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NEXT VOL. I

### **Transubstantiation in Aquinas and Ockham**

Philosophy and theology intersect at the Last Supper in Christ's declaration that, "This (bread) is my Body."<sup>1</sup> Explaining the resulting change from bread into the body of Christ provides both a challenge and a litmus test for medieval theories of matter.<sup>2</sup> In attempting to provide philosophical underpinnings for the process, Thomas Aquinas created theological constraints for later philosophers such as William of Ockham. Before Aquinas, the Eucharistic change that came to be known as "transubstantiation" was neither inherently Aristotelian nor decidedly church dogma. Fifty years later, Ockham found it to be both. Even though Ockham was bound by ecclesiastical mandate rather than convinced of the merits of transubstantiation by philosophical argument, he produced an explanation for how something that looks, smells and tastes like bread could actually be something entirely different that is consistent with his overall metaphysical view. I will argue that Ockham's explanation of transubstantiation is superior to that advanced by Aquinas, examining the manner in which each deals with the special concern of corruption of the Eucharistic species.

### **Real or Symbolic Presence**

The metaphysical explanation of the Eucharist varied in the early centuries of the Church. It was not until the ninth through the eleventh centuries that specifics became a source of controversy. Even then, debate centered on the more basic question of whether Christ is present in the Eucharist actually or symbolically. The two competing theories of Eucharistic presence had equally prominent and orthodox sources: Saints Ambrose and Augustine.<sup>3</sup> Ambrose argued that the bread and wine change into the actual body and blood of Christ while Augustine emphasized Christ's presence in "spirit and in power."<sup>4</sup>

The divergence of views reached ecclesiastical concern through the insistence of Berengar of Tours (999-1088). He held that the body of Christ is really present in the Eucharist in a virtual sense, as an intellectual or spiritual presence. The substance of the bread does not change but at the consecration it becomes *spiritually* the very body of Christ.<sup>5</sup> The debate was extended and lively. Eventually, Berengar signed a profession of faith at The Synod of Rome (1059) which included the graphic affirmation that "the bread and wine placed on the altar are, after the consecration, not merely the sacrament of but also the true body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ; and that these are not only sacramental but truly handled and broken by the hands of the priests and ground by the teeth of the faithful."<sup>6</sup> Despite the definitive nature of this confession, Berengar continued his opposition to the real presence, which forced a series of councils to reiterate the position. By the time he died, it was firmly entrenched as theological dogma.

That insistence on the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist defined the theological parameters but did not impose a specific philosophical solution. Transubstantiation was one of four competing theories: impanation, annihilation, consubstantiation and transubstantiation.<sup>7</sup>

The theological debate was not always philosophically precise. James McCue argues that the term "transubstantiation" was used by many thirteenth century writers to mean real presence in the Eucharist as against symbolic or spiritual presence, rather than as a philosophical term of art against other competing theories of real presence.<sup>8</sup> And, he argues, this is the same sense in which the Fourth Lateran Council used it in 1215. The council was concerned with several heresies, especially Albigensianism, which considered the human body to be evil and denied that Christ ever took on human form.<sup>9</sup> The council produced a definition of faith that includes the term transubstantiation:

Truly there is one universal Church of the faithful, outside of which there is absolutely no salvation. In this Church the priest himself is the sacrifice, Jesus Christ; and his body and blood are truly contained in the sacrament of the altar under the appearances of bread and wine – the bread being transubstantiated into his body and the wine into his blood by the divine power. Thus the mystery of unity is brought to perfection as we receive from him what he has received from us [i.e., human nature or substance].<sup>10</sup>

