'put[ting] matter in place of the Idea and *vice versa*' – 'for that would merely produce a new materialist metaphysics (i.e. a materialist version of classical philosophy, say, at best a mechanistic materialism)'; instead, Lenin turns Hegel into a materialist simply by reading him from 'a proletarian *class viewpoint* (a dialectical-materialist viewpoint)'.[18] With this method of reading, even Hegel's Absolute Idea can be made to reveal a 'materialist kernel'.[19]

There seems only one way to make sense of 'materialism' in this context – viz., by arguing that a reading from the proletarian class viewpoint is a reading directed towards practical political action, and that practical political action has a *material* effect upon the world. Such an argument would also make sense of Althusser's obscure notion of 'concern' in the assertion that 'of course, [the concept-concrete] does concern the concrete-real'.[20] But this is not a *scientific* kind of materialism; this is a *religious* kind of materialism, characteristic of any system of thought which sees not what the world *is* but what it *must be*. On such an argument, Mohammedanism can also count as a materialism. In the end, Althusser's version of Science seems to fall back upon a blind Marxist faith after all.

9
Foucault as archaeologist

(i)

Foucault carries Althusser's position through to more extreme conclusions. Like Althusser, he rejects the notion of truth as a matching or correspondence of ideas to things, and, like Althusser, he rejects the traditional belief that western science has been advancing towards this kind of truth. But unlike Althusser, he does not take it for granted that western science must still have been advancing in some other sort of way. Instead, he rejects the traditional belief in scientific progress.

In so doing, he rejects the traditional teleological version of scientific history which Althusser also takes for granted. The teleological version of scientific history focuses upon those past discoveries and knowledges which still seem important to us nowadays, those past discoveries and knowledges which can be seen as beating a path up to our own door. (In similar vein, a teleological version of political history might tell everything that happened to the German races from the Fall of the Roman Empire to 1871 in terms of a progress towards German nationhood.) But Foucault tries to see past periods through their own eyes, without retrospective selection. And he takes into account not just those past discoveries and knowledges which still seem important to us nowadays, but also and equally those past discoveries and knowledges which seem quite bizarre and

incredible to us nowadays. Foucault's 'archaeological' version of scientific history is a fascinating recovery of all the discards and failures and forgotten areas of human thought.

What this recovery reveals is that even the most apparently 'superstitious' period still makes perfectly good sense of the world in its own kind of way. (In this respect, Foucault demonstrates for historically remote societies what Lévi-Strauss demonstrates for geographically remote societies.) And, conversely, even the most apparently 'scientific' period is still perfectly irrational about the world in its own kind of way. There is no decisive revolution from ideology to science – neither the long-term revolution envisaged in most histories of human thought, nor the all-at-once revolution envisaged by Althusser. There is simply a succession of different ideologies, some of which consider themselves 'scientific'. (If Foucault himself prefers to avoid the term 'ideology', this is mainly in order to avoid any suggestion that ideology is something false and something different to science.)

Foucault's attitude to 'scientific' revolutions is clearly demonstrated in his account of the advent of modern medical science around the end of the eighteenth century. Ordinarily, we would think of this as a triumphant breakthrough from ignorance to truth. But Foucault presents it very differently. According to Foucault, the old 'superstitious' medicine made perfectly good sense of disease – but in terms of a discourse which has since been banished and forgotten. This discourse framed disease against a dominant assumption of life; and against a dominant assumption of life, disease showed up as a counter-life, an evil, a negative force. Disease was always the invisible 'other' of the visible human body. But in the new discourse emerging around the end of the eighteenth century, disease shows up not as a negative force but as a positive object – a positive object for a positivist science to study. Disease is no longer the invisible 'other' of the visible human body, but something visible in its own right *inside* the human body. It is no coincidence that the end of the eighteenth century also sees the emergence of pathological anatomy, the practice of opening up bodies in order to inspect disease actually within the organs. But this practice, of course, can only be carried out upon *dead* bodies. So in this respect, the new discourse frames disease

against a dominant assumption of death. As Foucault puts it: 'Disease breaks away from the metaphysic of evil, to which it had been related for centuries; and it finds in the visibility of death the full form in which its content appears in positive terms.'[1] Even to think and speak about disease in terms of separate static internal organs presupposes death as 'the concrete a priori of medical experience'.[2]

