FERTILITY CONTROL AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN CHINA
                              by

          MARTHA E. GIMENEZ AND ELIZABETH MOEN MATHIOT          
                   Department of Sociology
               University of Colorado at Boulder
                   Boulder, Colorado 80309
                             1978

[In case the paragraph indentations get lost in the translation into ASCII, they will be signified by the first two words being in all caps. Underlines will also be replaced by all caps.]

IN APRIL, 1978, we toured the People's Republic of China in the company of other U.S. demographers and sociologists. We visited factories, communes, hospitals, and schools where we learned a great deal through briefings, question sessions, and interviews. Equally valuable sources of information were our long walks in Shanghai and Peking, exploring shops, neighborhoods, big and little streets, and following the rhythm of the crowds in an attempt to get as close as possible to Chinese urban everyday life. Since days off from work are staggered throughout the week, we had ample opportunity to observe the Chinese in domestic and recreational activities as well as work.

WITHOUT AN interpreter, our encounters with the Chinese were limited to looking, smiling, shaking hands, sign language, and the few words of Chinese and English which we shared. But when one member of our group who grew up in Peking and speaks Chinese was with us we were able to have conversations and short interviews. Perhaps the most amazing feature of these walks, especially in Shanghai, was the friendly curiosity of the people who would often gather around us whenever we stopped to take a photograph, to look at a shop window, or to examine something of interest to us. Every time we stopped we found ourselves quickly surrounded by a crowd of smiling faces, everyone keeping close to each other without jostling, close to us without touching us, everyone as interested in us as we were interested in them, and we would spend a few minutes in silent conversation, attempting with smiles and exchange of greetings to bridge the language barrier and reach out to each other. In many other countries in the world we would have reacted with fear to such behavior, but the gentle and polite curiosity of the Chinese people made us feel at ease and welcome.

WE WERE especially struck by the women and children. The children seemed healthy, happy, physically fit, graceful, calm, self-disciplined, talented, and loved. The women seemed selfconfident, assertive, independent, strong, and attractive, albeit unadorned. China's official policies and emerging ideologies value women as citizens, workers, and mothers, not as sex objects. The demeanor of the women we encountered suggests that such definitions of women's social significance might have already acquired a reality in the lives and self-perceptions of Chinese women today.

THE WOMEN and children are quite a contrast to before the revolution when children often suffered from malnutrition and girl children were often sold or put to work in brothels. And if poor girls survived childhood they could look forward to little more than a slave-like existence of hard work, hunger, illiteracy, and continuous childbearing made even more painful by high infant death rates. Even the well-to-do women, though materially better off, had few rights (except to brutalize their daughters-in-law) and little identity except as the property of their husbands or fathers. We cannot but add that the women and children today are also an extraordinary contrast to what is generally the case in most developing nations where prostitution and domestic labor are the main alternatives open to most poor women, where poor children barely eke out a meager livelihood in the interstices of the urban subsistence economy, and where begging is the last refuge of those left behind by the capitalist strategies of "modernization" and industrialization. To those of us who have seen little children scramble in the dust for a few coins tossed by tourists, and for those of us who have seen entire families begging in the streets of some of the most "sophisticated" capitals of the world, the dignity, the health, and the obvious well-being of China's people bring joy and hope for the possibility of a better future for the world.

THE NEW Chinese children and women (and there cannot be either without new Chinese men) were made possible by the deep structural changes brought about by the revolution. In this essay we will explore two of those changes, China's policies for fewer and better children, the status of women in China and the relationship between the two. As the status of women in itself is a broad topic, we will limit our attention to those aspects most directly related to marriage and childbearing, i.e., the relationship between the sexes, and the working conditions of employed mothers.

The Relationship Between Men and Women in China

PERHAPS THE single greatest influence on the improved position and condition of women in China was the Marriage Law adopted in 1950, one year after the establishment of the People's Republic of china, and reflected in the 1978 Constitution. The 27 articles of the law made impossible the continuance of the patriarchal form of family organization, and the Confucian ideology regarding women and the family. Some reforms had been initiated before 1949 at the insistence of Socialists within China and Western governments wishing to prevent a revolution, but implementation was limited and unenthusiastic.1 The major provisions of the Marriage Law, which have been thoroughly discussed elsewhere,2 outlaw bigamy, concubinage, child betrothal, bride price and dowry; conceptualize husband and wife as partners with equal status in the home who have free choice in employment and other forms of social participation; allows wives to petition for divorce, and forbid husbands to do so if a wife is pregnant or if they have child under one; allow women to own and manage property and to have custody of children; and allow a wife to keep her name and children to use the family name of either parent.3

