Shared Governance: Pleas and Provocations

October, 2002

MEANINGS OF 9/11
Francis A. Beer, Department of Political Science

The meanings of 9/11 are embedded in the events, talk, and thoughts of the past year. They are in the deeds, words, and ideas of those who boarded the projectile airplanes that fateful morning, of those who watched them approach their destinations, of those who resisted, and of the victims who died when they struck their targets. They are in the reactions of the families and friends of those who died, of fire and police officers, media and political people, New Yorkers and Americans, and observers in all parts of the world.

During this year, we have tried to make new sense of our world. We have counted the casualties and mourned the dead. All of us have felt new stresses and vulnerabilities. We have celebrated our heroes, and set off to punish the guilty. One step on this path has been the military attack on al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The fate of Osama bin Laden is unknown, the Taliban have been dispersed but still exist. Less has been said about the casualties we have inflicted on Afghan civilians, although some have claimed them to be greater than the victims of the original event (http://www.cursor.org/stories/civilian_deaths.htm).

The domestic costs have also been great. In order to achieve greater security, our open, democratic society has been diminished. Civil liberties have been ignored as the government has taken and held prisoners without due process. Racial profiling has been accepted. Air transportation has been made more difficult, and major airlines have headed into bankruptcy. There has been extensive public discussion of the events of that day and their aftermath (http://www.newyorker.com/archive/previous/)

In the search for greater security, the United States now prepares for war on Iraq. Weapons of mass destruction in hostile hands pose a greater potential threat than poorly guarded commercial airliners. Suppression of their proliferation has become a major priority. The war of weapons is prepared beforehand by a strategic war of words carried in American and global media (http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15698).

We have clearly embarked on a course of war, war against terrorism, war against evil, war against the axis of evil. War in Afghanistan, war in Iraq. War in Iran, war Libya? War in Sudan, war in Syria? War in North Korea ? This is a war that has no natural boundaries in space or time. While it may have an identifiable beginning in time and a place of origin, it has no foreseeable historical end nor any obvious geographical limit.

The scope of this war is defined by its aim: to rid the world of terrorism. At the same time, the globalization of war implies costs and risks. There will be casualties, military and civilian, foreign and American. In an age of weapons proliferation, the global destruction of weapons of mass destruction implies mass destruction. The great military theorist Carl von Clausewitz referred to the friction and fog of war. As most political leaders in the region have been at pains to point out, once a land war begins in the Middle East and Central Asia, its progress is unpredictable. Beginning such a conflict will be easier than ending it.

There may be a cascade of unintended, destabilizing, follow-on effects in the complex international network. These include other states possibly using American preemptive intervention as a model for their own purposes: Russia in Georgia, Pakistan and India, China in Taiwan? Beyond setting a precedent for others to strike first, current American doctrine encourages hair-trigger responses. States that feel like "sitting ducks" have a perverse incentive to "use it or lose it" in reply to perceived first strike signs by others. Finally there are incentives for countries in the nuclear queue to accelerate the development of their own capabilities, anticipating that other states might decide to take them out "before it is too late."

There are also domestic risks for our society. Historical experience shows that, in the fever of war, we compress our republican institutions. Power flows naturally to the President, who is the Commander in Chief. Congress has a diminished role. Opposition dies in the fire of hyper-patriotism.

The ship of state stands on a course for war. Current American leaders support unilateral action, using military force in preemptive first strikes, as the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles put it, at times and places of our own choosing.

At the same time, many voices within the United States and abroad call for a more multilateral policy, using other available processes. They argue that international organizations such as the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have important roles as arenas for discussion and mobilization of political support. When military force must be used, it should be consistent with the norms of the international community. It should imply a measured, proportionate response to clear and present danger. Deterrence and containment instead of offense and intervention, under-reaction to provocation, will tend to dampen conflict. Other sticks and carrots (diplomatic, economic, social, cultural, and scientific) offer a full range of soft power alternatives (http://www.oup.co.uk/isbn/0-19-515088-0).

The course of prudence takes account of the multiple meanings of any situation of war and peace. It recognizes the claims of realism and the harsh requirements of the international struggle for power if the state is to survive and protect its citizens http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v027/27.1snyder.pdf). At the same time, it also respects the importance of the domestic and global struggle for meaning http://socsci.colorado.edu/~beer/PAPERS/MeaningsBook.html. There is no complete security, no final solution in an open society.

Prudence aims to preserve and develop our complex democracy. It supports its performance in a global context. And it recognizes the importance of peace to that democratic, global enterprise. All the meanings of 9/11 will ultimately be shaped by how well the ship of state steers to this star.


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