When Foucault puts it like this, the advent of modern medical science no longer looks like a case of scales falling from before the eyes:

> It is as if for the first time for thousands of years, doctors, free at last of theories and chimeras, agreed to approach the object of their experience with the purity of an unprejudiced gaze. But the analysis must be turned around: it is the forms of visibility that have changed; the new medical spirit . . . is nothing more than a syntactical reorganization of disease in which the limits of the visible and invisible follow a new pattern.[3]

The object that modern medical science studies no longer appears as something natural and obvious; on the contrary, it has to be carved literally or mentally out of the body, by an unnatural act of violence against the body. Nor was this object always there and waiting to be discovered; on the contrary, it has to be created by a certain practice – of pathological anatomy – and a certain way of speaking – in terms of separate static internal organs. (It is the combination of a practice and a way of speaking that constitutes what Foucault calls a discourse: not just a language, but also the 'experimental' approach which supports that language.) The vaunted objectivity of 'scientific' method here consists of turning the human body into an object for being objective about.

Of course, we might still want to argue against Foucault that, even if modern medical discourse is heavy with assumption and not transparent at all, it has none the less been proved valid in the long run by the success of its results. But on Foucault's argument, a discourse itself furnishes the very criteria by which its results are judged successful. And certainly, there have been growing suspicions in recent years that the much-vaunted achievements of modern medical science are, by other criteria,

somehow missing the point. Thus there have been growing suspicions about the long-term implications of the 'Magic Bullet' approach to curing infections, about the psychological implications of the 'hygienic' approach to childbirth, about the moral implications of the 'human vegetable' approach to maintaining bodily functions at all costs, and so on. Are we not here witnessing the final consequences of a way of looking at the body as though it were dead? Modern medical science has evidently produced its own kind of blindnesses along with its own kind of visibilities.

The self-confirming nature of modern medical science appears even more plainly when it extends its sway from bodily health to mental health. In Foucault's description, psychiatric medicine depends overwhelmingly upon the prestige and authority accorded to the figure of the doctor in our society. Thus the new 'medical' attitude to mental 'disease', as promoted by Tuke and Pinel also around the end of the eighteenth century, 'did not introduce science but a personality, whose powers borrowed from science only their disguise, or at most their justification'.[4] In effect, psychiatric medicine works only to the extent that patients are persuaded into speaking a scientific language about themselves. Patients are 'mad' because they have evaded the primary socialization which ordinarily enters into human beings along with their society's language; but they can still be subdued and at least partially socialized by a secondary web of restraining language. Needless to say, this seemingly 'successful' result in no way proves the validity of the psychiatrist's language. The psychiatrist has not caught the truth of madness in his language, he has merely taught it to speak the same language back to him. 'What we call psychiatric practice is a certain moral tactic . . . overlaid by the myths of positivism.'[5] Once again, this is a kind of objectivity that first creates its object for being objective about.

In general, Foucault views the science of modern medicine in much the same way as we ordinarily view the 'science' of wine-buffery. For the object that wine-buffs study is not at all natural or obvious, it was not always there waiting to be discovered. Without the special wine-buffs' language (of 'rounded', 'smooth', 'full-bodied', etc.) and without the special wine-buffs' practices (of holding wine in the mouth in ways that

separate out the 'palate' from the 'finish', etc.), our experience of the taste and smell of wine is quite shapeless and transient, impossible to pin down or recall voluntarily after the event. (Everyday language does not help because it offers so very few words for categorizing tastes and smells.) But with this special language and these special practices, wine-buffs – as a mutually supportive society – create an object for being objective about. And their results are certainly successful by their own criteria: a genuine expert, at least, can recognize wines with remarkable accuracy. None the less, the prestige and authority accorded to this discourse drives out other equally possible, equally valid discourses. For instance, a different approach with a different language and practices could define the experience of wine in social or religious terms – a Bacchic definition of wine. By other criteria, the wine-buff's discourse quite misses the point of the experience.