In addition to the historical context in which the council took place, it did not discuss competing theories of real presence, although Peter of Capua had earlier outlined them. So, the council's concern was arguably for establishing the real presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist, rather than for codifying one of the four metaphysical theories explaining how it could come about. Also, Pope Innocent III (who presided over the council) had favored a doctrine of transubstantiation in earlier writings but disagreed with consubstantiation as erroneous, not something heretical.<sup>11</sup> If he was changing his view to hold that only transubstantiation is an accepted church doctrine, it is likely some mention would have been made of that in records of the Council, but there is no such discussion. Furthermore, for the next eighty-five years, writers continued to discuss options for the real presence without thinking the council had canonized transubstantiation.<sup>12</sup> Most favored it, including Albert the Great in his *Sentences Commentary* (written 1246-1248). Although Albert did not consider transubstantiation to be dogma (three decades after the Fourth Lateran Council), he came to hold consubstantiation as "a very reckless view and quite close to heresy."<sup>13</sup>

### **Thomas, Transubstantiation and Theology**

Thomas Aquinas was the first to hold that consubstantiation is heretical, impossible and incongruous with Church law and practice.<sup>14</sup> Aquinas addressed the metaphysical question first, but I will consider it after reviewing his lesser objections. Aquinas believed consubstantiation is heretical because it is contrary to scripture. Christ said, "This is my body," using the neuter gender to agree with body (*corpus*). That would not be true if the substance of the bread remained, for the substance of the bread is never the body of Christ. If the bread remained, he should have said "Here is My body."<sup>15</sup> According to Aquinas, consubstantiation conflicts with Church practice because in rituals the consecrated host is adored as the actual presence of Christ. This type of veneration would not be appropriate if any substance were there because it "could not be adored with adoration of latria."<sup>16</sup> According to Aquinas, "latria" is the honor due to God as God (rather than honor due to God as creator of the universe).<sup>17</sup> Bread is not due that sort of adoration. Also, consuming a host that contains bread would violate church practice on fasting and be heretical.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, earlier writers who considered consubstantiation to be erroneous but not heresy had advanced each of these arguments, in various forms.<sup>19</sup>

### Thomas, Transubstantiation and Philosophy

Aquinas turned to philosophy of matter for his argument that consubstantiation is impossible. The body of Christ cannot come to be present where it was absent unless it moves or changes. Aristotle recognizes four kinds of natural change: qualitative, quantitative, substantial (generation and corruption) and local motion. Christian theology adds a supernatural change of creation and annihilation. The body of Christ exists before and after the consecration, so that rules out both substantial and supernatural change. It exists in heaven and is not changed qualitatively or quantitatively by the consecration. Change due to local motion is impossible for three reasons: the body of Christ does not lose its former location and gain a new one – it remains in heaven despite Eucharistic results; it does not move from point *a* (heaven) to point *b* (earthly altars) successively through a continuous path in between; and it is impossible for one local motion to have many *termini ad quem*. The body of Christ, however, may become present on many altars simultaneously.

And consequently it remains that Christ's body cannot begin to be anew in this sacrament except by change of the substance of bread into itself. But what is changed into another thing, no longer remains after such change. Hence the conclusion is that, saving the truth of this sacrament, the substance of the bread cannot remain after the consecration.<sup>20</sup>

If the substance of the bread doesn't remain, where does it go? Aquinas says it is not dissolved into original matter or annihilated. It is not dissolved into original matter, which is composed of the elements, because senses would detect that. Also, there is no instant when the original matter could be there. The substance, as bread and wine, "remains until the last instant of the consecration; but in the last instant of the consecration there is already present there the substance of the body or blood of Christ, just as the form is already present in the last instant of generation."<sup>21</sup> So, either there would be a time when the bread and the body of Christ were both present, or there would be a time when neither is present. If the bread were annihilated, the result would be nothing, not the body of Christ. The only way for the body of Christ to come to be as part of the Eucharist is for the bread to be converted into it.<sup>22</sup> So, sacramental conversion is a third sort of supernatural change (after creation and annihilation).<sup>23</sup> God can convert one whole substance into another instantaneously through succession without a moment of non-being.<sup>24</sup>

