Better Women: The Cultural Politics of Gendered Expertise in Indonesia

Carla Jones

ABSTRACT Through analysis of an increasingly popular phenomenon of courses training feminine comportment in Indonesia, I argue in this article that the appeal and work of femininity can be analyzed as a form of what Timothy Mitchell has called the "rule of experts." Building on Mitchell, I suggest that expertise is central to authoritarian projects and postauthoritarian aftermath and is especially evident in zones that masquerade as least public and yet most self-evident. As a result, expertise gains its value from the conditions it claims to alleviate. Placing gender at the center of the analytical frame reveals these effects more clearly and can potentially expose the ideological contradictions that ground their allure.

Keywords: expertise, femininity, Indonesia, consumption, postauthoritarian

Postauthoritarian Indonesia is teeming with expertise. From psychological advice columns to religious specialists, get-rich schemes, and self-esteem programs, Indonesia is, as Tania Murray Li has said, a place saturated with "talk of improvement" (2007:1). In this article, I analyze a particular site of expertise in contemporary Indonesia, a fee-based industry of seminars educating women in respectable femininity. Building on Timothy Mitchell's (2002) argument that the creation and distribution of particular ways of knowing have been central to eliding the political foundations of global modernities, I argue that expertise that positions Indonesian women as central to national change reveals the ways in which expertise is never generic but, rather, addresses particular subjects in highly specific ways. As a result, femininity—as well as the female form that is expected to embody it—are both the object and subject of expertise, thereby revealing the ideological justifications that expertise can generate.

Since the early 1990s, Indonesian cities have seen a proliferation of business institutes and occasional seminars offering self-improvement courses in which comportment, dress, and etiquette feature prominently. A subset of these courses has focused on skills considered appropriate to new forms of femininity. Instruction about how to dress, engage in polite conversation, make a bed, apply makeup, or eat Western-style meals rested on the assumption that a proven body of biopolitical rules exist on how to manage the self. These assumptions expand regionally specific conceptions of interiority and exteriority, bodily management, and status into a political culture that makes mastery of the self seem universal and egalitarian. Although the content and students vary, the general structure of these courses assumes that the self can be turned into an object of analysis, both as a physical body and as an individual personality. They also presume that individual drive combined with acquisition of technical knowledge about behavior can create a more successful, well-to-do, and content person. As one friend explained to me, following one of my first evenings in a class, "Becoming confident won't just happen. I will have to work at it" (conversation with author, April 7, 1997).

Although these ideas mirror U.S. self-help discourse (cf. Ehrenreich and English 1989), they did not emerge in a vacuum. Rather, they are in dialogue with particularly Javanese values of comportment and manners that have been harnessed to two historical, national projects in Indonesia, previously ubiquitous state-sponsored programs of gendered development and more recent market-based celebrations of consumption and self-discipline. As distant as domesticity and femininity might seem from affairs of state, Suzanne Brenner (1998:226) has argued that the authoritarian Soeharto New Order regime (1965–98) maintained its power through its reach into the domestic sphere. Many of the students in femininity courses considered them more attractive than state-sponsored programs on gendered conduct, even though the former required tuition while the latter was free—a choice that felt liberated and fashionable.

AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST, Vol. 112, Issue 2, pp. 270–282, ISSN 0002-7294 online ISSN 1548-1433. ©2010 by the American Anthropological Association. All rights reserved. DOI: 10.1111/j.1548-1433.2010.01225.x

Both forums relied on the authority of, and created additional authority through, the power of an external body of knowledge about correct femininity through consumption: in state programs, through reference to the correct way to raise children or manage a household, while in fee-based courses, the correct way to dress or interact socially.

This phenomenon parallels similar transformations from other parts of the world during the late 20th and early 21st centuries, changes typically identified as "neoliberal" in that they emphasize a new type of ethical subject, one less dependent on state services and more invested in self-actualization through consumption (cf. Harvey 2005; Watts 2000). Although the experts I describe used a global language that emphasized these qualities, they also achieved their status as experts and earned respect from their students as apt embodiments of regionally specific conceptions of self-control. I therefore argue that this culture of expertise cannot only be explained as a novel fascination with techniques of the self. Rather, its appeal rests on at least two other factors, politics and gender, both of which reveal the particular and contingent nature of expertise.

In his analysis of the formation of objects for intervention in Egyptian history, Mitchell identifies expertise, and those who wield it, as central to naturalizing the logics of capitalism and modernity. He argues that through a process of defining problems and their solutions as self-evident, both critics and proponents of capitalism and modernity frame them as internally propelled. Although this is an axiom of post-structural critique (e.g., Ferguson 1994; Gibson-Graham 1993), Mitchell's contribution extends Michel Foucault's excavation of European discipline and governance to a more recent and more global history. As he argues, "The more natural the object appears, the less obvious this discursive manufacture will be" (Mitchell 2002:210). Naturalness allows for recruiting particular solutions, soliciting the expertise that initially framed the problem, and generating categories ranging from "hygiene" to "state," "private sector," and the "economy" in the process (2002:211). Expertise thus becomes a key component of transnational circulations of knowledge through delimiting social and political problems, occluding their origins and even their violence. And because of its expert allure, it becomes difficult to critique.

My argument builds on Mitchell's, emphasizing two points that are less explicit in his analysis. First, expertise is especially appealing in a postauthoritarian environment. By *postauthoritarian,* I mean both terms equally: *post* and *authoritarian.* Although 12 years have now passed since the end of the Soeharto regime, its selective display and occlusion of authority generated a particular culture of expertise during its rule and an anxiety about reliable facts in its aftermath. Expertise offered twinned promises in this context: confidence from following rules through technical mastery of the world and a related allure of revelation and truth in conditions of uncertainty. Second, although Mitchell argues that expertise gains its authority from objectifying political problems as "natural," thereby depoliticizing them, his argument especially resonates with the social sphere so often objectified and naturalized: the feminine.

Indeed, feminist theoretical interrogations of hegemonic concepts such as kinship, sex, and gender have long queried the idea of "the natural" (Ortner 1974; Rubin 1975; Yanagisako and Delaney 1995). Feminist analysis of the gendered relationship between consumption and labor in Indonesian national history shows how female citizens were especially required to admire and apply expertise, revealing that the objectification of subjectivity always takes specific forms. In addition, the desire to train one's self rested on an ironic tension between conceiving femininity as a natural expression of an inner self versus as a result of tutelage, a tension that perpetually threatened to expose the artifice of expertise. Likewise, the appealing, apparent accessibility of cultivation versus its privilege were always in fragile balance, poised to fracture claims that had as much to do with inequalities within the category of the feminine such as power, ethnicity, and class (Ginsburg and Tsing 1990). Placing gender at the center of the analytical frame reveals these effects more clearly and potentially exposes the ideological contradictions that found their allure.

GENDERED OBJECT LESSONS

"My skin is a bit dark. Can I wear light colors, like peach or cream? Or will that make my skin look even darker?" Nina respectfully but directly asked the wardrobe instructor one evening. "Yes, you may wear cream, but be careful wearing it close to your face. That will emphasize the contrast" (field notes, August 7, 2007). "What about powder? How often should I powder my face through the day?" Dita asked a different evening. "Only as frequently as is necessary. It depends on your skin type. You don't want to blind people with your shiny face!" the makeup instructor replied (field notes, August 19, 2008).