THUS ON paper women do have equal status with men in the domestic domain (and the Constitution has extended equality to all other domains). The question is, how well is the law working in practice? Arranged marriages do seem to be a thing of the past, although it is common for couples to have been introduced by relatives. A divorce initiated by the wife or husband is also possible although not as simple a matter as in the early 1950s when the rush of unhappy wives to the divorce courts caused the Marriage Law to be nick-named the "Divorce Law." Today, according to judges from Shanghai Municipal Court, divorce requests are less frequent because of the improved domestic position of women and the divorce proceedings are more complicated, requiring negotiation and arbitration between the couple and their neighborhood and work organizations. It is believed that the offending partner should be given the opportunity for self-criticism and education which should lead to correct thoughts and behavior. But if problems are not resolved the divorce will be granted so both husband and wife are better able to "contribute to production and the revolution."

BESIDE FREEDOM in marriage and divorce, the law, as well as political writings, imply a sharing of domestic tasks and management as well as a shift in the relationship between women and men from one based primarily on sexuality and reproduction to one based on respect and caring.4 The Chinese say both of these goals are being achieved and from our observations of the public behavior of people and the public image of women (i.e., how they are represented in the media, arts, entertainment, etc.) in China it seems to be so.

OTHER VISITORS to China have commented on the good relationship between children and adults.5 We were also struck by the absence, in public, of overt conflict between adults and children. The familiar scenes of crying children and disciplining adults so common in our public milieu was conspicuously absent in China. Instead, children, parents and grandparents all seem to enjoy being out together. The same was true for the population in general; we didn't see anger or irritation. People were relaxed, happy and gentle with one another. Even in the most crowded streets and stores they did not jostle, bump or push. The relationship between men and women is also one of respect, courtesy, and camaraderie.

SINCE YOUNG people are encouraged to marry late and devote their energy to study and work, dating and romance are not top priorities for teenagers and young adults, who tend to socialize in same-sex groups rather than couples. This does not mean that love and sex are outside the scope of young people's concerns and experiences. It simply means, in our understanding of Chinese culture and priorities, that love and sex might not have the same central role which they play in Western culture. The widely discussed split between the private and the public spheres of life characteristic of advanced capitalist societies which reflects the exploitation and alienation of labor leaves only the realm of "personal life," i.e., love and sex, as the main or only source of meaning for people's lives.6 In China, social processes appear to have reversed that trend and their latent consequence seems to be a push towards restoring the unity of people's lives by infusing all dimensions of human existence with overtly public, social significance. People in China, young and old, seem to feel part of a larger social whole in whose process of development they play an active role. In that context, the obsession with love and sex that is so pervasive in advanced capitalist culture becomes an objective and subjective obstacle to the process of development. The fact that in China today, people in their middle to late twenties who do not date and remain still unmarried are not considered social failures indicates that a new basis for social and self-esteem must have emerged in the process of socialist construction. Once the pressures to fulfill sexual and parental roles as early as possible if lifted, people are free to develop their potentialities more fully and with greater dedication. Having the time to develop as individuals in their own right and to participate actively in the building of a new society must have surely contributed to the independence and self-confidence we observed in women. Rather than worrying about their apparent lack of sexual interest and involvement as many in our group did, we wondered, instead, about the effect that the early experience of independence and active social involvement may have upon the ability of women and men to develop sound and strong sexual and loving bonds.

THE PUBLIC appearance and the public image of women confirm what seems to be a major change in the way men and women interact with one another. In the United States it is not uncommon to hear derogatory remarks about Chinese women's simple, uni-sex (read un-sexy) clothes, lack of make-up and jewelry, and plain hair styles. What could be more liberating than freedom from concern about looks? Chinese women are healthy and attractive. Their public image is not "sexy" and they are not treated as sex objects in the course of public social interaction or depicted as such by the media and cultural events. The emergent cultural definitions of male and female success are based upon the attainment of social and political collective goals rather than performance in the marriage and sexual markets. Although all young people do expect and are expected to marry and form families, parents are no longer eager to marry daughters off at a young age, and attracting men or marrying up does not seem to be a major source of self- or public esteem.

