slaughter of the Kurds, and should pursue meaningful peace plans with all the nations and diverse ethnic groups (i.e., Palestinians and Kurds) in the region. In the open discussion that followed, the questions and concerns that were expressed ranged from the need to disaggregate "we" when speaking of moral responsibility, and how to deal with the military-industrial complex, to the hypocrisy of linking morality to military superiority in the first place. Most present seemed to agree that a new, global, morality was needed to replace the current nationalistic morality that is causing so many problems worldwide. IS THE COLD WAR OVER? - Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, Department of Political Science, Boulder - John O'Loughlin, Department of Geography, Boulder - Bob Schulzinger, Department of History, Boulder April 23, 1991 Co-Sponsored by Conflict and Peace Studies, UC-Boulder and Conflict Resolution Consortium The Soviet Union's decision to abandon the Cold War appears to have sharply reduced the risk of nuclear annihilation and given the U.N. Security Council real power for the first time. But how long will this last? The Soviets seem to be tottering on the brink of dictatorship or civil war as the U.S. moves aggressively to fill the military vacuum with talk of a New World Order. Other Eastern European countries are wobbling as well, finding the transition to democracy more difficult and painful than expected. Might the Cold War be reborn? Can the U.S. play a role, either positively or negatively, in preventing that from happening? These questions and others were addressed during the April 23 discussion with Schulzinger, Cioffi-Revilla, and O'Loughlin. According to Schulzinger, what was termed the "Cold War" was actually an ideological competition between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. and other countries. This ideological competition has disappeared; therefore the Cold War is over and will remain so. However, future competitions and conflicts will occur and will be dangerous. But they will differ from the Cold War because they will not be based on ideological differences between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Rather, they will be based on differences in national self interest. In looking to the future, Schulzinger said, prospects for economic problem-solving will depend on political viability and the ability of the superpowers to develop a cooperative plan much like the Marshall Plan. He suggests trying something like a Marshall Plan for the Construction of Eastern Europe, but he is somewhat dubious about the chances of success. His doubts stem from two key factors. First, the original Marshall plan worked because it was a reconstruction plan, not a construction plan. The countries given aid had had advanced and relatively successful economies before the war. This meant changes could come in small steps and the systems put in place were familiar. The people knew how the institutions being rebuilt were supposed to work. But now in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, massive change must take place all at once rather than in small steps. Further, the changes in the nature of the economy and the political systems are so massive that they are not familiar. No one knows what to expect or how to make the system work. " It's hard to jump a chasm in one jump," Schulzinger said. Second, the Marshall Plan worked because there was a perception of an enemy. This perception encouraged cooperation which might have otherwise not developed. Now that the "Cold War" is over, the perception of a common enemy no longer exists. Therefore, there may not be such strong incentives for cooperation. Nevertheless, Shulzinger concluded that peace is dependent upon the region developing stable political and economic systems. Therefore, we should try a Marshall type plan, and hope it works. Cioffi-Revilla agreed with most of Shulzinger's arguments, saying that yes, the Cold War is dead, but the probability of war is not. The Cold War, Cioffi-Revilla asserted, was not a classical power conflict, but one which was driven by ideological factors. (Ideology-driven conflicts are actually relatively rare in the political system, he added.) But despite the end of the ideological competition, the level of fear and anxiety which exists between the U.S. and U.S.S.R is still high. This fear will continue even after the Cold War has ended and may yet cause a war. Cioffi-Revilla based his remarks on his work on the Long Range Analysis of War Project, which is an empirical effort to examine the onset and nature of war over the very long range. The Cold War's ending, Cioffi-Revilla argues, will have some implications for long-term trends but those trends will be highly confined. Most interactions will remain the same. Nationality problems, territorial conflicts and other trends have historically been more important than ideological struggles. This is illustrated by the fact that over 80% of the world conflicts occur in neighboring states. Cioffi-Revilla suggests the following will take place now that the Cold War is dead: 1) The arms race and weapons proliferation will continue. 2) Old alliances will be meaningless. (Historically, there have been many more changes in alliance structures than in arms races.) 3) Solutions to development problems may change. They will no longer be tied to support of a particular ideology. Therefore, they may be able to better match the needs of particular societies and regions. 