Exchanges like these, in the context of lectures on feminine self-improvement, characterized the friendly but earnest atmosphere in a course called "Pengembangan Pribadi" (Personal Development).[1] Two evenings a week, for six weeks, women who paid 600,000 Rupiah (or $60 in 2008) would learn various rules of conduct. The course was modeled on the popular genre of self-improvement courses offered through the John Robert Powers finishing schools in Indonesia and around the world and was popularly referred to as "training," a word that deliberately maintained a foreign cachet even though other terms for cultivation exist in Indonesian and Javanese. Students ranged in ages and backgrounds, from college students about to enter the job market to wives of civil servants. Each cohort would begin their enrollment with a lecture on the components and importance of self-confidence, involving a preliminary analysis by the student of her own personality. Much of this was borrowed from Stephen Covey's (2004) *Seven Habits of Highly Effective People* but also resonated with U.S. makeover shows that promise, through an updating of personal appearance, a transformation of subjects' entire lives. Classes covered topics such as mental health (with an emphasis on self-esteem), public speaking, makeup application, hairstyling, evening wear, and table manners. Mastery of this expertise was simultaneously pleasurable and laborious: pleasurable because choosing to work on oneself could feel like an expression of freedom from state programs; laborious because it still required effort to achieve full compliance with course content. Yet, as I argue, pleasure and labor were in close dialogue, providing clarity and confidence in a threatening postauthoritarian political context in which previously fixed rules were in flux.

Instructors came from a variety of respected arenas in the Yogyakarta social world: wives of prominent officials, women with ties to the royal court, local fashion designers (typically male), or well-known businesswomen. The institute offered a wide array of courses on public relations, public speaking, and business strategies, but only Pengembangan Pribadi had a gendered focus. The institute's founders positioned it as an educational and feminist offering to the community, through a reputation for accessibility (the course was comparatively less expensive than similar courses in the city) and through its well-known graduates. Instructors blended international travel experience to Australia or Singapore with local reputations in Yogyakarta social circles. An ideal teacher was a person of influence, or *orang berpengaruh,* known for connections in the world.[2] Through hybrid and deft use of regional ideas of refinement, mass media directed at women, and English-inflected terms for confidence and success, popular teachers embodied an idealized mix of global and local. Their brokering of essential Indonesian femininity could seem like a noble intervention against global cultural imperialism, making translation an expression of cultural preservation through references to "Indonesian" tastes or social limits, asserting a Javanese quality to national character.

Much as Foucault described for the forms of biopolitical training associated with modern institutions, students had to learn psychological and professional categories to classify themselves (1979:170).[3] By identifying whether or not one enjoyed being the center of attention, was shy, or felt nervous speaking on the phone, one could then identify one's weaknesses and learn the correct protocol for interaction. Similarly, students were asked to identify themselves by (desired) job and dress style, selecting from "librarian" or "casual" to the recently introduced category of "Muslim dress." Each decision would then generate a flow chart of linked rules, such as what colors or shapes to wear, footwear options, and whether to consider contacts over eyeglasses. Instructors peppered their presentations with references to global and local facts, such as eschewing diamonds or the color black during the day or reminding students that Indonesian women should favor fair skin.

The rules were plentiful, ranging from fashion to etiquette. For example, on dress, students were instructed:

> Women naturally love to shop, especially for gold. But count up your accessories before you leave the house, and if you have more than seven, including gold buttons on your jacket, remove some. Seven is enough.
>
> This course is not about making you shop more. It is to make your trips to the mall optimal, maximal *(maksimal).* But you have to have to have a concept of yourself *(konsep diri)* first before you go.
>
> Don't go shopping with your husband or boyfriend unless you want to be disappointed later. He will say everything looks nice on you. Batik is tricky and requires care to wear. You could easily end up looking left behind the times *(ketinggalan jaman)* or like a tablecloth or curtains. Batik blazers are especially difficult, unless you want to look like a PKK matron (the state-mandated *Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga* or Family Welfare Program).
>
> If you really want someone to notice what you are saying, wear a bold color of lipstick. They will look at your mouth and pay attention to what you are saying.

Other rules applied to formal dining settings:

> Who knows, you just might become a minister's wife. You would need to know how to accompany your husband to a dinner party.
>
> Never sip your drink until others have done so first. If you are really thirsty, invite others to drink so you that can.
>
> Be kind to your fellow diners. Avoid discussing sensitive issues like politics or religion.
>
> Once you have taken a bite out of a dinner roll, don't put it back on the plate. Foreigners, especially Americans, find it distasteful to have anything that touched a mouth then touch a plate.

Each of these recommendations rested on several assumptions. First, desire for consumer goods, decoration, or even food and drink is a uniquely feminine impulse. Expertise could enable women to curtail those desires through expressing them judiciously. Second, adherence to rules promised minimizing shame in social encounters through self-restraint. The possibility of a flawed interaction assumed one right and countless wrong ways of being in the world. Education about those "right ways" reinforced the idea that expertise is reliable, universal knowledge. Finally, the rules were social in nature. Although they addressed individual behavior, they also assumed training was for moments when the individual goes into the social world. In each, expertise elided the privileged nature of the courses and framed the consumption they generated as pleasurable, natural, but potentially unruly expressions of femininity.

Student expectations for the course revealed their own interaction with these assumptions. Dita, a 40-year-old civil servant, had been advised by friends to enroll in the course. Dita was one of the most assertive yet serious students in her class, pressing teachers about ways to turn their fashion advice into practical solutions for her own use. Always polite, she never failed to ask if a particular wardrobe or makeup suggestion could be achieved more affordably than the suggested method.

> I took this class because I really hate shopping, but everyone in my office likes to dress up and I feel like I need to increase my PD (short for *percaya diri,* self-belief or self-confidence). I think my style is classic and simple, and I ride a motorbike to work, so it

> has to be practical, but I think it isn't enough. I need to look more *in*. [conversation with author, August 7, 2007]

She had faced challenges following the end of the Soeharto regime when policies on civil-servant uniforms were loosened, allowing for more personal variation in dress. This shift had generated more sartorial expression among women in her office, and she missed the old days when she had not had to invest as much energy or income into her work wardrobe. The uniform alone had been a sign of status and authority. Whispering to me late one evening after class, she confided that she was worried that her disinterest in appearance might be holding her back professionally, which was in turn exacerbating her lack of self-confidence.

Experiences like Dita's also index how courses generated both comfort and anxiety. On the one hand, students would not have enrolled in the course if they were not aware of the importance of comportment. Of the over 40 students I came to know, only one had not enrolled of her own accord, and even she became enthusiastic.[4] Most were already polished and polite and delighted in learning more on topics about which they were already interested.[5] References to women's universal desire to be attractive, to shop, or to wear jewelry established the starting point from which both teachers and students could unite in pursuit of beauty and confidence. Students regularly raised questions gleaned from mass media or life experiences, adding humor and energy to the classroom atmosphere. Instructors' openness to specific questions about slimming colors, etiquette on handling dropped phone calls, or clarification on whether one should use facial toner both morning and evening reinforced a value for practical application of knowledge. On the other hand, the appeal of the course also came from a desire to mitigate potentially embarrassing social encounters. Instructors frequently, and wittily, invited students to imagine their shame if they behaved differently than recommended. "Think how you would feel if you saw someone using their napkin to wipe their whole face during a meal, rather than just the corners of the mouth," one instructor joked, while exaggeratedly waving a napkin across his face. The whole class laughed at the absurdity of something they would never personally do.