Now the determination of every thing in actual existence comes from its form. Consequently, no natural or created agent can act except by changing the form in something; and on this account every change made according to nature's laws is a formal change. But God is infinite act, as stated in I, 7, 1; 26, 2; hence His action extends to the whole nature of being. Therefore He can work not only formal conversion, so that diverse forms succeed each other in the same subject; but also the change of all being, so that, to wit, *the whole substance of one thing be changed into the whole substance of another*. And this is done by Divine power in this sacrament; for the whole substance of the bread is changed into the whole substance of Christ's body, and the whole substance of the wine into the whole substance of Christ's blood. Hence this is not a formal, but a substantial

conversion; nor is it a kind of natural movement: but, with a name of its own, it can be called "transubstantiation." (emphasis added)<sup>25</sup>

While we can't see this entire process, what we can see looks the same, i.e., the remaining accidents. According to Aquinas, one reason for the body of Christ to appear as bread is Divine providence. Usually, "it is not customary, but horrible, for men to eat human flesh, and to drink blood."<sup>26</sup> So to quiet our queasy sensibilities, we are given Christ's body in the form of common food and, since it is invisible, our belief in the real presence is a testament to our faith (it also helps to avoid derision by unbelievers, who might rather reasonably assume that Christianity involved cannibalism).<sup>27</sup>

That doesn't answer *how* the accidents of bread remain after the substance has changed into the body of Christ. Aquinas looks beyond the substance of the bread to say that God preceded even it. Because God's power is the first cause of all things, "it is possible for that which follows to remain, while that which is first is taken away."<sup>28</sup> He explains further in section seventy-seven that after the consecration, the accidents of bread and wine do not remain in those subjects because the subjects are gone. The accidents do not have Christ's body and blood as a subject because that doesn't suit his "glorious and impassible body." The accidents are not in the air because the surrounding atmosphere is not suitable for those sorts of accidents. Accidents can't just move from subject to subject and the atmosphere has its own accidents that can't coexist with those of bread and wine. Therefore, it follows that the accidents remain without a subject. This is possible because "God who is the first cause both of substance and accident, can by His unlimited power *preserve an accident in existence when the substance is withdrawn* whereby it was preserved in existence as by its proper cause"<sup>29</sup> (emphasis added). So, once a form is individuated in a subject (like bread), God can therefore conserve the *esse* of it, which the subject has already supplied in its material causality.<sup>30</sup>

Still, aren't our senses deceived by such metaphysical manipulation? Surely, deception in a sacrament of truth is "unbecoming."<sup>31</sup> Aquinas replies that there is no deception. The accidents we perceive with our senses are truly present. They just don't give us all of the information necessary to understand this sacrament. Our intellect is preserved from deception by "faith [that] is not contrary to the senses, but concerns things to which sense does not reach."<sup>32</sup> Faith tells us that the accidents conceal the body and blood of Christ rather than bread and wine.

Since Aquinas sticks to the very words of the consecration in insisting on the real presence and condemning consubstantiation, it seems fair to ask that if only Christ's body and blood are in the Eucharist, then what about his soul, nerves or bones? Aquinas declares it is an article of faith that the entire Christ is present in the sacrament. To accomplish that, Aquinas argues that Christ is present in a twofold manner: by the power of the sacrament and from natural concomitance. The power of the sacrament uses the words, "This is my body," or, "This is my blood," to change the substance of the bread and wine. By natural concomitance, the sacrament also includes anything that is "really united" with the thing converted in the consecration because if two things are really united, they are distinguished only by an operation of the mind.<sup>33</sup> That includes his Godhead and entire body. His soul is included, too, but it wouldn't have been if the Eucharist had been celebrated while Christ was in the tomb because then his soul was separated from his body (and so not "really united"). Now that Christ had risen from the dead, his soul

would always be united with his body and would be in the Eucharist through natural concomitance. The same reasoning explains why the whole Christ is present in either the bread or the wine. The body of Christ is present in the bread by the power of the sacrament and the blood (along with everything else) is present by real concomitance. The reverse is true for the wine.<sup>34</sup>