WE DO not know what occurs in the bedrooms of China, but in public there is a complete absence of sexploitation and violence (which seem to go together). The public image of women corresponds to their public appearance. Farah Fawcett-Majors does not have a Chinese counterpart. There are not sex/violence movies or "girlie" magazines; about the sexiest movie poster we saw was one for "Woman Transportation Worker." In China there are no ads showing bosomy women draped over tractors, in fact there are no ads (which does not mean there is no variety or choice in consumer goods). The closest thing to advertising is the ubiquitous political poster which shows women as citizens-- industrial workers, farmers, members of the army, teachers, parents--not playthings. What contrast to Hong Kong and Tokyo, or the United States.

IN CHINA our night time entertainment included acrobatics, an opera, a martial arts competition and a performance by a folk song and dance troupe. In tokyo the Greyline night tours feature Geisha House, topless clubs and show bars. (Perhaps the female tourists are expected to behave like Japanese women and stay in at night.) A book in our Hong Kong hotel room described the night life. There are topless places: "Up until the mid-1970's no one would have believed Chinese girls could be induced to be topless barmaids, but Hong Kong did join the rest of the world in this respect." There are girlie bars: "...you are naturally expected to buy drinks for the bar-girls who have amazing capacities," (note the double meaning), and "If you wish to take the girl out of the bar, the ransom charge ranges around HK$50/100." Or if you want to begin the evening with a woman or just stay in your room with one, there are 'escort services': "The easiest way to find a charming partner at a fair charge is to choose one of any nationality" from the eight-page picture catalog in the book.7 In the section on shopping in Hong Kong the book describes the Cheongsam, the traditional Chinese dress (no longer worn in China) that is "...world (in)famous and needs no description other than a long low whistle." Regarding the side slit, some "...as all men notice on a windy day, have that slit stop at just below the hip, hence cometh the saying: "It's an ill wind that shows no good thighs."8

MOST CHINESE women in Hong Kong do not wear Cheongsams, but the many in make-up, elaborate hairstyles, tight clothes and spike heels bear little resemblance to their sisters in China. We do not know if they are trying to be modern, Western, or sexy but their public appearance also corresponds with their public image, a sex object and plaything rather than a citizen who fully participates in all spheres of society.

ANOTHER INDICATOR of the status of women in China is the way we were treated there. We, as well as the men in our party, constantly found ourselves stared at and even surrounded by people. But we never felt we were being leered at or appraised, and we were never touched, pawed or grabbed as we have been in other countries. We felt a new freedom in being able to stare at, smile at and say hello to Chinese men, knowing our actions would not be interpreted as anything more than the curiosity and friendliness they felt toward us.

PERHAPS THE most liberating thing for us as it must be for Chinese women, was experiencing freedom from fear. There is crime in China, but not enough to cause concern. Hotel rooms are not locked unless the staff thinks some of the guests might be troublesome. The police are unarmed and are mainly seen directing traffic. The army is quite evident, but only during the day, and it is hard to tell if they are on or off duty.

IMAGINE HOW exhilarating it is in China, especially for a woman, to be unafraid--to be able to sleep in an unlocked hotel room, to be able to walk in any area of a major city even at night, when the streets are barely lit, and not to feel "...the terror that every woman carries within her body."9

IN CONTRAST, a sign in our Tokyo hotel room had so many warnings and safety precautions that we were afraid to stay in or go out. While in Hong Kong we were indirectly warned of hazards with the promise that the "...very efficient Hong Kong Police...will ensure your safety."10

IT WAS only six years ago that the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars was almost always told whenever they asked who did the housework and child care, "The wife, of course."11 Today the answer is "Both of them, of course." We do not know how much indoor housework is being done by men, but since housing is crowded and there is a strong feeling of neighborliness, a great deal of domestic activity occurs outdoors. Young children were rarely seen without the company of an adult and this task was shared fairly equally by parents and grandparents of both sexes. Hanging of laundry, sweeping around the home, and most kinds of shopping also seemed to be shared fairly equally by men and women. The only place where women were highly overrepresented (about 70%) was at the early morning outdoor food market.

BUT IT is likely that women still perform more than their share of domestic tasks, since we saw only groups of men playing cards or chess, while women were more likely to be knitting, sewing, or preparing food, and more men than women were in the parks, in movie lines, or at the night time entertainments we attended. Women did participate equally in morning outdoor exercises.

SINCE WE had only short visits to communes we could not observe if these men and women shared domestic tasks. We were told that, as in most countries, change occurs first in the cities, so it is likely that rural women still do carry the largest share of the household workload.

