

April 2008

LUTHER AND SULEYMAN

Murat Iyigun
University of Colorado
CID at Harvard University
Institute for the Study of Labor, *IZA*

SUPPLEMENTARY RESULTS & TABLES

S.1. Results with Lagged Explanatory Variables

Some of the results using lagged explanatory variables are shown in Tables S.1 through S.4. These estimates are not only in line with those reported in the paper but also consistently stronger statistically. The lagged number of conflicts Ottomans were engaged in continental Europe, $OTTOMAN_{t-1}$, comes in with a negative and statistically significant sign in all six estimates shown in Table S.1. Interestingly, the estimates of the impact of Ottoman engagements elsewhere and at home, $OTHEROTTOMAN_{t-1}$, now come in with the expected positive sign and are significant at the 10 percent confidence level or higher in four of the six specifications. Note once more that the impact of Ottomans on intra-European conflict was waning over time, with the $OTTOMAN$ and $TIME$ interaction entering positively and significantly in all specifications. And, as before, the Ottoman population level, $OTTOPOP$, enters positively and significantly in all three specifications in which it is utilized.

As shown in the final two columns of the table, the estimates using the *religiously-driven* intra-European conflicts grew stronger using the lagged explanatory variables too.¹ And, although I have chosen not to report them here, the lagged explanatory variables worked quite well for the 1520 to 1651 *Protestant-Catholic conflicts* when I used a linear time trend: the lengthiest specification produced a statistically significant negative coefficient (of -1.19), while the two more parsimonious estimates produced insignificant but negative coefficients in the range of those shown in columns (4) and (5) of Table 3 and with p-values of 14 and 12 percent, respectively. When I used a non-linear time trend for these conflicts, instead, I did not get significant results, although all three specifications yielded negative coefficients on $OTTOMAN$.

Results using alternative timespans are shown in Tables S.2 through S.4. They are generally in line with those shown in Table S.1.

S.2. Instrumental Variable (2SLS) Estimates

Given the unique history of the Ottomans, we can employ various instrumental variable (*IV*) techniques in order to address the potential endogeneity of the empire's military campaigns. In particular, a widely shared view among historians is that the Ottomans were motivated by the *Gaza ideology*, at least during the empire's early era running through the end of the 16th century. According to this ideology, the empire steadily

¹Columns (5) and (6) of Table S.1 show the analogs of the estimates in columns (2) and (3) of Table 3 of the paper. But even the most parsimonious specification, not shown in Table S.1, produced a coefficient of -1.17 on $OTTOMAN_{t-1}$ at the 5 percent confidence level.

looked westward for expansion driven by religious motives.² Nonetheless, the Ottoman sultans varied in their propensity to not only target Europe as opposed to the east, but also undertake military conquests in general. For instance, the comparisons between Mehmed II (the Conqueror), Selim I (the Grim), and Suleyman I (the Magnificent) on the one hand, and Murad II and Beyazid II on the other are quite illuminating in this regard. To be specific, the succession of sultans had quite often different policies towards waging wars. These were not due to sudden shifts in the empire's priorities, but were attributable to the Sultan's personalities and preferences.

For our purposes, it is quite convenient that Ottoman successions were highly random and the rulers' reign varied in length considerably (e.g., Selim I reigned for only eight years, whereas Suleyman I remained at the helm for 46 years). In short, while we would expect the identity and length of the reign of each sultan to influence the patterns of Ottomans' military activities, it is not too likely that reverse causality would exist from the frequency of European conflicts to the duration of the reign of a sultan or their identities (more on which below).

Along similar lines, it is possible to construct two other alternative instruments. First, each sultan ascended the throne at a different age and this was highly random too (e.g., Mehmed II was only twelve when his father Murad II abdicated the throne, only to return within two years at the behest of his son and stay sultan for another seven years; Selim II was 42 when his father, Suleyman I died). Hence, it is plausible that the sultan's age at ascendancy potentially influenced the propensity of the empire to engage in conflict, but it was orthogonal to the intensity of intra-European confrontations.