4) The structure of the third world may change--both in organization and mindset. (The third world, Cioffi-Revilla asserted, was a product of the Cold War. Now that the Cold War is over, national identities and alliances may change.) 5) Some of the disintegrative forces (e.g., ethnic conflicts) that were held at bay during the Cold War will now develop and become serious threats to peace. Current crises may actually be more intense than they were during the Cold War. John O'Loughlin listed ten conceivable outcomes to the end of the Cold War--ten images of the "New World Order" which is likely to emerge. He started with the least likely which he quickly dismissed as highly improbable. These were: 1) Creation of a universal world state. 2) Creation of a "Super U.N." directing world relations. 3) Generalized nonalignment--everyone stays home and minds their own business. Decentralization of power with regional organizations, the most dominant concentrations of power. (India would be an example.) 4) Cooperation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (O'Laughlin does not believe a coalition between the First and Second worlds acting against the Third World is likely, as many others have suggested. The U.S.S.R. will not be a beneficial partner for the U.S. in most instances. Therefore, such a coalition is unlikely to develop.) 5) The establishment of a new bi-polar world with one pole made up of Japan, the Pacific Nations and the U.S. versus Europe. Somewhat higher up the probability list were the following: 6) Formation of anti-U.S. hegemony alliance: U.S. versus an alliance of Japan and Europe. This would be driven by economic competition, trade wars, and tariff barriers. 7) Division of the world into areas of stable peace and areas of regional conflict. Issues in conflict will be primarily ethnic and territorial. Neither the U.S.S.R. nor the U.S. will be involved. 8) Formation of regional trading blocks. The most likely possibilities, according to O'Laughlin's assessment were: 9) Reconstructed U.S./Soviet confrontation, stripped of ideology (but just as potentially deadly). 10) U.S. unilateralism. O'Loughlin believes that such unilateralism will be fairly selective and directed at key allies. Other conflicts which the U.S. views as "not mattering", will be ignored. While O'Loughlin ranked unilateralism as most likely, at least for awhile, he noted that the U.S. will face certain constraints. One is cost: while we may attempt to get others to pay for it, unilateralism would bankrupt the U.S. Sec ond, other countries will respond negatively to this type of power. NONVIOLENT DIRECT ACTION: AN EMPIRICAL, CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS - Chris Kruegler, President, Albert Einstein Institute, and Director, Program on Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense, Harvard University - Doug Bond, Research Associate, Program on Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense, Harvard University April 25, 1991 Sponsored by Conflict Resolution Consortium. Although history is filled with numerous examples of nonviolent direct action, direct action has not been systemat ically studied and developed in a manner comparable to knowledge of military strategies and technology. Nonviolent sanctions have often been spontaneous, poorly planned, and guided by untrained leaders. Nevertheless, nonviolence has provided an effective way to wage conflict without inflicting physical harm. Questions are now being posed as to how, why, and in what context nonviolent actions work as well as, or better than, violent action. The Albert Einstein Institute and the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense at Harvard University are addressing these issues. Chris Kruegler and Doug Bond spoke at the University of Colorado on April 25th about their work in analyzing nonviolence in a systematic research setting. Kruegler opened his talk by defining the organizational structure of the Einstein Institute and the Harvard Program. The Einstein Institute sees its purpose as three-fold: research on nonviolent action, education, and consulting. It has a fellowship program that rewards scholars doing research in the field of nonviolence. It sponsors conferences, regularly publishes a newsletter, and offers consultation on tactics of non-cooperation and nonviolent resistance. The Harvard Program, on the other hand, has no teaching or advocacy functions; it is engaged purely in policy-relevant research. The Einstein Institute, Kruegler said, takes the "technique approach" to nonviolence. This differs from the pacifist view, which assumes nonviolence is superior to violence for moral reasons. The technique approach makes no moral assumptions, but rather, asks whether nonviolent techniques are superior for the practical reason that they work better. Drawing from Gene Sharp's work, this approach is based on the proposition that power depends on the cooperation of the governed. If the people refuse to cooperate with the government, the government cannot continue to enforce its will. For example, nonviolent sanctions such as strikes or boycotts can be used to destabilize and overthrow a government, just as violent opposition can. Nonviolence can also be used to prevent change. Institute researchers believe that such actions might be able to replace other methods of armed struggle and violent opposition in many, but not all