WE MUST conclude that on paper and in practice the public and domestic relationships between men and women in China have changed so as to enormously improve the status and condition of women. There may not be full equality but in less than thirty years Chinese women and men have come closer to it than in any other country. To more fully understand why this is so, it is necessary to examine the nature and consequences of China's population policies, a topic which we will explore in the following section.

CHINA'S PLANNED BIRTH POLICIES

POPULATION POLICIES, in China as well as in any other country--capitalist or socialist--are extremely important because of their implications for the relations between the sexes and the status of women. Because of the unique characteristics of China's approach to socialist development, its population policies and their implementation are of great interest although (perhaps of) doubtful applicability in other countries. In China, as well as in any other country aiming to humanely control the growth of its population, effective policies must go beyond either making contraception available through the voluntaristic family planning approach, or engaging in coercive and/or manipulative measures to sterilize the population and increase the use of contraception. Effective and humane policies would have to include not only a redefinition of men's and women's roles at the ideological level but also the implementation of radical structural changes making possible the actual practice of those new self-concepts. China has adopted the latter road and her population policies are inextricably linked to the overall changes in the social structure fostered by the leadership and the masses. The leadership's commitment to lower population growth is startlingly expressed in the fact that such matters have become included in the constitution. According to Article 53 of the New Constitution of the People's Republic of China adopted on March 5, 1978, "The state advocates and encourages family planning."12 Essentially, the policy advocates late marriage, child spacing, fewer children, and better children. As the status of women in China has been traditionally attached to marriage and childbearing, deep changes in the social structure would have to occur to induce them to marry late and to bear fewer children in longer intervals of time. How are young people induced to postpone marriage? How are married couples induced to have fewer, well-spaced children? What follows are tentative answer based on what we learned during our visit.

FIRST OF all, late marriage can be considered as an unanticipated consequence of social and economic processes now taking place in China as well as the effect of material constraints upon people's options. Among the latter, the relative scarcity of housing might be an important factor. The effort to industrialize the country requires the allocation of capital to production; although housing is an important priority, it has been affected by the current industrialization drive. Among the former, perhaps the most important might be the patterns of sociability and socio-economic and political participation evolved because of deliberate efforts to combine intellectual and manual labor and to close the rural-urban gap. During the Cultural Revolution, young people routinely spent time away from their families working in factories and communes while engaging in studies and political activities. Although this process has been attenuated by the present leadership as a reaction to what they claim were the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, the pattern established during the last 10 years remains, and young men and women seem to spend a great deal of time in activities that, while integrating them into political and work settings, do not encourage sociability except in collective forms. For example, in a conversation with a young male student from the Shanghai's Teacher's University, we learned that students spend at least one day a week doing physical labor, and every year several weeks in a commune, several weeks in a factory and two weeks with the People's Liberation Army. When we asked about students' social activities, we were told that they generally spend their holidays and weekends with their parents and once in a while, they invite a friend of either sex to visit them there.

THE ISSUE of collective forms of sociability raises a variety of questions which we cannot answer in a definite way, for we do not know the extent to which they may reflect already existing cultural patterns, new forms of relations developed after 1949 and especially after the Cultural Revolution, or deliberate policies designed to keep young people busy in collective undertakings. When asked specifically about courtship, young people (in their early and middle twenties) consistently told us that they were too young for such things. Women, even in their late twenties, seemed embarrassed, and blushed when we discussed dating and courtship in general.

WHILE HOUSING scarcity, patterns of sociability, and organizational changes brought about by the aim of combining physical and intellectual labor and bridging the gap between town and country may indeed lead to late marriage as an unintended consequence, there is a clear-cut policy to urge young people to postpone marriage as long as possible. The minimum legal age at marriage is 18 for women and 20 for men, but both sexes are encouraged to wait about 10 years longer. Once people marry, they are expected to carry on the tradition of having a child right away, but they are advised to wait at least four years for the second child. While the family size considered adequate at the present time includes only two children, we saw a new poster for family planning stating that "One is not too few," which leads us to believe there might soon be a campaign supporting the one-child family.

THE CONTENT of birth planning policies vary depending on the marital status of the recipients. Different rationales are advanced to justify late marriage, family planning and smaller families. A general and recent policy statement of Chairman Hua Kuo-feng included in his report on the work of the government delivered at the 5th National People's Congress states:

     FAMILY PLANNING is a very significant matter.  Planned
     control of population growth is conducive to the planned
     development of the national economy and to the health of
     mother and child.  It also benefits the people where
     production, work and study are concerned.  We must continue
     to give it serious attention and strive to lower the annual
     rate of growth of China's population to less than one
     percent within three years.13

THIS STATEMENT contains the main elements of current family planning propaganda for unmarried and married people.