Last but not least, we also have some fairly reliable information on the ethnicity of sultans' mothers on the basis of which we can classify the rulers according to whether

²*Gaza* was originally articulated by the Arabs and later refined and modified by the Ottoman Turks to suit their geopolitical purposes. As analyzed by Paul Wittek and noted by Kafadar (1996, p. 11) "what fueled the energies of the early Ottoman conquerors was essentially their commitment to *Gaza*, an 'ideology of Holy War' in the name of Islam. Ottoman power was built on that commitment..."

It is at least partly implicit in this reasoning that the Ottomans' resounding military successes throughout the 16th century made them less concerned with intra-European developments in formulating their conquests strategies. In fact, one can review and classify the data at hand to see if this thesis has any merit. Doing so reveals that, of the 79 Ottoman-European military conflicts, 55 were historically documented to be initiated by the Ottomans (roughly about 70 percent), but only 18 out of 48 of the Ottomans confrontations with other sovereigns and elsewhere were instigated by the empire itself (about 38 percent). [There are only a few cases where border skirmishes prior to conflict itself make it harder to assess how the confrontation began; otherwise such a classification attempt turned out to be a fairly straightforward exercise.] Even more remarkable is the fact that most of the Ottomans' European ventures were front-loaded: in the period between 1450 and 1550, Ottomans engaged Europeans in 37 conflicts: Of those, 32 were begun with some Ottoman initiative (over 85 percent).

they had an ethnic Turkish lineage or a European one.³ While the influence of the Imperial Harem on the empire’s policies varied, it is quite well established that at times it wielded considerable power. Various historians have suggested that the members of the Harem with different ethnic backgrounds often lobbied the Sultan to influence the geography of Ottoman conquests.⁴ And the highest member of the Harem hierarchy was generally the *Valide Sultan*, the queen mother.

The validity of each of these three instruments would be questionable if the intensity of intra-European conflicts (a) had a bearing on who among the Sultan’s sons ascended the throne, with higher intra-European strife playing a role in the selection of a sultan who is more accommodating toward Europe; (b) had an effect on the age at which sultans acceded power; and (c) influenced the ethnic maternal background of the Sultan. While there might be some arguments to make about how there could be spillovers from European political turmoil to Ottoman instability, thereby making (b) a bit more likely, it is more of a stretch to come up with such reasoning to validate (a) or (c).

The main drawback of relying on whether mothers’ ethnic lineage was Turkish or not is that identification requires extending the analysis period to cover the earlier years between 1401 and 1450 (i.e., between 1450 and 1700, the only sultan with a Turkish maternal background was Selim I). In fact, neither of the parsimonious empirical specifications yielded first-stage F -statistics that are satisfactory using the 250-year sample period. However, either by extending the sample period back to 1401 or including the additional explanatory variables utilized in the third and sixth columns of Tables 2 and 3, first-stage identification is improved.

In Table S.5, I include a set of instrumental-variable (IV) estimates that exploit these ideas using the 300-year sample period. In the first stage, the key right hand side variables, *OTTOMAN*, *OTHEROTTOMAN*, *TIME * OTTOMAN*, and *TIME * OTHEROTTOMAN* are instrumented for by dummy variables for each Sultan’s period of reign as well as their mothers’ ethnicity, *TURKMOM* and *EUMOM*, and the age at which the sultans ascended the throne, *ASCENDAGE*.⁵ The second-stage estimates

³In the three centuries between 1400 and 1700, the empire had eighteen sultans. According to their maternal ethnic lineage they were: Mehmed II, Murad II, Selim I (Turkish); Beyazid I, Ahmed I (Greek); Murad III, Mehmed III, Mustafa II (Venetian); Selim II, Ahmed II (Polish); Osman II, Suleyman II (Serbian); Beyazid II, Mustafa I (Albanian); Suleyman I, Mehmed IV (Russian/Crimean); and Murad IV, Ibrahim I (Bosnian). For more details on Sultans’ genealogical links, see Peirce (1993, pp. 287-88).

⁴See Peirce (1993) and Shaw (1976, pp. 24, 98).