(ii)

In Foucault's 'archaeological' history, the advent of modern medical science around the end of the eighteenth century ties in with a whole range of similar transformations in human thought. Doctors and psychiatrists were able to constitute their own particular 'scientific' object under a new conceptual framework – and a new version of objectivity – that spread across the general community of scientists around the end of the eighteenth century. Such large-scale conceptual frameworks, which Foucault calls 'epistēmēs', are the ultimate revelation of 'archaeological' history.

An epistēmē, as Foucault describes it, is a social *a priori* of a kind that precedes any possible original discovery and any possible truth to the world. It precedes any possible original discovery because it is social and must therefore be spoken *together* before it can be spoken individually. 'One can no longer say that a discovery . . . inaugurates . . . a new phase in the history of discourse.'[6] And it precedes any possible truth to the world because it is an *a priori* and must therefore constitute the very ground upon which truth and falsity can be debated. Foucault does not deny that theories may be more or less true and more or less original within an epistēmē. Within an

epistēmē, he proposes quite as much conflict and disagreement between opposing theories as we ordinarily allow for. But between epistēmēs, he proposes something much more than we ordinarily allow for: a discontinuity so deep and unbridgeable as to be beyond even conflict and disagreement.

Such is the vision of 'archaeological' history. There are no absolute foundations of human thought; the foundations change from one epistēmē to another. So, whereas the orthodox history of human thought is a history of the different things that have been seen in the world by human eyes, 'archaeological' history is a history of the different worlds that different human eyes have seen. Foucault's achievement is to give us, for a moment, those different eyes, and have us realize, for a moment, how natural and obvious a different world can seem through them.

The Hegelian analogy emerges very plainly here. For Hegel too proposed a history that would deal with something more than things in the world – a 'philosophical' history as distinct from the 'anti-universal', 'pragmatic', 'critical' and 'fragmentary' varieties of factual history. And he developed the outlines of such a history in his account of the very general frameworks, or *Zeitgeists*, that have dominated the successive periods of human thought. Thus the thought of the Roman period, according to Hegel, was dominated by the concept of Law. Of course, Hegel's *Zeitgeists* are crudely homogenous and oversimplified compared to Foucault's epistēmēs – after all, Hegel was always more of a philosopher than a historian. But Hegel, following Schiller, did none the less recognize very radical changes in the foundations of human thought; and, even more than Schiller, he had the imagination to envisage historical worlds utterly different to our own.

In this historicism, Hegel differs significantly from Plato and Spinoza. By objectifying his objective ideas in social customs and institutions, Hegel makes them dependent upon a given state of society. Hegel's Objective Idealism is not a philosophy of perfect, timeless, immutable *idealities* – quite the contrary. Hegel *relativizes* the concept of the *a priori*. Admittedly, he still sees the historical succession of *Zeitgeists* marching towards a final perfect immutable state that embodies the Absolute Idea. But there is a potential for irrationalism in his kind of

rationalism. And this potential was in fact very strongly brought out by the most influential twentieth-century French proponent of Hegelianism, Alexander Kojève.[7] In Kojève's interpretation of Hegel, the progression from *Zeitgeist* to *Zeitgeist* depends more upon social might than intellectual right, and there are no absolute standards of reality at all: what was true in one period can become false in another period, and what was false in one period can become true in another.