YOUNG PEOPLE are encouraged to marry late and practice family planning once they do because of several benefits that will follow from that behavior:
1) it will further national economic development 2) it will allow young people to learn more, to do research and to do more book learning
3) it helps production
4) it is conducive to the education of young children

EMPHASIS ON the importance of having time to develop skills and learning as well as economic advantages for the collectivity are the essence of the message received by young people to encourage them to postpone marriage. In our analysis, this message is likely to be effective because of the nature of the social conditions now dominant in China. The patterns of sociability reflecting the forms of social, economic, and political participation into which Chinese people are drawn and the content of the ideologies transmitted through the multiple networks to which people belong do provide a material basis for the process, discussed earlier in this essay, of closing the gap between the private and public spheres of life. An important component of these mobilizing ideologies is the rationale for late marriages advocated in family planning propaganda at all levels. Early marriage and parenthood can thus appear to be antisocial behavior and a barrier to full participation in socialist construction and self-development.

WE HYPOTHESIZE that the public image of young men and women in China, their unique blend of shyness in personal and sexual matters, and forthrightness in political and social matters must largely reflect the quality of the life that is now being fostered in China. While "the fall of public man" is decried by Western social critics,14 the rise and consolidation of public life is being celebrated in China where among its material and social psychological consequences, those bearing upon the relations between the sexes and the status of women are perhaps the most striking. In these conditions, late marriage might not be the repressive, punitive pattern it appears to be in the light of our Western preconceptions but, instead, an affirmative expression of full citizenship.

SHIFTING OUR concern to the married, we learned that the rationale put forth to explain the benefits of family planning for married couples is:
1) it is good for the health of women and children 2) it is important for the children because fewer children make possible greater investments in education and a better future for all children
3) it is beneficial for the national economy. As a member of a commune's revolutionary committee told us, China practices a unified national economy, and if there were many people, production and distribution would become problematic.

BOTH THE married and unmarried learn that these population policies are important for the overall effort of socialist construction. They also learn that these policies bring specific benefits relevant to their own interests. Young people learn that late marriage increases their chances of self-development and their ability to contribute to the revolution. Married people learn that contraception and family planning result in healthier and stronger mothers and children and in better educated children. They learn these things not only through effective family planning propaganda but, even more importantly, through their daily experiences. The effectiveness of ideology and policy is cemented in the reality of a society able to provide food, clothing, and shelter to more than 900 million people while, at the time, engaging in what is perhaps the most massive investment in human capital ever attempted in modern times. The healthy, joyful, talented, and educated children of China are testimony of the success of China's population policies.

HOW ARE these policies implemented? They are implemented through a complex network of groups to which every person in China belongs. The leadership of these groups at all levels is responsible for disseminating family planning propaganda. Hospitals and healthcare personnel also engage in family planning propaganda in urban and rural settings. The word propaganda does not have negative connotations in China; it simply means the dissemination of information and education. Such methods of spreading information and educating the people seem to be very effective and to reach people of all ages. For instance, we were told by a retired worker who already had a grandson, that she did not expect many grandchildren in the future. "Too many children," she explained, "interfere with work and study. In preliberation times it was very sad; women had too many children and could hardly keep them alive. Too many children are not beneficial for the people or society." She preferred that her own children live well and have fewer children of their own.

WHEN WE inquired about the "deviants," those who may indulge in premarital sex, have children out of wedlock, or have too many children, we learned that they are tolerated, but undergo considerable social pressure to mend their ways. While premarital sex is discouraged, it does take place and women are given advice about abortion and contraception even though they may be unmarried. But they generally go to family planning clinics after having had sexual relations, not before, and they are usually sent there by the "responsible" persons (heads) of their organizations when pregnancy is suspected, to be given information and to have an abortion if they so decide. If a married woman were to have a pregnancy out of line with the existing policy, we were told that the couple would be sternly lectured by the responsible persons at work or in their neighborhood and encouraged to have an abortion. If they were to choose to have the baby, more persuasion and education would continue. Deviant behavior in these matters, therefore, is not punished either socially or economically. Deviants are subject to "rectification" or intensive education and persuasion; they are not, however, forced to be sterilized, forced to have abortions, or excluded from their neighborhoods and place of work.