A body of greater quantity cannot, however, be contained under the measure of a lesser body. The tiny host and chalice of wine are much smaller than the actual physical body of Jesus Christ. So, goes the objection, it is impossible that the entire Christ be contained under this sacrament.<sup>35</sup> Aquinas explained that the accidents of bread and wine remain after the consecration, which includes the dimensive quality. The substance of Christ's body is present by the power of the sacrament but not by way of quantity.<sup>36</sup> He explains further in Question seventy-three, article three that all of Christ is present in all of the host, or in any part of it.<sup>37</sup> The substance of the bread was present locally by reason of its dimensions. But, when it was converted, Christ's body did not become the subject of the dimensions of the bread. Christ's body is not present locally in the host; it is not in the sacrament circumscriptively. It is also not in the sacrament definitively because that would limit it to only the particular altar where the sacrament is being performed, but it is also present in heaven and on other altars.<sup>38</sup>

### **Divine Exit**

The presence of Christ in the Eucharist begins at the instant that the priest pronounces the words of the consecration. When and how it ends is less clear. The Roman Catholic Church says Christ departs if the unconsumed host has "become moldy or the contents of the Chalice sour."<sup>39</sup> But, if the substances of the bread and wine were converted into Christ's body and blood, why would they ever become corrupted? Corruption is the separation of the form from the matter. God has conserved the accidents of bread and wine through divine power while the substance changes into the body and blood of Christ. Why shouldn't the new transubstantiated combination remain forever? For an explanation, Aquinas returns to the way that the accidents exist in the transubstantiation. "The sacramental species retain the same being they had before the substance was converted from bread to the body of Christ."<sup>40</sup> Since God conserves the species as it was before the sacramental conversion, the being of those accidents can be corrupted now without the substance just as it could be corrupted while the substance of the bread and wine was present. So, the accidents of the bread and wine exist before the Eucharist, they are retained through the transubstantiation by divine power, and now they begin to decay as though no change had been made in the substance. Jesus Christ finds himself encased in accidents unconnected to substance but somehow inhering in quantity that mold and sour according to their original nature. That can't be good. Apparently taking his cue from the state of corruption of the physical accidents, Christ exits without an official pronouncement of the sort that heralded his arrival in the bread and wine.

Another difficult question is raised by what happens next: since the corruption of one thing is the generation of another, something is generated from the Eucharistic species (ashes, worms, dust) now bereft of its divine substance. Aquinas admitted it is difficult to see how anything could be generated from the body and blood of Christ, which is really there, because it is incorruptible. He also admitted it would be easy to answer if the substance of the bread remained (as in consubstantiation), but he has proven that to be false. He rejected a proposal that

the things generated come from the atmosphere. There had been no apparent alteration or corruption in the atmosphere to precede the generation, and the atmosphere isn't the right nature to permit that. Others suggested that the substance of the bread and wine returns during the corruption of the species and the worms are generated from that. But Aquinas said that could only happen if the body and blood of Christ were changed back into the bread and wine. There is no biblical formula for reverse-transubstantiation. Also, there is no time when it could happen. The substance of the bread and wine can't return while the sacramental species remain or when they pass away, because the substance of the bread and wine would be lacking their proper accidents.<sup>41</sup>

Aquinas wanted to keep the Eucharist to one miracle, not a series of them. To accomplish that, he concluded that in the actual consecration "it is miraculously bestowed on the dimensive quantity of the bread and wine to be the subject of subsequent forms"<sup>42</sup> Everything that could be generated from the matter of bread or wine could now be generated from the dimensive quantity by virtue of the miracle of the transubstantiation. If worms result from the Eucharistic species, then quantity "supplies the place of matter" for their generation. The *quantity* of bread and wine retains its own character. While the accidents of bread and wine are not substance, their quantity miraculously receives the "power and property of substance."<sup>43</sup> Whatever happens in the Eucharistic change, at the outset or conclusion, it inheres in quantity.