⁵The only restriction I imposed is that a sultan had to be at the helm for at least five years. On this basis, Mustafa I (r. 1617-18, 1622-23), Osman II (r. 1618-22), Suleyman II (r. 1687-91) and Ahmed II

use these predicted values to explore the role of Ottomans' military ventures.

The first-stage results are not strong but acceptable, with the instruments being statistically significant for *OTTOMAN* as verified by the first-stage *F*-statistics. In addition, the Sargan test p-values indicate that the instruments satisfy the over-identifying restrictions. Since these first-stage results are not particularly strong, I report in subsection S.2.1 conditional likelihood ratio (*CLR*) confidence intervals for two alternative specifications in which only *OTTOMAN* and *OTHEROTTOMAN* are instrumented for.

In any case, the 2nd-stage results are consistent with the baseline findings reported in Table 2. And this is also the case for various alternative specifications I ran, which I discuss at some length in subsection S.2.2. For instance, taking the specification in the first three columns of Table S.5, we derive a net conflict-reduction impact of an Ottoman-European war to be around 1.36 in *levels* around the year 1500. Given the average number of newly-initiated intra-European confrontations over the sample period, this implies close to a whopping 90 percent net impact around 1500. Taking the specification in the last three columns, we derive the net conflict-reduction impact of an Ottoman-European war to be around 1.46 in *levels* around the year 1500. Given that the average number of total intra-European confrontations over the 300-year sample period was 5.4, this implies a much more modest decline of about 28 percent in intra-European wars around 1500. In subsection S.2.3, I discuss *OLS* results derived using the parsimonious specifications shown in columns (1) and (4) of Table 2. For the *2SLS* estimates reported in Table S.5, those provide the comparable benchmarks (in levels), and not the Poisson regressions shown in Table 2. If anything, these *IV* estimates suggest that those provided by the *OLS* estimates may be a lower bound for the effect of the Ottomans on intra-European conflicts.

S.2.1. Alternative 2SLS estimates & CLR Confidence Intervals

Since the first-stage *F*-statistics were not particularly strong, I reran the specifications shown in Table S.5 using *OTTOMAN* or *OTHEROTTOMAN* as the one endogenous variable in the *2SLS* estimates. This enables us to calculate conditional likelihood ratio confidence intervals for the explanatory variables. As shown below, the confidence interval for *OTTOMAN* is in a strictly negative range, although the one for *OTHEROTTOMAN* cannot be pinned down in a strictly positive interval.

(1691-95) were excluded.

Dependent Variable: No. of New Continental European Wars per Year, (1), (2)
 No. of All Continental European Wars per Year, (3), (4)

	2SLS			
	2st Stg.	2nd Stg.	2st Stg.	2st Stg.
<i>OTTOMAN_t</i>	-1.52* (.464)	...	-1.42* (.595)	...
<i>OTHEROTTO_t</i>	...	2.09* (.945)	...	1.08 (1.14)
<i>TIME_t</i>	-.022* (.011)	.0005 (.014)	-.0034 (.015)	.013 (.016)
<i>EUCONFLICT_{t-1}</i>	-.027 (.066)	.006 (.070)	.728* (.042)	.725* (.041)
<i>EUROPOP_t</i>	.094** (.057)	-.018 (.071)	-.008 (.074)	-.084 (.085)
<i>No. of obs.</i>	299	299	299	299
<i>1st – Stage F-Statistic :</i>	1.86	1.11	1.95	.92
<i>2nd – Stage F-Statistic :</i>	4.44	3.52	124.1	128.5
<i>Likelihood Ratio Intervals :</i>	[-9.13, -1.17]	[-∞, +∞]	[-29.1, -1.56]	[-∞, +∞]

Note: * and ** respectively denote significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Cols. (1) and (2) dep. variable: no. new intra-European conflicts in year t with at least one continental European entity involved. Cols. (3) and (4) dep. variable: All intra-European conflicts per year. Source for conflict data: Brecke (1999). Source for population data: McEvedy and Jones (1978). First-stage estimates for OTTOMAN and OTHEROTTOMAN not shown. Instruments used in the 1st-stage regressions identical to those in Table 5. Critical values based on 200 simulations.

