Cross-Border Production, Technology Transfer, and the Choice of Partner

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Abstract

The goods that are consumed in developed countries are increasingly manufactured in developing countries. A developing-country producer can work with a local headquarter (within-border partnership); alternatively, it can form a cross-border partnership with a headquarter in developed countries. This paper develops a theory where the choice between cross-border partnership and within-border partnership depends on the size of the gain through technology transfer from developed-country headquarters. When developing-country producers have heterogeneous productivity, those with medium levels of productivity will gain sufficiently from technology transfer and choose cross-border partnership. In contrast, high- and low-productivity producers will work with their local headquarters, and the low-productivity producers will not be able to sell their products to developed countries at all. This paper also shows that among the producers that engage in cross-border partnership, those with relatively high productivity become vertically integrated with their developed-country headquarters, while those with relatively low productivity operate at arm’s length. These predictions are supported by firm-level evidence from China.
1 Introduction

Consumers in developed countries increasingly rely on goods that are produced abroad. For example, the United States, where television was invented and is watched more than in any other country, currently has no televisions produced domestically. It is apparent that every aspect of a developed economy such as the US involves products “Made in Country X” (where X refers to developing countries such as China, India, or Mexico). Much less well understood is what types of firms in foreign countries are producing for developed countries, namely, “Made by whom in Country X.” In particular, information on the productivity of foreign producers is important, because their productivity determines how efficiently developed countries are served.

This paper analyzes the productivity of foreign firms that serve developed countries. In the paper, I develop a theory that characterizes how producers in a foreign country (such as China) interact with headquarters in a home country (such as the US). A foreign producer faces a trade-off between the productivity gain generated by the home headquarters’ technology transfer and the coordination costs resulting from cross-border differences in machinery specifications, regulations, management routines, and cultures. As an alternative to this cross-border partnership, the foreign producer also has the option of partnering with its local headquarters. From the foreign producer’s perspective, the advantage of cross-border partnership over within-border partnership decreases if the foreign producer has a higher level of initial productivity.

The model shows that foreign producers (such as those in China) with mid-range initial productivity are the firms that engage in cross-border partnership. At mid-range level of productivity, the gains from technology transfer outweigh the frictions involved in cross-border coordination, such that cross-border partnership generates sufficient profits for both home headquarters and foreign producers. Unlike these mid-range producers, foreign producers with high levels of initial productivity cannot garner sufficient profits for themselves from technology transfer. Likewise, foreign producers with low productivity cannot generate suf-

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1 Trade models with firm productivity heterogeneity are analyzed in Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003), Bustos (2009), Costantini and Melitz (2008), Melitz (2003), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), and Yeaple (2005).

2 In the analysis I assume that developed-country headquarters are homogeneous. This removes from the analysis heterogeneity among internationally operating firms in developed countries, which is not crucial given my focus on the trade-off between technology transfer gains and coordination costs that foreign firms face. According to the literature, these headquarters are the most productive firms in developed countries; see, e.g., Antràs and Helpman (2004, 2008), Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004), and Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2005, 2006).
icient profits for home headquarters and thus are not selected for cross-border partnership. As a result, foreign producers with either high or low productivity engage in within-border partnership.\footnote{While there are no factor cost differences in the analysis, they could be added without affecting the main results.}

The model also shows that foreign producers with high initial productivity serve both their local market (such as China) and the market of the developed-country headquarter (such as the US),\footnote{Products made under this partnership type can be imported by either retailers or trade intermediaries (see Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei, 2010; Antràs and Costinot, 2010; Basker and Van, 2010; Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott, 2010; and Blum, Claro and Horstmann, 2010).} while those with low productivity serve only their local market because they cannot afford the fixed cost of exporting;\footnote{The relationship between producer and headquarter in the model is vertical; see e.g., Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2005), and Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) for discussions on vertical fragmentation of production. In this arrangement, cross-border production primarily serves the headquarter’s local market (such as the US). In an extension of the model, I show the same findings when cross-border partnership serves other markets as well.} moreover, among foreign producers that undertake cross-border partnership, those with relatively high productivity are vertically integrated with their headquarters, while those with relatively low productivity operate at arm’s length with their headquarters. This follows because, compared to arm’s length, vertical integration has the advantage of more effective technology transfer and easier coordination despite higher fixed costs.

The model is evaluated using firm-level data from China. China is arguably the ideal case for examining cross-border partnership since it is by now the largest exporting country in the world and the largest host country for foreign direct investment in the developing world. The model generates three testable predictions. (1) On average, Chinese producers that engage in within-border partnership (i.e., partnering with a Chinese headquarter) and serve only China have low productivity, those involved in cross-border partnership (i.e., partnering with an overseas headquarter) have mid-range productivity, and those involved in within-border partnership and serving both China and overseas markets have high productivity. (2) Among all exporters in China, cross-border partnership is more prevalent than within-border partnership in the industries with more transferable technology and less productivity dispersion. Cross-border partnership is also more prevalent in the regions that have higher qualities of infrastructures and institutions, because good infrastructures and institutions facilitate cross-border coordination.\footnote{My focus is the effect of infrastructures and institutions on the composition of exporters, while the existing literature emphasizes the effect on aggregated trade flows. See Bougheas, Demetriades, and Morgenroth (1999), Levchenko (2007), Nunn (2007), and Nunn and Treffer (2008).} (3) Among Chinese producers in cross-border partnership, those with relatively high productivity are vertically integrated with their headquarters, while
those with relatively low productivity operate at arm’s length with their headquarters.

The first prediction finds strong support from a simple regression of firm productivity on partnership types. A number of factors are considered that could potentially confound the result. The first is local tax policies of China—as those of other developing countries—favor cross-border over within-border partnership. I examine both ad-valorem as well as lump-sum tax favors, showing that my results are robust to incorporating taxation effects into the analysis (see Section 3.2). The second is causes other than initial productivity. The model centers on initial productivity, but the estimated productivity differences may also result from technology transfer as well as heterogeneity in products and headquarters across partnership types.

To isolate the effect of producers’ initial productivity, I examine the firms that undertook within-border partnership and sold their products only in China, but later switched to either cross-border partnership or within-border partnership serving both China and abroad. The results show that before switching the producers that eventually switched to within-border partnership serving both Chinese and overseas markets had high productivity, those that ultimately switched to cross-border partnership had mid-range productivity, and those that never switched at all had low productivity. These results directly support the idea that initial productivity determines the interaction between headquarters and producers.

I go on to test the second and third predictions of the model, investigating the impact of industrial and regional characteristics on relative prevalence of different partnership types in exporters, as well as the effect of productivity on the organizational form that is chosen. The empirical findings are in line with the predictions. In particular, among firms undertaking cross-border partnership, those that switched from arm’s length to vertical integration were more productive before switching than those that remained at arm’s length, again attesting to the effect of initial productivity.

This paper contributes to three branches of the literature. First, it develops a framework that allows offshore producers to endogenously choose their partners (headquarters). This goes beyond the existing literature in which offshore producers merely wait to be selected and the selection is unilaterally made by headquarters in developed countries. In my model, producers are not inactive; rather, producers and headquarters each select the other, so that cross-border partnership only forms if the producer also finds this type of partnership to be more profitable than working with its local partner. Taking producers’ choices into account is important because the efficiency of global production is closely linked to the initial

7See Antràs and Rossi-Hansberg (2009), Helpman (2006), and Spence (2005) for literature reviews.
productivity of offshore producers. This paper finds that one fourth of the productivity premium of Chinese offshore producers relative to Chinese producers that do not export can be attributed to their difference in initial productivity. Put differently, offshore producers turn out more productive than non-offshore producers that do not export, not only because of the technology transfer offshore producers *ex post* receive, but also because they are *ex ante* more productive.

The second contribution is to provide insights on the frictions between producers and headquarters that exist in cross-border partnership. These frictions were raised by Arrow (1969) but remain not well understood, because they are largely conceptual and cannot directly be pinpointed in the data. Recent studies infer their existence from their presentations. There is evidence that US multinational headquarters substitute for error-prone direct communications with offshore producers by exporting intermediates that embody technologies (Keller and Yeaple, 2010) and vertically integrate their foreign partners if the offshore tasks are complicated (Costinot, Oldenski, and Rauch, 2010). This paper complements these studies by theoretically showing that developing-country producers with high productivity do not choose to work with US multinational headquarters. Notably, if cross-border partnership were frictionless, foreign producers with high productivity would always find it profitable to partner with US multinational headquarters. This paper empirically finds that Chinese producers with high productivity actually choose within-border production, clearly attesting to the existence of frictions in cross-border partnership.

The third contribution is to assess the role of technology transfer in cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A). In my model, headquarters in developed countries (such as the US) prefer to partner with foreign producers with mid-range productivity because the technology transfer from headquarters to producers translates into an advantage of the headquarters in contracting. They do not target foreign producers with high productivity because, compared to those with mid-range or low productivity, producers with high productivity have better alternative options and thus demand better offers (i.e., profit shares). When partnering with producers with mid-range productivity, headquarters do not need to offer much profit share, as technology transfer from the headquarters makes their offers sufficiently attractive. This advantage in contracting also exists if foreign producers have low productivity, but in that case developed-country headquarters cannot garner enough profits and thus choose to work with their local producers.

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8 For studies on cross-border M&A, see, e.g., Neary (2007), Nocke and Yeaple (2007), and Spearot (2010).
9 Note that the foreign producers in my model are not necessarily merged or acquired, but can operate at arm’s length.
10 This model does not consider bi-sourcing, i.e., a home (US) headquarter works with both a home producer
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and discusses its four predictions (Propositions 1–4). Section 3 first describes the dataset and then tests the four predictions. Section 4 concludes and discusses directions for future research.

2 A Theory of Interaction

2.1 Environment

Consider a world that consists of a host country \((H)\) and a source country \((S)\), which correspond to the foreign country and the home country that were introduced before.\(^{11}\) Their residual demand functions for differentiated products are, respectively,

\[
y_H = \Phi_H p_H^{-1/(1-\alpha)}, \tag{1}
\]
\[
y_S = \Phi_S p_S^{-1/(1-\alpha)}, \tag{2}
\]

where \(p_l\) is price, \(\Phi_l\) measures the demand level, \(l \in \{H, S\}\), and \(\alpha\) is a parameter that determines the demand elasticity \(1/(1-\alpha)\). Production of a differentiated good involves two parties: a producer \(X\) and a headquarter \(Z\). There are \(X\) and \(Z\) in both countries: \(X_H, X_S, Z_H, \) and \(Z_S\).

The host-country producer \(X_H\) with initial productivity \(\theta \in \mathbf{R}_{++}\) can partner with either a host-country headquarter \(Z_H\) (partnership \(HH\)) using the production function

\[
y_{HH} = \theta x_{SS}, \tag{3}
\]

or a source-country headquarter \(Z_S\) (partnership \(HS\)) using the production function

\[
y_{HS} = g(\gamma; \mu, \theta) x_{HS}, \tag{4}
\]

where \(x_k, k \in \{HH, HS\}\), is the input of production. In the rest of the paper, these two partnership types are also referred to as within-border and cross-border, respectively. Under partnership types \(HH\) and \(HS\), \(X_H\) produces according to the design provided by \(Z_H\) and a foreign (Chinese) producer; see Du, Lu, and Tao (2009).

