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James Schlesinger was Secretary of Defense from July 2, 1973 - November
19, 1975. Despite his relative youth, given his academic and
government credentials he appeared exceptionally well-qualified for the
post. As a university professor, researcher at Rand, and government
official in three agencies, he had acquired an impressive background in
national security affairs.
Born on 15 February 1929 in New York City, Secretary Schlesinger was
educated at Harvard University, where he earned a B.A. (1950), M.A. (1952),
and Ph.D. (1956) in economics. Between 1955 and 1963 he taught economics at
the University of Virginia and in 1960 published The Political Economy of
National Security. In 1963 he moved to the Rand Corporation, where he
worked until 1969, in the later years as director of strategic studies.
In 1969 Schlesinger joined the Nixon administration as assistant
director of the Bureau of the Budget, devoting most of his time to Defense
matters. In 1971 President Nixon appointed Schlesinger a member of the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and designated him as chairman. Serving in
this position for about a year and a half, Schlesinger instituted extensive
organizational and management changes in an effort to improve the AEC's
regulatory performance. In February 1973 he became director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
As Secretary, Schlesinger saw a need in the post-Vietnam era to restore
the morale and prestige of the military services; modernize strategic
doctrine and programs; step up research and development; and shore up a DoD
budget that had been declining since 1968.
<>Analyzing
strategy, Schlesinger maintained that the theory and practice of the 1950s
and 1960s had been overtaken by events, particularly the rise of the Soviet
Union to virtual nuclear parity with the United States and the effect this
development had on the concept of deterrence. He had grave doubts about the
assured destruction strategy, which relied on massive nuclear attacks
against an enemy's urban-industrial areas. Credible strategic nuclear
deterrence, the secretary felt, depended on fulfilling several conditions:
maintaining essential equivalence with the Soviet Union in force
effectiveness; maintaining a highly survivable force that could be withheld
or targeted against an enemy's economic base in order to deter coercive or
desperation attacks against U.S. population or economic targets;
establishing a fast-response force that could act to deter additional enemy
attacks; and establishing a range of capabilities sufficient to convince
all nations that the United States was equal to its strongest competitors.
Because he regarded conventional forces as an equally essential element
in the deterrence posture of the United States, Schlesinger wanted to
reverse what he perceived as a gradual downward trend in conventional force
strength. He pointed out that because Soviet nuclear capabilities had
reached approximate parity with the United States, the relative
contribution to deterrence made by U.S. strategic forces had inevitably
declined. One of the missions of conventional forces, he noted, was to
deter or defeat limited threats.
Schlesinger devoted much attention to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, citing the need to strengthen its conventional capabilities.
He rejected the old assumption that NATO did not need a direct counter to
Warsaw Pact conventional forces because it could rely on tactical and
strategic nuclear weapons, noting that the approximate nuclear parity
between the United States and the Soviets in the 1970s made this stand
inappropriate. He also rejected the argument that NATO could not afford a
conventional counterweight to Warsaw Pact forces. Schlesinger promoted the
concept of burden-sharing, stressing the troubles that the United States
faced in the mid-1970s because of an unfavorable balance of international
payments.
Schlesinger had to deal with a succession of immediate crises that
tested his administrative and political skills. In October 1973, three
months after he took office, Egypt and Syria launched the Yom Kippur War
with a sudden attack on Israel. A few days after the war started, with
Israel not faring well militarily and the Soviets resupplying the Arab
belligerents, the United States began airlifting supplies to Israel. The
initial U.S. policy was to avoid direct involvement rested on the
assumption that Israel would win quickly. But when it became clear that the
Israelis faced formidable military forces and could not make their own
resupply arrangements, the United States took up the burden.
Another crisis flared in July 1974 when Turkish forces, concerned about
the safety of the Turkish minority community, invaded Cyprus after the
Cypriot National Guard, supported by the government of Greece, overthrew
President Archbishop Makarios. When the fighting stopped, the Turks held
the northern section of the island, about 40 percent of the total area.
Schlesinger felt the Turks had overstepped the bounds of legitimate
interests in Cyprus and suggested that the United States might have to
reexamine its military aid program to Turkey.
The last phase of the Indochina conflict occurred during Schlesinger's
tenure. Although all U.S. combat forces had left South Vietnam in the
spring of 1973, the United States continued to maintain a military presence
in other areas of Southeast Asia. When the North Vietnamese began an
offensive early in 1975, the United States could do little to help the
South Vietnamese, who collapsed completely as the North Vietnamese entered
Saigon in late April. Schlesinger announced early in the morning of 29
April 1975 the evacuation from Saigon by helicopter of the last U.S.
diplomatic, military, and civilian personnel.
In May 1975 forces of the Communist Cambodian government boarded and
captured the crew of the Mayaguez, an unarmed U.S.-registered freighter.
The United States bombarded military and fuel installations on the
Cambodian mainland and launched an amphibious invasion of an offshore
island to rescue the crew. The 39 captives were retrieved, but the attack
cost the lives of 41 U.S. military personnel. Nevertheless, the majority of
the American people seemed to approve of the administration's decisive
action.
Schlesinger's insistence on higher defense budgets, his disagreements
within the administration and with Congress on this issue, and his
differences with Secretary of State Kissinger all contributed to his
dismissal from office by President Ford in November 1975.
In spite of the controversy surrounding both his tenure and dismissal,
Schlesinger was by most accounts an able secretary of defense.
After leaving the Pentagon, Schlesinger wrote and spoke forcefully about
national security issues, especially the Soviet threat and the need for the
United States to maintain adequate defenses. When Jimmy Carter became
president in January 1977 he appointed Schlesinger, a Republican, as his
special adviser on energy and subsequently as the first head of the new
Department of Energy in October 1977. Schlesinger held this position until
July 1979 when Carter replaced him. Thereafter he resumed his writing and
speaking career and was employed as a senior adviser to Lehman Brothers,
Kuhn Loeb Inc., of New York City.
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