The potential for irrationalism is present in Superstructuralism too, right from the very start. Durkheim is a case in point. In Durkheim's highly social conception of the *a priori*, the rational thought of a given society can only be built upon foundations which are unthought and irrational. In the case of primitive societies, such foundations take the form of religious belief; in the case of our own present-day society, they take the form of a belief in science:

> It is not enough that [concepts] be true to be believed. If they are not in harmony with the other beliefs and opinions, or, in a word, with the mass of the other collective representations, they will be denied; minds will be closed to them; consequently it will be as though they did not exist. Today it is generally sufficient that they bear the stamp of science to receive a sort of privileged credit, because we have faith in science. But this faith does not differ essentially from religious faith . . . science rests upon opinion.[8]

Even when science (presumably in the human sciences) manages to observe its own underlying irrationality, it still cannot free itself from opinion:

> It is undoubtedly true that this opinion can be taken as the object of a study and a science made of it. . . . But the science of opinion does not make opinions; it can only observe them and make them more conscious of themselves. It is true that by this means it can lead them to change, but science continues to be dependent upon opinion at the very moment when it seems to be making its laws.[9]

There is a very obvious anticipation of Foucault here.

Durkheim similarly anticipates Foucault on the subject of those who do not conform to their society's social *a priori*. In

Hegel's philosophy, of course, the possibility of non-conformity is not even recognized. But Durkheim recognizes the possibility, and recognizes society's way of dealing with it: 'Does a mind ostensibly free itself from these forms of thought? It is no longer considered a human mind in the full sense of the word, and is treated accordingly.'[10] This brief insight foretells all of Foucault's excavations into the unrecorded and unrecordable side of history, into the existences of those who are excluded and denied the right to their discourse. The mind that does not conform is treated as aberrational, as mad, as perverted.

But if Durkheim and Foucault see the same facts, yet they take diametrically opposite attitudes towards them. Durkheim, with his curiously conservative 'socialisme', is quite happy to replace the principle of truth with a principle of social morality, quite happy to believe that science is valid for us because our society is valid for us. Nor does he feel any compunction about sacrificing non-conformists upon the altar of social solidarity – in spite of the fact that the thought of the judges is fundamentally just as irrational as the thought of the victims. Foucault, on the other hand, identifies with the victims. He identifies with them, not because their discourse would be *more* true, but because it would be no *less* true, and yet they are made to suffer for it. And he is hostile towards modern science, not because any alternative would be *more* objective, but because modern science proclaims and dismisses any alternative as *less* objective.

Indeed, Foucault seems happier with periods of history when social coercion was at least visible and overt. What he resents about the modern period in western history is that, thanks to modern science, social coercion has become insidious. For science excludes the non-conformists and denies them the right to their discourse, whilst all the time pretending to be pure and impartial and disinterested. Oppression by the smug superiority of 'knowledge' is particularly oppressive. Foucault has no more *reason* for attacking modern science and modern society than Durkheim has for endorsing them. But it is very evident in Foucault's 'archaeological' history that, although he cannot view any epistēmē as objectively better or worse than any other, yet he *feels* much more favourably towards pre- or post-scientific epistēmēs than towards scientific ones.

(iii)

Foucault's most complete history of epistēmēs is in *The Order of Things*. Here we have the four major epistēmēs of the last five centuries: Renaissance, Classical, Modern, and Post-Modern cum Structuralist. (These periods are in fact much like those in any other history of thought, save in the lack of a crucial revolution at the start of the twentieth century; Foucault's Structuralist period begins only tentatively with Freud and Saussure, and is still in the process of arriving.) *The Order of Things* also presents Foucault's most general and wide-ranging history of epistēmēs. For Foucault here examines not just one scientific field but the interrelations between three fields; and he readily refers to analogous developments in philosophy, literature and other sciences.

The three fields examined in *The Order of Things* are the study of language, the study of economic exchange and the study of living organisms. As usual in Foucault's 'archaeological' history, the focus is upon sciences less surely established than the 'hard' natural sciences, and sciences which have a particularly strong bearing on man's own idea of himself. And, as usual, the objects that these sciences study turn out to be quite different from epistēmē to epistēmē. Thus, the Modern period understands language, economic exchange and living organisms in a very different sense to the Classical period; and the further development of psychological and anthropological perspectives in the Modern period yields further new objects. It is only under these later perspectives that the truly 'human' human sciences emerge. And such human sciences are themselves dehumanized – or about to be dehumanized – in the Post-Modern period.

