It may be assumed that the colonizer will resort to any subterfuge to maintain the order of his domination of the colonized.

 Frantz Fanon A Dying Colonialism

From 1898 until the end of World War II, the United States, having earlier facilitated the overthrow of Hawai'i's legitimate government, administered the archipelago as a "permanent trust territory" (i.e., as a colony). Hence, in 1946, the former island kingdom was entered on a list of "non-self-governing territories" compiled by the United Nations Secretariat for purposes of facilitating their timely decolonization under Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter.1 It was removed from the list in 1959, after the U.S. certified that it had been not only restored to self-governing status, but had opted by popular vote to merge with its former colonizer, becoming the fiftieth state of the Union.2

For this outcome to have been valid, it is necessary that the U.S., as "administering state," met a range of legally-defined responsibilities during the intervening thirteen years. The essential question is whether, in preparing the 1959 plebiscite through which statehood was arranged, the U.S. fulfilled its "sacred" obligations to "hold paramount" the interests of the Kanaka Maoli (indigenous Hawaiians)&emdash;who, as a people, were recognized as possessing inherent sovereignty and the right to self-determination enunciated in Articles 1 and 55 of the Charter&emdash;and "promote[d] their utmost wellbeing [and of] develop[ing] their capacity of self-government" as is also required therein.

In substance: was the incorporation of Hawai'i into the U.S. accomplished in a manner contrary to the letter and/or intent of the Charter and thus in violation of international law? If so, does Hawai'i retain a legal status separate and distinct from the United States, even as it suffers the ongoing illegality of U.S. occupation? And, if that is so, is the United Nations, as "guarantor" of Chapter XI, required by its own Charter to reinscribe Hawai'i on its List of Non-Self-Governing Territories, ensuring thereby that the Kanaka Maoli are at last allowed to exercise their self-determining right to decide for themselves the nature of their relationship to the United States?

The Right to Self-Determination

The legal understanding of self-determination is predicated on the principle of "let the people decide" enunciated by President Woodrow Wilson at the end of World War I.3 As Wilson envisioned it, however, self-determination was an idea limited in scope only to peoples of recognized states who were under foreign domination, e.g., the peoples of Poland and the Balkans. Under the League of Nations, colonies&emdash;other than those of defeated states like Germany and Turkey&emdash;were not considered to be peoples imbued with such rights. Thirty years later, following the cataclysm of World War II, the embryonic United Nations expanded and consolidated the concept in Articles 1(2) and 55 of its Charter.4

From one point of view, "the incorporation of their right of self-determination in the Charter was thus certainly one of the most significant, and in a sense also the most revolutionary, steps accomplished at [at the U.N.'s founding conference in] San Francisco."5 Chapters XI and XII of the Charter addressed the status of classic colonies such as "French" Indochina and the "Belgian" Congo. Chapter XII applied to "trust territories"&emdash;that is, the former colonies "mandated" to one or another "protecting" power by the League of Nations after World War I, and the external territories of the defeated World War II states. Although there were divergent opinions regarding what constituted a non-self-governing territory, a formulation was ultimately accepted that this would "is usually interpreted to mean only non-self-governing colonies."6 In short, Chapters XI and XII were meant to "bring the Colonial world generally within the sphere of international responsibility."7

Chapter XI did not include direct mention of self-determination, but, rather, an injunction that non-self-governing territories must be allowed to "develop self-government." Questions arose during the framing of the Chapter XI whether this principle of self-governance actually provided for "absolute self-determination" (independence). Winston Churchill, expressing the sentiments of the colonial powers, argued in the negative.8 But the high costs of World War II had eroded Churchill's version of imperial authority beyond redemption, laying the groundwork for a progressive development of the self-determination, including independence, for all peoples. During the final drafting of Chapter XI, therefore, it finally was stated that "self-government did not exclude the possibility of independence and represented a broad measure of agreement which it would be inexpedient to impair by the situation of a more controversial wording."9 In effect, "while Chapter XI makes no reference to self-determination, it…assumes it in that it emphasizes the obligation of the administering powers to develop self-government in the territories and to take due account of the political aspirations of the people, and these political aspirations mean…the unformed will for the expression of self-determination."10

References to "inhabitants" and "peoples" in Chapter XI caused further debate regarding precisely who possessed the newly-guaranteed right to self-government. By "inhabitants," the colonizing powers argued, not only indigenous populations but also the immigrant settlers&emdash;who sometimes comprised the majority and, in any event, invariably held the reins of institutional power in colonial settings&emdash;might be at issue. It was, however, finally conceded by all parties that the term "'people'…includes only the indigenous population [emphasis added]" of a colonial or trust territory.11

Beyond this, the record reveals a considerable lack of clarity with respect to the criteria to be used in defining whether and when a non-self-governing territory had actually achieved self-government. General Assembly Resolution 742(VIII), adopted on November 27, 1953, articulated the matters an administering state should use in deciding whether a territory under its control had attained a full measure of self-government, specifying that administering states, when "taking into account the right of self-determination of peoples," should adhere to the principle that they were entitled to become "fully self-governing" and that self-governance is to be measured "primarily through the attainment of independence."12 It also required that any expression of opinion by any subject population as to the sort of political status it might desire must be arrived at through an "informed" and participatory process.