instances. If this is to happen however, nonviolence must be subjected to analysis and research, to develop better methods for engaging in it. Doug Bond discussed the Harvard program's cross-cultural empirical study of nonviolent direct action. The goal of the project is to better understand popular protest and its relation toward popular empowerment. They want to assess the utility of nonviolent techniques in comparison with violent techniques. The basic approach has been to extend and operationalize the conceptual framework developed by Gene Sharp. This focuses primarily on the dynamics of power in a struggle, how it transforms relationships between the opponents, and how nonviolent techniques can be strategically used as an alternative to violent tactics. One aim of the research is theory building and testing, another is simply expanding the field of nonviolence research. The project has gone through several pre-pilot and pilot stages and is now three years old. Much of this time was spent refining the conceptual framework and assessing the type of data and level and analysis which would be most appropriate to use. Defining what constituted a case, an actor, and an event, was particularly difficult. They decided to define events as acute international struggles where conflicting interests are found. These must go beyond chronic inequalities to include acute, manifest conflict processes. The events must also include direct action, though the degree of violence or nonviolence is allowed to vary. Right now they are looking at 39 cases of direct action occurring during three years--1981, 85, and 1989 (13 movements/year). This is an attempt to limit their data to a reasonable level. (An earlier effort which attempted to code all instances of direct action reported in the New York Times over a four month period yielded over 10,000 entries!) Their conceptual framework uses a four-dimensional definition of "nonviolent direct action." First, it is always unilaterally initiated. It does not require the cooperation of the opponent. Second, it involves an active struggle (not simply withdrawal). Third, the action engages the opponents' interest, meaning there is a significant cost to the opponent for ignoring the actor(s). Fourth, the action always creates a new or renewed balance of power. For each case, the study examines six domains: the case history (who, what, when, why, how), the context (i.e., the political systems, using conflict event data literature), actor attributes (using concepts derived from the social movement's literature), aggregate attributes (for instance, degree of ethnic diversity, gender involvement, etc.), perspectives (belief systems motivating actions), and the mechanisms of action (types of power used). The analysis is designed to examine how techniques can or cannot be used to cause or to resist change. This empirical study of nonviolence is extensive and is therefore proceeding slowly. There are numerous facets and variables to consider and little historical precedent to base the work upon. In light of the growing military industry and advancing technology, study of nonviolent alternatives is essential to offering a viable alternative to traditional uses of force. The research results of the Einstein Institute and the Harvard Program on Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense may be able to further our knowledge and competence in this area. CONTROLLING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: CAN PROLIFERATION BE STOPPED BEFORE WARS START? - Joe Burke, United States Air Force Academy - Steve Thomas, Department of Political Science, Denver - Jerry Krenz, Computer Engineering and Conflict and Peace Studies, Boulder May 7, 1991 Co-Sponsored by Conflict and Peace Studies, UC-Boulder The American public was led to believe that we had to go to war against Iraq quickly because they had the potential of using and/or further developing chemical and nuclear weapons. If this was true, the Iraq war is the first instance where failure to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has seriously threatened U.S. security. Unless such proliferation is checked, it is unlikely to be the last such situation the U.S. will face. Jerry Krenz opened the discussion by pointing out that Iraq was really very far from having usable nuclear warheads. However, he agreed that the thought of Hussein with "nukes" provided a strong selling point for the war. Nuclear weapons were actually used in the Gulf War by the U.S., Krenz argued. They were not detonated, but were used as a threat. Such weapons are not good for war fighting. They are only good for deterrence by threatening their use. Other nations will not give up the potential use of these weapons, Krenz feels, until we do. The U.S. must curb its own arsenal, and stop using nuclear weapons as a threat before it can have any effect on world-wide proliferation of weapons. Joe Burke provided some history of the use of chemical and nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in the Middle East. These weapons are not new--they have been there for forty years! Arab militaries, trained by Germany prior to World War II, and by the Soviets more recently, have turned to chemical weapons and ballistic missiles to oppose Israel's nuclear capability. (The Israelis have based their security on nuclear weapons, a high-tech air force and a small standing army. The Arabs have countered this with a large standing