THE CRUDE birth rate in China is conservatively estimated to have fallen from 33/1000 to 22/1000 since 1968.15 This unprecedented decline in fertility among developing nations is due, no doubt, to China's birth planning policies and the new place of women in Chinese society. Women are now free from the tyranny of reproduction, and they are expected to participate fully in society, both of which are prerequisites for their emancipation. But what about the women who do have families? Are they actually able to participate in society on an equal basis with men? In the following section we will examine the situation of the employed mother, for it is employment that is thought to be the first and foremost requirement for equality and it is employment that has always been the biggest obstacle to mothers' seeking economic and social independence.

THE EMPLOYED MOTHER

IT IS generally assumed that fertility will decline when women work outside the home. This assumption is based on an inverse correlation between employment and fertility that exists primarily for middle class urban women in the developed nations. Sociologically, the decline in fertility is thought to occur because employment creates role conflict, i.e., it is difficult to be a worker, a mother and a homemaker at the same time. From the viewpoint of microeconomics, the relationship is believed to occur because employment increases the actual costs of children if the mother does remain employed (e.g., nursery, daycare), and the opportunity costs of children if the mother does not remain employed (e.g., wages foregone). This perspective also implies that children and employment are in some way similar and can be substituted for one another, and that childbearing is highly rational with economic factors having the greatest weight in cost/benefit calculations.16 As a consequence, recent policy statements have stressed the employment of women as a means of reducing fertility in the developing nations.17

WE HAVE evaluated these theoretical positions elsewhere;18 here it is important to point out that fertility reduction policies based on this kind of reasoning are punitive since children would be foregone primarily to avoid loss of income (which may be needed to support other family members), or to avoid an increase in the physical and mental strain the mother already bears. Such policies would also discourage breastfeeding since the actual physical separation of the mother and child is thought to be necessary for a reduction in fertility.

THE IMPORTANCE of breastfeeding is becoming increasingly recognized.19 Not only does breast milk provide superior nutrition and protection against infectious diseases, but the method of delivery provides the necessary degree of sanitation that cannot be achieved by most families using powdered milk and bottles in the developing nations.

IN CHINA the opposite prevails in theory and in practice. All able-bodied Chinese women are expected to work outside the home and they do. This expectation arises from the theoretical premise that employment is necessary for the emancipation of women and the practical need for female labor power. Women are not employed in order to lower the birth rate; instead men and women are expected to marry late and have small families so they can work for the society. At the same time women are not penalized for having children. They are not put into the double bind that most other employed women experience in countries where childcare may cost so much and be such a hassle, and time out of work results in such a loss of advancement, seniority, and pension benefits--if not the job itself--that they drop out of the labor force after having a child. And having done so, go on to make motherhood a full-time career (this is the other side of the inverse relationship between employment and fertility). Or, in accord with the theory, if employment is an economic or psychic necessity they may forego wanted children, as has occurred even in the Eastern European Socialist countries and USSR where birth rates have dropped so low that governments are offering pronatalist incentives or adopting coercive pronatalist policies.20 The combined goals of full employment for women and better children have produced a very different situation for Chinese women.

DURING PREGNANCY women receive regular and frequent medical examinations. Those involved in heavy work are switched to light work without loss of pay, and during the last trimester, work hours are reduced with no reduction in pay. Fifty-six days of paid leave may be taken before and after delivery. If the delivery is difficult leave may be extended to 70 days, and regular sick leave may be taken if more time is needed. Then the infant is placed in a nursery or left with a grandparent.

BREASTFEEDING IS encouraged in China and almost every mother who is able does so for 10 to 12 months. During this period the mother is assigned light work without a loss of pay and given two half-hour nursing breaks each day which are counted as part of her eight work hours. Since most women live near their work place or the work place has a nursery in it, they can take advantage of the opportunity to breastfeed, and by utilizing their lunch hour they can see their babies every two hours during the work day.

FOR MANY employed parents in other countries the costs and logistics of childcare may be overwhelming. Daycare may not be available at all or not until the child is toilet trained, daycare hours may not coincide with work hours, and transportation may be a problem. When the child starts school transportation may still be a problem, and there is the issue of childcare after school, during vacations or when children are sick. While nurseries and kindergartens are not yet universal in China, it is a goal, and even now for special cases 24-hour childcare is available. Since schools are generally at the workplace or in the neighborhood, transportation is not a problem. Sick children may be left at factory or neighborhood clinics, or if they are too sick to be moved, someone will come to care for them. When childcare is not yet available, grandparents often are. After school and during vacation there are organized activities for children, and if there are no grandparents in the home, the neighborhood committee of retired workers will look after the children.