Many students privately explained that their hope in taking the class, besides any concrete achievement like getting a job or being a poised wife to a state official, was to replace a feeling of backwardness with a sense of percaya diri. The term *percaya diri* has entered the public lexicon through the hip abbreviation "PD," especially through advertisements for personal-care goods, revealing the centrality of self *(diri)* in a discourse of improvement as the lens through which to experience progress. Indeed, shame and confidence were only two of the ways through which the idea of diri circulated. Diri was essential to ideas such as *konsep diri* (self-conception) and *kontrol diri* (self-control), construed as managing impulses and appetites.

Sani stood out in her cohort because her desire to increase her PD almost overcame her profound shyness. A 37-year-old housewife, Sani confided to me that she enrolled in the course to mitigate her lack of PD, stemming from a sense of being *kampungan,* meaning low class or provincial.[6] Sani identified her naturally curly hair as the source of her anxiety—hair that was very different from the glossy, long hairstyles favored by most Indonesian celebrities and models. Although she found her insecurity painful, even preventing her from leaving the house on occasion, she said her greatest concern was not for herself but for her daughter, whom she worried would sense her lack of confidence and suffer from the same unease. In spite of her nervousness, Sani was especially interactive during the sessions on haircare and makeup for tips that might increase her confidence. Several months later, Sani told me that she was successfully applying the rules for carriage and interaction, but she still hated her hair.

Identifying, controlling, or believing in oneself were such shared aspirations that they almost overcame the otherwise striking differences among students. Tina, a 26-year-old woman with a newly minted master's degree in architecture, had recently established a small NGO for land rights for the urban poor. Tina had long been athletic and outgoing and favored what she called "simple garb" such as jeans and collared shirts. Having known her for over a decade, I was surprised when I heard her casually mention that she had recently completed the femininity course. I teased her that she did not need the course, because she already had a distinctive personal style as an "activist," an identity associated with resisting authoritarianism (see Lee "Activis, Activist" in Barker and Lindquist et al. 2009). Surprised by my surprise, Tina explained that she was learning kontrol diri, which was obviously vital to her chosen career path, saying, "I have a vision for our institute, our projects, and I have to manage my staff and our resources. I work long hours. I want to be efficient and effective. I have to learn how to control myself" (conversation with author, August 9, 2008). Pressed, she added that the course had not substantially changed her style but that frugality with her wardrobe was consistent with self-control. It had also helped with what she described as her constant dieting.

CULTIVATION AND CONTROL

Identifying, cultivating, and managing the self are not unique to Indonesia; methods of doing so have deeper national and transnational histories. In his description of the linked formation of states, classes, and manners in France and Germany, Norbert Elias considered self-restraint, experienced as "self-compulsion" (2000:367), one of the key elements of the "civilizing process." Taxation, increasing contact across social groups, and the need for order during change saw considerable transformation of rules for bodily comportment and social interaction from the 15th to the 20th centuries, "beginning with the middle classes" (2000:383). If self-control is a sign of civilization, then Java has been civilized for a long time. Esoteric knowledge linking mastery of the body to other forms of power (religious, political, and status) has long been associated with particular groups of people in Java, especially nobility *(priyayi).* Dutch conquest of central Javanese kingdoms during the same period Elias studied involved wresting political and economic control from sultans in exchange for increasing their symbolic status, which further inflated the importance of etiquette (Brenner 1998:70–71).

More recently, Tom Boellstorff has described the mutually constituting relationship of middle-class consumer desire and heteronormativity in contemporary Indonesia as a process of "personhood-as-career" through which "the self becomes the self's profession . . . a story that the self tells to itself about itself" (2005:119). Boellstorff's description of subjectivity as self-work resonates with Nikolas Rose's assertion that political and economic shifts in late-20th-century Europe and North America have created new aesthetic communities that valorize specific arts of living including consumption, domesticity, and erotics. Rose describes the restructuring of the relationship between states and citizens into "a contract between those who exercise power and those who are obliged to be its subjects" (2000:1397–1398). These new political forms frame endless work on the self as desirable, autonomous, and liberating but are social imperatives, requiring choosing an identity and interpreting that choice as an essential component of the subject. The entire process rests on expertise:

> Norms of conduct for the civilized are now disseminated by independent experts, no longer explicit agents of a social code or moralizing instructions enjoined by superiors, but concerned professionals seeking to allay the problems, anxieties and uncertainties engendered by the seemingly so perplexing conditions of our present. [Rose 1999:87]

Rose's description of the link between the internalization of self-work and public valorization of expertise partially explains the appeal of political and social changes that have arguably generated new forms of social difference.[7] Although denigration of the state and celebration of consumption as authentic self-expression appear to have recent parallels in Indonesia, they also build on much older regional forms of cultivation that connect bodily training to social embedding, interiority, and exteriority, suggesting that these changes may not be as radical as they at first appear.[8] A rich literature on emotions in Southeast Asia examines the ties among conduct, personhood, and status (Geertz 1960; Geertz 1961; Peletz 1996). For example, Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead's (1942) description of the training of young Balinese dancers emphasized the effort involved in subsuming individual impulses to the physical requirements of formal, synchronized movements. Rather than direct, exterior expressions of a hermetically sealed "self" that is ideally unaffected by the tumult of others' feelings or expectations, personhood is in conversation with the social, formed in relation to those with whom one interacts. Shelly Errington compares U.S. self-help discourses that emphasize reading body language as an expression of an interior psyche to conceptions of spiritual potency in south Sulawesi that frame reading the body as "public in the sense that one's body stance does not express one's interiority . . . Rather, it registers the status of the person to whom it is oriented" (1989:155). In this context, one comes to understand behavior as aesthetic allusions (Florida 1995:276) to social relations and to the possibility that, although behaviors ought to mirror an inner condition, they just as easily might not (Anderson 1990; Siegel 1986:55).

Bodily training thus entails orientation toward the world outside the self, even as it demands internalizing that orientation as the recognition of the self. Training in this sense can have high stakes, potentially resulting in shame. Shame is an effect of social interactions gone wrong or of failing to manage the body properly, especially with regard to appetites that are both physical and psychic. Analyzing Javanese concern with status, Ward Keeler (1990) describes this culturally specific emotion as gendered, with a heavier burden for performing linguistic expertise and deference for men than women. In contrast, through analysis of political and economic marginalization in the off-shore manufacturing industries of Batam, Johan Lindquist (2008) describes shame and anxiety as experienced especially intimately by feminized migrant laborers. In femininity courses, ideas about self-work were therefore not simply direct translations of imported celebrations of individuation, even as they reinforced the pleasures of consumption and the prestige of expertise. Rather, terms such as *konsep diri, percaya diri,* and *kontrol diri,* while reiterating the centrality of self, situated that self in an imagined social landscape of potential missteps, contexts in which the self was a possible barrier to smooth interpersonal relations.