The literal absorption (rather than decolonization) of several territories by colonizing powers during the 1950s&emdash;Surinam by the Netherlands, for example&emdash;seems to have had a substantial impact on the attitudes embodied in the General Assembly. As a consequence, on December 14, 1960, the Assembly adopted Resolution 1514(XV), titled the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," in which it was declared unequivocally that "immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations."13

To amplify its intent, the Resolution contains specific criteria indicating circumstances in which the U.N. considers the attainment of independence a virtual concomitant of self-determination/self-governance. For instance, there is the matter of "geographical considerations" in which the "intent to which the relations of the territory with the capital of the central government may be affected by circumstances arising out of their respective geographical positions, such as separation by land, sea or other natural obstacles" must be taken into account. This "Salt-" or "Blue-Water Thesis," as it has come to be known, essentially holds that independence is the sole legitimate signifier of self-determination in overseas colonies and/or trust territories.14

This posture was buttressed by much bitter experience of the consequences of efforts by colonial "Mother Countries" to abort decolonization by integrating selected colonies into themselves. While the above-mentioned Dutch manipulation with respect to Surinam generated no armed conflict, things often worked out quite differently. A prime example was the prolonged and bloody national liberation struggle precipitated by the 1954 French claim that Algeria had been incorporated as a "department" of metropolitan France "as a result of an occupation which occurred 120 years ago, which nobody had questioned in the meanwhile and which had thus acquired undoubtedly international recognition."15 Upon consideration, the member-states of the U.N. found the reverse to be true, that Algeria was a colony obtained through conquest and that prior to conquest it had "possessed all…prerogatives of statehood and sovereignty."16 Ultimately, the "Blue-Water Thesis" prevailed, and "proceedings on the Algerian question took place on the assumption that Algeria was a colony" rather than part of France itself.17

Portugal also refused to submit information on its overseas territories to the U.N. when it became a member in 1955. Its argument was that "natives could become 'assimilado' after successfully meeting the qualifications established by the Portuguese."18 In 1961, Portugal transformed all colonial subjects into citizens by law, and advanced the convoluted argument that its overseas territories were now "truly independent," since Portugal's laws applied equally to all people of the Portuguese state, and that "as integral parts of the nation, all our extra-European provinces have always shared in the independence of the nation."19 As armed responses began to build among the colonized peoples of Angola and Mozambique, the U.N. flatly rejected this subterfuge. Finally, in 1974, a new Portuguese government acceded to the purpose and principles of the United Nations and recognized the right of self-determination of its overseas territories.20

The Hawaiian "Exception"

Between 1946, when, in compliance with international law, the United States placed Hawai'i on the United Nations List of Non-Self-Governing Territories, and 1959, when the islands were brought within the metropolitan corpus of the United States, the U.S. exhibited absolutely no willingness to prepare the territory for independence. On the contrary, the only option admitted to discussion was Hawai'i's incorporation as a State of the Union, a notion dating back to 1854.21 Aside from the profits deriving from sugar production, the main attraction of Hawai'i for the United States was its utility as a military base to protect U.S. interests in the Pacific.22 Various methods were used to control Hawai'i during the 1860s, '70s and '80s, but the first giant step towards direct incorporation occurred when the United States invaded Hawai'i in 1893 and assisted nonindigenous settlers in overthrowing the Hawaiian monarchy.23 A second such step was taken in 1898 when the United States annexed Hawai'i, making it formally a U.S. colony.24

The concerted campaign that eventually resulted in statehood did not really materialize until the period following World War II, the very point at which the rights of Native Hawaiians to determine for themselves the nature of their political status began to be legally clarified. In 1947, a Hawaii Statehood Bill was introduced in Congress but quickly disappeared for more-or-less technical reasons. A bill in 1950 fared much the same. In 1953, further such roadblocks prevented still another bill from coming to a vote: "From 1953 to 1958, procedural knots were tied, untied, and then tied again."25 Finally a political compromise "decoupling" Alaskan and Hawaiian statehood. In May 1958, a bill was passed bringing Alaska into the Union; in March 1959, the Hawaii Statehood Bill was also passed.26

Hawaiian statehood, however, was not yet a legal reality. In accordance with the requirements of Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter and General Assembly Resolution 742(VII), the "people of Hawaii"&emdash;a term the U.S. subverted to include the islands' nonindigenous settler population&emdash;still had to approve the matter through a plebiscite. This was conducted on June 27, 1959, without direct U.N. supervision.27 While most of those polled voted to become a state, the Kanaka Maoli themselves were far less supportive, a matter U.S. representatives had actively and quite illegally sought to combat.

The drivers of tourist buses, mostly Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians, were filling their passengers full of anti-statehood prejudice. The Hawaii Statehood Commission promptly issued an informative pamphlet to combat the insidious threat."28

In Niihau, the only electoral precinct in which native people comprised a clear majority was also the sole district in which the vote went solidly against statehood.29 It is thus rather apparent that endorsement of the proposition came not from indigenous Hawaiians but from the settler population. Suffice to observe that the discussion leading up to statehood never for a moment focused on U.S. obligations to Native Hawaiians or the "sacred trust" described in Chapter XI and the guidelines Resolution 742. At no point was there a genuine debate as to whether Hawai'i should resume its pre-1893 existence as a separate and independent nation. Instead, the major "issue" preoccupying Congress seems to have been whether absorption of an "alien" population like the Hawaiians might corrupt "America's special qualities."30

On the official ballot used during the Plebiscite, the sole question posed for consideration was whether or not "Hawaii [shall] be admitted to the Union as a State?"31 The option of independence was not presented. The U.S. nonetheless reported to the U.N. that, by virtue of its having "attained" statehood, Hawai'i had also achieved self-governance, and therefore removed it from the list of territories subject to decolonization procedures. This contention must continue to be considered legally dubious, if for no other reason than because the "selection of an alternative to independence, especially if that alternative is a union or association with he former 'colonial parent,' is viewed with a jaundiced eye [under international law] and deemed to be inherently reversible rather than final."32

The insistence on independence "without any conditions or reservations" is also based on the rejection of the concept of trusteeship, and the unwillingness of the majority of the states to, as it were, consent to the fruits of assimilationist policies implemented under the guise of the trusteeship principle. There was a general suspicion on the part of the most ardent supporters of decolonization that the choice of a dependent people for any stakes other than independence was not genuine but rather the result of colonial machination.33

Most certainly, in the case of Hawai'i, which had a long history of effective self-governing independence, not only in its aboriginal form, but also as an internationally-recognized constitutional monarchy for a half-century prior to the 1893 overthrow of its queen, such juridical skepticism would seem abundantly warranted. The idea that indigenous Hawaiians could not resume an autonomous self-governing existence, or that they might not opt to do so if afforded the opportunity required by law, is absurd on its face.34 This probability, after all, would seem to be the primary motive underlying the refusal of the United States to allow their exercise of self-determining prerogatives at any point in the entire statehood process.