### **Ockham's take**

By the time that William of Ockham wrote, the profession of faith from the Fourth Lateran Council was taken as official church sanction of transubstantiation over consubstantiation.<sup>44</sup> Ockham considered himself bound by the theology but unconvinced by the philosophical maneuvers necessary to support it.<sup>45</sup> He was also unwilling to accept that quantity is necessary in any circumstance. Since quantity does most of the work in Aquinas' version of Eucharistic presence, he must have a different story about what the words of the Bible mean to our view of the world.

Ockham restated three familiar alternatives for real presence in the Eucharist: (1) the substance of the bread is identical with the flesh of Christ, (2) the substance of the bread and wine cease to exist, only their accidents remain, and the body of Christ begins to exist under those accidents and (3) the substance of the bread and wine remain together with the substance of the body of Christ. He found the first option "irrational." The second was the consensus of theologians and an opinion he held "because of the determination of the Church and not because of any argument."<sup>46</sup> The third opinion avoids all the difficulties that follow from the separation of accidents from their subject and is not contradicted by the Bible. It also aligns with the principle that a plurality of miracles should not be posited without necessity. In other words, it is not necessary to claim that the substance of the bread does not remain. But, "[f]or the opposite is the determination of the Church."<sup>47</sup>

Not only is transubstantiation less plausible than consubstantiation, Ockham believed it is not necessary. What God can conserve, He can also produce. Aquinas argued that God conserves the body of Christ in the Eucharistic species without the substance of the bread. So, Ockham said, God could make the body of Christ be present in the Eucharist even if the substance of the bread had never been there.<sup>48</sup> He could also conserve the body of Christ in the Eucharist under the host without it existing anywhere else.<sup>49</sup>

Even granting that he must accept transubstantiation according to the literal words of the Bible, Ockham could not accept Aquinas' theory of concomitance.<sup>50</sup> He argued that "conversion" can be understood in two ways: properly (strictly) and improperly (broadly). The first proved a transubstantiation of the bread into the body of Christ and the wine into the blood of Christ only.

He argued as follows:

The bread is converted into the body of Christ but not into anything that was separated from his body during the triduum of Christ's death, i.e., his divinity or soul or blood or any other accident, because:

- (1) If the sacramental words had been spoken at that time, then the bread would not have been converted into the soul and blood because the soul was not then united to the body of Christ and the blood had been poured out on the cross
- (2) And the bread would not be converted into the divinity, because the divinity is always omnipresent, only the body comes to exist where it previously did not.

The second, improper reading is Aquinas' version. The bread is converted into each thing that

- (1) Is joined to another thing into which the conversion is made and
- (2) That now in fact begins to exist under the appearances of the bread when the sacramental words are spoken.

Even in that sense, Ockham granted that the bread is converted into the soul and into the accidents but not into the divinity because they begin to exist in that place when the words are uttered, but this is not true for the divinity.<sup>51</sup>

Ockham did not think it was any more of a contradiction for Christ's body to exist along with the substance of the bread than for it to exist with the bread's accidents. Two quantities can exist simultaneously in the same place just as two bodies can.<sup>52</sup> And, the substance of the body can exist in the same place as the quantity of the host, so it can exist in the same place as the substance of the host.

As to placement, Ockham argued that the body of Christ exists within the host definitively but not circumscriptively. He used a comparison with an angel or an intellectual soul, each of which exist as a whole in the entire body and as whole in each part. Further, it is possible for two parts of a body that previously existed in two places to exist in the same place, as in condensation. By divine power, it is possible for a body to have all its parts in a single place at the same time. It is also possible, by God's power, for two bodies to exist in the same place at the same time. So, it is possible (by the same divine power) for two parts of the same body to exist in a single place. And if two parts can, all the parts can.<sup>53</sup>

That does not answer how it is done. He said it is not a contradiction for the same part of the body of Christ to exist in more than one place at one time in the same way that an angel or the intellectual soul exists as a whole in a whole and as a whole in each part. The same part of the body of Christ, or the whole body, can exist together with the whole host and with each part of the host, so the same part will exist in more than one place. Furthermore, we hold "by faith" that bodies—of the same or diverse species—can exist in the same place at the same time. So in the same way, it is not a contradiction that two parts of the same body are in the same place. But

then Ockham considered the problem that Christ's body has organic parts. If they are not distant in place, what makes them distinct? Ockham said it is not local distance that makes a distinction among organic parts but rather a real distinction among "material dispositions". Even if a foot and an eye are in the same place, they retain their natural dispositions.<sup>54</sup>