army, tanks, and ballistic missiles with chemical weapons.) In the Iran/Iraq war, 900 missiles were fired and chemical weapons were used very effectively. This created a large demand for resupply, enticing new suppliers to enter the market. Big suppliers are now the Chinese, the North Koreans, Argentina and Brazil. Even if the U.S. and the Europeans stop supplying arms to the region, the new entrants on the supply side are likely to continue for financial reasons. As chemical weapons and ballistic missiles became increasingly used as a counterforce threat, everybody in the Middle East got "geared-up" for the chemical warfare environment. The result of this, according to Burke, was that the power and sophistication of the weapons increased, the region was destabilized, and leaders with the capability became more aggressive. This decreased crisis stability in the region (which increased the incentive to strike first). A way to control aggressive leaders is to increase crisis stability. Burke suggested two ways of doing this: 1) harden missiles and other key military installations so that a first strike is not militarily devastating, and 2) increase incentives within the region not to use ballistic missiles and chemicals. While these changes might be possible, controlling the international arms trade itself is likely to be very difficult, due to three factors. First, the arms business is no longer just between nations per se where complete weapons systems are bought and sold. Now the tendency is to buy and sell pieces from various sources to increase the range, accuracy, and payload of existing systems, rather than buying a whole new system. Second, this trade in components is often being done through third countries to "hide" the transaction. Third, many of the components have uses other than weapons. Such dual use technology can go into building space-launch vehicles or ballistic missiles, fertilizer or chemical weapons. So trade in these materials cannot be stopped. Steve Thomas added that "nukes" and other weapons of mass destruction were not only used for deterrence but also for compellence. And the superpowers are still using them for compellence with non-superpowers. Proliferation continues, according to Thomas, because non-superpower countries: a) don't like their relationships controlled by the superpowers; b) don't like the hegemony of either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. or their opposing world views; and c) weapons of mass destruction, especially chemical and nuclear weapons provide relatively cheap superpower status as in the case of France and China. NON-CONSORTIUM SEMINARS CONFLICT AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPACT AND RELATIONSHIP - Bruce Byers, Conflict & Peace Studies Program, University of Colorado, Boulder March 4, 1991 Sponsored by the IBS Environment and Behavior Program Colloquium At this seminar, Bruce Byers presented a general conceptual framework for understanding the linkages between environment, development, and violent conflict. He first proposed that global environmental degradation is a symptom of unsustainable societies. The syndrome of environmental problems now familiar to all of us, from ozone holes to the loss of biodiversity, are caused by the exponential growth of the already immense human population, high per capita energy and resource use in the "North" and increasing per capita energy and resource use in "South," and use of environmentally-damaging technologies and energy sources. Byers then argued that global environmental degradation will threaten the quality of life for humans in both rich and poor countries, and ultimately lead to violent conflict. A number of cases in which environmental damage has, or seems likely to, cause conflict and war were reviewed briefly, including the Horn of Africa and the Indus River basin. One requirement for stopping and reversing global environmental degradation is "ecodevelopment." Ecodevelopment, now often called "sustainable development," is the development of a global economic system that can support the human population and provide everyone with a high quality of life without: 1) damaging regional ecosystems or the biosphere as a whole, 2) reducing the planet's carrying capacity for humans or any other species, or, 3) overexploiting the biosphere in such a way that future generations inherit a depleted environment. A stable human ecology, the goal of ecodevelopment, has at least these minimum requirements: - a stable human population (zero population growth) - sustainable agriculture (no reliance on non-renewable energy subsidies, no unsustainable soil erosion, biological pest management or IPM, etc.) - sustainable use of forests, fisheries, and rangelands - use of renewable energy sources at levels only high enough to provide a high quality of life - recycling of material resources - the preservation of ecosystems and high levels of species and genetic diversity - minimally-polluting, ecologically-benign technologies - self-sufficiency in basic ecological resources (food, water, energy) within each ecoregion. This last "requirement" was controversial, with several audience members raising objections that it ran counter to global trends of increasing economic interdependence, which many argue may reduce the likelihood of war. Byers stated his view that the kind of economic "interdependence" that has developed is still quite often a matter of very inequitable terms of