Shifts in the relationship between selfhood and cultivation can also be traced to Indonesian nationalist and postcolonial state "enframings" (Mitchell 2002:296–297) of desire that linked appearance and the feminine as self-evident and the emergence of expertise for managing them. Feminine expertise was part of the colonial project in the Dutch East Indies, a fact evident in tutelage for Dutch wives and for native girls, which, although different in content, assumed that the proof of European superiority and the rationale for rule could be found in the essential differences between European and native femininities (Locher-Scholten 1998; Stoler 2002). Colonial expertise on femininity could be marked as specific to European subjects or dispensed as a generous bequest to native women, adding to the secretive nature of a knowledge that was also framed as universal. Stigmatization of native femininity, thus, had two linked effects. First, it reinforced priyayi claims that proper femininity was a quiet, undemanding expression of feminine care (Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis 1987). At the same time, it established family life and gender roles as terrain for public discussion and technical improvement, which revolutionary movements in the late 19th and early 20th centuries then claimed and expanded on (Gouda 1998). Rudolf Mrázek (2002:137) has shown that in the early 20th century the use of styles and objects associated with modernity, especially those technological and those worn on the body, were modes of nationalist struggle. For nationalist women, European forms of femininity were especially lively symbols in these debates, evident in revolutionary novels such as Achdiat Kartamihardja's *Atheis* (1949) or Adboel Moeis's *Salah Asoehan* (1928), in which female characters enamored of European-style clothes, lipstick, and perfume failed to find happiness or met tragic fates. Saskia Wieringa (1988) has argued that nationalist women's organizations of the 1920s, which taught members about companionate marriage and the domestic arts, were the foundation for socialist feminist groups of the Sukarno period (1949–65) that were ultimately discredited and decimated during the New Order.[9]

President Soeharto drew on priyayi political symbolism, extending the value of etiquette and mastery into a powerful bureaucratic center that was also diffuse and apparitional. His centralized authority rested on a stylized display of transparency and opacity, didactic paternalism and illegible intimidation, presented as caring leadership for a developing nation. The release of complex, scientistic five-year development plans (GBHN or Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara) began during the Soeharto period, each iteration forecasting national economic targets focused on architecture, the economy, or engineering (Amir 2008; Barker 2005; Kusno 2000) but also reintroducing the "family principle" or *azas kekeluargaan* (Boellstorff 2005:189, 197; Shiraishi 1997). The family principle wove the metaphor of the nation as a family into state programs for families, making domestic management central to a calm, developing collective. Recommending small family size, nuclear family residence, and the transformation of the domestic sphere from a social unit of production to consumption, the GBHN brought a middle-class model of family life onto the same stage as high-profile technical projects like a national airplane, framing them as equally amenable to the benefits of expertise.

STATE-SPONSORED FEMININITY

An important medium for the manifestation of an otherwise remote state was the rise of the civil service during this period. James Siegel has described the revolutionary-era investment in being seen by the state as a fetish for "recognition" (1997:92–93), an intense desire by citizens for validation by the nation, thereby animating institutions that became the "state." Employment in the civil service was the clearest form of recognition, a public acknowledgement of having been chosen for the nation, and was most visible in the civil-service uniform. The civil service not only grew during the Soeharto period but also helped found a new middle class.[10] Training for civil servants materialized ties among centralized authority, technocratic expertise, and social mobility similar to what Max Weber described as bureaucracy's demand for cultivation, affecting "the most intimate aspects of personal culture" (1968:1002). Many of the seminars and business courses that became popular during the 1990s were modeled on civil-service training seminars—the Penataran Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (Orienting Guidelines for Comprehension and Application of Pancasila), intended to inculcate the pluralist state ideology. Its didactic format was replicated in development projects designed to uplift citizens. For the rural poor, these programs assumed that villages had been "left behind" in a march toward progress, using experts to educate about hygiene or agriculture (Li 2007).

One arena, distinct from a publicly centralized state and a political culture that won its authority through blending Javanese etiquette with seemingly universal technical facts, brought these elements home. The domestic sphere, and the feminine figure who managed it, generated an image of the family as a model of modern living. Based on the family principle, middle-class life was idealized as domestic, situated in nuclear families where fathers earned, mothers cared, and children obeyed. One of the most forceful media for this message was the association for civil servants' wives. Established in 1974, Dharma Wanita, or "Women's Duty," required civil-servant wives to participate in regular sessions associated with their husbands' work units (Blackburn 2004; Suryakusuma 1996). Meetings took the form of a class and focused on the virtues of housewifery, cooking, interior decorating, dress, and beauty, most of which could only be expressed through managed consumption, all in the service of producing and reproducing a developing nation. Failure to attend classes could jeopardize a male civil servant's professional advancement. Female civil servants attended the unit associated with their own office (or risked being held back) as well as that of their husband, if he, too, was a civil servant.[11] The guiding philosophy of Dharma Wanita, in which female citizens achieved recognition through caring for other citizens (esp. male heads of household and offspring), was used in most national programs with women's branches, especially the Family Welfare Program, designed to extend middle-class domesticity to poor neighborhoods across the country (Newberry 2006). By the mid-1990s, domesticity and femininity were skills that a woman could execute more or less well.

New Order gender politics therefore did what expertise does best: it combined objectification with naturalization. Display of the domestic sphere as the smallest unit of the nation went hand in hand with the naturalization of women's roles in that sphere, as both biological and social reproducers of the nation (Dwyer 2000). Yet, as with much of the New Order, this objectification had its anxious side. In addition to fears about criminality (Barker 2001; Siegel 1998), a kleptocratic state culture, and the inability to raise public questions about such fears, a rise in consumption and commodity culture generated its own anxieties, positioning consumer desire as a peculiarly feminine problem. Echoing John Pemberton's (1994:15) description of Soeharto's transformation of cultural finesse into a security state in which "nothing happened," Lizzy van Leeuwen (2008) argues that, in the late 1990s, consumption became a similar site of concern. For the Indonesian middle classes, the mall came to be, ideally, a space where nothing (i.e., nothing detrimental to the social body) happened. Rumors abounded about how the excess consumer desire of the mall was so powerful that young women would engage in commodified sex to fund fashionable shopping, making malls spaces that, left unmanaged, could lead to gendered disorientation and disorder. As a result, emerging alongside a public celebration of the Indonesian family and the maven who managed it were counterdiscourses that blamed the social decay of uncontrolled consumption on women.

A political context that generated a public value for feminine expertise thus intersected with priyayi values for self-control throughout the courses I studied but perhaps most in the classes on etiquette *(etiket pergaulan)*. Taught by an elegant woman known for her genealogical ties to the Yogyakarta royal court, the lecture interpreted the word *etiquette* as originally French but with a uniquely Indonesian valence. The instructor explained, "Just as in France, we, too, have rules for behavior . . . If we follow them correctly, our PD will improve, our self-image will rise" (field notes, October 7, 1997). The ten specific rules outlined a relationship among self-control, the importance of *menyusaikan diri,* or adjusting individual desires into harmony with others, and, ultimately, happiness.

> We came to this class out of a desire to conceal our weaknesses. We want to feel more confident, more beautiful. If we feel insecure, we don't feel beautiful. So when you feel that way, follow this recipe: take a deep breath. Think a minute. Control your emotions. This is hard, especially for women! But it will make you more beautiful . . . Learn how to say these three key words: thank you, I'm sorry, and please. [field notes, October 7, 1997]

"And say them with a smile," she added—smiling herself. If a given student was especially gifted at minimizing personal desire in favor of that of others, this talent suggested particular service careers, such as working in a supermarket or as a secretary. Emphasizing the inflexibility of social rules and threat of desire, the instructor continued, "Imagine an incredibly beautiful woman driving a luxurious car, with an expensive handphone, nice sunglasses, and then she crosses the solid 'no passing' lines on the road in order to avoid traffic. Suddenly, she is very ugly. Rules cannot be negotiated" (field notes, October 7, 1997). Gentle laughter and approving nods rippled across the room, reinforcing the value of rules while critiquing the selfishness of following one's own wishes. Objects figured centrally in this lesson, conveying a class-specific virtue of self-control as both frugal and social. The woman in the story was not just unattractive because she failed to control her impulses in a frustrating moment on the road. She entered the narrative having already succumbed to her own desires, evident through her collection of luxury commodities.