IT SHOULD be noted that the costs and benefits of childbearing are not as clear cut or regular in the communes as in the cities. Women may not get work points when they stop work for delivery or children, which would result in a loss of income.

On the other hand, the family gets another private plot for each child, which could result in an increase in income.

A FINAL help for the working mother is that more husbands are now sharing housework and childcare (a husband's refusal to help in the home is grounds for divorce) and if grandparents are in the home they may do most of this work if they are able.

CONTRARY TO the experience of most women, employment in China does not discourage childbearing; neither the mother nor the child is penalized. Thus we hypothesize that the decline in China's birth rate is more a response to the birth planning propaganda than because the employment of women has made childbearing too difficult and too costly, and that childbearing is not a significant barrier to the emancipation of women.

CONCLUSION

DEMOGRAPHICALLY, CURRENT planned birth policies in China have met with what experts call an unprecedented success.21 To assess the meaning of that success it is necessary to determine who benefits from it. In the case of China, a lower rate of population growth not only may have a positive impact on the current industrialization effort but, given the nature of socialist production and distribution patterns, it will most likely lead--in the long run--to a further overall improvement in the standard of living of the population as a whole.

FAMILY PLANNING programs and policies introduced in the Third World by Western (mainly U.S.) financed and controlled agencies operate in a context which renders meaningless their goals.22 Presumably, smaller families will result in an improvement of the people's "life chances," both in socioeconomic terms as well as in terms of health and life expectancy. Given the distortions in social and economic development in most developing nations which have resulted in high rates of rural and urban unemployment, maintenance of inefficient patterns of land ownership and agricultural exploitation, etc., to tell the people that having smaller families will benefit their situation and improve their standard of living is at best a naive and at worst a manipulative and cruel tactic that hides, under a manifest concern for human welfare, a latent concern with lowering the rates of population growth in an attempt to check the development of a politically explosive situation.23

MANIPULATION IS also inherent in the argument that women should be given an increased participation in the labor force IN ORDER TO lower the birth rate. The sociological theoretical assumption of structural incompatibility between maternal and occupational roles and the economic assumption that the opportunity costs of children increase as the process of industrialization advances, rest upon the existence of class exploitation and sexual oppression which, while segregating women into the lower paid and less prestigious occupations, deliberately denies them the necessary infrastructure (nurseries, maternity benefits, childcare services, etc.) to enable them to work and make decisions about childbearing based on the assertion, rather than the denial, of their needs. Some have argued that social legislation establishing maternity benefits and nurseries for women factory workers are "pronatalist" in their effects.24 From this standpoint, it becomes expedient to abolish social legislation and pursue punitive policies aimed at lowering the birth rate and the supply price of labor at the same time.

TO THE contrary, China's population policies calling for fewer and better children do not manipulate the status of women to further demographic and political goals nor do they offer nonexistent or unrealistic benefits. These policies have led to great improvements in the status of women and children as well as qualitative changes in the relations between men and women because they are interwoven with a series of crucial social, economic, and political processes which are working towards the creation of a new form of social organization. Women can now control their reproduction and enjoy better health due to the availability of contraceptive technology and medical care in rural and urban areas and because of real and meaningful alternatives that enhance the desirability of the new life. The existence of maternity benefits, nurseries, kindergartens, schools and health care in the place of work do not act as an incentive to childbearing but, in the context of China, they fulfill two important functions:
1) they free women for economic, political, and social participation.
2) they provide children with the best China has to offer today. The material confirmation of the benefits brought about by implementing in one's own life the slogan "fewer and better children" surely acts as a powerful incentive for parents to have smaller families.

POPULATION GROWTH in China is being successfully curtailed because the planned birth program operates in the context of sweeping changes which have positively affected class relations, the relations between the sexes, as well as the relations between parents and children, while at the same time allowing for the full integration of everyone in the national effort for attaining modernization and building socialism.

DEMOGRAPHICALLY, CHINA'S experience challenges the notion that birth rates can be lowered only by raising the costs of children. China is showing that a lower birth rate can be attained by improving the quality of life for all and by enabling full participation in the economic and political life of the country rather than punishing childbearing.