As regards the Renaissance period, there are no human sciences because there is no specifically human object of knowledge. In this epistēmē, the division between the human and the non-human does not exist. Foucault's Renaissance stands at the tail-end of the theological Middle Ages, and, by way of God, turns the whole world into a cultural product. What we now see as the natural world appears in the Renaissance as a great artifice, a great book, in which God, as the Word itself, inscribes signs and clues and an endless play of overlapping resemblances for men to interpret. (For a similar account of the Renaissance

world, see E. M. W. Tillyard's book, *The Elizabethan World Picture*.) And, as the natural world is a kind of language, so human language is a kind of nature. Thus the fables of extraordinary plants and animals handed down in books are just as reliable in the way of evidence as any first-hand observation of plants and animals. What appears to us nowadays merely as an incredible degree of subservience to 'authority' is really the consequence of a totally different epistemological framework. In the Renaissance, language is not regarded as a secondary human creation always liable to diverge from the primary world; it is 'a part of the world, ontologically interwoven with it'.[11]

With the rise of the natural sciences in the early part of the seventeenth century, the Renaissance gives way to the Classical period. In this new period, the non-human splits off from the human. There is a sharp and simple dichotomy: the natural world becomes an object to be known by the human mind as a subject. But, at the same time, this knowing operates in a very close and immediate way, holding subject and object directly up against each other, face to face. Specifically, this knowing operates as *representation*: the mind re-presents a simulacrum of the outside world. Or, in a favourite metaphor of the Classical period, the outside world is captured in the mind like a reflection in a mirror. What's more, this knowing is essentially optical, just as the metaphor suggests. According to Foucault, the Classical notion of first-hand observation devolves upon a single human sense – the sense of sight. And the understanding that accompanies such observation is no more than a kind of visual analysis, articulating a general picture into its component parts and features. Hence the predilection for classificatory tables and taxonomies in the Classical period. Although the non-human and the human have split apart, there is still an assumed harmony between them, which makes it very easy for the mind to take down the true pattern of things.

This Classical dichotomy is well suited to the development of the 'hard' natural sciences, where the world of the object is non-human Nature and the world of the human subject is pure transparency. But it also allows a development of the 'softer' sciences of life and culture, to the extent that they can fit into the same mould. Thus the Classical study of economic exchange is

founded upon a somewhat limited concept of wealth, where wealth is something in Nature – i.e. land – or at least something visually observable – i.e. goods. Similarly in the study of living organisms. Classical Natural History describes plants and animals (and not man) in terms of their visually observable parts and features; it is, in Foucault's words, 'nothing more than the nomination of the visible'.[12] As for the study of language, the Classical view is that language should be no more than the transparent glass over the reflecting silver of the mind. The business of language is to let the picture through, and to let the picture re-reflect from mind to mind, with a minimum of interference and distortion. Thus viewed, language becomes a mere passive application of names. 'The fundamental task of Classical "discourse" is *to ascribe a name to things, and in that name to name their being*.'[13] In the final total taxonomy of the world, the pattern of names in language will harmonize with the pattern of representations in the mind which will harmonize with the pattern of things in Nature.

Around the end of the eighteenth century, however, this kind of harmony begins to seem no longer attainable. In the natural sciences, for instance, the focus shifts from the mechanical interactions of solid bodies to the insubstantial functionings of forces like electricity, heat and magnetism; and Nature ceases to be an 'object' in the simple thing-like sense of the term. First-hand observation still allows one to record the effects of electricity, heat and magnetism, but it does not allow one to picture the forces as they are in themselves. The forces as they are in themselves have become inaccessible to the sense of sight; they can be known only by the understanding, only in the abstract. 'The visible order with its permanent grid of distinctions, is now only a superficial glitter above an abyss.'[14] In the natural sciences, the reality of Nature retreats outside the ambit of man's mirroring apparatus, just as, in philosophy (and also around the end of the eighteenth century), the Kantian thing-in-itself vanishes beyond the bounds of knowledge.