Surely, the U.S. performance with respect to Hawai'i conforms to any reasonable definition of the "conduct of a [colonizing power] which does not promote, but which hinders, the process towards independent [nation]hood, or is expressly aimed at its obstruction," and was thus in 1959 "qualified already at this stage as being contrary to the rules of international law."35 Nonetheless, despite the General Assembly's sharp rejection of the contemporaneous and entirely comparable maneuverings of French and Portuguese colonialism, no U.N. member-state has ever contested the methods used by the U.S. in absorbing its overseas Hawaiian colony.

It is obviously a juridical contradiction of the first order that, even as French and Portuguese colonies were being inscribed on the list of non-self-governing territories over the most vociferous objections of the colonizers, America's Hawaiian colony should have been removed from it. At the very least, it must be said that the U.N. defaulted on its responsibility as guarantor of adherence to international standards insofar as it failed to ascertain the relative degree of truth or falsity attending U.S. claims that its plebiscite process in Hawai'i was an authentic exercise in self-determination. Had it done so, there can be no serious question that the islands would have remained on the list until such time as a United Nations-supervised procedure was conducted and genuine decolonization achieved.

Public Law 103-150

Somewhat surprisingly, one hundred years after the 1893 overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy, the U.S. government elected to formally and officially apologize to the Kanaka Maoli for the internationally/constitutionally illegal "act of war" entailed in its participation.36 The instrument by which this apology was transmitted took the form of a U.S. Public Law, duly enacted by Congress and signed by President Bill Clinton on November 23, 1993. Although there are strong indications that the U.S. intended the missive/statute as little more than a rhetorical device by which to claim it had already satisfied any sort of reparations requirements emerging from future "international torts" cases which might be brought against it by indigenous Hawaiians,37 many of its formulations might be seen as admissions of the sort which can be used to reopen the whole question of the self-determining rights of Hawaiians under international law.38 We may proceed to analyze its phraseology from this perspective.

Implications of the Term "Invasion"

From the text of P.L. 103-150, it is easy to discern that the Congress is quite cognizant of the history of illegality inhering in U.S. actions vis-à-vis Hawai'i. To quote: "[Although} between 1826 and 1893 the United States recognized the independence of the Kingdom of Hawaii, extended full and complete recognition of the Hawaiian Government, and entered into treaties and conventions with the Hawaiian monarchs…the United States Minister and the naval representatives of the United States caused naval armed forces of the United States to invade the sovereign Hawaiian nation on January 16, 1893, and to position themselves near Hawaiian Government buildings and the Iolani Palace to intimidate Queen Lili'uokalani and her government [emphasis added]."

[The] United States Minister thereupon extended diplomatic recognition of the Provisional Government that was formed by the conspirators without the consent of the Native Hawaiian people or the lawful Government of Hawaii and in violation of treaties between the two nations and of international law [emphasis added].

The 1993 apology thereby formally acknowledged that the U.S. flagrantly violated two cardinal principles of international legal custom and convention: first, that all nations must refrain from the unprovoked use of force in international affairs;39 send, that they must observe the primacy of treaties&emdash;"pacta sunt servanda," or "treaties are to be observed"&emdash;in their interactions with other nations.40 The admitted U.S. breach of its treaties with the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1893 was also a violation of Article VI(2) of the U.S. Constitution: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof; and all the Treaties made, under authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding [emphasis added]."41

The immediate result of the military invasion of Hawai'i by the U.S. was that Queen Lili'uokalani acceded "to the superior force of the United States of America whose Minister Plenipotentiary…has caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support the Provisional Government. Now to avoid any collision of armed forces, and perhaps the loss of life, I do this under protest and impelled by said forces yield my authority."42 Lili'uokalani never abdicated or otherwise compromised the legitimacy of her government. Indeed, she acquiesced her patently coerced position only to avoid bloodshed and, expressly, "until such time as the Government of the United States, upon facts being presented to it, undo the actions of its representatives and reinstate me in the authority which I claim as the Constitutional Sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands."43

Hence, as is conceded in P.L. 103-150, "the indigenous Hawaiian people never directly relinquished their…inherent sovereignty as a people." What this means in international legal terms is that Native Hawaiians continue to hold de jure (primary and innate) sovereignty throughout their archipelago. Under such conditions, the United States can lay claim only to de facto sovereignty&emdash;that is, imposition of the "fact" of governing prerogatives without establishment of a genuine legal basis for them&emdash;anywhere in the islands.

From the principle of inalienable sovereignty over a territory spring the constraints that international law imposes upon the [occupier]. The power exercising effective control within another sovereign's territory has only temporary managerial powers, for the period until a peaceful solution is reached. During that limited period, the [occupier] administers the territory in behalf of the sovereign. Thus the [occupier's] status is conceived to be that of a trustee [rather than as a supplanting sovereign].44

In substance, the illegalities now admitted by the U.S. as having occurred in 1893 remain unchanged, irrespective of how many statutes the Congress has subsequently enacted in an effort to unilaterally legitimize the results, and they will remain unchanged until such time as the Kanaka Maoli are afforded a bona fide opportunity to exercise their right to self-determination. As things stand, the U.S. posture of perpetual occupation of Hawai'i constitutes "permanent aggression" in precisely the same sense as was intended by the U.N. in its description of Portugal's 450-year occupation of the Goa area in India.45

There are no valid counterarguments the U.S. might offer to this contention, since it is a matter of settled law that the invasion and occupation of the territory of one sovereign by another can never be legitimated by the unilateral decree(s) of the occupier. Nor can it be proffered that an illegal occupation, no matter how longterm, serves in and of itself to extinguish the de jure sovereignty of the occupied.46 Finally, suggestions that the withdrawal of U.S. recognition of Hawai'i's sovereignty implicit to its invasion and occupation of the islands somehow alters the situation are without merit insofar as "the recognition of a State is not constitutive, but merely declaratory."47 The right to sovereign expression on the part of any nation derives at base, not from recognition of this right by other nations, but by virtue of its "continued existence" within its own frontiers or boundaries.48 The "international status of a State 'subject to international law' is," therefore, "independent of recognition."49