S.2.2. Additional Results with Instrumental Variable Specifications

When I ran the specification in Table S.5 with the dependent variable being the number of religiously-motivated European conflicts between 1401 and 1700, I got insignificant coefficients on both *OTTOMAN* and *OTHEROTTOMAN*.

When I tried the same specification on the Protestant-Catholic wars over the period between 1520 and 1651, the coefficient estimates came in with the predicted signs and the one on *OTTOMAN* attained significance at the 10 percent confidence level. The downside of this specification was that neither of its four first-stage F -statistics were higher than .80 (it attained a *Sargan* test p-value of .637). This is not surprising since identification on the basis of *TURKMOM* and *EUROMOM* requires the sample period to extend back prior to the 1450s.

Then, when I ran specifications which more closely resembled those in Tables 2 and 3 in terms of sample period and the inclusion of additional control variables, such as *OTTOLENGTH*, *OTHERLENGTH*, *CUMOTTO* and *CUMOTHER*, I got equally strong results. In particular, Ottomans' European military campaigns influenced *EUROPE*, *AGEURO* and the number of religiously-motivated wars in Europe negatively and statistically significantly (at the five percent level or higher). *OTTOMAN* also had a similar impact on the number of Protestant-Catholic wars for the period covering 1520 and 1651.

To test a more parsimonious specification, I relied on mothers' ethnicity, *TURK – MOM* and *EUMOM*, age at throne ascendance, *ASCENDAGE*, and length of reign, *RGNLENGTH* only in the first stage. For both newly-initiated and aggregate numbers of intra-European conflicts, the results were quite similar to those shown in Table 2. The main difference was that the first-stage *F*-statistics were slightly above the 10 percent confidence interval, with the overidentification tests not rejecting the null.

S.2.3. Summary of Results using OLS Specifications (in Levels)

Recall that the baseline estimates shown in Tables 2 and 3 were generated with Poisson regressions. For comparison purposes, the baseline *OLS* estimate which is the analog of the specification shown in column (1) of Table 2 yielded a negative and significant coefficient of $-.665$ on *OTTOMAN* and a positive and significant value of $.0035$ on *TIME * OTTOMAN* (both at the 5 percent level). Thus, around the year 1500, the *OLS* specification implies a net reduction of $.315$ (given by $.0035 * 100 - .665$) in the *level* of intra-European confrontations, which is equivalent to a 21 percent drop.

Again for comparison, the baseline *OLS* estimate which is the analog of the specification shown in column (4) of Table 2 yielded a negative and significant coefficient of $-.832$ on *OTTOMAN* (at the 5 percent level) and a positive and insignificant value of $.0032$ on *TIME * OTTOMAN* (p-value = 0.16). Thus, around the year 1500, this specification generated a net reduction of $.532$ (given by $.0032 * 100 - .832$) in the *level* of *aggregate* intra-European confrontations, which is equivalent to a 10 percent drop (bearing in mind that this is only a lower bound due to the insignificant *TIME * OTTOMAN* interaction).

S.3. Distance of Intra-European Conflicts from the Ottoman Frontier

In general, it is possible that we are primarily picking up the influence of Ottomans on those intra-European conflicts immediately across their Eastern European frontiers, and that they did not suppress intra-European continental conflicts that were deeper

in continental western Europe. I tested for this possibility in two ways. First, I constructed the ratio of the number of intra-European conflicts, *EUROPE*, to the average distance from Istanbul of the capitals of European foes in conflict with each other, *EURODISTANCE*.⁶ I used this as an alternative dependent variable and regressed it on the explanatory variables utilized in Table 2. The results are shown in the first three columns of Table S.6. They verify that, even with an adjustment for distance from the Ottoman frontier, the number of Ottoman military actions in Europe had a statistically significant and negative impact on the number of intra-European conflicts. The estimates in all three columns are in line with those shown in Table 2. Moreover, the coefficient magnitudes are about 15 to 20 percent higher.

