FERTILITY CONTROL AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN CHINA
by
MARTHA E. GIMENEZ AND ELIZABETH MOEN MATHIOT
Department of Sociology
University of Colorado at Boulder
Boulder, Colorado 80309
1978
[In case the paragraph indentations get lost in the translation
into ASCII, they will be signified by the first two words being
in all caps. Underlines will also be replaced by all caps.]
IN APRIL, 1978, we toured the People's Republic of China in
the company of other U.S. demographers and sociologists. We
visited factories, communes, hospitals, and schools where we
learned a great deal through briefings, question sessions, and
interviews. Equally valuable sources of information were our
long walks in Shanghai and Peking, exploring shops,
neighborhoods, big and little streets, and following the rhythm
of the crowds in an attempt to get as close as possible to
Chinese urban everyday life. Since days off from work are
staggered throughout the week, we had ample opportunity to
observe the Chinese in domestic and recreational activities as
well as work.
WITHOUT AN interpreter, our encounters with the Chinese were
limited to looking, smiling, shaking hands, sign language, and
the few words of Chinese and English which we shared. But when
one member of our group who grew up in Peking and speaks Chinese
was with us we were able to have conversations and short
interviews. Perhaps the most amazing feature of these walks,
especially in Shanghai, was the friendly curiosity of the people
who would often gather around us whenever we stopped to take a
photograph, to look at a shop window, or to examine something of
interest to us. Every time we stopped we found ourselves quickly
surrounded by a crowd of smiling faces, everyone keeping close to
each other without jostling, close to us without touching us,
everyone as interested in us as we were interested in them, and
we would spend a few minutes in silent conversation, attempting
with smiles and exchange of greetings to bridge the language
barrier and reach out to each other. In many other countries in
the world we would have reacted with fear to such behavior, but
the gentle and polite curiosity of the Chinese people made us
feel at ease and welcome.
WE WERE especially struck by the women and children. The
children seemed healthy, happy, physically fit, graceful, calm,
self-disciplined, talented, and loved. The women seemed selfconfident,
assertive, independent, strong, and attractive, albeit
unadorned. China's official policies and emerging ideologies
value women as citizens, workers, and mothers, not as sex
objects. The demeanor of the women we encountered suggests that
such definitions of women's social significance might have
already acquired a reality in the lives and self-perceptions of
Chinese women today.
THE WOMEN and children are quite a contrast to before the
revolution when children often suffered from malnutrition and
girl children were often sold or put to work in brothels. And if
poor girls survived childhood they could look forward to little
more than a slave-like existence of hard work, hunger,
illiteracy, and continuous childbearing made even more painful by
high infant death rates. Even the well-to-do women, though
materially better off, had few rights (except to brutalize their
daughters-in-law) and little identity except as the property of
their husbands or fathers. We cannot but add that the women and
children today are also an extraordinary contrast to what is
generally the case in most developing nations where prostitution
and domestic labor are the main alternatives open to most poor
women, where poor children barely eke out a meager livelihood in
the interstices of the urban subsistence economy, and where
begging is the last refuge of those left behind by the capitalist
strategies of "modernization" and industrialization. To those of
us who have seen little children scramble in the dust for a few
coins tossed by tourists, and for those of us who have seen
entire families begging in the streets of some of the most
"sophisticated" capitals of the world, the dignity, the health,
and the obvious well-being of China's people bring joy and hope
for the possibility of a better future for the world.
THE NEW Chinese children and women (and there cannot be
either without new Chinese men) were made possible by the deep
structural changes brought about by the revolution. In this
essay we will explore two of those changes, China's policies for
fewer and better children, the status of women in China and the
relationship between the two. As the status of women in itself
is a broad topic, we will limit our attention to those aspects
most directly related to marriage and childbearing, i.e., the
relationship between the sexes, and the working conditions of
employed mothers.