Invalidation of the 1959 Plebiscite

Perhaps the only recourse available to the U.S., should it, as seems probable, seek to preserve the status quo in Hawai'i, is to attempt a defense of the integrity of the procedures leading up to the Hawaiian statehood vote, and the 1959 plebiscite itself. If the issues raised in the preceding section can be said to have been resolved through a genuinely self-determining process, then the issues are moot. At one level, the above-noted admission, that the Kanaka Maoli "never relinquished" their sovereignty, serves to completely undercut any such contentions. Since questions of exactly how this is so may still arise, however, it is appropriate to revisit in more detail the issue of who, precisely, is the "self" meant in self-determination under international law.50

As was mentioned earlier, Resolution 742(VIII) makes it clear that those accorded the right are "colonized peoples," the victims of "colonial exploitation [as well as] colonial and alien domination," not the settler populations of alien colonizers who have exploited them.51 For this reason, the U.N. rejected self-government by the settler population of the former British colony of Rhodesia (now Zimbawe).52 Similarly, in 1986, when it was discovered that a settler population outnumbering the indigenous population of New Caledonia (Kanaky) had dominated the "the process of self-determination" in that French colony to keep it in a subordinate relationship with France, it was reinscribed on the list of non-self-governing territories.53 In each instance, the "assumption is patent that expatriates' [settlers'] wishes should be accorded relatively little weight."54

The U.S. reply to this would likely be that these are improper analogies, that its handling of the Hawaiian situation had far more in common with that of Great Britain in its former colonies of Bermuda and Ceylon (Sri Lanka), where U.N. oversight bodies approved participation of settler populations in the processes of self-determination. In Bermuda, however, the U.N.'s Special Committee on Decolonization effected extraordinary measures to prevent the "expatriate vote" from having a decisive influence on determining the island's political destiny.55 In Sri Lanka, where the settlers were not even British, but Tamils relocated there from southern Indian by the colonizers, a special arrangement was nonetheless effected to leave the island's indigenous people with the decisive voice in the outcome (after independence, the Sri Lankans disenfranchised the "Estate Tamils" altogether).56 In neither example, unlike Hawai'i, were settlers allowed to ignore or override the preferences of the native population.

The closest parallel to Hawai'i might actually be Malta, where, prompted by the same sort of strategic considerations as the United States, Britain attempted to claim that it had legally integrated a remote colony into itself after World War II. Although Malta was consequently removed from the list of non-self-governing territories in 1949, a 1959 constitutional crisis exposed the nature of the manipulation by which island's process of self-determination had been subverted, and it was therefore reinscribed by the United Nations. Ultimately, in 1964, the Maltese opted for complete independence from the British Empire.57 This outcome could prove instructive with respect to Hawai'i.

There can be no question that the United States was somehow "confused" as to who qualified, legally, as a member of the colonized, indigenous people of Hawai'i, and who, conversely, constituted the colonizing, alien settler population. A "Native Hawaiian" is quite accurately defined in P.L. 103-150 as being "any individual who is a descendant of the aboriginal people who, prior to 1778, occupied and exercised sovereignty in the area that now constitutes the State of Hawaii."58 The U.S. decision to allow the wishes of the settlers to overwhelm those of the Kanaka Maoli in 1959&emdash;thereby thwarting the self-determination of the colonized in Hawai'i&emdash;can thus be viewed only as a deliberate, intentional and thoroughly illegal act.

Nor can the U.S. plead "mitigating circumstances" in the fact that the United Nations did not exercise meaningful oversight authority during the run-up to and vote on Hawaiian statehood. Although the U.N. may have been remiss in not having directly supervised the application of self-determining procedures relative to the Hawaiian plebiscite, the examples of Malta and New Caledonia plainly demonstrate that this does not serve to confirm or mitigate the results. Absent direct United Nations oversight, administering states are themselves required to observe the "strictest" standards in implementing the process of self-determination in non-self-governing territories.58 Failure of the administering state to uphold such standards, as was patently the case in Hawai'i, serves to invalidate both the process and its outcome.59

The Congressional Disclaimer

In P.L. 103-150, Congress "expresses its commitment to acknowledge the ramifications of the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, in order to provide a proper foundation for reconciliation between the United States and Native Hawaiian people." It is further urged that "the President of the United States…also acknowledge the ramifications of the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii and…support reconciliation efforts between the United States and the Native Hawaiian people." Having made its "apology" and "committed" itself to "reconciliation" with the Kanaka Maoli, however, Congress caps off its rhetoric by placing everything firmly on a purely rhetorical plane: "Nothing in this Joint Resolution is intended to serve as a settlement of any claims against the United States."60

The disclaimer appears to be based on a rather ambiguous and internally-contradictory contention that the statute, while obviously a law, does not carry the force normally associated with statutory law in that it merely codifies a Joint Congressional Resolution. This reasoning is especially odd insofar as the legal authority by which the U.S. presumed to annex Hawai'i in the first place is lodged in precisely the same mechanism: a Congressional Joint Resolution codified as a Public Law.61

One argument which might be offered to distinguish between the two statutes is that the annexation resolution was effected contemporaneously with the events it addressed, while the apology resolution has been effected long after any conceivable statute of limitations concerning these events has expired. It should be noted, however, that, under U.S. law, constitutional breaches are always subject to remediation without regard to such limits.62 In any event, it is the possibility of judicial remedy rather than congressional legislative prerogatives that are limited by the passage of time.

International law, moreover, makes it clear that there is no statute of limitations with respect to rectifying the suppression of sovereignty through illegal use of force. Indeed, the "prohibition against the threat or use of force in international relations, embodied in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, has been called the 'principle norm of international law in our time'."63 The case of Hawai'i&emdash;where the United States has formally and officially "apologized" for the invasion of a friendly nation with which it had numerous treaties, as well as the subsequent and ongoing suppression of that nation's inherent sovereignty&emdash;clearly meets these international legal requirements.64 Consequently, the United States is legally obliged to effect "reconciliation" through concrete actions, not empty rhetoric.