Ockham denied that quantity has a role at all, much less the favored role Aquinas imagined in the Eucharistic conversion. If ever there was a place where his razor was needed, it is here. Ockham begins his reply to the question "*Can it be proved sufficiently through principles of faith that quantity is an absolute thing distinct from substance and quality?*" with the emphatic framework: "[W]hen a proposition is made true by things, if two things are sufficient for its truth, then it is superfluous to posit a third."<sup>55</sup> He then defines quantity as "a thing that has a part that is distant in position from a part."<sup>56</sup> If a quantity were a 'skin' mediating between a substance and its accidents,

then I would maintain either that (i) the quantity [of the body of Christ] does not exist under the host but exists [only] in heaven or that (ii) if it does exist under the host, then it exists there only definitively, in the way that substance exists there, with the result that the quantity is not a quantum [there].<sup>57</sup>

And, consequently, quantity is not the sort of mediating thing between substance and accidents.<sup>58</sup> Further, it cannot be proved "evidently"<sup>59</sup> or "through principles of faith"<sup>60</sup> that quantity is an absolute thing distinct from substance and quality. He first showed that quantity cannot be a substance itself. He then focused on the accidents of the bread that remain after the consecration. Some argue that quantity is needed so that the dimensions of the host are retained. Without it, the accidents might all collapse into one another and occupy the same space. Conversely, Ockham argued that extended qualities retain their nature and do not need an additional accident such as quantity for extension<sup>61</sup>. He concluded that quantity remains only as part of the extended qualities of the bread and the opposite is not required by scripture.<sup>62</sup>

### **Exit, Again**

Ockham believed that accidents can be part of the reason that the Eucharistic species becomes corrupt (accidents of bread/mold, of wine/sour). But whether they are joined to their subjects or are separate, they are not the total cause because God is an immediate and efficient partial cause of every created effect.<sup>63</sup> He further argued that natural agents can annihilate separate accidents even if they can't create them. Thus, bread can corrupt due to natural (rather than supernatural) causes. "[W]hy should destructive power have to rely on the concurrence of a material cause, just because generative power does?"<sup>64</sup> When the host turns color, then the created cause destroys the old color but God would have to be the total immediate cause of creating a new one. As to the generation of worms, however, no matter persists through the change for the worms to come from. So, when the host turns to worms, "God creates the matter there from which the form of worm is educed."<sup>65</sup>

### **Coming and Going**

The doctrine of transubstantiation presents at least two primary philosophical questions. First, how do bread and wine turn into the body and blood of Christ when they still look, smell and taste exactly the same? Our senses detect no change. Only the words of the Bible suggest

any reason why bread and wine are not just what they seem. Second, if there is such a change, how does it end? When do bread and wine lose their divine identity? There must be a way to account for unconsumed bread and wine that spoils or consumed bread and wine that follow the natural digestive course. Aquinas argues that the accidents of bread and wine remain in "quantity" once their substance has changed to the body and blood of Christ. God preserves the appearance (accidents) of bread and wine through the change. The accidents, although severed from their substance and maintained by divine power, still corrupt as though there had been no supernatural intervention. Ockham argues that bread and wine can coexist with the body and blood of Christ. The accidents remain because their substance remains. The accidents corrupt because there is no reason not to – they and their substance remain along with the divine presence. "Quantity" adds nothing useful to the concept of bread, the body of Christ, or to their interaction.