The Relationship Between Men and Women in China
PERHAPS THE single greatest influence on the improved
position and condition of women in China was the Marriage Law
adopted in 1950, one year after the establishment of the People's
Republic of china, and reflected in the 1978 Constitution. The
27 articles of the law made impossible the continuance of the
patriarchal form of family organization, and the Confucian
ideology regarding women and the family. Some reforms had been
initiated before 1949 at the insistence of Socialists within
China and Western governments wishing to prevent a revolution,
but implementation was limited and unenthusiastic.1 The major
provisions of the Marriage Law, which have been thoroughly
discussed elsewhere,2 outlaw bigamy, concubinage, child
betrothal, bride price and dowry; conceptualize husband and wife
as partners with equal status in the home who have free choice in
employment and other forms of social participation; allows wives
to petition for divorce, and forbid husbands to do so if a wife
is pregnant or if they have child under one; allow women to own
and manage property and to have custody of children; and allow a
wife to keep her name and children to use the family name of
either parent.3
THUS ON paper women do have equal status with men in the
domestic domain (and the Constitution has extended equality to
all other domains). The question is, how well is the law working
in practice? Arranged marriages do seem to be a thing of the
past, although it is common for couples to have been introduced
by relatives. A divorce initiated by the wife or husband is also
possible although not as simple a matter as in the early 1950s
when the rush of unhappy wives to the divorce courts caused the
Marriage Law to be nick-named the "Divorce Law." Today,
according to judges from Shanghai Municipal Court, divorce
requests are less frequent because of the improved domestic
position of women and the divorce proceedings are more
complicated, requiring negotiation and arbitration between the
couple and their neighborhood and work organizations. It is
believed that the offending partner should be given the
opportunity for self-criticism and education which should lead to
correct thoughts and behavior. But if problems are not resolved
the divorce will be granted so both husband and wife are better
able to "contribute to production and the revolution."
BESIDE FREEDOM in marriage and divorce, the law, as well as
political writings, imply a sharing of domestic tasks and
management as well as a shift in the relationship between women
and men from one based primarily on sexuality and reproduction to
one based on respect and caring.4 The Chinese say both of these
goals are being achieved and from our observations of the public
behavior of people and the public image of women (i.e., how they
are represented in the media, arts, entertainment, etc.) in China
it seems to be so.
OTHER VISITORS to China have commented on the good
relationship between children and adults.5 We were also struck
by the absence, in public, of overt conflict between adults and
children. The familiar scenes of crying children and
disciplining adults so common in our public milieu was
conspicuously absent in China. Instead, children, parents and
grandparents all seem to enjoy being out together. The same was
true for the population in general; we didn't see anger or
irritation. People were relaxed, happy and gentle with one
another. Even in the most crowded streets and stores they did
not jostle, bump or push. The relationship between men and women
is also one of respect, courtesy, and camaraderie.
SINCE YOUNG people are encouraged to marry late and devote
their energy to study and work, dating and romance are not top
priorities for teenagers and young adults, who tend to socialize
in same-sex groups rather than couples. This does not mean that
love and sex are outside the scope of young people's concerns and
experiences. It simply means, in our understanding of Chinese
culture and priorities, that love and sex might not have the same
central role which they play in Western culture. The widely
discussed split between the private and the public spheres of
life characteristic of advanced capitalist societies which
reflects the exploitation and alienation of labor leaves only the
realm of "personal life," i.e., love and sex, as the main or only
source of meaning for people's lives.6 In China, social
processes appear to have reversed that trend and their latent
consequence seems to be a push towards restoring the unity of
people's lives by infusing all dimensions of human existence with
overtly public, social significance. People in China, young and
old, seem to feel part of a larger social whole in whose process
of development they play an active role. In that context, the
obsession with love and sex that is so pervasive in advanced
capitalist culture becomes an objective and subjective obstacle
to the process of development. The fact that in China today,
people in their middle to late twenties who do not date and
remain still unmarried are not considered social failures
indicates that a new basis for social and self-esteem must have
emerged in the process of socialist construction. Once the
pressures to fulfill sexual and parental roles as early as
possible if lifted, people are free to develop their
potentialities more fully and with greater dedication. Having
the time to develop as individuals in their own right and to
participate actively in the building of a new society must have
surely contributed to the independence and self-confidence we
observed in women. Rather than worrying about their apparent
lack of sexual interest and involvement as many in our group did,
we wondered, instead, about the effect that the early experience
of independence and active social involvement may have upon the
ability of women and men to develop sound and strong sexual and
loving bonds.