Likewise in the study of language, economic exchange and living organisms, the new epistēmē brings to light the functioning of abstract forces outside of man's direct experience. In economics, for instance, the observable substance of goods turns out to be merely a surface manifestation of something

which cannot be directly observed, something which is 'hidden' in the past history of the goods – namely, the force of human labour expended in their production. The truth about economic exchange is that the activity is the measure of the things. But as Marx most notably demonstrates, this truth is inaccessible to ordinary experience, which knows exchange only in terms of goods. Similarly in the study of living organisms. The outward parts and features turn out to be merely a surface manifestation of the essential inward organs; and the organs themselves, 'which are spatial, solid, directly or indirectly visible', have to be understood by way of 'the functions, which are not perceptible, but determine, as though from below, the arrangement of what we do perceive'.[15] No longer does one account for a living organism by finding its place in a taxonomic table; now one accounts for it in terms of a past history of internal growth. This kind of thinking, when applied to the totality of all living species, leads to the Darwinian conept of a 'hidden' past history of evolution.

As for the study of language, the nineteenth century sees the advent of historical philology. The Classical dream of a single great pattern of names is overthrown; now there is a multitude of separate languages, all with their own peculiar evolutionary histories, like so many separate living species. And, by virtue of their own peculiar evolutionary histories, these separate languages all have their own peculiar deposits of vocabulary and grammar – thus determining the possibilities of what can be expressed in them. As Foucault puts it on behalf of the new epistēmē:

> Expressing their thoughts in words of which they are not the masters, enclosing them in verbal forms whose historical dimensions they are unaware of, men believe that their speech is their servant and do not realize that they are submitting themselves to its demands. The grammatical arrangements of a language are the *a priori* of what can be expressed in it.[16]

Language is no longer a pure transparency, but filled with 'hidden' forces that the language-user never directly experiences.

In these 'softer' sciences of life and culture, the notion of

abstract forces has an effect which it does not have in the natural sciences: it bends back round against the notion of the human subject. Suddenly man finds himself under the control of his own language and biology and economic system. The abstract forces are 'exterior to himself, and older than his own birth', they 'anticipate him, overhang him with all their solidity, and traverse him as though he were merely an object of nature'.[17] No longer can man hold himself aloof and superior. With the new notion of abstract forces, the Classical dichotomy between the subject as mirror and the object as thing has become irrelevant. For the same abstract forces run through *both* the human subject *and* the non-human object; and the human subject is inserted back in with the rest of the world again.

From Foucault's point of view, this is all a step in the right direction. But it is compromised, in the Modern period, by a simultaneous step in the wrong direction. For the Modern period, according to Foucault, invents a new image of man that recuperates his importance and apartness: the image of psychological man. Psychological man retreats inwardly out of the reach of the forces which control his outward language and labour; he dwells privately in the middle of his own purely individual experience. Such inwardness was never even contemplated in the Renaissance and Classical periods. But it arises in the nineteenth century as a general cultural trend (with the Romantic poets, for instance, and the psychological nineteenth-century novelists); and it is visible as a general philosophical trend in the 'I'-philosophies of Rousseau and Kant, the Phenomenologists and the Existentialists.