### **Conclusion**

On Ockham's view, there is no deception in the sacrament. The senses perceive bread and wine because they are actually present, as substances rather than accidents inhering in quantity. The body of Christ is also present and is perceived through faith, as it is for Aquinas. Quantity serves no purpose for Ockham, and is not needed. For Aquinas, it provides an all-purpose explanation for whatever pieces of this theory don't fit. It is somewhere for free-floating accidents to inhere once deprived of their substance through the transubstantiation. It gives the accidents a place to preserve the appearances of their former substance (bread or wine) and it provides any necessary power for the corruption of the species or generation of new species. The list of attributes is long, convenient and unconvincing. Ockham presents a more compelling explanation of the Real Presence in the Eucharist than Aquinas without the use of quantity. Any God who could intervene to preserve accidents in quantity, change substances, maintain them and then allow the accidents to corrupt according to their original nature, then somehow produce products of corruption (such as worms) from nothing could just as easily make the body of Christ be present in the Eucharist along with the substance of bread and wine.

It is essential for any theory of Eucharistic real presence to deal with the corruption of the species. If it can't explain how the divine presence ends, it doesn't have a compelling justification for divine presence at all. Ockham incorporates corruption into a more philosophically coherent whole than Aquinas, who seems to be arguing backward from an obvious physical fact. Moldy bread and sour wine prove a fatal recipe for transubstantiation as envisioned by Aquinas.

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## NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> " **I Corinthians 11:24**. And giving thanks, broke and said: Take ye and eat: This is my body, which shall be delivered for you. This do for the commemoration of me." *Et gratias agens fregit et dixit hoc est corpus meum pro vobis hoc facite in meam commemorationem*. St. Paul (I Corinthians 11:23 sqq.). *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (1913) <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/>

<sup>2</sup> "...medieval ideas about body were shaped as much by the constraints of this doctrine as by anything Aristotle ever said. Indeed, philosophers continued to measure the adequacy of a philosophy of body in terms of its ability to make room for transubstantiation down to the seventeenth century when Descartes' theory is charged with a failure to do so." Adams, Marilyn McCord, *William Ockham*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, v. 1, (p. 187).

<sup>3</sup> McCue, James F., "The Doctrine of Transubstantiation from Berengar Through Trent: The Point At Issue," *The Harvard Theological Review*, July 1968, (p. 386).

<sup>4</sup> "This may be explained on three general grounds:

- \* because of the peace and security there is in their possession of the Church's truth, whence resulted a certain want of accuracy in their terminology;

- \* because of the strictness with which the Discipline of the Secret, expressly concerned with the Holy Eucharist, was maintained in the East until the end of the fifth, in the West down to the middle of the sixth century;

- \* because of the preference of many Fathers for the allegorical interpretation of Scripture, which was especially in vogue in the Alexandrian School (Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Cyril), but which found a salutary counterpoise in the emphasis laid on the literal interpretation by the School of Antioch (Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret)." "The Real Presence," *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (1913) <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/>

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> McCue, (p. 387). Berengar didn't give up easily. He recanted that profession of faith and wrote a book opposing the Synod that imposed it. He was again condemned and a new

confession of faith was imposed on him in 1079 that declared "I Berengarius believe in my heart and confess aloud that the bread and wine which are placed on the altar are substantially changed, through the mystery of the sacred prayer and the words of our Redeemer, into the true, the living, the very own flesh and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ." He recanted again but made a final retraction in 1080 and died eight years later without extending the debate further.

<sup>7</sup> "(i) 'impanation', according to which the Body of Christ assumed the substance of the bread, the way the Divine Word assumes Christ's human nature; (ii) 'annihilation', according to which the substance of the bread is annihilated; (iii) 'consubstantiation', which stipulates that the substance of the bread remains and the Body of Christ coexists with it; and (iv) 'transubstantiation', which says the bread is neither annihilated nor remains, but is converted into the Body of Christ."

Adams, Marilyn McCord, "Aristotle and the Sacrament of the Altar: A Crisis in Medieval Aristotelianism", *Aristotle and His Medieval Interpreters*, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1991, (p. 195).

<sup>8</sup> McCue, (p. 388).