The Matter of Restitution

In international law, an "apology" implies admission of guilt and requires some for of restitution. There are two primary principles of restitution: (a) "restitutio integrum" (restoration of the former legal situation) and, (b) "restitutio in natura" (returning of something wrongfully taken to its original owner).65 Acts of compensation or reparation are considered only if the former legal situation cannot be restored. In the case of Hawai'i, however, the original situation can obviously be reconstituted simply by a transfer of U.S. de facto sovereignty back to the Hawaiian Nation (an entity the U.S. acknowledges by virtue of its apology in P.L. 103-150 as continuing, in effect, to exist). The route to this end resides in restoration of Hawai'i's legal status in 1946, when Hawai'i was declared a "non-self-governing territory" under authority of Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter.

The U.S. might argue that, insofar as its use of force against the Hawaiian Nation predates not only the Charter, but the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, the League of Nations Covenant (1919), and even the First Hague Convention of 1899&emdash;all of which outlaw such behavior&emdash;it cannot be held to the standards enunciated therein, and that restitution cannot therefore be enforced. All necessary rebuttals to the idea that the normal rule against ex post facto applications of law should be binding in such cases were made, however, by the U.S. representatives to the International Tribunal convened to prosecute the nazi leadership at the end of World War II.66 Moreover, the rules on international responsibility, which were very much in effect when the U.S. invaded Hawai'i in 1893, can be reduced to two propositions:

1) the breach of any international obligation constitutes an 'illegal act of international tort', and

2) the commission of an international tort involves the duty to make reparation.67

The U.S. might also pretend that, according to its interpretation of international law existing in 1893, invasion of territories did not constitute an international tort. Such a position would be completely indefensible in view of Senator James Blount's official and contemporaneous depiction, in a report he prepared at the request of President Grover Cleveland, of U.S. conduct in Hawai'i during the overthrow as "unlawful."68 The same can be said of Cleveland's own use of the same characterization in his resulting Special Message to Congress.69 Further, the language of P.L. 103-150 leaves no doubt that the U.S. government has always been fully aware of the illegality of its actions in Hawai'i. Treaty violation, for example, has never been lawful under the U.S. Constitution.70

A breach of an international obligation, or international tort, is defined "as an act or omission which is unjustified, uncondoned, attributable to a subject of international law and voluntary."71 Claimants pressing for restitution and/or reparations must demonstrate that they have a legitimate "legal interest." However, if "an international tort has been committed directly against a subject of international law as, for instance by the invasion of the territory of another State, it is not necessary for the claimant to prove the infliction of actual damage. The illegal act itself&emdash;and even a mere threat of such action&emdash;constitutes a sufficient legal interest."72 The U.S. apology of course concedes exactly this sort of violation.

The United States thereby incurs "the obligation to re-establish, as far as possible, the state of affairs as it would probably have existed had the international tort not been committed. The function of this rule is to assist in the restoration of the legal equilibrium which has been disturbed by the commission of an international tort. Thus, in the first place, reparation takes the form of restitution in kind."73 Only in instances where actual restitution is an objective impossibility, rather than a mere inconvenience to the offending power, is an apology, usually accompanied by appropriate monetary and/or other material compensation, deemed adequate.

In Hawai'i, where a vibrant sovereignty movement exists among the sizable indigenous population, situated as they are within naturally-defined borders, and evidencing as they do the basis for economic self-sufficiency, it is obvious that an apology, even if attended by substantial monetary reparations, is an insufficient remedy. Although both the apology and the reparations are plainly warranted, only reinscription of Hawai'i on the United Nations List of Non-Self-Governing Territories and strict U.N. supervision of a process by which the Kanaka Maoli can at last determine for themselves the nature of their political destiny can be considered sufficient. In the alternative, a condition of "unwilling subjugation" comparable to that imposed by the Portuguese upon Goa will be perpetuated against the Hawaiian people.74

The Responsibility of the United Nations to Hawai'i

The United Nations held the initial responsibility to decide which territories should be placed under Chapter XI and thus scheduled for decolonization. The viewpoint "of a Non-Self-Governing Territory as a colony by states themselves holding colonies was consistent with the terms of Article 74 of the Charter, which refers to other Non-Self-Governing Territories in contrast to metropolitan areas, excluding thus Non-Self-governing Territories from the metropolitan areas of member states."75

The territory of a colony or other Non-Self-Governing Territory has, under the Charter, a status separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering it; and such separate and distinct status under the Charter shall exist until the people of the colony of Non-Self-Governing Territory have exercised their right of self-determination in accordance with the Charter, and particularly its purposes and principles.76

Under Chapter XI, administering states&emdash;sometimes referred to as "obligatees"&emdash;are required to prepare non-self-governing territories for self-determination. Period.

[The] existence of a dependent or subject peoples under the right of self-determination calls for an "active obligatee." This "obligatee" is the perpetrator of the act of subjugation. Specifically, its obligation is to restore the subjugated community to full self-government in a manner consistent with the norms of international society. The relationship between the "obligatee" and the beneficiary, which often lacks the capacity to remedy its situation, is such that 'the protection of beneficiary rights and interests requires the interpolation of an Agent of Protection'.77

The "obligatee" assumes its duties under the U.N., which serves as "guarantor." The non-self-governing territory, therefore, assumes the status of "third party beneficiary." In the event that the administering state fails in its duties as obligatee, the third party beneficiary's special status as non-self-governing territory resumes. At this juncture, the obligation to guarantee the right of self-determination to the third party accrues directly to the "guarantor" itself. The U.N. is thus obliged to serve in the role of "Agent of Protection."78

The creation of third party beneficiary rights necessarily crates obligations for an obligatee and for a guarantor or agency for the protection of the beneficiary rights. In fact, the obligatee creates the beneficiary rights by undertaking obligations towards the beneficiary; and the relationship between these two is such that the protection of the rights of the beneficiary requires the interpolation of a guarantor.79

It follows that "United Nations supervision or surveillance of any act of self-determination is clearly desirable to ensure the freedom of choice so made."80 Prior to 1960, direct U.N. participation in processes of self-determination was rare.81 Instead, the General Assembly accepted in good faith the assurances of administering states that they were truly fulfilling their fiduciary responsibilities in preparing colonies and dependent territories for self-government. Accordingly, the General Assembly approved the incorporation of Puerto Rico, Alaska and Hawai'i by the United States (Resolutions 748 and 1469), as well as the incorporation of the Dutch Antilles and Surinam by the Netherlands (Resolution 946), and Greenland by Denmark (Resolution 849).