CONSUMPTION AND CLARITY

The decade since the end of the New Order has seen substantial economic and political restructuring. Politically, the Asian Economic Crisis led to Soeharto's resignation in 1998, regular and more open elections, and a program of regional autonomy *(otonomi daerah)* that promised regions *(kabupaten)* greater control over revenues and budgets. Economically, International Monetary Fund expertise, offered in exchange for loans during the crisis, increased ease for transnational capital flows and decreased state supplements for staples such as gas and rice, as well as state industries (Hadiz 2006). Dharma Wanita was restructured into a voluntary organization and has now dwindled to a nominal place in national life. I often hear Dharma Wanita described as "out of fashion," much like a bygone hairstyle or hemline.

Private self-improvement courses have become even more popular. Commodification of expertise under these conditions is recognizable as an example of neoliberal logic, distributing public concerns into a newly created "private sphere," construed as both individuated and market based. Rather than attend a femininity session out of duty, as was the case with Dharma Wanita classes, instructors and students shared a sense that commodified expertise was more sophisticated and effective in part because of its voluntary nature. State-mandated gender organizations seemed unpleasant or uncool. The warning to avoid wearing batik, the wax-resist textile associated with local and national identity but also used in civil-service uniforms and at official functions of Dharma Wanita and PKK, garnered student laughter, reinforcing the sense that theirs was a more cosmopolitan femininity. Dita's anxiety about the changing dress requirements at her office illustrates this, as the professional disadvantages associated with state employment were not because of decreased employment opportunities. Rather, it was the fact that the terrain for advancement had become more fashion based. Instructors also emphasized practical learning, suggesting that Dharma Wanita classes were superficial, obligatory, and theoretical exchanges of political deference, rather than sincere exercises in development. Formal dining classes were held at a local hotel restaurant, make-up classes often required students to bring in their skin-care products for assessment, and classes on dress invited students to submit for approval fabric they were considering having tailored. The last session of each course was dedicated to a runway show in which students modeled day and evening outfits, followed by verbal and written examinations of their selections.

In spite of Dharma Wanita's decline as a national institution, management of feminine consumption has not disappeared from the official sphere. Henk Schulte Nordholt (2003) has argued that, rather than generate democratic reform, regional autonomy has reinvigorated the power of local elites to turn access to the state into personal patrimony. Rather than diminishing opportunities for social mobility, regional autonomy can mean the opposite, increasing wealth in regional coffers and sometimes employment. As a result, instructors' suggestions that a student might "become a minister's wife" were both humorous and plausible. This transformation of access into class privilege, typically glossed by foreign and local media as corruption, is also cited as evidence of Indonesia's financial backwardness

(World Bank 2003). New government programs specifically link corruption to feminine unruliness. When mid-level civil servants, assumed to be male, are identified as candidates for national-level positions, their wives are summoned to week-long training sessions in which they are prepared for the responsibilities of being the wife of a high-ranking official, men whose increasing authority will tempt them to accept bribes. Although many of these women are educated and professional, the sessions focus almost entirely on feminine consumption.[12] Wives are instructed to resist temptations like daily salon visits or discarding clothing after one wearing and told to not ask husbands for more money than they are allotted, even though most Javanese wives manage middle-class household finances.[13] Such advice assumes that without instruction, women will always favor excess.

Fee-based self-improvement courses were clearly in dialogue with the legacy of state femininity programs, but what might seem an extension of formerly state-organized expertise into a market-based form involved other concerns, both cultural and political, which complicate that analysis. Consumption, underpinning both paying for expertise and the future personal consumption that the expertise might generate, was not unproblematically pleasurable. Turning to Javanese conceptions of self-restraint, instructors reminded students that they should limit their consumption, through reducing use of accessories or finding their *konsep diri* before going to a mall. Rather than emphasizing the pleasure of shopping, instructors emphasized managing it. Students shared this ethic, evident in Tina's preference for jeans and button-down shirts as the stylistic evidence of someone who controlled her appetites. Similarly, Dita's worries about her work wardrobe revealed concern about freedoms following the New Order. Like most students, Dita said she disliked shopping for clothes, yet she could no longer rely on her civil-service uniform to convey status. She repeatedly asked instructors why she could not replace her uniforms with business wear sewn from batik, as that felt closer to the respectability she had lost with her uniforms; each time she was reminded that batik was best reserved for formal occasions like weddings or for the ethnicized poor.

A clearer sense of the work that expertise performed requires addressing the kinds of anxieties it could allay. First, the stigmatization of consumption as a selfish expression of feminine nature threatening the social fabric is common to histories of capitalism. Analyses of industrialization in Europe and North America argue that the sudden availability of mass commodities generated anxieties about social change that were ameliorated by feminizing consumption, positioning those required to consume as frivolous and self-indulgent (Abelson 1989; De Grazia 1996; Rappaport 2001). Feminist rereadings argue that linking femininity to consumption erases its labor, making uncompensated tasks associated with overproduction and social reproduction appear as pleasure (Freeman 2000; Hochschild 1989). Turning consumption into pleasure and linking to it to a naturalized, devalued sphere of action requires political work, especially given the history of women and money in Java. Analyzing batik merchants in Solo, Suzanne Brenner (1998) argues that a powerful unofficial discourse in Java inverts both dominant Javanese ideologies and familiar Western assumptions, showing that men can be associated with unrestrained consumption while women, out of concern for family welfare, are considered more conservative consumers. By reclaiming consumption as moral labor, instructors and students attempted to loosen the links between consumption and excess, even as they jointly created the value of expertise.

A second source of anxiety behind the appeal of feminine expertise was more broadly political. The emotional intersection of home, family, and consumption was not only with love or shame but also with fear. Nils Bubandt (2008) has argued that a powerful effect of the New Order's combination of visible central rule and invisible and diffuse state terror was paranoia, especially following Soeharto's resignation. Arguing that affect is an effect of postauthoritarian conditions and that anxiety arises from an absence of a formerly strong center, conspiracy theories and rumors are responses to the "murkiness" of politics (Bubandt 2008:812), thereby generating an intense desire for evidence. This description fits well with the worries of middle-class families I knew during this time. For them, anxiety literally came home. Responding to the inability to identify sources of fear, many families managed their worries by shutting out the world, limiting activities outside the home, hoarding groceries, and managing family savings in an uncertain economic environment.[14] These were feminine responsibilities, ranging from calling in personal loans to insisting that children remain indoors. In addition, the most anxious months from 1998–2000 saw not only decreased status associated with the civil-servant uniform but also risk. Because of the outpouring of violence directed at any symbol of the regime, female and male civil servants alike in Yogyakarta took to changing clothes before commuting or chose to minimize errands. Every traffic intersection demanded diligence before arriving at the safe haven of home.[15]

Under these conditions, forms of knowledge that provided clarity and safety had a special allure. The comfort of expertise helped the business of fee-based courses boom in the years following the New Order, in spite of several years of economic crisis. Rather than nostalgia for the New Order, students such as Dita identified the weakening of respectability associated with the state as part of a general atmosphere of instability in the wake of the regime. Considering the legacy linking feminine consumption to national development, acquiring new expertise on how to be a better woman seemed the least one could do under the circumstances. Expertise therefore made a unique promise. Framed as knowledge that was public, verified, and universal, it deciphered invisible sources of social disorder through visible, acquirable, truthful solutions. Expertise implied a revelation of secrets, an endorsement of authentic power that itself rested on secrecy. Femininity courses relied on the allure of tutoring, exercises in which the rewards of learning came primarily from showing up, testifying to one's self and to others about the benefits of expertise. The specific rules mattered little. Yet the privileged nature of expertise, available only to those who could afford the tuition and who recognized its value, reproduced its secrecy. Expertise's exclusiveness—founded on its appreciation and mastery by a select few—contributed to its mystique, even as it masqueraded as democratic, accessible, and reassuring.