\(^{11}\)This change in denomination is to save mental efforts for the author and readers. In technical writing, the term home/foreign may be subconsciously interpreted in different meanings depending on one’s nationality background. Unlike home/foreign, source/host is neutral with respect to the reference country.
In $\gamma$, $\mu$, and $\theta$ of production function (4), only $\theta$ is a producer-level parameter. $\gamma$ denotes technology transfer from $Z$ and $\mu$ is an inverse measure of coordination difficulty. The combination $(\gamma, \mu, \theta)$ determines $g$, i.e., the final productivity of production. Henceforth, $\theta$ and $g$ are referred to as ex-ante and ex-post productivity, respectively. Technology transfer $\gamma$ and initial productivity $\theta$ are complementary in effect, while coordination difficulties reduce both $\gamma$ and $\theta$. I use the functional form

$$g(\gamma, \mu, \theta) = (\gamma \theta)^\mu, \mu \in (0, 1)$$

(5)

to characterize the fact that both parties’ contributions to $g$, namely $\gamma$ and $\theta$, are reduced because of coordination difficulties. If either $\gamma$ or $\theta$ doubles, $g$ increases less than double.\(^{12}\)

Tariff and cross-border transport costs are assumed to be zero at this point, but can easily be incorporated as shown later. In country $H$, unit cost of the input $x$ is $c$. Under partnership $HH$, the output may either serve country $H$ only or both countries $H$ and $S$. In the latter case a fixed cost $f_{EX}$ ($EX$ stands for “exporting”) must be paid to build overseas marketing and sales networks. For convenience, these two cases are regarded as two different partnership types, denoted by $(HH, NON)$ and $(HH, B)$, respectively. Cross-border partnership $HS$ is free from $f_{EX}$ because $Z$ knows its local market well.

In country $S$, unit cost of the input $x$ is $\tilde{c}$. $X_S$’s only potential partner is $Z_S$ (if they work together, the partnership type is referred to as $SS$), and the production function thereof is

$$y_{SS} = \tilde{\theta} x_{SS},$$

(6)

where $\tilde{\theta}$ is a constant, which can be rationalized by considering $X_H$ as the best available producer in Country $S$.$^{13}$ To summarize, $Z_S$ chooses between partnership types $HS$ and $SS$, while $X_H$ chooses between partnership types $(HH, NON)$, $(HH, B)$, and $HS$.

\(^{12}\)The functional form $g(\gamma, \mu, \theta) = \gamma \mu \theta$, which I use later for robustness check, leads to the same results. It is not used here as the benchmark case because it requires constant productivity returns from $\gamma$ and $\theta$, which contradicts empirical evidence (see Belderbos, Ito, and Wakasugi, 2008).

\(^{13}\)In other words, cross-border partnership becomes an option when $Z_S$ has exhausted domestic options to raise productivity.
The joint profits under the four partnership types are

\[ \pi_{HH,NON}(\Theta) = \Psi \Phi_H \Theta, \]  
\[ \pi_{HS}(\Theta) = \Psi \Phi_S \Gamma \Theta^\mu, \]  
\[ \pi_{HH,B}(\Theta) = \Psi (\Phi_H + \Phi_S) \Theta - f_{EX}, \]  
\[ \pi_{SS} = \tilde{\Psi} \Phi_S \tilde{\Theta}, \]

where \( \Theta = \theta^{\omega}, \) \( \tilde{\Theta} = \tilde{\theta}^{\omega}, \) \( \Gamma = \gamma^{\omega}, \) \( \Psi = (1 - \alpha)/(\alpha^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)}), \) and \( \tilde{\Psi} = (1 - \alpha)/(\tilde{\alpha}^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)}). \)

The threshold of \( \Theta \) for \( X_H \) in within-border partnership to serve both countries can be solved by equating \( R_{HH,NON} \) to \( R_{HH,B}: \) \( \Theta^* = f_{EX}/(\Psi \Phi_S). \) \( \pi_{SS} \) all goes to \( Z_S \) if \( Z_S \) chooses partnership \( SS, \) because \( X_S \) has no outside option. Since \( \tilde{\Psi}, \Phi_S, \) and \( \tilde{\Theta} \) are all constants, \( \tilde{\pi} = \pi_{SS} = \tilde{\Psi} \Phi_S \tilde{\Theta} \) is defined for convenience.

\[ \Gamma = [\gamma^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)}]^{\mu} \] is technology transfer after factoring in coordination difficulties, which determines whether cross-border partnership is feasible. If \( \Gamma \) is too low, cross-border partnership becomes inferior to within-border partnership because technology transfer is always outweighed by difficulties in cross-border coordination. Formally, \( \Gamma \) is required to satisfy

\[ \Gamma > \left[ \frac{\tilde{\Psi}}{\Phi_H} \cdot \left( \frac{\tilde{\Theta}}{\Theta^*} \right) + \left( \frac{\Phi_H}{\Phi_S} \right) \right] \Omega. \]  

where \( \Omega \equiv (\Theta^*)^{1-\mu} \) sets a reference level of technology transfer. The components in the right-side bracket of condition (11) are the factors that affect the requirement on technology transfer. This requirement on \( \Gamma \) becomes relaxed if Country \( S \) has a stronger cost disadvantage (smaller \( \tilde{\Psi} \)), worse local producers (smaller \( \tilde{\Theta} \)), or a wider local market (larger \( \Phi_S \)). Remember that Country \( S \) is a developed (Northern) country. In a North-South setting, \( Z_S \) resorts to a Southern Country \( H \) for low input costs, the effect of which is through \( \tilde{\Psi}/\Psi. \) In comparison, in a North-North setting, \( Z_S \) resorts to another Northern Country \( H \) for more productive producers, the effect of which is through \( \tilde{\Theta}/\Theta^*. \)

The timing of events is as follows. On date 1, \( Z_H \) and \( Z_S \) propose their respective contracts to \( X_H \) and \( X_H \) accepts one of the two. The contracts specify who partner with whom and how future revenue will be divided between them. \( Z_H \) can only propose to \( X_H, \) and has to exit if its proposal is rejected. \( Z_S \) will partner with \( X_S \) if either its proposal is rejected by \( X_H, \) or it does not want to partner with \( X_H \) at all.\(^ {15} \)

The contracting process is summarized in Figure 1. On date 2, production, sales, and revenue division are carried out

\(^{14}\)See Appendix A.1 for derivation.

\(^{15}\)The latter case is equivalent to that \( Z_S \) issues an invalid contract to \( X_H. \)
2.2 Equilibrium

The equilibrium characterizes how four parties, $X_H$, $X_S$, $Z_H$, and $Z_S$, choose their partners given all possible values of $\Theta$. As shown in Figure 1, $X_S$ does not have an option other than $Z_S$, so the analysis centers on what $Z_H$ and $Z_S$ offer $X_H$ in their respective contracts and how $X_H$ chooses between them. $X_H$ chooses between $Z_H$ and $Z_S$ depending on which one offers a larger profit transfer in its contract; meanwhile, the offers by $Z_H$ and $Z_S$ depend on how each other responds.

Let $\pi_{HH}(\Theta)$ be the maximum joint profit when $X_H$ and $Z_H$ become partners,

$$\pi_{HH}(\Theta) = \max\{\pi_{HH,NON}(\Theta), \pi_{HS}(\Theta)\},$$

and $\pi_{HH}^X(\Theta)$ be the portion in $\pi_{HH}(\Theta)$ that goes to $X_H$. The reservation profit for $X_H$ to choose partnership $HS$ is $\pi_{HH}^X(\Theta)$, while that for $Z_S$ is $\tilde{\pi}$. Thus, partnership $HS$ is chosen according to the contracts.
by $X_H$ and $Z_S$ if and only if\(^\text{16}\)

\[
\pi_{HS}(\Theta) - \pi_{HH}^{X_H}(\Theta) - \bar{\pi} > 0. \tag{12}
\]

I next investigate when condition (12) holds. $\bar{\pi}$ is known, and $\pi_{HH}^{X_H}(\Theta)$ is unknown but its maximum is $\pi_{HH}(\Theta)$. It is currently unclear whether $\pi_{HH}^{X_H}(\Theta) = \pi_{HH}(\Theta)$; thus, I examine instead the condition

\[
\pi_{HS}(\Theta) - \pi_{HH}(\Theta) - \bar{\pi} > 0, \tag{13}
\]

which is stricter than condition (12), and then prove:

**Lemma 1** (i) $\pi_{HS}(\Theta) - \pi_{HH}(\Theta) - \bar{\pi} = 0$ has two solutions $\Theta$ and $\overline{\Theta}$: $\Theta < \Theta^* < \overline{\Theta}$; (ii) $\pi_{HS}(\Theta) > \pi_{HH}(\Theta) + \bar{\pi}$ if and only if $\Theta \in (\Theta, \overline{\Theta})$.

**Proof.** See Appendix A.2. \(\blacksquare\)

Lemma 1 presents two thresholds of $\Theta$, $\Theta$ and $\overline{\Theta}$, and shows condition (13) to hold given $\Theta \in (\Theta, \overline{\Theta})$.$\text{17}$ Its intuition is summarized in **Panel (a) of Figure 2**, which shows the equilibrium joint-profit schedule from $X_H$’s perspective. Notably, $\bar{\pi}$, $Z_S$’s reservation profit in cross-border partnership, is essentially a fixed cost from $X_H$’s perspective. Next, I prove

**Lemma 2** Conditions (12) and (13) are equivalent.

**Proof.** See Appendix A.3. \(\blacksquare\)

The intuition behind Lemma 2 is as follows. When $\Theta \in (\Theta, \overline{\Theta})$, $Z_H$ and $Z_S$ compete to get $X_H$, and $Z_S$ wins by offering a profit of $\pi_{HH}(\Theta)$ to $X_H$. $Z_S$ matches this offer by keeping no profit for itself; however, by Lemma 1, $Z_H$ can always offer slightly more. In equilibrium, partnership $HS$ is formed, $\pi_{HS}^{Z_H}(\Theta) = 0$, $\pi_{HH}^{X_H}(\Theta) = \pi_{HH}(\Theta)$, and $\pi_{HS}^{Z_S}(\Theta) = \pi_{HS}(\Theta) - \pi_{HH}(\Theta)$. When $\Theta \in [\overline{\Theta}, \infty)$, because of difficulties in cross-border coordination, $Z_H$ can beat $Z_S$ by offering a profit of $\pi_{HS}(\Theta) - \bar{\pi}$ to $X_H$. Thus, partnership $(HH, B)$ is formed, $\pi_{HS}^{Z_H}(\Theta) = \pi_{HH,B}(\Theta) - (\pi_{HS}(\Theta) - \bar{\pi})$, $\pi_{HH}^{X_H}(\Theta) = \pi_{HS}(\Theta) - \bar{\pi}$, and $\pi_{HS}^{Z_S}(\Theta) = \bar{\pi}$.