THE PUBLIC appearance and the public image of women confirm
what seems to be a major change in the way men and women interact
with one another. In the United States it is not uncommon to
hear derogatory remarks about Chinese women's simple, uni-sex
(read un-sexy) clothes, lack of make-up and jewelry, and plain
hair styles. What could be more liberating than freedom from
concern about looks? Chinese women are healthy and attractive.
Their public image is not "sexy" and they are not treated as sex
objects in the course of public social interaction or depicted as
such by the media and cultural events. The emergent cultural
definitions of male and female success are based upon the
attainment of social and political collective goals rather than
performance in the marriage and sexual markets. Although all
young people do expect and are expected to marry and form
families, parents are no longer eager to marry daughters off at a
young age, and attracting men or marrying up does not seem to be
a major source of self- or public esteem.
WE DO not know what occurs in the bedrooms of China, but in
public there is a complete absence of sexploitation and violence
(which seem to go together). The public image of women
corresponds to their public appearance. Farah Fawcett-Majors
does not have a Chinese counterpart. There are not sex/violence
movies or "girlie" magazines; about the sexiest movie poster we
saw was one for "Woman Transportation Worker." In China there
are no ads showing bosomy women draped over tractors, in fact
there are no ads (which does not mean there is no variety or
choice in consumer goods). The closest thing to advertising is
the ubiquitous political poster which shows women as citizens--
industrial workers, farmers, members of the army, teachers,
parents--not playthings. What contrast to Hong Kong and Tokyo,
or the United States.
IN CHINA our night time entertainment included acrobatics,
an opera, a martial arts competition and a performance by a folk
song and dance troupe. In tokyo the Greyline night tours feature
Geisha House, topless clubs and show bars. (Perhaps the female
tourists are expected to behave like Japanese women and stay in
at night.) A book in our Hong Kong hotel room described the
night life. There are topless places: "Up until the mid-1970's
no one would have believed Chinese girls could be induced to be
topless barmaids, but Hong Kong did join the rest of the world in
this respect." There are girlie bars: "...you are naturally
expected to buy drinks for the bar-girls who have amazing
capacities," (note the double meaning), and "If you wish to take
the girl out of the bar, the ransom charge ranges around
HK$50/100." Or if you want to begin the evening with a woman or
just stay in your room with one, there are 'escort services':
"The easiest way to find a charming partner at a fair charge is
to choose one of any nationality" from the eight-page picture
catalog in the book.7 In the section on shopping in Hong Kong
the book describes the Cheongsam, the traditional Chinese dress
(no longer worn in China) that is "...world (in)famous and needs
no description other than a long low whistle." Regarding the
side slit, some "...as all men notice on a windy day, have that
slit stop at just below the hip, hence cometh the saying: "It's
an ill wind that shows no good thighs."8
MOST CHINESE women in Hong Kong do not wear Cheongsams, but
the many in make-up, elaborate hairstyles, tight clothes and
spike heels bear little resemblance to their sisters in China.
We do not know if they are trying to be modern, Western, or sexy
but their public appearance also corresponds with their public
image, a sex object and plaything rather than a citizen who fully
participates in all spheres of society.
ANOTHER INDICATOR of the status of women in China is the way
we were treated there. We, as well as the men in our party,
constantly found ourselves stared at and even surrounded by
people. But we never felt we were being leered at or appraised,
and we were never touched, pawed or grabbed as we have been in
other countries. We felt a new freedom in being able to stare
at, smile at and say hello to Chinese men, knowing our actions
would not be interpreted as anything more than the curiosity and
friendliness they felt toward us.
PERHAPS THE most liberating thing for us as it must be for
Chinese women, was experiencing freedom from fear. There is
crime in China, but not enough to cause concern. Hotel rooms are
not locked unless the staff thinks some of the guests might be
troublesome. The police are unarmed and are mainly seen
directing traffic. The army is quite evident, but only during
the day, and it is hard to tell if they are on or off duty.