These conditions have also been linked to the rise in expressions of Islamic piety in Indonesia in the last decade (Brenner 1996; Gade 2004; Hefner 2000; Smith-Hefner 2007). The appeal of a universal, time-tested, alternative framework through which to improve oneself and the nation allowed religion to circulate as an antidote to state developmentalism—and was made all the more appealing given the regime's repression of political resistance and the uncertainty following its demise. Perhaps the most visible sign has been the increased popularity of women's Islamic dress, a relatively new phenomenon in Indonesian sartorial and religious history. Initially positioned in the 1990s as a medium and symbol of self-discipline free from consumerism, corruption, and politics, Islamic dress has since been intensively commodified, with fashion cycles that almost outpace the nonreligious clothing market. This has, in turn, created a countercritique of Islamic dress that reintroduces accusations of feminine frivolity and consumer excess with the added postauthoritarian anxieties of suspicion and obscurity, suggesting that pious women are not what they seem.[16] With more and more students in each session wearing Islamic dress, instructors found themselves faced with competing expertise, traced to a powerful authority in the Qur'an.

The religious nature of Islamic identities was especially difficult for instructors who considered themselves pious yet did not wear Islamic dress. Instead, polite additional rules for pious women were added to the list of behaviors for proper femininity. As a makeup instructor informed students one evening,

> If you want to wear a *jilbab* (headscarf), feel free *(silakan),* but remember that this will mean extra effort. We live in a tropical climate, and the *jilbab* is designed for the Middle East, so it is hard on your hair and skin. You will need to use more toner on your face. And you will need to go to the salon for hair conditioning treatments much more often. [field notes, October 21, 1997]

Similarly, the wardrobe instructor reminded students that although piety and fashion were not contradictory, pious women risked overdecorating themselves, given the additional fabric such dress required. Instead, he asked pious students to exercise self-control, emphasizing the overlapping elements of restraint shared by secular and religious conceptions of improvement.[17] Gently making eye contact with several young women with headscarves, he urged them to "return to the foundation of the principles of your dress choice. The idea of reconstructing yourself is positive, so situate your values there. Keep your life goals in sight" (field notes, August 14, 2007).

CONCLUSION

Indonesian women who take femininity courses are proud of their efforts. Instructors are likewise proud of improving Indonesian femininity. In this sense, instructors and students share respect for their mutual creation: expertise. The industry of feminine expertise in Indonesia can thus be read as an example of what Mitchell has called a "rule of experts" (2002:11–12), through instructors' and students' joint appreciation for revelations, rules, and truths.

These cases and histories reveal two key components of expertise: its centrality to authoritarian and postauthoritarian political projects, on the one hand, and the invisibility yet necessity of gender to such projects, on the other hand. Expertise not only creates the smooth illusion of singular, universal objects like capitalism or modernity but also is in dialogue with prior cultural and political conceptions that enhance particular authoritarian projects. In their wake, the value of expertise inflates further, promising facts in moments of ambiguity. Indeed, expertise gains its value from—even requires—the conditions it claims to alleviate. The Soeharto regime's enframing of gendered citizenship combined cultivation with coercion, linking femininity with consumption as natural expressions that required skilled management and revealing how the effects of expertise are most evident in zones that masquerade as least public and yet most self-evident. Dharma Wanita and the Family Welfare Program each distributed feminine skills, instilling not only facts about the ideal woman and her household but also the idea that such facts existed. Although I have described anxiety and fear as a general condition following Soeharto's resignation, middle-class women were unique laborers in that national moment. Following an environment in which expertise had been centralized and women had been assigned a specific role, decentralization and entropy increased the pressures on women to maintain individual and household safety.

Expertise could only provide this comfort, however, by eliding its foundation on two sets of opposing claims. The first posited the idea of femininity as an unstudied, unproblematic, natural expression against the allure of femininity as trained. The second claimed that, in a national context in which advice on how to live one's life has proliferated, the common appeal of improvement for everyone competes with the exclusive appeal of being part of a select group that recognizes expertise's value. Feminine training, official or commodified, trafficked in and benefited from the spaces between these poles but was also caught by this tension, as was evident in the disavowals of consumption by both instructors and students. Enframed as pleasure yet reframed as labor, courses became environments where Indonesian citizens applied the dignity of expertise to a stigmatized sphere of objectification and accusation: that of feminized consumption. These tensions escalated the need for instructors and students to differentiate the distinctiveness of their forms of femininity, sometimes resorting to using classed or political others as foils.

Expertise assumes legibility. It implies a neat transfer of preexisting knowledge that can transform an individual or a society. This mirage of transparent factuality occludes its manufacture, its singular perspective at the expense of multiple voices. I have argued that the appeal and limits of expertise are most apparent when gender is placed in the center of our analytical frame. Only when we acknowledge how much work—ideological, cultural, political, and economic—it takes to create the illusion of the natural can we see the alternatives that have been silenced in the process.

Carla Jones *Department of Anthropology, University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder, CO 80309; carla.jones@colorado.edu*

NOTES

Acknowledgments. This research comes out of a broader project conducted between 1996 and 2008, support for which came from the following institutions: the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; the Fulbright Educational Foundation in Jakarta; Gadjah Mada University; the Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia; and two grants from the University of Colorado at Boulder, from the Center to Advance Research and Teaching in the Social Sciences and the Innovative Seed Grant program. My analysis has benefited from conversations with several friends and colleagues, especially Ann Marie Leshkowich, Carla Freeman, and Donna Goldstein. Detailed and generous readings by five anonymous reviewers and Tom Boellstorff were essential to revising and clarifying my arguments and I would like to explicitly thank them for the depth of their engagement with my material.