trade between the North and South, and not really movement in the direction of ecodevelopment. Stopping and reversing environmental degradation also will require modifications of state sovereignty -- "ecopolitics," for short. Ecopolitics is the modification of the political power and sovereignty of states in order to reflect ecological realities and to build the institutions that can resolve ecologically-rooted conflicts and create ecologically- sustainable development. One kind of ecopolitics, the pooling of sovereignty in supra-state institutions, is relatively familiar. International treaties and conventions such as the Law of the Seas, Antarctic Treaty, Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, and the Montreal Protocol to that Convention. Decentralization of state power may also be necessary to address certain kinds of environmental problems and to promote ecodevelopment. Examples from the Horn of Africa, the U.S., Canada, and the U.S.S.R. were presented. This aspect of ecopolitics is less widely recognized and much more controversial than international cooperation to protect the environment. Both of these transformations of the global economic and political system will produce conflict, as they are resisted by states, corporations, and social groups with strong vested interests in the status quo. Ecodevelopment and ecopolitics will therefore require advances in peace research and conflict management -- although just what kinds of advances will be needed is not yet very clear. Carrying out these three kinds of reform will also be expensive, and require a redirection of a substantial portion of the funds now spent on military forces worldwide to environmental conservation, restoration, and ecodevelopment. Many in the audience agreed that the large transformations in the international economic and political systems proposed by Byers were necessary to solve global environmental problems and prevent conflict, but many argued that they were so large and so unlikely in the near future as to be "utopian." The incremental steps by which societies can get from "here" to "there" are not yet very clear to any of us, it seems. It was pointed out that to begin to take these incremental steps, it is necessary to understand the social, economic, and political actors and their motivations, in order to move them in the necessary directions. For example, although all in the audience agreed that it was absurd that the U.S. spent only one ten-thousandth as much on biodiversity conservation efforts as on military forces in 1987, or that the U.N. Action Plan for Tropical Forests would cost only half a day of worldwide military spending but has not yet been funded, they did not think that these spending priorities could be changed easily or soon. IMPERIALISM AND THE GULF WAR - Tom Mayer - Sociology Department, University of Colorado, Boulder March 8, 1991 Sponsored by the Department of Sociology, UC - Boulder Tom Mayer gave a presentation of a paper which will be published in the April issue of Monthly Review. In this paper he analyzed the implications of the Gulf War for what he calls the "new phase of imperialism." Mayer argues that since World War II, there have been three main constraints on the imperialist tendencies of the United States: "(1) there existed a major military power (the Soviet Union) with ideology and political interests at least partially opposed to those of the United States; (2) largely as a result of the Vietnam disaster, a significant share of the American public strongly opposed foreign wars; and, (3) the high expense of major imperialist adventures aggravated certain structural problems of the American economy." The decline of the Soviet Union as a significant political power coupled with the rise of economic competition to the United States (particularly Germany and Japan) has "weakened or eliminated the three constraints" on imperialism. Mayer asserts that United States involvement in the Gulf War would not have occurred if the Soviet Union were still a "superpower." It is this new freedom to engage in imperialist actions that allowed the United States and Britain to form a coalition to enter the Gulf. Mayer further suggests that in general, declining powers tend to protect themselves by exerting more political and military power. He sees the United States and Britain as militarily strong, but economically declining. The combination of declining economy and dependency on oil makes unrest in the Middle East appear particularly threatening to the United States and Britain, and, as a consequence they were the leaders of the coalition. The Bush administration saw the Gulf War as an opportunity to further escape the constraints to imperialistic action in the sense that a quick American victory would consolidate public opinion about the moral and practical value of war, and erase the lingering effects of the defeat in Vietnam. The third constraint to imperialism, the monetary expense of the venture, was also overcome by the Bush administration in their demands for support from the countries who are rising economically; Germany and Japan. This new phase of imperialism which Mayer envisions has several main ingredients: "(a) an increased tendency towards direct American military intervention in the third world, (b) a concentrated effort to exercise unilateral American political power in world affairs, (c) expanded pressure on Europe and Japan to pay the costs of American