In each case, the U.N. restricted itself to merely expressing opinions, post hoc and solely on the basis of documentation presented by the administering powers, that the subject peoples had freely exercised their right of self-determination.82 In passing Resolution 946(X), approving Surinam's supposed attainment of self-government, however, the General Assembly "reserved its position as regards the situation of these territories with respect to Resolution 742."83

The basis for this reservation was a clause in Resolution 742: "Freedom of the population of Non-Self-Governing Territory which has associated itself with the metropolitan country as an integral part of that country…to modify this status through the expression of their will by democratic means." In practice, this provision prevented the Dutch from finalizing their 1954 incorporation of Surinam and vested the colonized people with a permanent right to alter their relationship to the Netherlands. In 1975, they exercised it by becoming fully independent of their former colonizers.84

More direct was the case of Oman, which Britain attempted to keep off the List of Non-Self-Governing Territories from the outset, arguing that the sultanate had never been a colony, per se, but rather had always remained an independent entity in its own right. This peculiar stance prompted an investigation by an ad hoc U.N. committee, which reported that "Oman as a whole represented a colonial situation, and asked the Committee of 24 to concern itself with this question." Hence, Britain's "non-colony" was inscribed on the list over strong British objections, and made subject to decolonization procedures.85

Less fortunate were the Kanaks of New Caledonia. When the French ceased reporting on this colony in 1947, claiming that it had opted to become part of metropolitan France, prevailing U.N. procedures left the General Assembly little choice but to accept French claims that they had met their trust obligation by making the interests of the Kanaks paramount in determining the future political status of the colony. It was not until 1986, when several other by then independent nations of the southern Pacific region entered formal objections to the nature of the "self-determining" processes employed in New Caledonia, that the matter was reopened. At that point, the U.N. finally fulfilled its role as guarantor, and New Caledonia was reinscribed on the list of non-self-governing territories.86

As has been discussed, these and other instances of serious manipulation of decolonization processes by the colonial powers prompted the U.N. to amplify the legal definition and requirements of self-determination by promulgating Resolution 1514(IX) in 1960. This was coupled to Resolution 1541(IX) the same year, in which the structure and procedures for enforcement were detailed for the first time. The instrumentality for such purposes&emdash;the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (or "Committee of Twenty-Four," as it is best known)&emdash;was then established under Resolution 1654(XVI) in 1961.87

The Committee's mandate was to closely monitor ostensible processes of self-determination carried out in non-self-governing territories and "refuse to endorse the results of [referenda on status] in which the [U.N.] was not officially represented."88 It was also charged with responsibility for receiving petitions from territories in which unmonitored processes had already resulted in the incorporation of former colonies into the colonizing power or other dispositions of status short of full independence. If, upon investigation, the Committee found these results to have been illegally obtained, it was empowered to recommend that the General Assembly withdraw its recognition of the outcome and reinscribe the victims on the list of non-self-governing territories.89

[The] General Assembly has refused to accept change in the status of Non-Self-Governing Territories not involving independence and in which no participation of the U.N. was permitted by the Administering Powers… The General Assembly refused to recognize in 1967 the choice of French Somaliland to remain French among other reasons because the French did not allow a U.N. presence at the time the plebiscite took place.90

As was noted above, the U.N. unequivocally refused to recognize the so-called self-determination proclaimed by the settlers population of Rhodesia.91 On December 11, 1980, it also rejected South Africa's right to administer Namibia, and called upon that country's settler government to withdraw its administration from "the former South West Africa mandate."92 As the General Assembly framed the matter in Resolution 35/118, the U.N. categorically "rejects any agreement, arrangement or unilateral action by colonial and racist Powers which ignores, violates, denies or conflicts with the inalienable right of peoples under colonial domination to self-determination and independence."93 The resolution then outlined a plan of action to implement independence for other colonized peoples:

The Special Committee shall continue to examine the full compliance of all states with the Declaration and with other relevant resolutions on the question of decolonization… Where General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) has not been fully implemented with regard to a given Territory, the Assembly shall continue to bear responsibility for that Territory until all powers are transferred to the people of the Territory without any reservations and the people concerned have had an opportunity to exercise freely their right to self-determination and independence… The Special Committee is directed… To continue to examine the view expressed, orally or in writing by the peoples of the colonial Territories as well as by representatives of non-governmental organizations and individuals with knowledge of the conditions in those Territories. Particular consideration shall be given to oral petitions and written communications regarding the Territories on which information is not being transmitted.94

The General Assembly then followed up these actions by announcing in Resolution 2625(VIII) that all member-states must support its role in serving as guarantor of self-determination for all peoples.

Every State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate action, realization of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, and to render assistance to the United Nations in carrying on the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter regarding the implementation of the principle, in order to… (a) bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to the freely expressed will of the peoples concerned; and bearing in mind that the subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a violation of the principles, as well as a denial of fundamental human rights, and is contrary to the Charter.

The nations comprising the South Pacific Forum immediately accepted the responsibilities to entailed in Resolution 2625. One of their first collective endeavors was to deal with the issue of New Caledonia.95 In the same vein, all member-states and organs of the U.N. have a clear responsibility to review whether the colonized people of Hawai'i were afforded a genuine opportunity to exercise their right to self-determination in 1959, in accordance with the principles and purposes of international laws pertaining to decolonization. If the findings indicate that the U.S., like France and other colonizing powers, failed to meet its trust obligations, the General Assembly must exercise its authority to rectify the situation by reinscribing Hawai'i on the List of Non-Self-Governing Territories and overseeing the initiation of a bona fide process of decolonization in its behalf.