As another alternative test of the idea that Ottoman military involvements in Europe might have had a stronger discouraging effect on intra-European violent feuds that were closer geographically, I first eliminated all the years in which there were no intra-European violent feuds (61 observations in the 250-year sample) and treated *EURODISTANCE* as the dependent variable. The results are shown in the final three columns of Table S.6. The coefficient on Ottomans' European conflicts is statistically significant and positive only in column (6), but the coefficients in the first two columns enter with the expected positive sign and they attain p-values of 13 and 12 percent, respectively. Accordingly, when Europeans were engaged in violent feuds amongst themselves, it was more likely that their confrontations took place in parts of Europe that were farther away from the Ottoman frontier when the Ottomans engaged Europeans militarily. Taking the significant estimate in the final column, an additional Ottoman military engagement in Europe, *OTTOMAN*, extended the average distance of intra-European violent conflicts from Istanbul by about 200 miles. Given that the average distance of European conflicts from Istanbul was about 960 miles, this corresponds to an effect of more than 20 percent. To put things in perspective, this is roughly analogous of an intra-European conflict shifting from Prague in the Czech Republic to Nice, France when the Ottomans made a European move.⁷ This is further indication that the Ottomans' impact was not solely concentrated on the buffer-zone territories within geographical proximity of the Ottoman frontier.

S.4. The Fatality Impact of Ottoman Wars

While Brecke's catalog is not comprehensive in its fatality coverage, it does include data

⁶Specifically, I constructed this variable as the ratio of $EUROPE_t$ to $EURODISTANCE_t$ plus .01 to keep it defined at zero when there were no violent intra-European conflicts at time t .

⁷Prague and Nice are 938 and 1122 miles away from Istanbul, respectively.

and estimates for about a third of the sample. Specifically, between 1451 and 1700, we have data for the 38 conflicts between the Ottomans and Europeans and for another 145 which took place among the Europeans. The average toll of an Ottoman-European confrontation was 29,401 with an average duration of 3.7 years. This corresponds to 7,989 total deaths per year (civilian and military included). In contrast, the average death toll of an intra-European confrontation was 81,366 with a duration of 2.5 years, and yielding 32,546 total fatalities per year. Assuming that the share of European fatalities in each Ottoman-European confrontation over this period was about a half to two-thirds of the total, and working with the 25 percent negative impact of the Ottomans on intra-European conflicts, one calculates that, with one more Ottoman-European conflict, European fatalities dropped anywhere between 742 to 5642 deaths around approximately around 1500.⁸ Given the average total European deaths of 32,546 per intra-European conflict, this accounts for anywhere between a 2 to 17 percent drop in total European deaths. Carrying out similar calculations for a narrower period between 1451 and 1650, one comes up with a drop in total European fatalities of roughly 20 percent.⁹

Along these lines, another interesting calculus can be carried out by comparing the net fatality impact that I discussed in the paper with those derived using Levy (1983). In the latter dataset, there are 31 intra-European wars with fatality data which took place between 1495 and 1700. The average military fatalities in those wars was 118,083 (the Levy data does not contain information on total fatalities). There were another 19 Ottoman-European wars over the same period with an average military death toll of 70,662.

A comparison of these figures with those derived from Brecke reveals the clear ‘Great Power Wars’ bias in Levy’s coverage. In any event, according to the Levy data, the net fatality impact of the Ottoman wars was anywhere between 5,810 and 17,823. Relative to the average death toll of 118,083 per Great Powers European war, this corresponds to between a 5 percent to 15 percent net *positive* impact of the Ottoman wars on the European death toll. The difference in the estimated impact of Ottomans on net European fatalities (when the Levy dataset is used instead of Brecke) suggests that the Ottomans’ role in lowering intra-European deaths mostly worked through reducing those in smaller scale intra-European conflicts. It also suggests that the Ottoman-European confrontations had a larger role in reducing intra-European civilian deaths as opposed to military ones. Indeed, a highly relevant observation is that the total death toll of the

⁸That is, $29,401 * (.67 \text{ or } .5) - 81,366 * .25 = -742 \text{ or } -5642$.