<sup>9</sup> The battle against this heresy occupied the church from 1022 to the end of the 14<sup>th</sup> Century, prompting the Inquisition and bloody crusades that invaded Albigensian strongholds in the south of France. "Albigenses" *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (1913) <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/>

<sup>10</sup> McCue, (p. 393).

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., (p. 391).

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., (p. 393).

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., (p. 399) fn. 26.

<sup>14</sup> Adams, (p. 196).

<sup>15</sup> ST III.75.2.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> ST III.25.2 He explains the difference between honoring something as a symbol of God and honoring it as God in response to a question about images

<sup>18</sup> ST III.75.2.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. McCue

<sup>20</sup> ST III.75.2 and Adams, (p. 197).

<sup>21</sup> ST III.75.3.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Adams, (p. 198).

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> ST III 75.4.

<sup>26</sup> ST III 75.5.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> ST III 75.5 ad 1.

<sup>29</sup> ST III.75.1

<sup>30</sup> Adams, (p. 201).

<sup>31</sup> ST III.75.5 obj.2

<sup>32</sup> ST III 75.5.2

<sup>33</sup> ST III 76.1

<sup>34</sup> ST III 76.2

<sup>35</sup> ST III.76.1 obj. 3

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

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<sup>37</sup> ST III 76.3

<sup>38</sup> ST III 76.4

<sup>39</sup> The permanence of Presence, however, is limited to an interval of time of which the beginning is determined by the instant of Consecration and the end by the corruption of the Eucharistic Species. If the Host has become moldy or the contents of the Chalice sour, Christ has discontinued his presence therein. "Real Presence," *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (1913) <<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/>>

<sup>40</sup> ST III 77.4

<sup>41</sup> ST III 77.5

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> ST III 77.5 reply to objections 1-3.

<sup>44</sup> John Duns Scotus is the first to interpret the confession of faith as a dogmatic affirmation of transubstantiation over other alternatives. However, he finds the reasoning given by Aquinas unpersuasive. The doctrine is thus a question of the authority of the Church rather than of understanding the Eucharist. McCue, (p. 403).

<sup>45</sup> Ockham's reply to *Quodlibet* IV, Question twenty-nine quotes that profession of faith after saying "...this cannot be proven either by reason or by the authority of the Bible; instead, it is proved through the writings of the Saints and the determination of the Church." Freddoso, Alfred J. and Francis E. Kelley, trans., *Quodlibetal Questions*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991, (p. 368).

<sup>46</sup> *Quodlibet* IV, Reply to Question thirty.

<sup>47</sup> *Quodlibet* IV, Question thirty.

<sup>48</sup> Adams, (p. 236).

<sup>49</sup> *Quodlibet* IV, Question twenty-five, (p. 343).

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. (p. 8). What is "really united" comes along with the conversion of the body and/or blood.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> FN 139 "Ockham undoubtedly has in mind here the three examples he cites below in *Quodlibet* 4.31, Reply to Difficulty 2. The first is that of Christ's glorified body, which according to Sacred Scripture was able to pass through the walls of the room in which the Apostles were gathered after the Resurrection. The second is the birth of Christ, in which, according to tradition, Christ passed through the womb of the Blessed Virgin without violating her bodily integrity, i.e., without breaking her hymen. The third is the ascension of Christ, wherein he ascended bodily to heaven without (on medieval cosmology) dividing any celestial sphere." *Quodlibet IV*, Question thirty, (p. 371).

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., Question thirty-one, (p. 372).

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., Question thirty-one, (p. 374).

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., Question twenty-six, (p. 353).

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., Question thirty-one, (p. 375).

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., Question twenty-four, (p. 343).

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., Question twenty-five, (p. 343-350).

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., Question twenty-six, (p. 350).

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., (p. 351).

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., (p. 357), also Question thirty-three, (p. 379).

<sup>63</sup> Adams, (p. 246).

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<sup>64</sup> Adams, (p. 247).

<sup>65</sup> *Quaest. in II Sent.*, q. 6; OTh V, 97 quoted in Adams (p. 247).