With respect to the U.S., the U.N. Special Committee on Decolonization has already demonstrated an ability to uphold the law by investigating the status of another territory, Puerto Rico, which was invaded and annexed by the United States in 1898.96 Although the island was removed by the U.S. from the List of Non-Self-Governing Territories in 1953, persistent reports of discrimination against, and outright persecution of, Puerto Rican nationalists caused the committee to investigate the situation during the early 1980s.97 The findings were significant enough that it was decided in 1986 that the committee should take the "Puerto Rican Question" under continuing review.98 In 1993, the colonized population of Puerto Rico was finally given an opportunity to vote upon their status, with the result that the majority opted to continue in their "commonwealth" relationship to the U.S. (statehood polled a close second, with independence coming in a distant third).99

Although the Kanaka Maoli may follow the same course as the Puertorriqueños when provided the chance to engage in a true process of self-determination, this in no way diminishes their right to make the choice, and in a manner free of U.S. interference. The United Nations' obligation is to ensure that they are at last accorded this fundamental right, after a suitable period of preparation (the duration and nature of which they themselves must take the lead in defining). The indigenous people of Hawai'i, have every legitimate reason to expect that the U.N. will shoulder its responsibilities to them in the immediate future. And they should demand no less.

Notes

1. General Assembly Resolution 66(I).

2. General Assembly Resolution 1469(XIV).

3. A. Rigo Sureda, The Evolution of the Right to Self-Determination: A Study of United Nations Practice (Leiden, Netherlands: A.W. Sijhoff, 1973) p. 28.

4. 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, 1976 Y.B.U.N. 1043 (Oct. 24, 1945). For text, see Burns H. Weston, Richard A. Falk and Anthony D'Amato, eds., Basic Documents in International Law and World Order (St. Paul, MN: West, 1990) pp. 16, 24.

5. Djura Nincic, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Charter and Practice of the United Nations (The Hague: Marinus Nijhoff, 1979) p. 222.

6. Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations (London: Stevens & Son, 1951) p. 555.

7. Ibid. For text, see Weston, Falk and D'Amato, Basic Documents, pp. 27-9.

8. Nincic, Problem of Sovereignty, p. 227.

9. Kelsen, Law of the United Nations, p. 559.

10. Nincic, Problem of Sovereignty, p. 228.

11. Kelsen, Law of the United Nations, p. 559.

12. "Factors Which Should Be Taken Into Account in Deciding Whether a Territory Is or Is Not a Territory Whose People Have Not Yet Attained A Full Measure of Self-Government," General Assembly Resolution 741(VIII).

13. U.N.G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961). For text, see Weston, Falk and D'Amato, Basic Documents, pp. 343-4.

14. Michla Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice (The Hague: Marinus Nijhoff, 1982) p. 15.

15. Nincic, Problem of Sovereignty, p. 238.

16. Ibid.

17. Rigo Sureda, Right to Self-Determination, p. 107.

18. W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, The Principle of Self-Determination in International Law (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1972) p. 136.

19. Ibid.

20. Ernest Harsch and Tony Thomas, Angola: The Hidden History of Washington's War (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1976) pp. 25-48; Courtland Cox, "Western Strategy in Southern Africa," Western Massachusetts Association of Concerned Scholars, U.S. Military Involvement in Southern Africa (Boston: South End Press, 1978) pp. 41-4.

21. Gavan Daws, Shoal of Time: A History of the Hawaiian Islands (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1968) p. 382.

22. See generally, Lilikala Kame'eleihiwa, Native Land and Foreign Desires (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1992) esp. pp. 169-199.

23. Michael Dougherty, To Steal a Kingdom: Probing Hawaiian History (Waimanalo, Hawaii: Island Style Press, 1992) pp. 165-75; William Adam Russ, Jr., The Hawaiian Revolution, 1893-94 (London: Associated University Presses, [2nd ed.] 1992).

24. Rich Budnick, Stolen Kingdom: An American Conspiracy (Honolulu: Aloha Press, 1992) pp. 168-81; Noel J. Kent, Hawai'i: Islands Under the Influence (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1993) pp. 69-91.

25. Daws, Shoal of Time, p. 389.

26. Alaska Statehood Act of 1958 (72 Stat. 339); Hawaii Statehood Act of1959 (73 Stat. 4).

27. This had the effect of making the U.S., as administering state, entirely responsible for the integrity of the plebiscite process; Hurst Nannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990) p. 40. Also see Ofuatey-Kodjoe, Principle of Self-Determination, p. 118.

28. Daws, Shoal of Time, p. 390.

29. Ibid., p. 391.

30. Ibid., p. 385.

31. Hawaii Sovereignty Advisory Commission, Final Report (Honolulu: State of Hawaii, 1994) p. 45.

32. Pomerance, Self-Determination, p. 25.

33. Ibid., p. 121.

34. See, e.g., Michael Kioni Dudley and Keoni Kealoha Agard, A Call for Hawaiian Sovereignty (Honolulu: Na Kane O Ka Malo Press, 1990); Ulla Hasager and Jonathan Friedman, eds., Hawai'i: Return to Nationhood (Copenhagen: International Work Group on Indigenous Affairs Doc., 75, 1994).

35. Hanna Bokor-Szeggo, New States and International Law (Budapest: Academiai Kiado, 1970) p. 50.

36. The term "act of war" is taken from President Grover Cleveland's Message to Congress concerning the then-recent events in Hawai'i (Washington, D.C.: 53rd Cong., 2d Sess., Rpt. No. 243, Dec. 18, 1893).

37. On the matter of international torts, see Eduardo Jiminez de Arechaga, "International Responsibility," in M. Sorenson, ed., Manual of Public International Law (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968) pp. 564-72.

38. Although the question of Hawai'i is left conspicuously unaddressed in the book, the issue is framed reasonably well in Roy L. Brooks' "The Age of Apology," in his edited volume, When Sorry Isn't Enough: The Controversy Over Apologies and Reparations for Human Injustice (New York: New York University Press, 1999) pp. 3-11. Also see Elazar Barkman, The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000) pp. xxix, xxxvi,164, 188, 216-31. 321.