⁹In this case, we have $5,361 * (.67 \text{ or } .5) - 87,136 * .25 = -18,210 \text{ or } -19,103$.

Thirty-Years War is estimated at 8 million, whereas its military toll was 2, 073,000.

S.5. Alternative Time Periods

The Ottomans' impact on intra-European violent conflicts is robust to a contraction in the analysis period. For example, I recalculated all of the estimates, focusing on a narrower 200-year time span between 1451 and 1650 using both contemporaneous and lagged explanatory variables. The results, which are respectively shown in Tables S.7 and S.2, were very much in line with those reported earlier, with the Ottomans' European military feuds exerting a statistically significant and negative impact in all six specifications listed in Table S.2 and in three of the six specifications using lagged explanatory variables. I also examined the sensitivity of the results over a longer time span covering the period between 1401 and 1700. Using this longer time span, the lagged explanatory variables worked best, with all six estimates yielding negative and statistically significant coefficients on $OTTOMAN_{t-1}$ (see Table S.3). Using the contemporaneous explanatory variable, $OTTOMAN_t$, results, which are shown in Table S.8, were a bit weaker, with three coefficients coming in negative and statistically significant. Despite the fact that in the three other specifications results were insignificant, they all attained negative values. And the insignificant coefficients still produced p-values of 14 percent, 16 percent and 11 percent in columns (3), (4) and (6) of Table S.8, respectively.

As a final cut of the data, I examined the results over the period 1401 to 1650. Those estimates are shown in Tables S.2 and S.9, with S.2 reporting results using lagged-explanatory variables and S.9 showing those produced with contemporaneous ones. In Table S.2, all six coefficients on $OTTOMAN$ and all six on $OTHEROTTOMAN$ come in significantly and with the predicted signs. In Table S.9, only two of the six coefficients on $OTTOMAN$ are negative and significant, although the other four are all negative.

S.6. Alternative Specifications Using the Levy Dataset

Using the Levy (1983) dataset, I ran two other alternative specifications. They are shown in Table S.10. First, I obtained strong and negative effects of $OTTOMAN$ when I used $LENGTH$ of conflicts calculated by Levy as the dependent variable. With his data on the frequency of intra-European conflicts, I also constructed an alternative $EUROPE$ as my dependent variable and I got results that were in line with those above but slightly weaker; in all three specifications similar to those shown in columns (4) through (6) of Table S.10, the coefficient on $OTTOMAN$ was negative, with one of three specifications generating significance at the 10 percent confidence level and another yielding a p-value of 13 percent.

Table S.1: Lagged Explanatory Variables, 1451 C. E. - 1700 C. E.

Dependent Variable: No. of New Continental European Wars per Year, (1) - (2)
 No. of All Continental European Wars per Year, (3) - (4)
 No. of Religious Wars per Year, (5) - (6)