According to Foucault, these general trends lie behind the nineteenth-century creation of the truly 'human' human sciences – anthropology, sociology and, of course, psychology itself. (Unfortunately, it is often difficult to know exactly what sciences Foucault has in mind, because the relevant chapters, 'Man and His Doubles' and 'The Human Sciences', do not refer to specific anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists or other human scientists in the way that previous chapters referred to Condillac, Turgot, Linnaeus, Smith, Cuvier, Bopp, etc. Foucault's discussion of the new human sciences remains always more of a discussion of the general cultural and philosophical trends that have influenced them.) ~~The new human~~

sciences counter the move by which the non-human object, in philology, biology and nineteenth-century economics, bends back round and dehumanizes the subject; in the new human sciences, the human subject swings across and constitutes itself on the side of the object. So, as the Classical dichotomy fails, a new dichotomy appears – a dichotomy not between the human and the non-human, but within the human itself. And, within the human itself, subject and object can come directly up against each other, face-to-face once more; for man's experience is still directly observable, even if the forces 'hidden' behind it are not. Thus the Classical situation is restored in a new mode, and 'it is easy to understand why every time one tries to use the human sciences to philosophize . . . one finds oneself imitating the philosophical posture of the eighteenth century, in which, nevertheless, man had no place.'[18] What's more, there is even a possibility of restoring the Classical ideal of totality, the single great pattern, in a new mode. For is not every kind of knowledge also a psychological experience? Could one not draw together under a single conspectus a psychology of mathematics, a psychology of optical observation, a psychology of philosophy, and so on and so forth? Man's inward retreat is beginning to look like a master-tactic for securing the ultimate victory.

But the further development of anthropology and psychology turns the tables on man once again. In the Post-Modern cum Structuralist period, a new abstract force of signs and signification appears, a force not recognized under the positivistic framework of the nineteenth century. When this new abstract force enters into Freud's psychoanalysis and Lévi-Strauss's ethnology, even the human sciences of psychology and anthropology can no longer claim to understand man on the basis of his own experience. In Foucault's words, 'Not only are [psychoanalysis and ethnology] able to do without the concept of man, they are also unable to pass through it. . . . One may say of both of them . . . that they dissolve man.'[19] At the same time, there is the further Saussurean development of linguistics, which extends the control of language until it penetrates into even the most private thoughts and representations. Under the Post-Modern epistēmē, man is routed from his final bastion of psychological inwardness. The abstract forces that first threatened to overrun him in biology, philology and nineteenth-

century economics can no longer be staved off. The dichotomy of subject and object begins to fail in *every* mode; and the attitude of aloofness and superiority that man has so long maintained towards the rest of the world begins to slip irretrievably away from him.

However, it seems that these implications of the Post-Modern epistēmē are still to be fully realized. In dealing with the Post-Modern epistēmē, Foucault is not just recounting the past but also predicting the future; and not just predicting the future but also promoting one possible future in preference to others. (Thus Structuralism appears in a much less promising light when yoked alongside phenomenology in the 'Man and His Doubles' chapter.) In the chapter on 'The Human Sciences', the Post-Modern epistēmē is presented as a goal that we are on the verge of achieving. And Foucault hereby reveals an undeniable teleological drift. Although the theory of epistēmēs apparently involves an acceptance of pure haphazard change from period to period, yet the actual history of epistēmēs ends up by pushing human thought towards a goal that Foucault quite clearly desires.

In fact, the actual history of epistēmēs has never really been haphazard at all. From period to period, each epistēmē *answers to* and *rises upon* its predecessor – though it may not necessarily *improve upon it*. *The Order of Things* presents a Grand Historical Design of impeccable and inevitable logic, working through a dialectical succession of divisions and reunifications. Thus the monism of the Renaissance period is separated out in the Classical period into a first division of subject-versus-object; this subject-versus-object division is closed over in the Modern period, but only as an alternative subject-versus-object division is separated out; finally, this alternative subject-versus-object division is itself closed over in the new monism of the Post-Modern period. Of course, there is no progress towards truth in the scientific sense here, no progress towards a true subject-to-object matching of ideas to things. But there is a progress towards what Foucault evidently regards as the philosophical truth of monism, where subject and object are inseparable – and therefore unmatchable. After the initial fall from monism, brought on by science in the seventeenth century, human thought cycles inevitably round – even by way of science,