39. On the relevant customary law (jus cogens), see Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, Documents on the Laws of War (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1982) pp. 4-6, 10, 16.

40. On the relevant customary law, see Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, [2nd ed.] 1984) pp. 2-21.

41. Weston, Falk and D'Amato, Basic Documents, p. 3.

42. Quoted in Helena Allen, The Betrayal of Queen Lil'uokalani: Last Queen of Hawaii, 1838-1917 (Honolulu: Mutual, 1982) p. 294.

43. Ibid.

44. Eyal Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) pp. 5-6.

45. Pomerance, Self-Determination, p. 49.

46. Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) p. 82.

47. James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) p. 21.

48. This principle was committed to black letter law in the Treaty of Saint-Germain (1919); Crawford, Creation of States, p. 50. It is also worth noting that no nation, having recognized a nation as sovereign, can "nullify" the latter's sovereignty merely by withdrawing such recognition; Lassa Oppenheim, International Law (London: Longman, Green, [8th ed.] 1955) p. 120.

49. Crawford, Creation of States, p. 24.

50. Pomerance, Self-Determination, p. 89.

51. Rigo Sureda, Right to Self-Determination, p. 106.

52. G.A. Res. 41/41A UN GAOR Supp. (No. 53), UN Doc. A/41/53 (1986) at 49. Also see "Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," 41 UN GAOR (No. 23), UN Doc A/41/23 (1986).

53. Pomerance, Self-Determination, p. 30.

54. Ibid.

55. Rigo Sureda, Right to Self-Determination, p. 181.

56. Crawford, Creation of States, p. 432.

57. Pomerance, Self-Determination, p. 32.

58. This follows the definition originally advanced in the 1921 Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (42 Stat. 108); Linda S. Parker, Native American Estate: The Struggle Over Indian and Hawaiian Lands (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1989) pp. 152-64, 190-1.

58. Lee Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (Hew Haven: Yale University Press, 1978) p. 33.

59. Pomerance, Self-Determination, pp. 30-1.

60. This is rather standard; see Roy L. Brooks, "What Form Redress?" in Brooks, When Sorry Isn't Enough, pp. 87-91.

61. Native Hawaiians Study Commission, Report on the Culture, Needs and Concerns of Native Hawaiians, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 1983) Vol. I, pp. 306-8. The administrative apparatus was then established under the Hawaii Organic Act of 1900 (31 Stat. 141).

62. For application of this principle in a closely-related connection, see Milner S. Ball, "Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes," American Bar Foundation Research Journal, No.1, 1987.

63. Pomerance, Self-Determination, p. 32.

64. The same, of course, can be said with respect to the various indigenous nations within the continental U.S. with which the United States has ratified treaty relationships; Vine Deloria, Jr., and David E. Wilkins, Tribes, Treaties, and Constitutional Tribulations (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999).

65. Istvan Vasarhelyi, Restitution in International Law (Budapest: Hungary Academy of Science, 1964) p. 74.

66. Henry L. Stimson, "The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law," in J. W. Baird, ed., From Nuremberg to My Lai (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath Co., 1972) pp. 114-25.

67. George Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1967) p. 173.

68. James Blount, Report to the United States Congress: Hawaiian Islands (Washington, D.C.: Ex. Doc. 47, 53rd Cong., 2d Sess., 1893).

69. Grover Cleveland, "President's Special Message to Congress Relating to the Hawaiian Islands, Dec. 18, 1893," in Hasager and Friedman, Hawai'i, pp. 121-37.

70. See note 41.

71. Schwarzenberger, Manual of International Law, p. 174.

72. Ibid., p. 175.

73. Ibid., p. 180.

74. Crawford, Creation of States, p. 413.

75. Rigo Sureda, Right to Self-Determination, p. 102.

76. General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV).

77. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, Principle of Self-Determination, p. 177.

78. Ibid., pp. 178-9.

79. Ibid., p. 179.

80. Crawford, Creation of States, p. 368.

81. Pomerance, Self-Determination, p. 35.

82. Quoted in Ofuatey-Kodjoe, Principle of Self-Determination, p. 122.

83. Rigo Sureda, Right to Self-Determination, p. 63.

84. Stewart C. Easton, The Rise and Fall of Western Colonialism: A Historical Survey from the Early Nineteenth Century to the Present (New York: Praeger, 1964) p. 110; Franz Ansprenger, The Dissolution of Colonial Empires (London: Routledge, 1989) pp. 106-8.

85. Rigo Sureda, Evolution of the Right to Self-Determination, p. 63.

86. Stephan Bates, The South Pacific Island Countries and France: A Study of Inter-State Relations (Canberra: Australian National University, 1990) p. 77.

87. There were several precursors to the Committee of Twenty-Four. An ad hoc committee was created in 1946 to receive reports from administering states. In 1948, this was redesignated the Special Committee of Information, and, in 1952, as the Special Committee of Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. None of these earlier versions were imbued with any sort of enforcement power; Pomerance, Self-Determination, p. 35.

88. Ibid., pp. 35-6.

89. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, Principle of Self-Determination, p. 178.

90. Rigo Sureda, Right to Self-Determination, p. 314.

92. GAR 1747(XVI). For background, see Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Collective Responses to Illegal Acts in International Law: United Nations Actions in the Question of Southern Rhodesia (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1990).

93. Quoted in John Dugard, The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983) p. 481.

94. Ibid., pp. 481-2.

95. Stephen Hemmingham, France and the South Pacific (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992) p. 197.

96. Alfredo López, Doña Licha's Island: Modern Colonialism in Puerto Rico (Boston: South End Press, 1987); Ronald Fernandez, The Disenchanted Island: Puerto Rico and the United States in the Twentieth Century (New York: Praeger, 1992).

97. General Assembly Resolution 748(VIII).

98. "Special Committee Decision of 14 August 1986 Concerning Puerto Rico," A/AC.109/25, 11 Aug. 1987.

99. The background of the plebiscite is covered, but the outcome avoided, in Ronald Fernandez. Prisoners of Colonialism: The Struggle for Justice in Puerto Rico (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1994) pp. 321-8.

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