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$\text{16}$ The proof of this condition is straightforward. For “if,” given the condition satisfied, $X_H$ and $Z_S$ have their reservation profits secured, and thus will accept any division of the extra profit $\pi_{HS}(\Theta) - \pi_{HH}(\Theta) - \bar{\pi}$. For “only if,” to profitably partners with $X_H$, $Z_S$ must ensure $X_H$ of at least $\pi_{HH}^{X_H}(\Theta)$, leading to $\pi_{HS}(\Theta) - \bar{\pi} > \pi_{HH}^{X_H}(\Theta)$.

$\text{17}$ As a numerical example of $\Theta$ and $\overline{\Theta}$, let $\Psi = \Psi = 1$, $\Phi_H = 1$, $\Phi_S = 1.2$, $\Gamma = 1.1$, $\mu = 0.5$, and $\bar{\pi} = 0.3$; then the two solutions are $\Theta = 0.12$ and $\overline{\Theta} = 0.74$. 

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When $\Theta \in (0, \Theta)$, the analysis is slightly complex. Define $\Theta_*$ such that $\pi_{HS}(\Theta_*) - \bar{\pi} = 0$. With a moderately low $\Theta \in (\Theta_*, \Theta)$, $X_H$ finds technology transfer from $Z_S$ attractive, but its ex-post productivity is not high enough to earn $X_H$ as much profit from cross-border partnership as from within-border partnership for the following reason. If $X_H$ wants to keep
ZS in the partnership, XH has to pay ZS the reservation profit \( \tilde{\pi} \). After paying \( \tilde{\pi} \), XH earns less than in within-border partnership, because in the partnership with ZH, XH has a stronger leverage, thanks to its alternative partner ZS. Thus, partnership \((HH, NON)\) is formed, \( \pi^Z_H(\Theta) = \pi_{HH,NON}(\Theta) - (\pi_{HS}(\Theta) - \tilde{\pi}) \), \( \pi^X_H(\Theta) = \pi_{HS}(\Theta) - \tilde{\pi} \), and \( \pi^Z_S(\Theta) = \tilde{\pi} \). When \( \Theta \in (0, \Theta^*_s) \), XH cannot afford \( \tilde{\pi} \) anyway, so it has no option but to partner with ZH, leading to partnership \((HH, NON)\). In this partnership, XH has no leverage such that \( \pi^Z_{HH,NON}(\Theta) = \pi_{HH,NON}(\Theta) \), \( \pi^X_{HH,NON}(\Theta) = 0 \), and \( \pi^Z_S_{HH,NON}(\Theta) = \tilde{\pi} \).

The above discussion has analyzed both profit and partnership schedules for each party. The profit schedules are graphically summarized by Panel (b) of Figure 2. The areas [1], [2], and [3] are the surpluses obtained by ZS, XH, and ZH, respectively. The partnership schedules are summarized by Proposition 1:

**Proposition 1** In equilibrium, the partnership schedules are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ex-ante Productivity</th>
<th>Partnership Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \Theta \leq \Theta^*_s )</td>
<td>((HH, NON))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Theta &lt; \Theta &lt; \Theta^*_s )</td>
<td>(HS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Theta \geq \Theta^*_s )</td>
<td>((HH, B))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three issues are noteworthy here. First, the equilibrium results from interaction between the four parties rather than any one party’s unilateral decision. Specifically, the model is not simply XH sorting itself into one of the three different partnership types, as XH makes decisions in response to the decisions of the other three parties. The model is also not as simple as ZS selecting one partner between XH and XS, because ZS’s choice depends on how ZH behaves. It is difficult to say which party of the four is the most active one, because the findings will change if any of the four parties deviates from the equilibrium.

Second, intermediate trade can easily be added to the model. \( x \) is a combination of production factors, including capital, labor and intermediates. Suppose that ZS finishes the intermediates in Country S and ships them to XH. Then, the \( c \) under partnership HS will change relative to \( \tilde{c} \), which nevertheless does no more than change \( \Psi \) relative to \( \tilde{\Psi} \) and hence \( \Theta \) and \( \Theta^*_s \). This also applies to the case in which ZS provides capital or labor.

Third, transport cost and tariff are absent in the model, but including them does not make a notable difference. For example, with an iceberg transport cost, both \( \pi_{HS} \) and \( \pi_{HH,B} \) decline, the former of which declines by a larger magnitude than the latter, because partnership \((HH, B)\) exports only part of its output, but partnership HS exports all of
its output. Consequently, $\Theta$ rises and $\bar{\Theta}$ declines, discouraging partnership $HS$ relative to partnerships $(HH, NON)$, $(HH, B)$, and $SS$. This does not change the above findings. A tariff is similar to transport cost in reducing $\pi_{HS}$ more than $\pi_{HH,B}$, such that trade liberalization encourages partnership $HS$ relative to other partnership types.

### 2.3 Average ex-ante productivity

Up to this point, the model has only four parties involved: $X_H$, $X_S$, $Z_H$, and $Z_S$. In this four-party setting, $X_H$ has an exogenously determined productivity $\Theta$ and the previous discussion focuses on how equilibrium partnership and profit schedules vary by $\Theta$. Now I consider a world with multiple four-party sets with different $\Theta$. Specifically, $\Theta$ is now randomly drawn from a population with cumulative density function $V(\Theta)$, and each $\Theta$ is associated with a four-party set. Let $\theta_0$ be the lower bound of ex-ante productivity and $\Theta_0 = \frac{\theta_0}{\alpha}$. Now each four-party set engages in the interaction discussed above. The average ex-ante productivity in the three partnership types are defined as, respectively,

$$
\tilde{\Theta}_{HH,NON} \equiv \frac{1}{V(\Theta) - V(\theta_0)} \int_{\theta_0}^{\Theta} \Theta dV(\Theta), \tag{14}
$$

$$
\tilde{\Theta}_{HS} \equiv \frac{1}{V(\Theta) - V(\Theta_0)} \int_{\Theta_0}^{\Theta} \Theta dV(\Theta), \tag{15}
$$

$$
\tilde{\Theta}_{HH,B} \equiv \frac{1}{1 - V(\Theta)} \int_{\Theta}^{\infty} \Theta dV(\Theta). \tag{16}
$$

It then follows that there is a ranking of average ex-ante productivity among the three partnership types:

**Proposition 2** $\tilde{\Theta}_{HH,NON} < \tilde{\Theta}_{HS} < \tilde{\Theta}_{HH,B}$.

### 2.4 Introducing industrial and regional characteristics

The analysis in Section 2.3 can be extended by allowing additional parameters of four-party sets to vary. Specifically, the four-party sets can be from different industries, so the effectiveness of technology transfer ($\gamma$) varies between industries. In Country $H$, the

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18The number of $X_H$-$Z_H$ pairs and the number of $X_S$-$Z_S$ pairs are implicitly assumed to be equal, so their numbers are equal to the number of four-party sets. If the number of $X_H$-$Z_H$ pairs is unequal to that of $X_S$-$Z_S$ pairs, the analysis will entail the interplay among market sizes, free-entry conditions, and entry costs of two countries’ local markets. These issues are beyond the scope of this paper.
producers can be from regions with different qualities of infrastructures and institutions, so
the coordination difficulty $\mu$ varies between regions within Country $H$.$^{19}$ Note that in the
previous discussion, both partnership types $HS$ and $(HH, B)$ involve exporting (i.e., to serve
Country $S$). Now I analyze how $\gamma$ and $\mu$ affect the prevalence of one partnership relative to
the other in the collection of four-party sets. The shares of the two partnerships that involve
exporting, $HS$ and $(HH, B)$, are respectively

$$\sigma_{HS} = \frac{V(\Theta) - V(\Theta)}{1 - V(\Theta)},$$

$$\sigma_{HH,B} = \frac{1 - V(\Theta)}{1 - V(\Theta)}. \quad \text{(18)}$$

These two equations imply that more exporters will be under partnership $HS$ relative to partnership
$(HH, B)$ if (1) the technology transfer from $Z$ to $X$ becomes more effective ($\gamma$ increases), or (2) the coordination between $Z$ and $X$ becomes easier because of the higher
quality of infrastructures and institutions in the region where $X$ is located ($\mu$ increases).

Next, I assume $V(\Theta) = 1 - \left(\frac{\Theta_0}{\Theta}\right)^{\zeta}$, $\zeta > 0$; i.e., $\Theta$ follows a Pareto distribution.$^{20}$
Thus, $\sigma_{HS} = 1 - \left(\frac{\Theta}{\Theta}\right)^{\zeta}$, $\sigma_{HH,B} = \left(\frac{\Theta}{\Theta}\right)^{\zeta}$. It follows that more exporters would be under
partnership $HS$ relative to partnership $(HH, B)$ if the dispersion of $\Theta$ becomes smaller ($\zeta$
increases). To summarize,$^{21,22}$

**Proposition 3** Among exporters, cross-border partnership becomes more prevalent than
within-border partnership, given more transferable technology, less productivity dispersion,
and easier cross-border coordination. Formally, $d(\frac{\sigma_{HS}}{\sigma_{HH,B}})/d\gamma > 0$; (ii) $d(\frac{\sigma_{HS}}{\sigma_{HH,B}})/d\mu > 0$; (iii)
$$d(\frac{\sigma_{HS}}{\sigma_{HH,B}})/d\zeta > 0.$$

**Proof.** See Appendix A.4. ■

Proposition 3 shows how relative prevalence of partnership types depends on industrial and

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$^{19}$Coordination can also be affected by industrial characteristics, which would not affect Proposition 3. The
reason is as follows. Let $\mu = \mu + \mu_{in}$, where $\mu$ and $\mu_{in}$ are region- and industry-specific, respectively. Then,
$g = (\gamma^\mu = (\gamma^\mu_{in})^\mu_{in} = \gamma^\mu_{in}^{\mu_{in}}$, where $\gamma$ is industry-region specific and $\mu_{in}$ is industry-specific.
Parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 3 can be proved as before. Part (iii) of Proposition 3 does not involve $\gamma$ or
$\mu$, so it is unaffected.

$^{20}$For analyses of the Pareto distribution, see Axtell (2001) and Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) for empirical evidence, and Gabaix (2009) and Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007) for theoretical discussions.

$^{21}$Note that only part (iii) of Proposition 3 relies on the assumption of a Pareto distribution. I will revisit
this assumption later in the empirical study (see page 20).
regional characteristics. Notably, under partnership types HS and (HH, B), the products are both “Made in Country H”; but the product designs are from Country S and Country H, respectively, as designs are provided by headquarters (see Section 2.1).