IMAGINE HOW exhilarating it is in China, especially for a
woman, to be unafraid--to be able to sleep in an unlocked hotel
room, to be able to walk in any area of a major city even at
night, when the streets are barely lit, and not to feel "...the
terror that every woman carries within her body."9
IN CONTRAST, a sign in our Tokyo hotel room had so many
warnings and safety precautions that we were afraid to stay in or
go out. While in Hong Kong we were indirectly warned of hazards
with the promise that the "...very efficient Hong Kong
Police...will ensure your safety."10
IT WAS only six years ago that the Committee of Concerned
Asian Scholars was almost always told whenever they asked who did
the housework and child care, "The wife, of course."11 Today the
answer is "Both of them, of course." We do not know how much
indoor housework is being done by men, but since housing is
crowded and there is a strong feeling of neighborliness, a great
deal of domestic activity occurs outdoors. Young children were
rarely seen without the company of an adult and this task was
shared fairly equally by parents and grandparents of both sexes.
Hanging of laundry, sweeping around the home, and most kinds of
shopping also seemed to be shared fairly equally by men and
women. The only place where women were highly overrepresented
(about 70%) was at the early morning outdoor food market.
BUT IT is likely that women still perform more than their
share of domestic tasks, since we saw only groups of men playing
cards or chess, while women were more likely to be knitting,
sewing, or preparing food, and more men than women were in the
parks, in movie lines, or at the night time entertainments we
attended. Women did participate equally in morning outdoor
exercises.
SINCE WE had only short visits to communes we could not
observe if these men and women shared domestic tasks. We were
told that, as in most countries, change occurs first in the
cities, so it is likely that rural women still do carry the
largest share of the household workload.
WE MUST conclude that on paper and in practice the public
and domestic relationships between men and women in China have
changed so as to enormously improve the status and condition of
women. There may not be full equality but in less than thirty
years Chinese women and men have come closer to it than in any
other country. To more fully understand why this is so, it is
necessary to examine the nature and consequences of China's
population policies, a topic which we will explore in the
following section.
CHINA'S PLANNED BIRTH POLICIES
POPULATION POLICIES, in China as well as in any other
country--capitalist or socialist--are extremely important because
of their implications for the relations between the sexes and the
status of women. Because of the unique characteristics of
China's approach to socialist development, its population
policies and their implementation are of great interest although
(perhaps of) doubtful applicability in other countries. In
China, as well as in any other country aiming to humanely control
the growth of its population, effective policies must go beyond
either making contraception available through the voluntaristic
family planning approach, or engaging in coercive and/or
manipulative measures to sterilize the population and increase
the use of contraception. Effective and humane policies would
have to include not only a redefinition of men's and women's
roles at the ideological level but also the implementation of
radical structural changes making possible the actual practice of
those new self-concepts. China has adopted the latter road and
her population policies are inextricably linked to the overall
changes in the social structure fostered by the leadership and
the masses. The leadership's commitment to lower population
growth is startlingly expressed in the fact that such matters
have become included in the constitution. According to Article
53 of the New Constitution of the People's Republic of China
adopted on March 5, 1978, "The state advocates and encourages
family planning."12 Essentially, the policy advocates late
marriage, child spacing, fewer children, and better children. As
the status of women in China has been traditionally attached to
marriage and childbearing, deep changes in the social structure
would have to occur to induce them to marry late and to bear
fewer children in longer intervals of time. How are young people
induced to postpone marriage? How are married couples induced to
have fewer, well-spaced children? What follows are tentative
answer based on what we learned during our visit.
FIRST OF all, late marriage can be considered as an
unanticipated consequence of social and economic processes now
taking place in China as well as the effect of material
constraints upon people's options. Among the latter, the
relative scarcity of housing might be an important factor. The
effort to industrialize the country requires the allocation of
capital to production; although housing is an important priority,
it has been affected by the current industrialization drive.
Among the former, perhaps the most important might be the
patterns of sociability and socio-economic and political
participation evolved because of deliberate efforts to combine
intellectual and manual labor and to close the rural-urban gap.