1. *Pengembangan*—from the root *kembang,* meaning to blossom or flourish—is not the only term for development in Indonesian. Ariel Heryanto (1985:50–51) argues that a discursive effect of the Soeharto regime was replacing *pengembangan* with the more distant and technical term *pembangunan,* which is also used to refer to infrastructural growth.
2. Instructors were also described as *ahli* (expert), a term denoting a mastery of technique or knowledge.
3. Sandra Lee Bartky (1990:64–65) asserts that the docile masculine bodies Michel Foucault describes as produced by military or penal systems are nowhere near as docile as those produced by feminine codes of comportment.
4. She came from a rural town near Yogykarta but was engaged to a wealthy restaurateur. He paid her course fees.
5. The privileged nature of these programs echoes Foucault's argument that "the most rigorous techniques were formed and . . . applied first, with the greatest intensity, in the economically privileged and politically dominant classes" (1990:120).
6. *Kampungan* is used by the middle classes to refer negatively to the urban poor, although it also has positive connotations of communalism (Newberry 2006:34, 44).
7. These differences are diverse. Barbara Cruikshank (1999) argues that self-esteem suggests that political economic inequities can be resolved through self-analysis and empowerment, whereas Lisa Duggan (2002:190) argues that "the privatization of affective as well as economic and public life" in the United States has prevented questions about inequality from entering public discourse.
8. Several scholars have argued that forms of self-cultivation now glossed as "neoliberal" have long existed across Asia (Farquhar 2005; Kipnis 2008; Ong 2006; Rofel 2007), suggesting that the "neo" aspect of neoliberalism underpins its own teleology.
9. The model of wives meeting in hierarchical settings arranged according to the rank of their husbands is an older, elite Javanese tradition. Raden Adjeng Kartini described gatherings of women ranked by their husbands' titles in her father's home (Kartini 1964:175).
10. Although Indonesian middle classes were widely described in the 1990s as the natural expression of a maturing society, especially by corporations and investors cheerleading the sales potential of a new consuming class, scholars have argued that the demographic segment most associated with middle-class economic power and cultural sensibilities formed first within the civil service (Robison 1996). The glamour of a new middle class occluded national recognition of the resources, natural (Nevins and Peluso 2008) and human (Wolf 1992), fueling the rise in foreign direct investment and exports.
11. Women have steadily comprised 38 percent of the civil service (Oey-Gardiner 2002:109).
12. My understanding of these sessions is based on firsthand notes and materials from a friend who completed the training in advance of her husband's promotion to a national office in 2006.
13. This point is evident in an additional recommendation: that wives monitor household income for deviations that might indicate a bribe, suggesting that men are also prone to excess.
14. At the peak of the currency crisis in 1997–98, a "Love the Rupiah" campaign linked patriotism to the national currency, compounding the guilt that many women I knew felt over converting their savings to U.S. dollars. One woman quietly wept the evening after she converted her family's savings in September 1997, confessing that she had faced an impossible choice, either betraying her grandparents' revolutionary legacy or protecting her children's financial future.
15. Although civil servants felt especially anxious and vulnerable, their worries might have in part been a legacy of the 1965–66 violence in which civil servants were not only targets of violence but also perpetrators (Cribb 1990).
16. I have discussed the relationship between fashion and faith elsewhere (Jones 2007).
17. Daromir Rudnyckjy (2009) argues that a new genre of Islamic business expertise, linking spiritual reform to economic reform, is a specifically Indonesian expression of neoliberalism.

REFERENCES CITED

Abelson, Elaine

1989 When Ladies Go A-Thieving: Middle-Class Shoplifters in the Victorian Department Store. New York: Oxford University Press.

Amir, Sulfikar

2008 The Engineers versus the Economists: The Disunity of Technocracy in Indonesian Development. Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society 28(4):316–323.

Anderson, Benedict R. O'G.

1990 Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Barker, Joshua

2001 State of Fear: Controlling the Criminal Contagion in Suharto's New Order. *In* Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia. Benedict R.O.'G. Anderson, ed. Pp. 20–53. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

2005 Engineers and Political Dreams. Current Anthropology 46(5):703–727.

Barker, Joshua, and Johan Lindquist, with Tom Boellstorff, Chris Brown, Aryo Danusiri, Dadi Darmadi, Sheri Gibbings, Jesse Grayman, James Hoesterey, Carla Jones, Doreen Lee, Daromir Rudnyckyj, Rachel Silvey, and Karen Strassler

2009 Figures of Indonesian Modernity. Indonesia 87:35–72.

Bartky, Sandra Lee

1990 Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression. New York: Routledge.

Bateson, Gregory, and Margaret Mead

1942 Balinese Character: A Photographic Analysis. New York: New York Academy of Sciences.

Blackburn, Susan

2004 Women and the State in Modern Indonesia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Boellstorff, Tom

2005 The Gay Archipelago: Sexuality and Nation in Indonesia. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Brenner, Suzanne

1996 Reconstructing Self and Society: Javanese Muslim Women and "the Veil." American Ethnologist 23(4):673–697.

1998 The Domestication of Desire: Women, Wealth, and Modernity in Java. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bubandt, Nils

2008 Rumors, Pamphlets, and the Politics of Paranoia in Indonesia. The Journal of Asian Studies 67(3):789–817.

Covey, Stephen R.

2004[1989] The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People: Powerful Lessons in Personal Change. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Cribb, Robert

1990 The Indonesian Killings, 1965–1966. Clayton, Australia: Victoria Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University.

Cruikshank, Barbara

1999 The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

De Grazia, Victoria

1996 Introduction. *In* The Sex of Things: Gender and Consumption in Historical Perspective. Victoria De Grazia and Ellen Furlough, eds. Pp. 11–24. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis, Madelon

1987 Ibuism and Priyayization: Path to Power? *In* Indonesian Women in Focus: Past and Present Notions. Elsbeth Locher-Scholten and Anke Niehof, eds. Pp. 42–51. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Foris.

Duggan, Lisa

2002 The New Homonormativity: The Sexual Politics of Neoliberalism. *In* Materializing Democracy: Toward a Revitalized Cultural Politics. Russ Castronovo and Dana Nelson, eds. Pp. 175–194. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Dwyer, Leslie

2000 Spectacular Sexuality: Nationalism, Development and the Politics of Family Planning in Indonesia. *In* Gender Ironies of Nationalism: Sexing the Nation. Tamar Mayer, ed. Pp. 25–64. London: Routledge.

Ehrenreich, Barbara, and Deirdre English

1989 For Her Own Good: 150 Years of the Experts' Advice to Women. New York: Anchor.

Elias, Norbert

2000[1939] The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Errington, Shelly

1989 Meaning and Power in a Southeast Asian Realm. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Farquhar, Judith

2005 Biopolitical Beijing: Pleasure, Sovereignty, and Self-Cultivation in China's Capital. Cultural Anthropology 20(3):155–179.

Ferguson, James

1994 The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Florida, Nancy

1995 Writing the Past, Inscribing the Future: History as Prophecy in Colonial Java. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Foucault, Michel

1979 Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage.

1990 The History of Sexuality, vol. 1: An Introduction. New York: Vintage.

Freeman, Carla

2000 High Tech and High Heels in the Global Economy: Women, Work, and Pink Collar Identities in the Caribbean. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Gade, Anna

2004 Perfection Makes Practice: Learning, Emotion, and the Recited Qur'an in Indonesia. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