2.5 Organizational form

The previous discussion does not consider the organizational form of cross-border partnership. Now I assume that $Z_S$ also specifies the organizational form $m \in \{O, I\}$ in its proposed contract, where $I$ and $O$ denote vertical integration and arm’s length, respectively. Compared with arm’s length, vertical integration facilitates technology transfer and coordination, but incurs a higher fixed cost: $\Gamma_I > \Gamma_O, \mu_I > \mu_O, f_I > f_O = 0$. Then, the model can be resolved and generates the following findings:

**Proposition 4** Let $\Theta_m$ and $\overline{\Theta}_m$ be the new productivity thresholds among partnership types. Then, (i) $\Theta_O = \Theta < \Theta_I < \overline{\Theta}_O = \overline{\Theta} < \overline{\Theta}_I$, (ii) the thresholds between partnership types (HH, NON), HS, and (HH, B) are $\Theta$ and $\overline{\Theta}_I$; (iii) if joint profits satisfy

\[\pi_{HS,I}(\Theta_I) > \pi_{HS,O}(\Theta_I)\]
\[\pi_{HS,I}(\Theta) < \pi_{HS,O}(\Theta),\]

there exists $\Theta_I$ such that $\Theta < \Theta_I < \overline{\Theta}_I$ and

\[(k, m) = \begin{cases} (HS, O) & \text{if } \Theta < \Theta < \Theta_I \\ (HS, I) & \text{if } \Theta_I \leq \Theta < \overline{\Theta}_I; \end{cases}\]

(iv) Define

\[\hat{\Theta}_{HS,O} = \frac{1}{V(\Theta_I) - V(\Theta)} \int_{\Theta}^{\Theta_I} \Theta dV(\Theta),\]
\[\hat{\Theta}_{HS,I} = \frac{1}{V(\Theta_I) - V(\Theta_I)} \int_{\Theta_I}^{\overline{\Theta}_I} \Theta dV(\Theta);\]

then,

\[\hat{\Theta}_{HS,O} < \hat{\Theta}_{HS,I}.\]

The intuition behind Proposition 4 is graphically illustrated by Figure 3. Notice that conditions (19) are used to ensure $\Theta_I \in (\Theta, \overline{\Theta}_I)$. Violating them does not alter the analysis,

23 Notably, the analysis before this subsection focuses the arm’s length case.
but it removes one of the two organizational forms from the equilibrium.

2.6 Robustness: served market and functional form

This paper focuses on how host-country producers with different levels of productivity serve Country $S$ in different partnership types. To sharpen the analysis, the model has so far assumed cross-border partnership to serve only Country $S$. I now show that the previous results hold if cross-border partnership instead serves both countries. In that case, profit function in partnership $HS$ becomes

$$\pi_{HS}(\Theta) = \Psi(\Phi_S + \Phi_H)\Gamma^{\Theta_H}. \quad (22)$$

Then the necessary condition (11) for the presence of cross-border partnership in equilibrium becomes

$$\Gamma > \left[ (1 - \Delta) \left( \frac{\tilde{\Psi}}{\Psi} \right) \left( \frac{\tilde{\Theta}}{\Theta} \right) + \Delta \right] \Omega. \quad (23)$$

where $\Delta = \Phi_H/(\Phi_H + \Phi_S)$, which is smaller than the $\Phi_H/\Phi_S$ in condition (11), namely a weak version of relative market size.
Returning to Figure 2, the only difference that this additional served market introduces is a far rightward intersection between \( \pi_{HS} \) and \( \pi_{HH,B} \). Propositions 1 and 2 still hold, as the three sections in the productivity spectrum have the same relative location as before. So do Propositions 3 and 4, as they are unrelated to the market(s) that cross-border partnership serves. This analysis can be generalized by using additional markets of irregular sizes for cross-border partnership. Unlike within-border partnership in the host country, cross-border partnership can serve a third market, which is referred to as export-platform FDI in the literature (Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen, 2007).\(^{24}\) This third-market advantage results from the fact that \( Z_S \) may have marketing and sales channels that are unavailable to \( Z_H \). Its effect is technically the same as \( \Delta \) in condition (23).

The case in which cross-border production serves two markets is useful for showing how functional form affects the previous findings.\(^{25}\) I next show that using another functional form leads to the same result. The functional form in equation (5) neatly presents the fact that \( \gamma \) is constrained by difficult cross-border coordination \( \mu \in (0,1) \), but \( \gamma \) can also be constrained by factors other than \( \mu \). For instance, \( \gamma \) can be constrained by itself—\( Z_S \) “has little to teach” if the producer is sufficiently productive—then \( \gamma \) reaches its limit if \( \theta \) is sufficiently high. Formally, \( d\gamma(\theta)/d\theta > 0, d^2\gamma(\theta)/d\theta^2 < 0 \), so \( \gamma \theta \) approaches \( \theta \) as \( \theta \) rises.

Now, let cross-border partnership use the production function

\[
y_{HS} = \mu\gamma(\theta)x_{HS}, \mu \in (0,1),
\]

and within-border partnership in Country \( H \) uses production function (3) as before. Define \( \pi'_{HH,B} \) as the profit from within-border partnership with cross-border coordination, which is a hypothetical case to facilitate the analysis. Formally, this hypothetical within-border partnership employs

\[
y'_{SS} = \mu\theta x'_{SS}.
\]

As shown in Figure 4, the productivity advantage of cross-border partnership attenuates as \( \Theta \) rises, so \( \pi_{HS} \) eventually parallels \( \pi'_{HH,B} \). As previously shown, \( X_H \) with mid-range \( \Theta \) still chooses partnership \( HS \), while high and low \( \Theta \) lead to partnerships \( (HH,B) \) and \( (HH,NON) \), respectively. Therefore, Propositions 1–4 can be similarly proved as before.

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\(^{24}\)As discussed in section 2.5, the headquarter and producer in cross-border production can also operate at arm’s length in this paper; this practice is actually export-platform subcontracting.

\(^{25}\)This discussion on alternative functional form also applies to the case in which cross-border partnership serves only Country \( S \) (the benchmark model) or serves a third market (export-platform FDI/subcontracting). The use of the two-market setting provides a clearer graphical presentation. As shown in Figure 4, the alternative functional form translates into a self-explanatory slope change.
3 Empirical Evidence

3.1 Data

The primary data source for my empirical work is the *Annual Surveys of Industrial Production* (ASIP) from 2000 through 2003 conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. These annual surveys collected detailed information on firms that were either state- or non-state owned with annual sales of 5,000,000 Yuan or more, including sales revenue, exported value, capital, employment, and wage. The industry section of *China Statistical Yearbooks* was compiled using these surveys. I provide more details on these surveys in Appendix B.

Firm-level information on ownership (domestic or overseas) and sales destination (domestic or overseas) reported by the ASIP, as summarized in Table 1, is used to identify the partnership types and organizational forms specified in the theoretical model. Recall that there are three partnership types for host-country producers: \((HH, NON)\), \(HS\), and \((HH, B)\). The two partnership types of within-border partnership, \((HH, NON)\) and \((HH, B)\), corre-

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26 A number of papers have recently used this data for other purposes, including Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Lu, Lu, and Tao (2009), Park, Yang, Shi, and Jiang (2009), and Qian (2008).

27 In the covered years, the exchange rate was approximately \$1=8.27\) Yuan. So 5,000,000 Yuan were equivalent to about \$600,000.
spond to domestically owned firms that serve only the Chinese market and both Chinese and overseas markets, respectively. The partnership type of cross-border partnership, HS, refers to the firms that serve only the overseas market; they can be either domestically owned or foreign-owned, depending on their organizational form: arm’s length (HS, O) or vertical integration (HS, I).

Table 2 reports the share of each partnership type in total value of exports and total number of exporters during the years 2000-2003. Cross-border partnership, or HS, accounts for roughly 40% in total exported value and 35% in total number of exporters. Under partnership HS, the ratio between ownerships (domestic to overseas) is about 2:3.

### 3.2 Relative productivity

Propositions 2–4 are directly testable and I start with Proposition 2. I first specify a simple regression

\[
\ln TFP_{djrt} = \omega + \kappa TYPE_d + \nu j + \nu t + \epsilon_{djrt},
\]

and include in the sample only those firms with invariant partnership types over time. This specification is convenient in estimating productivity differences among partnership types. Regressions in the other way around (i.e., partnership types on TFP) are reported in Appendix C and show the same results.

The dependent variable is total factor productivity (TFP) calculated using Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) estimates. Indices \(d, j, r, \) and \(t\) represent firm, industry, region, and year, respectively. \(TYPE_d\) is a vector of dummy variables that indicates firm \(d\)’s partnership type. Firms under \((HH, NOH)\) serves as the reference group. \(TYPE_d = [HS_d, HHB_d]\), \(HHB_d = 1\) if the firm is under \((HH, B)\), \(HS_d = 1\) if the firm is under either \((HS, O)\) or \((HS, I)\), and \(\kappa_{HS}\) and \(\kappa_{HHB}\) are their respective coefficients. \(C_{drt}\) is a set of firm/region characteristics in year \(t\). An industry is defined by a four-digit industry code. \(\nu j\) and \(\nu t\) are industry and year fixed effects, respectively. \(\epsilon_{djrt}\) is a classic error term.

Table 3 shows \(\hat{\kappa}_{HHB} > \hat{\kappa}_{HS} > 0\), supporting the prediction of Proposition 2. The difference between \(\hat{\kappa}_{HS}\) and \(\hat{\kappa}_{HHB}\) is statistically significant at 1% level in all columns.

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28 According to The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Foreign-funded Enterprises, overseas-owned firms refer to “those enterprises established in China by foreign investors, exclusively with their own capital, in accordance with relevant Chinese laws.”

29 TFP is the output not explained by inputs used in production. Its value relies on the estimated coefficients of inputs in the production function. OLS estimates of the input coefficients are potentially biased by unobservables. To address the bias, the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method uses intermediate inputs to proxy for the unobservables.
Column (1) is the baseline regression without control variables. Column (2) is similar to (1) but controls for profit margin, capital intensity, and regional population. The profit margin, defined as pre-tax profit over sales in the literature (Phillips, 1995), purges possible market power from the estimated productivity; capital intensity and regional population as control variables reduce noises caused by industry composition and local market size. Columns (1)–(2) have included fixed effects, while column (3) includes random effects.

Next I discuss whether various confounding factors influence these results. First, I examine whether the results are affected by taxation effects. Developing countries such as China usually have local tax policies that favor cross-border partnership. I consider ad-valorem and lump-sum tax favors, respectively, which affect the empirical results in different ways. Ad-valorem tax favors provide producers with the highest productivity the incentives to choose cross-border partnership. In absence of tax incentives, these producers would have chosen within-border partnership. This effect is harmless in this paper because it strengthens rather than weakens the previous finding. Remember that Table 3 documents a productivity premium of firms in within-border partnership serving both domestic and overseas markets relative to those undertaking cross-border partnership. In effect, the ad-valorem tax favors reduce this estimated productivity premium, such that the real premium is larger than estimated.

Unlike ad-valorem tax favors, lump-sum tax favors may affect the empirical results through contaminating TFP. TFP is the output not explained by inputs used in production, and tax payment is not an input of production; thus, reduced tax payment may present itself as an increase in TFP. To address this, the regression is rerun with tax payment included as shown in column (4) of Table 3. Notably, the coefficients of $HS$ and $HHB$ are very close to those in columns (1)–(3), suggesting that the lump-sum tax favors are not a significant issue. In China, there are export-promotion zones (EPZs) and free-trade zones (FTZs) where exports are promoted by multiple policy instruments that are not applicable to the rest of China, such as lower taxes, eliminated quotas, or bureaucratic requirements. Firms are accordingly divided into two subsamples according to whether a firm is inside a four-digit administrative division with a EPZ/FTZ. Columns (5) and (6) replicate column (4) using the two subsamples and show the same findings. The coefficients of $HS$ and $HHB$ are slightly different from those in other columns, indicating that FTZs and EPZs may have different industry composition from other regions.