SOCIALLY AND politically, China's experience shows that the relations between the sexes are amenable to change when linked to overall changes in the social and economic structure. Although women have not achieved full equality in China, the achievements of Chinese women and the changes in the relations between the sexes in China must be understood in the light of the Chinese situation before the revolution rather than in the light of the aspirations of middle class American feminists. Twenty-nine years after the revolution, or as Chinese people would say, 29 years after Liberation, what China has been able to accomplish so far places Chinese women ahead of most women in the world.

NOTES

  1. Kate Curtain, WOMEN IN CHINA (New York: Pathfinder, 1975).
  2. Julia Kristeva, "On the Women of China," SIGNS, 1 (1975), pp. 57-81.
  3. Central People's Government Council, THE MARRIAGE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1975).
  4. Hsu Kwang, "Women's Liberation is a Component Part of the Proletariat Revolution," PEKING REVIEW, 10 (March 8, 1974), pp. 12-15; "Constitution of the People's Republic of China," DOCUMENT OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE FIFTH NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1978).
  5. Ross Terrill, 800,000,000 (New York: Dell, 1971). Ruth Sidel, WOMEN AND CHILD CARE IN CHINA (Baltimore: Penguin, 1973).
  6. Isabel Largine and J. Dumsulin, "Toward a Science of Women's Liberation," LATIN AMERICA AND EMPIRE REPORT, 6 (December, 1972), pp. 3-20; Martha E. Gimenez, "Marxism and Feminism," FRONTIERS, 1 (Winter, 1975), pp. 61-81; Eli Zaretsky, CAPITALISM, THE FAMILY, AND PERSONAL LIFE (New York: Harper and Row, 1976).
  7. Hong Kong Tourist Association, OFFICIAL GUIDEBOOK (Hong Kong, 1978), p. 71.
  8. Ibid, p. 201.
  9. Devaki Jain, "Are Women a Separate Issue?" POPULI, 5 (1978),
  10. 9.
  11. Hong Kong Tourist Association, p. 61.
  12. Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, CHINA! INSIDE THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (New York: Bantam, 1972), p. 282.
  13. "Constitution of the People's Republic of China," p. 170.
  14. Hua Kuo-feng, "Unite and Strive to Build a Modern, Powerful Socialist Country!" DOCUMENTS OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE FIFTH NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, p. 76.
  15. Richard Sennett, THE FALL OF PUBLIC MAN (New York: Vintage books, 1978).
  16. Estimates derived from a Report to the U.S. House of Representatives by Leo Orleans, cited in "Notes and Comments," POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW, 3 (December, 1977), pp. 482- 485; and Population Reference Bureau "World Population Data Sheet," (Washington, D.C., 1978).
  17. For one review of these perspectives, see Ruth Dixon, "Women's Rights and Fertility," REPORTS ON POPULATION/FAMILY PLANNING #17, 1975.
  18. For example see Parker Maulden, et al., "A Report on Bucharest," Studies in Family Planning, 5 (1974), pp. 357-395; National Academy of Sciences, IN SEARCH OF A POPULATION POLICY (Washington, D.C., 1974).
  19. Elizabeth Moen, "Third World Women, World Population Growth: A Case of Blaming the Victim?" JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL WELFARE, 4 (November, 1977), pp. 1186-1202; Martha E. Gimenez, "Population and Capitalism," LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, 10 (Fall, 1977), pp. 5-40.
  20. Alvin Berg, The Nutrition Factor
  21. Hilda Scott, DOES SOCIALISM LIBERATE WOMEN? (Boston: Beacon Press, 1974); Population Reference Bureau, "East Germany Claims Baby Production Success," INTERCOM, 6 (March, 1978), p. 16.
  22. For example see Shirley Cereseto, "On the Causes and Solution to the Problem of World Hunger and Starvation," THE INSURGENT SOCIOLOGIST, 3 (Summer, 1977), pp. 33-51.
  23. For an analysis of U.S. control of population policies and programs in Latin America see Terry L. McCoy, "Linkage Politics and Latin American Population Policies," pp. 55-94 in Terry L. McCoy, ed., THE DYNAMICS OF POPULATION POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1974); Paul Banan, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968).
  24. Paul Banan, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH; Alain de Janvry, "Material Determinants of the World Food Crisis," BERKELEY JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 21 (1976), pp. 3-26; Martha E. Gimenez, "Population and Capitalism."
  25. David Chaplin, "Some Institutional Determinants of Fertility in Peru," pp. 223-230 in David Chaplin, ed., POPULATION POLICIES AND GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1971).