During the Cultural Revolution, young people routinely spent time
away from their families working in factories and communes while
engaging in studies and political activities. Although this
process has been attenuated by the present leadership as a
reaction to what they claim were the excesses of the Cultural
Revolution, the pattern established during the last 10 years
remains, and young men and women seem to spend a great deal of
time in activities that, while integrating them into political
and work settings, do not encourage sociability except in
collective forms. For example, in a conversation with a young
male student from the Shanghai's Teacher's University, we learned
that students spend at least one day a week doing physical labor,
and every year several weeks in a commune, several weeks in a
factory and two weeks with the People's Liberation Army. When we
asked about students' social activities, we were told that they
generally spend their holidays and weekends with their parents
and once in a while, they invite a friend of either sex to visit
them there.
THE ISSUE of collective forms of sociability raises a
variety of questions which we cannot answer in a definite way,
for we do not know the extent to which they may reflect already
existing cultural patterns, new forms of relations developed
after 1949 and especially after the Cultural Revolution, or
deliberate policies designed to keep young people busy in
collective undertakings. When asked specifically about
courtship, young people (in their early and middle twenties)
consistently told us that they were too young for such things.
Women, even in their late twenties, seemed embarrassed, and
blushed when we discussed dating and courtship in general.
WHILE HOUSING scarcity, patterns of sociability, and
organizational changes brought about by the aim of combining
physical and intellectual labor and bridging the gap between town
and country may indeed lead to late marriage as an unintended
consequence, there is a clear-cut policy to urge young people to
postpone marriage as long as possible. The minimum legal age at
marriage is 18 for women and 20 for men, but both sexes are
encouraged to wait about 10 years longer. Once people marry,
they are expected to carry on the tradition of having a child
right away, but they are advised to wait at least four years for
the second child. While the family size considered adequate at
the present time includes only two children, we saw a new poster
for family planning stating that "One is not too few," which
leads us to believe there might soon be a campaign supporting the
one-child family.
THE CONTENT of birth planning policies vary depending on the
marital status of the recipients. Different rationales are
advanced to justify late marriage, family planning and smaller
families. A general and recent policy statement of Chairman Hua
Kuo-feng included in his report on the work of the government
delivered at the 5th National People's Congress states:
THIS STATEMENT contains the main elements of current family
planning propaganda for unmarried and married people.
YOUNG PEOPLE are encouraged to marry late and practice
family planning once they do because of several benefits that
will follow from that behavior:
EMPHASIS ON the importance of having time to develop skills and
learning as well as economic advantages for the collectivity are
the essence of the message received by young people to encourage
them to postpone marriage. In our analysis, this message is
likely to be effective because of the nature of the social
conditions now dominant in China. The patterns of sociability
reflecting the forms of social, economic, and political
participation into which Chinese people are drawn and the content
of the ideologies transmitted through the multiple networks to
which people belong do provide a material basis for the process,
discussed earlier in this essay, of closing the gap between the
private and public spheres of life. An important component of
these mobilizing ideologies is the rationale for late marriages
advocated in family planning propaganda at all levels. Early
marriage and parenthood can thus appear to be antisocial behavior
and a barrier to full participation in socialist construction and
self-development.
WE HYPOTHESIZE that the public image of young men and women
in China, their unique blend of shyness in personal and sexual
matters, and forthrightness in political and social matters must
largely reflect the quality of the life that is now being
fostered in China. While "the fall of public man" is decried by
Western social critics,14 the rise and consolidation of public
life is being celebrated in China where among its material and
social psychological consequences, those bearing upon the
relations between the sexes and the status of women are perhaps
the most striking. In these conditions, late marriage might not
be the repressive, punitive pattern it appears to be in the light
of our Western preconceptions but, instead, an affirmative
expression of full citizenship.
SHIFTING OUR concern to the married, we learned that the
rationale put forth to explain the benefits of family planning
for married couples is:
BOTH THE married and unmarried learn that these population
policies are important for the overall effort of socialist
construction. They also learn that these policies bring specific
benefits relevant to their own interests. Young people learn
that late marriage increases their chances of self-development
and their ability to contribute to the revolution. Married
people learn that contraception and family planning result in
healthier and stronger mothers and children and in better
educated children. They learn these things not only through
effective family planning propaganda but, even more importantly,
through their daily experiences. The effectiveness of ideology
and policy is cemented in the reality of a society able to
provide food, clothing, and shelter to more than 900 million
people while, at the time, engaging in what is perhaps the most
massive investment in human capital ever attempted in modern
times. The healthy, joyful, talented, and educated children of
China are testimony of the success of China's population
policies.