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30 As in Antràs (2003), capital intensity is measured using the ratio of capital stock to total employment.
31 Four-digit level administrative division in China refers to prefecture-level cities. A prefecture is typically an urban center with surrounding rural areas that are much larger than the urban center.
Second, I determine whether the results are affected by industry composition. Certain partnership types may be concentrated in an industry for some reason, and thus the results in Table 3 are possibly driven by industry composition. To address this, columns (1)–(6) all include industry effects, either fixed or random. In addition, I specifically look into two industries, apparel and electronics, which have the largest trade surplus in all industries and are meanwhile of opposite levels of sophistication. Columns (7)–(8) present the regressions respectively using the two subsamples, the results of which point to the same conclusion as those in columns (1)–(6).

Third, I address whether the results are affected by outliers. Table 4 reports the results from quantile regressions with similar specifications as in Table 3, which show that the results in Table 3 are robust with respect to extreme values. In addition, I calculated the differences between the coefficients of the two dummy variables, and found that the productivity premium of partnership \((HH, B)\) relative to partnership \(HS\) becomes larger at higher quantiles, suggesting that the productivity distribution is skewed to the right. In other words, the larger is the productivity dispersion, the more firms with high productivity fall in partnership \((HH, B)\), supporting the assumption of Pareto-distributed productivity discussed earlier (see page 13).

Fourth, I evaluate whether the results are specific to the parametric estimation approach. Least-squares regression and quantile regression fit linear conditional mean expectation and conditional quantile expectation, respectively. Notice that the foundation of Proposition 2, Proposition 1, argues that the productivity ranking among the three partnership types holds in terms of distribution rather than expectation. A nonparametric test on Proposition 2 will be discussed in Section 3.5, together with a nonparametric test of Proposition 4(iv).

Fifth, I investigate whether the estimated ranking of productivity indeed reflects the ranking of ex-ante productivity. Tables 3 and 4 establish productivity differences between the three partnership types, but cannot pinpoint the ultimate sources of the differences. Recall that the theoretical model centers on ex-ante productivity. Ex-ante productivity is not directly estimable, which means that the estimated productivity differences may not result from differences in ex-ante productivity but other differences between the three partnership types. For instance, cross-border partnership produces intermediates, whereas within-border partnership produces final goods; in that case, measured productivity is not comparable among partnership types.

To address this concern, I examine the firms that engage in cross-border partnership and serve only the Chinese market (i.e., \((HH, \text{NON})\) in the model) in year \(t\). They have three
options in year $t+1$: stay under the same partnership, switch to cross-border partnership (i.e., $HS$ in the model) or switch to within-border partnership serving both Chinese and overseas markets (i.e., $(HH, B)$ in the model). Their production activities, even if not comparable after switching (year $t+1$), were comparable before the switching (year $t$), because they were then undertaking the same production activity under the same partnership. Formally, each observation (a firm-year pair) under partnership $(HH, NON)$ is assigned two dummy variables:

$$PRE-HS_{dt} = \begin{cases} 
1, & \text{if } HS_{dt+1} = 1, \\
0, & \text{otherwise},
\end{cases}$$

and

$$PRE-HHB_{dt} = \begin{cases} 
1, & \text{if } HHB_{dt+1} = 1, \\
0, & \text{otherwise},
\end{cases}$$

and $TFP$ is regressed on $PRE-HS$ and $PRE-HHB$ along with control variables:

$$\ln TFP_{djr} = \tau + \chi_1 PRE-HS_{dt} + \chi_2 PRE-HHB_{dt} + \iota'C_{drt} + \varphi_j + \eta_t + \epsilon_{djr}.$$  
(27)

The reference group is now firms that remain under partnership $(HH, NON)$ in year $t+1$. Then, $\hat{\chi}_2 > \hat{\chi}_1 > 0$ if the difference in ex-ante productivity is present.

Table 5 establishes the effect of ex-ante productivity. First, switchers were on average more productive than non-switchers before switching; second, firms that eventually switched to $(HH, B)$ were on average more productive than those that eventually switched to $HS$ (the difference is statistically significant at 1% level). Notably, the average productivity difference between $$ and $(HH, NON)$ in Table 5 is approximately one fourth of that in Table 3, and the average productivity difference between $(HH, B)$ and $HS$ in Table 5 is about half of that in Table 3. That is, as expected, ex-ante productivity explains only part of the differences in measured productivity among the three partnership types.

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32 In terms of the theory, in an ideal setting, researchers study firms on date 1 (interaction and contracting). In practice, however, date 1 finishes quickly and date 2 (production) immediately follows, such that what statistical agencies observe is only date 2. This paper’s approach is to examine the change in partnership type between one date 2 and another date 2. Specifically, if a firm in partnership type $(HH, NON)$ in year $t$ switches to partnership $HS$ or $(HH, B)$ in year $t+1$, there must be a new date 1 (another interaction and contracting) that takes place between the two consecutive years. Date 1 is not documented in the data, but it is reflected in the production activity of year $t+1$. 

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21
3.3 Prevalence of exporters across partnership types

Proposition 3 says that the share of exporters in partnership HS relative to \((HH, B)\) rises if technology transfer becomes more effective \((\gamma \text{ increases})\), coordination difficulty lowers \((\mu \text{ increases})\), or dispersion of productivity diminishes \((\zeta \text{ increases})\). \(\gamma\) and \(\zeta\) are industrial characteristics. Technology complexity measured by R&D intensity reduces the effectiveness of technology transfer.\(^{33}\) A dummy variable \(HIT\ ECH\) is constructed to proxy for \(\gamma\), which equals 1 if a given firm is from a high-technology industry and 0 otherwise.\(^{34}\) \(\zeta\) reflects the productivity similarity among firms within an industry, from all firms being almost identical to all firms ranked clearly as a spectrum, and it is inversely measured by the standard deviation of \(TFP\), denoted by \(DISP\).

Unlike \(\gamma\) and \(\zeta\), \(\mu\) is primarily affected by local infrastructures and institutions. Coordination would not be an issue if the host country had infrastructures and institutions identical to those in the source country. High-quality local infrastructures facilitate cross-border coordination between Chinese producers and their source-country headquarters. Meanwhile, good local institutions, including the protection of intellectual properties and availability of legal and accounting services, are also important in providing a business-friendly environment for cross-border partnership.

This paper uses the marketization index published by the National Economic Research Institute of the China Reform Foundation as a proxy for local infrastructures across regions in China. Compiled for each province, this index, denoted by \(LOCAL\), quantitatively evaluates (1) the relationship between local government and market (e.g., tax burden and local government size), (2) the development of the local private sector (e.g., its size relative to other sectors), (3) the efficiency of local product markets (e.g., protectionism in favor of local firms), (4) the efficiency of local factor markets (e.g., financial service and labor mobility), and (5) the local legal environment and the availability of market intermediaries (e.g., intellectual property-protection, as well as the number of accountants and lawyers in the population).\(^{35}\)

\(^{33}\)Using R&D intensity as a measure of technology complexity follows the literature; e.g., Carluccio and Fally (2008), and Keller and Yeaple (2010).

\(^{34}\)The “classification of manufacturing industries based on technology” published in OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2005 (p.182) is used to distinguish high-technology industries from low-technology ones. High-technology industries in the text refer to high- and medium-high technology industries in the classification, which include (1) aircraft and spacecraft; (2) chemicals, including pharmaceuticals; (3) office, accounting and computing machinery; (4) radio, TV, and communications equipment; (5) medical, precision, and optical instruments; (6) electronic machinery and apparatus; (7) motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers; (8) railroad equipment and transport equipment; and (9) machinery and equipment, n.e.c.

\(^{35}\)The Marketization Index Report 2006 reports cross-province marketization indices for years 2001-2005,
The data are then aggregated to the industry-province-year level, and Proposition 3 is tested with the regression:

\[
\left( \frac{\sigma_{HS}}{\sigma_{HH,B}} \right)_{jrt} = \varphi_0 + \varphi_1 HITECH_j + \varphi_2 \text{DISP}_{jt} + \varphi_3 \text{LOCAL}_{rt} + \vartheta M_{jrt} + u_{jrt},
\]

(28)

where \( \sigma_{HS}/\sigma_{HH,B} \) is the number ratio of exporters in cross-border partnership relative to within-border partnership, and \( M_{jrt} \) is a set of industry- and province-level characteristics in year \( t \). Now \( j \) refers to a two-digit industry because \( HITECH \) is only available at the two-digit level; furthermore, the dependent variable has much fewer zeros at the two-digit level than at the four-digit level. A possible concern is that \( \sigma_{HS}/\sigma_{HH,B} \) is contaminated by industry composition. For instance, some industries are more labor-intensive than others; meanwhile, labor-intensive production tends to be located in China by developed-country headquarters because of low labor costs in China. To address this, capital intensity is included as a control variable. Provincial population is included as well to prevent \( \sigma_{HS}/\sigma_{HH,B} \) from being driven by the size of local economy.

The regression results are reported in Table 6. Column (1) uses the full sample and presents the OLS estimates, which are consistent with the theoretical prediction: \( \hat{\varphi}_1 < 0, \hat{\varphi}_2 < 0, \hat{\varphi}_3 > 0 \).\(^{36}\) All observations with zero-value dependent variables are dropped from the sample in column (2), and Tobit estimation is used instead in column (3), both of which point to the same findings. Lastly, the dependent variable has three dimensions: industry, province and year; therefore, there are potential province-industry autocorrelation within a year, province-year correlation within an industry, and industry-year correlation within a province. In column (4), OLS is used with the three-way clustering proposed by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008), which simultaneously controls for clustering in all three dimensions. Column (4) shows that the findings from columns (1)–(3) still hold.

### 3.4 Organizational form

Proposition 4 predicts that in cross-border partnership, producers at arm’s length have lower ex-ante productivity than those in vertical integration. Using samples of firms under partnership \( HS \), Table 7 regresses \( TFP \) on a dummy variable that equals 1 for vertical inte-

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\(^{36}\)It should be noted that \( \text{DISP} \) is the disperson of ex-post productivity rather than that of ex-ante productivity. This is not a significant concern for the following reason. \( g = (\gamma \theta)^{\mu} \), or \( \ln g = \mu \ln \gamma + \mu \ln \theta \). Notice that \( \gamma \) and \( \mu \) are included in the regression; what \( \hat{\varphi}_2 \) captures is the effect of ex-ante productivity.

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gration, and shows that vertical integration is associated with a higher average productivity than arm’s length. Column (1) includes no control variables, while column (2) includes profit margin, capital intensity, and regional population with the same rationale as in column (2) of Table 3. Both columns (1) and (2) use fixed effects while column (3) uses random effects. Columns (4)–(6) consider tax payments and EPZ/FTZ as their counterparts in Table 3. In columns (7)–(8), the regression is rerun with the subsamples of firms in apparel and electronics. All these specifications lead to the same finding.