interventionism, (d) attempts to enhance the military superiority of the United States over all other countries plus continued reliance upon weapons production as a lever for managing domestic capitalism, and, (e) increased efforts to legitimize American military interventions through the United Nations." Mayer emphasizes that though the Gulf War signals the beginning of this new phase of imperialism, the use of the word "phase" is important because it denotes a temporary state. He believes that the United States will not alone be able to economically sustain the cost of continued intervention, and that over time Europe and Japan will feel less compelled and less threatened to support the cost of American imperialism. In conclusion, Tom Mayer's presentation focused on the macro-political events which led to the American presence in the Gulf. This presence is explained in terms of weakening constraints on imperialist activity, along with the United States' interest in maintaining control of the source of oil which the Middle East provides. He projects a relatively short period of increased efforts of the United States to engage in imperialism, and increased pressure on Europe, Japan, and the United Nations to sanction and assume the cost of this imperialist activity. STRATEGIES FOR OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO ENVIRONMENTAL SOLUTIONS - Guy Burgess, Conflict Resolution Consortium February 25, 1991 Sponsored by the Institute for Artic and Alpine Research, UC-Boulder. Burgess began by arguing that finding solutions to most of our current environmental problems depends as much upon understanding society's environmental problem-solving processes as upon understanding the physical and biological dynamics of the environment. The environmental problem solving process has many socio-political components which interact. This complexity makes understanding, manipulating, and modifying the process very difficult and risky. However, such modifications will be necessary to solve any of our major environmental problems effectively. Burgess went on to describe the principal components of the socio-political environmental problem solving process, and how they interact. He also presented a general strategy for developing solutions to environmental problems which have a realistic chance for implementation. From the socio-political point of veiw, the environmental problem solving process starts with the identification of an environmental problem. In some cases this is a generic problem (e.g., acid raid, global warming, endangered species, habitat or wetland deplention). In other cases is it site specific (e.g., protecting a particular wetland, or habitat, disposing of hazardous waste at a particular site, building a new source of hydrocarbon emmissions, etc.). In either case, parties identifying the situation as a problem generally hire technical experts to identify potential solutions to the problem--solutions that are usually crafted to correspond to that interest group's particular agenda. They often support their analysis with environmental impact studies, which analyze the problem and illustrate how the proposed solution is likely to work. (In many cases this is required as part of the federally-mandated EIS process.) A negotiation process, sometimes formal and explicit, but often informal and implicit, is used to choose among all the the alternative options put on the table by different experts and interest groups. Also important, but often overlooked, are distributional impact studies. It must be clear how different groups are being affected by the problem and the proposed solutions. If solutions are likely to hurt some groups significantly at the expense of others, the groups being hurt are likely to attempt to block the implementation of the solution. Public input is therefore another important overlapping element in the problem solving process. In addition to simply listening to public and interest group sentiment, technical experts and policy makers need to consider how their studies and decision making proceedures can be made understandable and believable to a nontechnical and often skeptical or even hostile public. Burgess emphasized that the process of building credibility must proceed in tandem with technical studies since after the fact add-ons are notoriously ineffective. Another crucial component of the process involves mechanisms for limiting destructive interpersonal conflicts. Often conflicts over environmental issues escalate deep-seated conflicts between groups or individuals, clouding those people's ability to make sound analyses or decisions. A final obtacle to successful negotiation and implementation is what Roger Fisher and William Ury (Getting to Yes, 1980) call BATNAs--Best Alternatives to Negotiated Agreements. Negotiation processes are unlikely to be successful when one or more of the parties feels that they could get a "better deal" with some type of power contest -- economic, legal, political, or even military. When this is the case, power contests are usually inevitable, though their costs can, at times, be limited. Power contests are also likely to be required when negotiated compromises so weaken environmental solutions that they can no longer successfully address the problem. Burgess went on to describe strategies for lowering the cost of power contests and, if possible, returning to the negotiation process once power relationships are clearly established.