HOW ARE these policies implemented? They are implemented
through a complex network of groups to which every person in
China belongs. The leadership of these groups at all levels is
responsible for disseminating family planning propaganda.
Hospitals and healthcare personnel also engage in family planning
propaganda in urban and rural settings. The word propaganda does
not have negative connotations in China; it simply means the
dissemination of information and education. Such methods of
spreading information and educating the people seem to be very
effective and to reach people of all ages. For instance, we were
told by a retired worker who already had a grandson, that she did
not expect many grandchildren in the future. "Too many
children," she explained, "interfere with work and study. In
preliberation times it was very sad; women had too many children
and could hardly keep them alive. Too many children are not
beneficial for the people or society." She preferred that her
own children live well and have fewer children of their own.
WHEN WE inquired about the "deviants," those who may indulge
in premarital sex, have children out of wedlock, or have too many
children, we learned that they are tolerated, but undergo
considerable social pressure to mend their ways. While
premarital sex is discouraged, it does take place and women are
given advice about abortion and contraception even though they
may be unmarried. But they generally go to family planning
clinics after having had sexual relations, not before, and they
are usually sent there by the "responsible" persons (heads) of
their organizations when pregnancy is suspected, to be given
information and to have an abortion if they so decide. If a
married woman were to have a pregnancy out of line with the
existing policy, we were told that the couple would be sternly
lectured by the responsible persons at work or in their
neighborhood and encouraged to have an abortion. If they were to
choose to have the baby, more persuasion and education would
continue. Deviant behavior in these matters, therefore, is not
punished either socially or economically. Deviants are subject
to "rectification" or intensive education and persuasion; they
are not, however, forced to be sterilized, forced to have
abortions, or excluded from their neighborhoods and place of
work.
THE CRUDE birth rate in China is conservatively estimated to
have fallen from 33/1000 to 22/1000 since 1968.15 This
unprecedented decline in fertility among developing nations is
due, no doubt, to China's birth planning policies and the new
place of women in Chinese society. Women are now free from the
tyranny of reproduction, and they are expected to participate
fully in society, both of which are prerequisites for their
emancipation. But what about the women who do have families?
Are they actually able to participate in society on an equal
basis with men? In the following section we will examine the
situation of the employed mother, for it is employment that is
thought to be the first and foremost requirement for equality and
it is employment that has always been the biggest obstacle to
mothers' seeking economic and social independence.
THE EMPLOYED MOTHER
IT IS generally assumed that fertility will decline when
women work outside the home. This assumption is based on an
inverse correlation between employment and fertility that exists
primarily for middle class urban women in the developed nations.
Sociologically, the decline in fertility is thought to occur
because employment creates role conflict, i.e., it is difficult
to be a worker, a mother and a homemaker at the same time. From
the viewpoint of microeconomics, the relationship is believed to
occur because employment increases the actual costs of children
if the mother does remain employed (e.g., nursery, daycare), and
the opportunity costs of children if the mother does not remain
employed (e.g., wages foregone). This perspective also implies
that children and employment are in some way similar and can be
substituted for one another, and that childbearing is highly
rational with economic factors having the greatest weight in
cost/benefit calculations.16 As a consequence, recent policy
statements have stressed the employment of women as a means of
reducing fertility in the developing nations.17
WE HAVE evaluated these theoretical positions elsewhere;18
here it is important to point out that fertility reduction
policies based on this kind of reasoning are punitive since
children would be foregone primarily to avoid loss of income
(which may be needed to support other family members), or to
avoid an increase in the physical and mental strain the mother
already bears. Such policies would also discourage breastfeeding
since the actual physical separation of the mother and child is
thought to be necessary for a reduction in fertility.
THE IMPORTANCE of breastfeeding is becoming increasingly
recognized.19 Not only does breast milk provide superior
nutrition and protection against infectious diseases, but the
method of delivery provides the necessary degree of sanitation
that cannot be achieved by most families using powdered milk and
bottles in the developing nations.