Similar to Table 3 in section 3.2, Table 7 may capture differences between organizational forms other than ex-ante productivity. For example, the estimated productivity differences could result from technology transfer between organizational forms rather than ex-ante productivity. It should be noted that my theoretical model does predict more effective technology transfer in vertical integration than at arm’s length; however, this effect ultimately works through the influence of ex-ante productivity. Also, the estimated productivity difference in Table 7 may also result from the heterogeneity in source-country headquarters.

To address the above concerns, Table 8 follows a similar specification as Table 5, which focuses on the firms that were in partnership (HS, O) in year $t$ but switched to partnership (HS, I) in year $t + 1$; in the latter case, the dummy variable $PRE-I$ equals 1. The results show that the firms that eventually switched to partnership (HS, I) were on average more productive than nonswitchers before integration, which cannot be explained by the differences in technology transfer or source-country headquarters. This lends strong support to the effect of ex-ante productivity on the choice of organizational form. Quantitatively, ex-ante productivity explains about 70% of the productivity premium of vertical integration relative to arm’s length.\(^{37}\)

### 3.5 Nonparametric results

Proposition 1 rationalizes the relationship between ex-ante productivity and partnership type, and Proposition 2 provides a simple version of Proposition 1 that is easy to test parametrically. Similarly, Proposition 4(iii) demonstrates the relationship between ex-ante productivity and organizational form, and Proposition 4(iv) provides a simple version for parametrical testing. It should be noted that Propositions 1 and 4(iii) hold for any productivity level across the spectrum rather than only in terms of parameters (e.g., mean and median). In order to test these propositions without resorting to parameters, a relative

\(^{37}\)The coefficients of $PRE-I$ in Table 8 are not as significant as 1% because of the small number of switchers in the data (58 out of 7358), so caution is needed in interpreting their magnitudes.
distribution function is now employed to compare the distribution of productivity across partnership types and organizational forms.

Supposing that two groups, represented by two axes in the four panels of Figure 5, have the same distribution of TFP. Then, the blue curve, i.e., the relative cumulative density function, will coincide with the diagonal. If the group represented by the vertical axis has a TFP distribution that stochastically dominates the TFP distribution of the group represented by the horizontal axis, the blue curve will fall beneath the diagonal.38 The upper-left, upper-right, lower-left, and lower-right panels, respectively, present TFP comparisons

38Jann (2008) discusses the relative-distribution method in economics.
of partnership types \((HH, NON)\) vs. \((HS, O)\) vs. \((HS, I)\), \((HS, O)\) vs. \((HH, B)\), and \((HS, I)\) vs. \((HH, B)\). Clearly, the productivity of \((HH, NON)\) is stochastically dominated by \((HS, O)\) by \((HS, I)\), and \((HS)\) by \((HH, B)\), all in line with the results using parametric methods as shown above. I now turn to some concluding remarks.

4 Concluding Remarks

This paper provides a theory of the interaction between headquarters and producers in a world of globalized production. Specifically, it addresses what types of foreign producers are serving developed countries. There are two types of these foreign producers. The first type has mid-range productivity and works with developed-country headquarters, while the second type has high productivity and partners with local headquarters. The former does not serve its local market, while the latter serves both local and developed-country markets.

The theory also predicts that cross-border partnership is more prevalent in the industries with more transferable technologies and less heterogeneous producers, as well as in the regions with higher quality infrastructures and institutions, and that in cross-border partnership, foreign-country producers with relatively high productivity are vertically integrated with their headquarters, while those with relatively low productivity operate at arm’s length with their headquarters. These predictions are supported by firm-level evidence from China.

There are at least two important directions for future research. The first is to examine the dynamic aspects of the model. For instance, an advanced technology in the developed country, once transferred to a foreign producer, may carry over to that producer’s future partnership with its local headquarter. This provides the foreign producer and the developed-country headquarter incentive and disincentive, respectively, to undertake cross-border partnership. The second is to consider general-equilibrium effects in the model. For instance, technology transfer may drive up factor prices in the foreign country, which forces the least productive foreign producers to exit; therefore, the foreign country gains from improved aggregate productivity.

References


A. Derivations and proofs

A.1. Derivation of profit functions

Under partnership \((HH, NON)\), \(p_H = \left(\frac{\Phi_H}{\gamma_{HH,NON}}\right)^{1-\alpha}\), so \(R_{HH,NON} = p_H y_{HH,NON} = \Phi_H^{1-\alpha} y_{HH,NON} = \Phi_{HH}^{1-\alpha}(\theta x_{HH,NON})^\alpha\). The profit is \(R_{HH,NON} = cx_{HH,NON}\), the first order condition of which
shows $x_{HH, NON} = \alpha R_{HH, NON}$. Plugging $x_{HH, NON}$ back to $R_{HH, NON} = \Phi^{1-\alpha}_H(\theta x_{HH, NON})^\alpha$, I get $R_{HH, NON} = \Phi_H \theta^{\frac{\alpha}{\Gamma(\alpha)}} (\frac{\alpha}{c})^{\frac{\alpha}{\Gamma(\alpha)}}$. The profit function is

$$R_{HH, NON} - cx_{HH, NON}$$

$$= R_{HH, NON} - c \frac{\alpha R_{HH, NON}}{c}$$

$$= (1 - \alpha) R_{HH, NON}$$

$$= (1 - \alpha) \Phi_H \theta^{\frac{\alpha}{\Gamma(\alpha)}} (\frac{\alpha}{c})^{\frac{\alpha}{\Gamma(\alpha)}} \equiv \Psi \Phi_H \Theta.$$ 

The case of partnership $SS$ is similar.

Under partnership $HS$, $p_S = (\frac{\Phi_S}{y_{HS}})^{1-\alpha}$, so $R_{HS} = p_S y_{HS} = \Phi_S^{1-\alpha} y_{HS}^\alpha = \Phi_S^{1-\alpha} (\gamma^\mu \theta^\mu x_{HS})^\alpha$. The profit is $R_{HS} - cx_{HS}$, the first order condition of which shows $x_{HS} = \frac{\alpha R_{HS}}{c}$. Plugging $x_{HS}$ back to $R_{HS} = \Phi_S^{1-\alpha} (\gamma^\mu \theta^\mu x_{HS})^\alpha$, I get $R_{HS} = \Phi_S \gamma^{\frac{\alpha}{\Gamma(\alpha)}} \theta^{\frac{\alpha}{\Gamma(\alpha)}} (\frac{\alpha}{c})^{\frac{\alpha}{\Gamma(\alpha)}}$. The profit function is

$$R_{HS} - cx_{HS}$$

$$= R_{HS} - c \frac{\alpha R_{HS}}{c}$$

$$= (1 - \alpha) R_{HS}$$

$$= (1 - \alpha) \Phi_S \gamma^{\frac{\alpha}{\Gamma(\alpha)}} \theta^{\frac{\alpha}{\Gamma(\alpha)}} (\frac{\alpha}{c})^{\frac{\alpha}{\Gamma(\alpha)}} \equiv \Psi \Phi_S \Gamma \Theta.$$

Under partnership $(HH, B)$, $p_B = (\frac{\Phi_B}{y_{HH,B,H}})^{1-\alpha}$, $p_S = (\frac{\Phi_S}{y_{HH,B,S}})^{1-\alpha}$, then

$$R_{HH,B} = R_{HH,B,H} + R_{HH,B,S} = p_B y_{HH,B,H} + p_S y_{HH,B,S}$$

$$= \Phi_H^{1-\alpha} (\theta x_{HH,B,H})^\alpha + \Phi_S^{1-\alpha} (\theta x_{HH,B,S})^\alpha.$$ 

The profit is $R_{HH,B} - cx_{HH,B,H} - cx_{HH,B,S}$, the first order condition of which shows $x_{HH,B,H} = \frac{\alpha R_{HH,B,H}}{c}$, $x_{HH,B,S} = \frac{\alpha R_{HH,B,S}}{c}$. Plugging $x_{HH,B,H}$ and $x_{HH,B,S}$ back to $R_{HH,B,H} = \Phi_H^{1-\alpha} (\theta x_{HH,B,H})^\alpha$ and $R_{HH,B,S} = \Phi_S^{1-\alpha} (\theta x_{HH,B,S})^\alpha$, respectively, I get $R_{HH,B,H} = \Phi_H \theta^{\frac{\alpha}{\Gamma(\alpha)}} (\frac{\alpha}{c})^{\frac{\alpha}{\Gamma(\alpha)}}$, $R_{HH,B,S} =$
\[ \Phi_S \theta^{\frac{\alpha}{c} \left( \frac{c}{\alpha} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{c}}} \] The profit function is
\[ R_{HH,B} - cx_{HH,B,H} - cx_{HH,B,S} - f_{EX} \]
\[ = R_{HH,B,H} + R_{HH,B,S} - cR_{HH,B,H} - cR_{HH,B,S} - f_{EX} \]
\[ = (1 - \alpha)R_{HH,B,H} + (1 - \alpha)R_{HH,B,S} - f_{EX} \]
\[ = (1 - \alpha)(\Phi_H + \Phi_S)\theta^{\frac{\alpha}{c} \left( \frac{c}{\alpha} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{c}}} - f_{EX} \]
\[ = \Psi(\Phi_H + \Phi_S)\Theta - f_{EX}. \]

A.2. The proof of Lemma 1

Define
\[ \Lambda(\Theta) \equiv \pi_{HS}(\Theta) - \pi_{HH}(\Theta) - \tilde{\pi} \]
\[ = \Psi \Phi_S \Gamma^\mu - \Psi \Phi_H \Theta - \tilde{\Psi} \Phi_S \tilde{\Theta}. \]

By condition (11),
\[ \Gamma > \frac{\Psi \Phi_H \Theta^* + \tilde{\Psi} \Phi_S \tilde{\Theta}}{\Psi \Phi_S \Theta^\mu}, \]
so \( \Lambda(\Theta^*) > 0 \). If \( \Theta \) is sufficiently large, so \( \Lambda(\Theta) < 0 \); if \( \Theta \to 0 \), \( \Lambda(\Theta) < 0 \) so there exist two values respectively \((0, \Theta^*)\) and \((\Theta^*, \infty)\) at which \( \Lambda(\Theta) = 0 \). Denote them by \( \underline{\Theta} \) and \( \overline{\Theta} \), respectively. Then, any \( \Theta \in (\underline{\Theta}, \overline{\Theta}) \) satisfies \( \pi_{HS}(\Theta) - \pi_{HH}(\Theta) - \tilde{\pi} > 0 \) (part (ii) proved).

QED.

A.3. The proof of Lemma 2

The “if” part is obvious, as condition (13) is stricter than condition (12). The “only if” part is equivalent to this claim: if \( \Theta \not\in (\underline{\Theta}, \overline{\Theta}) \), condition (12) fails. The proof is as follows. Define \( \Theta^* \) such that \( \pi_{HS}(\Theta^*) - \tilde{\pi} = 0 \).

**Case 1:** \( \Theta \in (0, \Theta^*] \). Since \( d\pi_{HS}(\Theta)/d\Theta > 0 \) for any \( \Theta \in \mathbb{R}^+, \pi_{HS}(\Theta^*) - \tilde{\pi} < 0 \), so \( \pi_{HS}(\Theta) - \pi_{HH}^X(\Theta) - \tilde{\pi} < 0 \).