Geertz, Clifford

1960 The Religion of Java. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Geertz, Hildred

1961 The Javanese Family. New York: Free Press of Glencoe.

Gibson-Graham, J. K.
1993 Waiting for the Revolution, or How to Smash Capitalism while Working at Home in Your Spare Time. Rethinking Marxism 6(2):10–24.
Ginsburg, Faye, and Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing
1990 Introduction. *In* Uncertain Terms: Negotiating Gender in American Culture. Faye Ginsburg and Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, eds. Pp. 1–16. Boston: Beacon.
Gouda, Frances
1998 Good Mothers, Medeas, or Jezebels: Feminine Imagery in Colonial and Anticolonial Rhetoric in the Dutch East Indies, 1900–1942. *In* Domesticating the Empire: Race, Gender, and Family Life in French and Dutch Colonialism. Julia Clancy-Smith and Frances Gouda, eds. Pp. 236–254. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
Hadiz, Vedi
2006 Corruption and Neo-Liberal Reform: Markets and Predatory Power in Indonesia and Southeast Asia. *In* The Neo-Liberal Revolution: Forging the Market State. Richard Robison, ed. Pp. 79–97. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Harvey, David
2005 A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hefner, Robert
2000 Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Heryanto, Ariel
1985 The Development of "Development." Nancy Lutz, trans. Indonesia 46(October):1–24.
Hochschild, Arlie
1989 The Economy of Gratitude. *In* The Sociology of Emotions: Original Essays and Research Papers. David D. Franks and E. Doyle McCarthy, eds. Pp. 95–113. Greenwich: JAI Press.
Jones, Carla
2007 Fashion and Faith in Urban Indonesia. Fashion Theory 11(2–3):211–232.
Kartamihardja, Achdiat
1949 Atheis. Jakarta: Balai Pustaka.
Kartini, Raden Adjeng
1964 Letters of Javanese Princess. Hildred Geertz, ed. Agnes Louise Symmers, trans. New York: W. W. Norton.
Keeler, Ward
1990 Speaking of Gender in Java. *In* Power and Difference: Gender in Island Southeast Asia. Jane Atkinson and Shelly Errington, eds. Pp. 127–152. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Kipnis, Andrew
2008 Audit Cultures: Neoliberal Governmentality, Socialist Legacy, or Technologies of Governing? American Ethnologist 35(2):275–289.
Kusno, Abidin
2000 Behind the Postcolonial: Architecture, Urban Space and Political Cultures. New York: Routledge.
Li, Tanya Murray
2007 The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Lindquist, Johan
2008 Anxieties of Mobility: Migration and Tourism in the Indonesian Borderlands. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
Locher-Scholten, Elsbeth
1998 So Close and Yet So Far: The Ambivalence of Dutch Colonial Rhetoric on Javanese Servants in Indonesia, 1900–1942. *In* Domesticating the Empire: Race, Gender, and Family Life in French and Dutch Colonialism. Julia Clancy-Smith and Frances Gouda, eds. Pp. 131–153. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
Mitchell, Timothy
2002 Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Moeis, Abdoel
1928 Salah Asoehan. Weltevreden: Balai Poestaka.
Mrázek, Rudolf
2002 Engineers of Happy Land: Technology and Nationalism in a Colony. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Nevins, Joseph, and Nancy Lee Peluso
2008 Introduction: Commoditization in Southeast Asia. *In* Taking Southeast Asia to Market: Commodities, Nature, and People in the Neoliberal Age. Joseph Nevins and Nancy Lee Peluso, eds. Pp. 1–26. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Newberry, Jan
2006 Back Door Java: State Formation and the Domestic in Working Class Java. Peterborough, Canada: Broadview.
Oey-Gardiner, Mayling
2002 And the Winner Is . . . Indonesian Women in Public Life. *In* Women in Indonesia: Gender, Equity and Development. Kathryn Robinson and Sharon Bessell, eds. Pp. 100–112. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Ong, Aihwa
2006 Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Ortner, Sherry
1974 Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture? *In* Women, Culture, and Society. Michelle Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere, eds. Pp. 67–88. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Peletz, Michael
1996 Reason and Passion: Representations of Gender in a Malay Society. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Pemberton, John
1994 On the Subject of "Java." Ithaca, NC: Cornell University Press.
Rappaport, Erika
2001 Shopping for Pleasure: Women in the Making of London's West End. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Robison, Richard
1996 The Middle Class and the Bourgeoisie in Indonesia. *In* The New Rich in Asia: Mobile Phones, McDonald's and Middle-Class Revolution. Richard Robison and David S. G. Goodman, eds. Pp. 79–104. London: Routledge.
Rofel, Lisa
2007 Desiring China: Experiments in Neoliberalism, Sexuality, and Public Culture. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Rose, Nikolas

1999 Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

2000 Community, Citizenship, and the Third Way. American Behavioral Scientist 43(9):1395–1411.

Rubin, Gayle

1975 The Traffic in Women: Notes on the "Political Economy" of Sex. *In* Toward an Anthropology of Women. Rayna Reiter, ed. Pp. 157–210. New York: Monthly Review.

Rudnyckjy, Daromir

2009 Spiritual Economies: Islam and Neoliberalism in Contemporary Indonesia. Cultural Anthropology 24(1):104–141.

Schulte Nordholt, Henk

2003 Renegotiating Boundaries: Access, Agency and Identity in Post–Soeharto Indonesia. Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-en Vokenkunde 159(4):550–589.

Shiraishi, Saya

1997 Young Heroes: The Indonesian Family in Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program.

Siegel, James

1986 Solo in the New Order: Language and Hierarchy in an Indonesian City. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

1997 Fetish, Recognition, Revolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

1998 A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: Counter-Revolution Today. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Smith-Hefner, Nancy

2007 Javanese Women and the Veil in Post-Soeharto Indonesia. Journal of Asian Studies 66(2):389–420.

Stoler, Ann

2002 Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Suryakusuma, Julia

1996 The State and Sexuality in New Order Indonesia. *In* Fantasizing the Feminine in Indonesia. Laurie J. Sears, ed. Pp. 92–119. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

van Leeuwen, Lizzy

2008 Lost in Mall: An Ethnography of Middle-Class Jakarta in the 1990s. Leiden, the Netherlands: KITLV Press.

Watts, Michael

2000 Neo-Liberalism. *In* The Dictionary of Human Geography. 4th edition. R. J. Johnston, Derek Gregory, Geraldine Pratt, and Michael Watts, eds. Pp. 547–548. Oxford: Blackwell.

Weber, Max

1968 Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Gunether Roth and Claus Wittich, eds. New York: Bedminster.

Wieringa, Saskia

1988 Aborted Feminisim in Indonesia: A History of Indonesian Socialist Feminism. *In* Women's Struggles and Strategies. Saskia Wieringa, ed. Pp. 69–90. Aldershot: Gower.

Wolf, Diane

1992 Factory Daughters: Gender, Household Dynamics, and Rural Industrialization in Java. Berkeley: University of California Press.

World Bank

2003 Combating Corruption in Indonesia: Enhancing Accountability for Development. Washington, DC: East Asia Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit.

Yanagisako, Sylvia, and Carol Delaney

1995 Naturalizing Power. *In* Naturalizing Power: Essays in Feminist Cultural Analysis. Sylvia Yanagisako and Carol Delaney, eds. Pp. 1–22. New York: Routledge.

FOR FURTHER READING

(These selections were made by the American Anthropologist *editorial interns as examples of research related in some way to this article. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the author.)*

Boellstorff, Tom

2004 Playing Back the Nation: *Waria,* Indonesian Transvestites. Cultural Anthropology 19(2):159–195.

Roseman, Sharon R.

2002 "Strong Women" and "Pretty Girls": Self-Provisioning, Gender, and Class Identity in Rural Galicia (Spain). American Anthropologist 104(1):22–37.

Simon, Gregory M.

2009 The Soul Freed of Cares? Islamic Prayer, Subjectivity, and the Contradictions of Moral Selfhood in Minangkabau, Indonesia. American Ethnologist 36(2):258–275.

Smith-Hefner, Nancy J.

2009 Language Shift, Gender, and Ideologies of Modernity in Central Java, Indonesia. Journal of Linguistic Anthropology 19(1):57–77.

Yafeh, Orit

2007 The Time in the Body: Cultural Construction of Femininity in Ultraorthodox Kindergartens for Girls. Ethos 35(4):516–553.