IN CHINA the opposite prevails in theory and in practice.
All able-bodied Chinese women are expected to work outside the
home and they do. This expectation arises from the theoretical
premise that employment is necessary for the emancipation of
women and the practical need for female labor power. Women are
not employed in order to lower the birth rate; instead men and
women are expected to marry late and have small families so they
can work for the society. At the same time women are not
penalized for having children. They are not put into the double
bind that most other employed women experience in countries where
childcare may cost so much and be such a hassle, and time out of
work results in such a loss of advancement, seniority, and
pension benefits--if not the job itself--that they drop out of
the labor force after having a child. And having done so, go on
to make motherhood a full-time career (this is the other side of
the inverse relationship between employment and fertility). Or,
in accord with the theory, if employment is an economic or
psychic necessity they may forego wanted children, as has
occurred even in the Eastern European Socialist countries and
USSR where birth rates have dropped so low that governments are
offering pronatalist incentives or adopting coercive pronatalist
policies.20 The combined goals of full employment for women and
better children have produced a very different situation for
Chinese women.
DURING PREGNANCY women receive regular and frequent medical
examinations. Those involved in heavy work are switched to light
work without loss of pay, and during the last trimester, work
hours are reduced with no reduction in pay. Fifty-six days of
paid leave may be taken before and after delivery. If the
delivery is difficult leave may be extended to 70 days, and
regular sick leave may be taken if more time is needed. Then the
infant is placed in a nursery or left with a grandparent.
BREASTFEEDING IS encouraged in China and almost every mother
who is able does so for 10 to 12 months. During this period the
mother is assigned light work without a loss of pay and given two
half-hour nursing breaks each day which are counted as part of
her eight work hours. Since most women live near their work
place or the work place has a nursery in it, they can take
advantage of the opportunity to breastfeed, and by utilizing
their lunch hour they can see their babies every two hours during
the work day.
FOR MANY employed parents in other countries the costs and
logistics of childcare may be overwhelming. Daycare may not be
available at all or not until the child is toilet trained,
daycare hours may not coincide with work hours, and
transportation may be a problem. When the child starts school
transportation may still be a problem, and there is the issue of
childcare after school, during vacations or when children are
sick. While nurseries and kindergartens are not yet universal in
China, it is a goal, and even now for special cases 24-hour
childcare is available. Since schools are generally at the
workplace or in the neighborhood, transportation is not a
problem. Sick children may be left at factory or neighborhood
clinics, or if they are too sick to be moved, someone will come
to care for them. When childcare is not yet available,
grandparents often are. After school and during vacation there
are organized activities for children, and if there are no
grandparents in the home, the neighborhood committee of retired
workers will look after the children.
IT SHOULD be noted that the costs and benefits of
childbearing are not as clear cut or regular in the communes as
in the cities. Women may not get work points when they stop work
for delivery or children, which would result in a loss of income.
On the other hand, the family gets another private plot for each
child, which could result in an increase in income.
A FINAL help for the working mother is that more husbands
are now sharing housework and childcare (a husband's refusal to
help in the home is grounds for divorce) and if grandparents are
in the home they may do most of this work if they are able.
CONTRARY TO the experience of most women, employment in
China does not discourage childbearing; neither the mother nor
the child is penalized. Thus we hypothesize that the decline in
China's birth rate is more a response to the birth planning
propaganda than because the employment of women has made
childbearing too difficult and too costly, and that childbearing
is not a significant barrier to the emancipation of women.
CONCLUSION
DEMOGRAPHICALLY, CURRENT planned birth policies in China
have met with what experts call an unprecedented success.21 To
assess the meaning of that success it is necessary to determine
who benefits from it. In the case of China, a lower rate of
population growth not only may have a positive impact on the
current industrialization effort but, given the nature of
socialist production and distribution patterns, it will most
likely lead--in the long run--to a further overall improvement in
the standard of living of the population as a whole.