**Case 2:** \( \Theta \in (\Theta^*, \overline{\Theta}] \). By Lemma 1, \( \pi_{HS}(\Theta) - \pi_{HH,non}(\Theta) - \tilde{\pi} < 0 \); however, \( \pi_{HS}(\Theta) - \pi_{HH,non}^X(\Theta) - \tilde{\pi} \) can be positive if \( \pi_{HH}^X(\Theta) < \pi_{HH}(\Theta) \). If \( \pi_{HS}(\Theta) - \pi_{HH,non}^X(\Theta) - \tilde{\pi} > 0 \), it is profitable for \( Z_S \) to choose \( X_H \) instead of \( X_S \). To get \( X_H, Z_S \) can offer \( X_H \) any profit transfer \( T_{ZS}(\Theta) \in [0, \pi_{HS}(\Theta) - \tilde{\pi}] \); but, \( X_H \) will bid up any \( T_{ZS}(\Theta) \) by \( T_{ZH}(\Theta) = T_{ZS}(\Theta) + \varepsilon \).
where $\varepsilon$ is a slightly positive value, because $\pi^{Z_H}(\Theta) = \pi_{H,H,N} \Theta - (\pi_{H}(\Theta) - \bar{\pi} + \varepsilon) = -(\pi_{H}(\Theta) - \pi_{H,H,N}(\Theta) - \bar{\pi}) - \varepsilon > 0$; then, $Z_S$ will further bid up by $T^{Z_H}(\Theta) + \varepsilon'$ in return. The only equilibrium is when $Z_H$ offers $T^{Z_H}(\Theta) = \pi_{H,S}(\Theta) - \bar{\pi}$, $Z_H$ has no incentive to change because its reservation profit is zero, and $Z_S$ has no incentive to bid up further. That is, $\pi^{X_H}(\Theta) = \pi_{H,S}(\Theta) - \bar{\pi}$, so $\pi_{H,S}(\Theta) - \pi_{H,H,N}(\Theta) - \bar{\pi} = \pi_{H,S}(\Theta) - \pi_{H,S}(\Theta) + \bar{\pi} - \bar{\pi} = 0$.

**Case 3:** $\Theta \in [\bar{\Theta}, \infty)$. Similar to Case 2, the only equilibrium is when $Z_H$ offers $T^{Z_H}(\Theta) = \pi_{H,S}(\Theta) - \bar{\pi}$. That is, $\pi^{X_H}(\Theta) = \pi_{H,S}(\Theta) - \bar{\pi}$, so $\pi_{H,S}(\Theta) - \pi^{X_H}(\Theta) - \bar{\pi} = \pi_{H,S}(\Theta) - \pi_{H,S}(\Theta) + \bar{\pi} - \bar{\pi} = 0$. QED.

### A.4. The proof of Proposition 3

Notice that $\sigma_{H,S}/\sigma_{H,H,B} = [V(\Theta) - V(\Theta)]/[1 - V(\Theta)]$.

**Parts (i) and (ii).** The goal is to show $\frac{\partial \sigma}{\partial \gamma} > 0$, $\frac{\partial \sigma}{\partial \mu} > 0$, $\frac{\partial \sigma}{\partial \gamma} < 0$, and $\frac{\partial \sigma}{\partial \mu} < 0$.

At $\bar{\Theta}$, define $\Xi = \pi_{H,S}(\bar{\Theta}) - \pi_{H,H,B}(\bar{\Theta}) - \bar{\pi} = 0$. By implicit function theorem,

$$\frac{d \Xi}{d \gamma} = -\frac{\frac{\partial \Xi}{\partial \Theta}}{\frac{\partial \Theta}{\partial \gamma}} = -\frac{\frac{d \pi_{H,S}(\bar{\Theta})}{d \gamma}}{\frac{d \pi_{H,S}(\bar{\Theta})}{d \gamma} - \frac{d \pi_{H,H,B}(\bar{\Theta})}{d \gamma}},$$

$$\frac{d \Xi}{d \mu} = -\frac{\frac{\partial \Xi}{\partial \Theta}}{\frac{\partial \Theta}{\partial \mu}} = -\frac{\frac{d \pi_{H,S}(\bar{\Theta})}{d \mu}}{\frac{d \pi_{H,S}(\bar{\Theta})}{d \mu} - \frac{d \pi_{H,H,B}(\bar{\Theta})}{d \mu}}.$$

Note that $\frac{d \pi_{H,S}(\bar{\Theta})}{d \gamma} - \frac{d \pi_{H,B}(\bar{\Theta})}{d \Theta} < 0$, $\frac{d \pi_{H,S}(\bar{\Theta})}{d \gamma} > 0$, and $\frac{d \pi_{H,S}(\bar{\Theta})}{d \mu} > 0$, so $\frac{\partial \sigma}{\partial \gamma} < 0$, $\frac{\partial \sigma}{\partial \mu} > 0$.

At $\Theta$, define $\Xi' = \pi_{H,S}(\bar{\Theta}) - \pi_{H,H,N}(\bar{\Theta}) - \bar{\pi} = 0$. Then,

$$\frac{d \Xi}{d \gamma} = -\frac{\frac{\partial \Xi}{\partial \Theta}}{\frac{\partial \Theta}{\partial \gamma}} = -\frac{\frac{d \pi_{H,S}(\bar{\Theta})}{d \gamma}}{\frac{d \pi_{H,S}(\bar{\Theta})}{d \gamma} - \frac{d \pi_{H,H,N}(\bar{\Theta})}{d \gamma}},$$

$$\frac{d \Xi}{d \mu} = -\frac{\frac{\partial \Xi}{\partial \Theta}}{\frac{\partial \Theta}{\partial \mu}} = -\frac{\frac{d \pi_{H,S}(\bar{\Theta})}{d \mu}}{\frac{d \pi_{H,S}(\bar{\Theta})}{d \mu} - \frac{d \pi_{H,H,N}(\bar{\Theta})}{d \mu}}.$$

Note that $\frac{d \pi_{H,S}(\bar{\Theta})}{d \gamma} - \frac{d \pi_{H,H,N}(\bar{\Theta})}{d \Theta} > 0$, $\frac{d \pi_{H,S}(\bar{\Theta})}{d \gamma} > 0$, and $\frac{d \pi_{H,S}(\bar{\Theta})}{d \mu} > 0$, so $\frac{\partial \sigma}{\partial \gamma} < 0$, and $\frac{\partial \sigma}{\partial \mu} < 0$.

**Part (iii).** $\sigma_{H,S} = 1 - (\Theta/\bar{\Theta})^\zeta$, $\Theta < \bar{\Theta}$, so $\frac{d \sigma_{H,S}}{d \zeta} > 0$. Similarly, $\frac{d \sigma_{H,H,B}}{d \zeta} < 0$. QED.
B. Details on the data

The primary data source is the Annual Surveys of Industrial Production from 2000 through 2003 conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. These survey data are proprietary.

Each firm in the survey has an ID number. There are about 10 duplicate IDs in each year, and I dropped these observations. The dataset for the years 2000-2004 has 162,869, 169,017, 181,545, and 196,206 observations, respectively. Then, data for all years are merged by ID number. Further data cleaning takes three steps. First, firms outside manufacturing industries (four-digit industry code <1311 or >4392) are dropped, which reduces the sample size by 60,415. Second, firms that are not in normal operation (i.e., status code does not equal 1) are dropped, which reduces the sample size by 16,141. Third, observations with wrong industry and area codes are also dropped, which reduces the sample size by about 140.

My study focuses on domestically owned firms (registration type code <200) that export some or all of their outputs, and foreign-owned firms (registration type codes: 230 and 330) that export all of their outputs. Keeping these firms only, my working dataset has 512,832 observations. I then drop the firms that are present only once in the four-year time span, because their productivity cannot be estimated using the Levinsohn-Petrin method. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table S1. The within-border partnership serving the Chinese market only, within-border partnership serving both markets, cross-border partnership at arm’s length, and cross-border partnership in vertical integration have 338,532, 64,335, 15,845, and 14,107 observations, respectively.

C. Supplementary results

Section 3 of the paper regresses TFP on either partnership types or organizational forms. This approach is useful because of its simplicity in estimating productivity differences among the three partnership types or between the two organizational forms. The alternative specification, i.e., regressing partnership on TFP, is more intuitive as it suggests how productivity predicts the choices between partnership types or organizational forms.

Table S2 estimates a multinomial logit model. The dependent variable is partnership type: within-border partnership serving the Chinese market only (0), cross-border partnership (1), and within-border partnership serving both Chinese and overseas market (2). They
are respectively linked to partnerships \((HH, NON)\), \(HS\), and \((HH, B)\) in the text. The reference group is \((HH, NON)\). Columns (1)–(2) show that producers with higher productivity have a higher probability of choosing partnership \(HS\) relative to \((HH, NON)\), and an even higher probability of choosing partnership \((HH, B)\) relative to \((HH, NON)\). Control variables are as in the text. Also as in the text, columns (3)–(4) include tax payment as an additional control variable, and columns (5)–(6) and (7)–(8) consider the apparel industry and the electronics industry. All columns lead to the same finding.

**Table S3** uses the same specification as Table S2 but employs an ordered logit model. The theoretical model suggests that \(HS\) is a better choice for producers that are qualified for \((HH, NON)\) and have sufficiently high productivity; similarly, \((HH, B)\) is a better choice for producers that are qualified for \(HS\) and have sufficiently high productivity. Thus, I order the three partnerships as 0, 1, 2, and examine whether productivity premium in the form of “upgrade probability” is present between the three partnership types. As expected, productivity has a positive and significant coefficient in all columns.

**Table S4** uses a logit model to examine the choice between organizational forms under cross-border partnership: arm’s length (0) and vertical integration (1). Its structure is similar to Table 7 and Table S2. Notably, the magnitude of the productivity increase associated with productivity is smaller in column (4) than in column (3). This is possibly because productivity heterogeneity becomes less significant in industries with a comparative disadvantage. Specifically, China has a comparative disadvantage in industries with high sophistication, such as electronics. Therefore, the productivity dispersion of Chinese electronics firms is smaller than average, and the productivity difference across organizational forms becomes smaller.
### Table 1: Theoretical and Empirical Partnership Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partnership Types &amp; Organizational Forms</th>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>Sales</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(HH, NON)</td>
<td>domestic</td>
<td>domestic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(HH, B)</td>
<td>domestic</td>
<td>domestic and overseas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(HS,I)</td>
<td>overseas</td>
<td>overseas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(HS,O)</td>
<td>domestic</td>
<td>overseas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2: Shares of Different Partnership Types and Organizational Forms in Exporters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partnership HS</th>
<th>Arm's length (HS,O)</th>
<th>Vertical integration (HS,I)</th>
<th>Partnership (HH,B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>11.20%</td>
<td>10.70%</td>
<td>28.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>12.20%</td>
<td>13.30%</td>
<td>28.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>11.30%</td>
<td>13.90%</td>
<td>29.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>11.70%</td>
<td>13.40%</td>
<td>31.10%</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Table 3: Productivity across Partnerships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cross-border partnership (HS dummy)</td>
<td>0.223***</td>
<td>0.207***</td>
<td>0.205***</td>
<td>0.203***</td>
<td>0.198***</td>
<td>0.192***</td>
<td>0.108***</td>
<td>0.267***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within-border partnership &amp; serving both markets</td>
<td>0.357***</td>
<td>0.352***</td>
<td>0.352***</td>
<td>0.335***</td>
<td>0.301***</td>
<td>0.348***</td>
<td>0.205***</td>
<td>0.379***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(HHB dummy)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specification</td>
<td>FE</td>
<td>FE</td>
<td>RE</td>
<td>FE</td>
<td>FE</td>
<td>FE</td>
<td>FE</td>
<td>FE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Special Zones</td>
<td>Non-Special Zones</td>
<td>Apparel</td>
<td>Electronics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control vars.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, with tax</td>
<td>Yes, with tax</td>
<td>Yes, with tax</td>
<td>Yes, with tax</td>
<td>Yes, with tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t-test [p-value]</td>
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<td>[0.00]</td>
<td>[0.00]</td>
<td>[0.00]</td>
<td>[0.00]</td>
<td>[0.00]</td>
<td>[0.00]</td>
<td>[0.00]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of obs.</td>
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<td>376,390</td>
<td>376,390</td>
<td>376,390</td>
<td>130,337</td>
<td>246,053</td>
<td>12,640</td>
<td>18,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of inds.</td>
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<td>752</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable is TFP calculated with Levinsohn-Petrin estimates. Firms undertaking within-border partnership and serving the Chinese market only, i.e., (HH,NON), is the reference group. Control variables are profit margin, capital intensity, and regional population. Industry (four-digit) and year fixed effects are controlled for in columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(8), while random effects are used in column (3). Columns (4)-(8) include tax payment as an additional control variable. Columns (5)-(6) use subsamples of firms located where there are special zones, including export-promotion zones (EPZs) and free trade zones (FTZs); see text for details. Columns (7) and (8) use subsamples of firms in two-digit industries apparel and electronics, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The t-test examines if the coefficients of the two dummy variables are equal (H0: equal). “No. of inds.” reports the number of four-digit industries in the used sample. Constant term is suppressed. *, significant at 10%; **, significant at 5%; ***, significant at 1%.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-border partnership</td>
<td>0.184***</td>
<td>0.138***</td>
<td>0.131***</td>
<td>0.143***</td>
<td>0.153***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within-border partnership</td>
<td>0.240***</td>
<td>0.226***</td>
<td>0.278***</td>
<td>0.345***</td>
<td>0.387***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&amp; serving both markets</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.202</td>
<td>0.234</td>
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<td>376,390</td>
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<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pseudo R^2</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable is TFP calculated with Levinsohn-Petrin estimates. Firms undertaking within-border partnership and serving the Chinese market only, i.e., (HH,NON), is the reference group. The five columns use five different quantiles. The row “difference” reports the differences between the coefficients of the two dummy variables. Control variables are profit margin, capital intensity, and regional population. Two-digit industry fixed effect is controlled for in all columns, and “No. of inds.” reports the number of two-digit industries in the used sample. Constant term is suppressed. *, significant at 10%; **, significant at 5%; ***, significant at 1%.
Table 5: Partnership Switchers and Ex-ante Productivity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.057***</td>
<td>0.059***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy: would switch to cross-border partnership (PRE-HS)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy: would switch to within-border partnership and serving two markets (PRE-HHB)</td>
<td>0.196***</td>
<td>0.195***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Control vars. No Yes

t-test [p-value] [0.00] [0.00]

No. of obs. 334,469 334,469

No. of inds. 750 750

R^2 0.01 0.02

Notes: The dependent variable is TFP calculated with Levinsohn-Petrin estimates. The firms that remain under partnership (HH,NON) in the surveyed periods is the reference group. See text for details on the two dummy variables. Control variables are profit margin, capital intensity, and regional population. Industry (four-digit) and year fixed effects are controlled for in column (2). Robust standard errors in parentheses. The t-test examines if the coefficients of two dummy variables are equal (H0: equal). “No. of inds.” reports the number of four-digit industries in the used sample. Constant term is suppressed. *, significant at 10%; **, significant at 5%; ***, significant at 1%.
Table 6: Technology Intensity, Productivity Dispersion, and Local Infrastructures and Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HITECH</td>
<td>-0.782***</td>
<td>-1.488***</td>
<td>-1.088**</td>
<td>-0.782**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.173)</td>
<td>(0.300)</td>
<td>(0.450)</td>
<td>(0.397)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISP</td>
<td>-0.306***</td>
<td>-0.618**</td>
<td>-3.535***</td>
<td>-0.306**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.247)</td>
<td>(0.563)</td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INST</td>
<td>0.470***</td>
<td>0.620***</td>
<td>2.073***</td>
<td>0.470**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td>(0.234)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>OLS/full sample</th>
<th>Nonzero</th>
<th>Tobit</th>
<th>Three-way cluster</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of obs.</td>
<td>2062</td>
<td>1044</td>
<td>2062</td>
<td>2062</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of the number of firm undertaking cross-border partnership (HS) to that of firms undertaking within-border partnership and serving both markets (HH,B) at the industry-province-year level. HITECH is an industry-level dummy variable for high technology intensity. DISP is an industry-year-level measure of productivity dispersion. INST is a province-level measure of local institutional quality. See text for details on these measures. Control variables are capital intensity and provincial population. Column (1) uses the full sample and regular OLS estimation. Column (2) excludes observations where the dependent variable equals 0. Column (3) uses Tobit instead of OLS estimation. Column (4) uses three-way clustering; see text for details. Constant term is suppressed. *, significant at 10%; **, significant at 5%; ***, significant at 1%.
Table 7: Productivity across Organizational Forms in Cross-Border Partnership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dummy: vertical integration</td>
<td>0.139***</td>
<td>0.136***</td>
<td>0.139***</td>
<td>0.133***</td>
<td>0.124***</td>
<td>0.115***</td>
<td>0.113***</td>
<td>0.129***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specification</td>
<td>FE</td>
<td>FE</td>
<td>RE</td>
<td>FE</td>
<td>FE</td>
<td>FE</td>
<td>FE</td>
<td>FE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Special</td>
<td>Zones</td>
<td>Non-Special Zones</td>
<td>Apparel Electronics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control vars.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>with tax</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>with tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of obs.</td>
<td>376,390</td>
<td>376,390</td>
<td>376,390</td>
<td>376,390</td>
<td>130,337</td>
<td>246,053</td>
<td>12,640</td>
<td>18,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of inds.</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R^2</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable is TFP calculated with Levinsohn-Petrin estimates. All firms are in cross-border partnership. Producers at arm’s length (HS,O) is the reference group. Control variables are profit margin, capital intensity, and regional population. Industry (four-digit) and year fixed effects are controlled for in columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(8), while random effects are used in column (3). Columns (4)-(8) include tax as an additional control variable. Columns (5)-(6) use subsamples of firms located where there are special zones, namely either export-promotion zones (EPZs) or free trade zones (FTZs); see Section 3.2 for details on them. Columns (7) and (8) use subsamples of firms in two-digit industries apparel and electronics, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. “No. of inds.” reports the number of four-digit industries in the used sample. Constant term is suppressed. *, significant at 10%; **, significant at 5%; ***, significant at 1%.
Table 8: Organizational-Form Switchers and Ex-ante Productivity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dummy: would switch to integration</td>
<td>0.110*</td>
<td>0.098**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control vars.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t-test [p-value]</td>
<td>[0.00]</td>
<td>[0.00]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of obs.</td>
<td>7358</td>
<td>7358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of inds.</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R^2</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable is TFP calculated with Levinsohn-Petrin estimates. The firms that remain under organizational form (HS,O) in the surveyed periods is the reference group. Control variables are profit margin, capital intensity, and regional population. Industry (four-digit) and year fixed effects are controlled for in column (2). Robust standard errors in parentheses. “No. of inds.” reports the number of four-digit industries in the used sample. Constant term is suppressed. *, significant at 10%; **, significant at 5%; ***, significant at 1%.
Table S1: Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>432819</td>
<td>312.1014</td>
<td>1176.646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exported value</td>
<td>432819</td>
<td>7893.862</td>
<td>104344.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit</td>
<td>432819</td>
<td>2143.871</td>
<td>35735.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed assets</td>
<td>432819</td>
<td>26536.57</td>
<td>303054.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>432819</td>
<td>55765.27</td>
<td>417282.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediates</td>
<td>432819</td>
<td>43643.36</td>
<td>329399.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax payment</td>
<td>432819</td>
<td>112.9358</td>
<td>1414.343</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table S2: Multinomial Logit Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>With Tax Included</th>
<th>Apparel</th>
<th>Electronics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HS (HH,B)</td>
<td>HS (HH,B)</td>
<td>HS (HH,B)</td>
<td>HS (HH,B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productivity</td>
<td>0.715***</td>
<td>1.402***</td>
<td>0.804***</td>
<td>1.282***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>0.778***</td>
<td>1.261***</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of obs.</td>
<td>376390</td>
<td>376390</td>
<td>376390</td>
<td>12640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>376390</td>
<td>12640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12640</td>
<td>18107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12640</td>
<td>18107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable is partnership type: 0 (HH,NON), 1 (HS), and (HH,B). See text for their definitions. Productivity is measured by TFP calculated using Levinsohn-Petrin estimates. Control variables are profit margin, capital intensity, and regional population. Columns (1)-(2) are the baseline results. Columns (3)-(4) include tax payments as an additional control variable. Columns (5)-(6) and (7)-(8) use subsamples of firms in two-digit industries apparel and electronics, respectively. Constant term is suppressed. ***, significant at 1%.
Table S3: Partnership Choice, Ordered Logit Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Productivity</td>
<td>1.213***</td>
<td>1.083***</td>
<td>1.003***</td>
<td>1.319***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of obs.</td>
<td>376390</td>
<td>376390</td>
<td>12640</td>
<td>18107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable is partnership type: 0 (HH,NON), 1 (HS), and (HH,B). See text for their definitions. Productivity is measured by TFP calculated using Levinsohn-Petrin estimates. Control variables are profit margin, capital intensity, and regional population. Column (1) is the baseline result. Column (2) includes tax payments as an additional control variable. Columns (3) and (4) use subsamples of firms in two-digit industries apparel and electronics, respectively. Constant term is suppressed. ***, significant at 1%.

Table S4: Organizational Form Choice, Logit Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Productivity</td>
<td>0.306***</td>
<td>0.309***</td>
<td>0.340***</td>
<td>0.143***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>22016</td>
<td>22016</td>
<td>3888</td>
<td>1282</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable is the organization form of cross-border production: 0 (HS,O) and 1 (HS,I). See text for their definitions. Productivity is measured by TFP calculated using Levinsohn-Petrin estimates. Marginal effects are reported. Control variables are profit margin, capital intensity, and regional population. Column (1) is the baseline result. Column (2) includes tax payments as an additional control variable. Columns (3) and (4) use subsamples of firms in two-digit industries apparel and electronics, respectively. Constant term is suppressed. ***, significant at 1%.