FAMILY PLANNING programs and policies introduced in the
Third World by Western (mainly U.S.) financed and controlled
agencies operate in a context which renders meaningless their
goals.22 Presumably, smaller families will result in an
improvement of the people's "life chances," both in socioeconomic
terms as well as in terms of health and life expectancy. Given
the distortions in social and economic development in most
developing nations which have resulted in high rates of rural and
urban unemployment, maintenance of inefficient patterns of land
ownership and agricultural exploitation, etc., to tell the people
that having smaller families will benefit their situation and
improve their standard of living is at best a naive and at worst
a manipulative and cruel tactic that hides, under a manifest
concern for human welfare, a latent concern with lowering the
rates of population growth in an attempt to check the development
of a politically explosive situation.23
MANIPULATION IS also inherent in the argument that women
should be given an increased participation in the labor force IN
ORDER TO lower the birth rate. The sociological theoretical
assumption of structural incompatibility between maternal and
occupational roles and the economic assumption that the
opportunity costs of children increase as the process of
industrialization advances, rest upon the existence of class
exploitation and sexual oppression which, while segregating women
into the lower paid and less prestigious occupations,
deliberately denies them the necessary infrastructure (nurseries,
maternity benefits, childcare services, etc.) to enable them to
work and make decisions about childbearing based on the
assertion, rather than the denial, of their needs. Some have
argued that social legislation establishing maternity benefits
and nurseries for women factory workers are "pronatalist" in
their effects.24 From this standpoint, it becomes expedient to
abolish social legislation and pursue punitive policies aimed at
lowering the birth rate and the supply price of labor at the same
time.
TO THE contrary, China's population policies calling for
fewer and better children do not manipulate the status of women
to further demographic and political goals nor do they offer nonexistent
or unrealistic benefits. These policies have led to
great improvements in the status of women and children as well as
qualitative changes in the relations between men and women
because they are interwoven with a series of crucial social,
economic, and political processes which are working towards the
creation of a new form of social organization. Women can now
control their reproduction and enjoy better health due to the
availability of contraceptive technology and medical care in
rural and urban areas and because of real and meaningful
alternatives that enhance the desirability of the new life. The
existence of maternity benefits, nurseries, kindergartens,
schools and health care in the place of work do not act as an
incentive to childbearing but, in the context of China, they
fulfill two important functions:
POPULATION GROWTH in China is being successfully curtailed
because the planned birth program operates in the context of
sweeping changes which have positively affected class relations,
the relations between the sexes, as well as the relations between
parents and children, while at the same time allowing for the
full integration of everyone in the national effort for attaining
modernization and building socialism.
DEMOGRAPHICALLY, CHINA'S experience challenges the notion
that birth rates can be lowered only by raising the costs of
children. China is showing that a lower birth rate can be
attained by improving the quality of life for all and by enabling
full participation in the economic and political life of the
country rather than punishing childbearing.
SOCIALLY AND politically, China's experience shows that the
relations between the sexes are amenable to change when linked to
overall changes in the social and economic structure. Although
women have not achieved full equality in China, the achievements
of Chinese women and the changes in the relations between the
sexes in China must be understood in the light of the Chinese
situation before the revolution rather than in the light of the
aspirations of middle class American feminists. Twenty-nine
years after the revolution, or as Chinese people would say, 29
years after Liberation, what China has been able to accomplish so
far places Chinese women ahead of most women in the world.
NOTES
FAMILY PLANNING is a very significant matter. Planned
control of population growth is conducive to the planned
development of the national economy and to the health of
mother and child. It also benefits the people where
production, work and study are concerned. We must continue
to give it serious attention and strive to lower the annual
rate of growth of China's population to less than one
percent within three years.13
1) it will further national economic development
2) it will allow young people to learn more, to do research and
to do more book learning
3) it helps production
4) it is conducive to the education of young children
1) it is good for the health of women and children
2) it is important for the children because fewer children make
possible greater investments in education and a better future for
all children
3) it is beneficial for the national economy. As a member of a
commune's revolutionary committee told us, China practices a
unified national economy, and if there were many people,
production and distribution would become problematic.
1) they free women for economic, political, and social
participation.
2) they provide children with the best China has to offer today.
The material confirmation of the benefits brought about by
implementing in one's own life the slogan "fewer and better
children" surely acts as a powerful incentive for parents to have
smaller families.