	Poisson Regressions					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>OTTOMAN</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	-.519*	-.620*	-.293*	-.284*	-1.19*	-1.46**
	(.192)	(.219)	(.085)	(.094)	(.573)	(.767)
<i>OTHEROTTOMAN</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	.382**	.508**	.226**	.282*	.043	.105
	(.229)	(.285)	(.127)	(.138)	(.467)	(.544)
<i>TIME</i>	-.012	-.012	-.0008	-.0003	-.016	-.017
	(.009)	(.009)	(.0043)	(.0043)	(.017)	(.017)
<i>TIME</i> * <i>OTTOMAN</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	.0034*	.0036*	.0015*	.0018*	.0054*	.0083*
	(.0011)	(.0012)	(.0005)	(.0005)	(.0025)	(.0033)
<i>TIME</i> * <i>OTHEROT.</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	-.0004	-.001	-.0008	-.001	.005*	-.0017
	(.0015)	(.0018)	(.0009)	(.001)	(.0025)	(.0027)
<i>EUCONFLICT</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	-.077**	-.085**	.144*	.133*	.936*	.850*
	(.044)	(.045)	(.011)	(.011)	(.185)	(.190)
<i>EUROPEPOP</i> _{<i>t</i>}	.051	.014	-.002	-.0039	.090	-.0047
	(.047)	(.052)	(.023)	(.0026)	(.094)	(.095)
<i>OTTOLENGTH</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	-.010	-.010	.0013	.0006	.017	.0064
	(.012)	(.012)	(.0056)	(.004)	(.017)	(.016)
<i>OTHERLENGTH</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	-.0012**	-.003*	-.0001	-.0009	-.009**	-.061**
	(.0009)	(.001)	(.0005)	(.0005)	(.005)	(.032)
<i>DISTANCE</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	...	-.0001	...	-.0001	...	-.0005**
		(.0002)		(.0001)		(.00027)
<i>OTHERDISTANCE</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}0001000040006*
		(.0001)		(.00008)		(.0002)
<i>CENTURY</i> _{<i>t</i>}310*068043
		(.192)		(.082)		(.246)
<i>OTTOPOP</i> _{<i>t</i>}034**052*177*
		(.019)		(.010)		(.026)
<i>No. of obs.</i>	250	250	250	250	250	250
<i>(pseudo) R</i> ²	.033	.046	.152	.167	.244	.301

Note: * and ** respectively denote significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Cols. (1), (2) dep. variable: no. of conflicts that began in a given year with at least one continental European entity involved in each. Cols. (3), (4) dep. variable: all new or on-going conflicts in a given year with at least one continental European group involved in each. Cols. (5), (6) dep. variable: no. of religiously-motivated conflicts that began in a given year within continental Europe between 1451 - 1700. Source for conflict data: Brecke (1999). Source for distance measures: <http://www.geobytes.com/CityDistanceTool.htm>. Source for population data: McEvedy and Jones (1978). *AGOTTO*_{*t*-1} and *AGOTHER*_{*t*-1} included in cols. (3) and (6), not statistically significant, hence, not shown.

Table S.2: Lagged Explanatory Variables, 1451 C. E. - 1650 C. E.

Dependent Variable: No. of New Continental European Wars per Year, (1) - (3)
 No. of All Continental European Wars per Year, (4) - (6)

	Poisson Regressions					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>OTTOMAN</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	-.363* (.195)	-.356** (.200)	-.578* (.206)	-.224* (.083)	-.225* (.084)	-.284* (.093)
<i>OTHEROTTOMAN</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	.710* (.229)	.697* (.229)	.663* (.299)	.377* (.105)	.379* (.105)	.351* (.114)
<i>TIME</i>	-.020* (.011)	-.019** (.011)	-.023* (.012)	-.0015 (.0045)	-.0016 (.0046)	-.0029 (.0048)
<i>TIME * OTTOMAN</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	.0019** (.0011)	.0023** (.0012)	.0032* (.0013)	.0011* (.0005)	.0011** (.0005)	.0016* (.0006)
<i>TIME * OTHEROT</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	-.003* (.0014)	-.003* (.0014)	-.0033* (.0016)	-.0021* (.0007)	-.0021* (.0007)	-.0021* (.0008)
<i>EUCONFLICT</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	-.097* (.049)	-.099* (.049)	-.107* (.051)	.124* (.011)	.124* (.010)	.112* (.011)
<i>EUROPEPOP</i> _{<i>t</i>}	.102* (.056)	.098** (.057)	.196* (.063)	.010 (.023)	.011 (.024)	.063** (.026)
<i>OTTOLENGTH</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	...	-.015 (.013)	-.011 (.012)0023 (.059)	.0032 (.0052)
<i>OTHERLENGTH</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	...	-.0012 (.0010)	-.0018 (.0013)0001 (.0006)	-.0005 (.0007)
<i>AGOTTO</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}184* (.061)058* (.024)
<i>OTHERDISTANCE</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}0002 (.00017)00006 (.00007)
<i>CENTURY</i> _{<i>t</i>}	-.108 (.200)	-.276* (.091)
<i>OTTOPOP</i> _{<i>t</i>}	-.107* (.037)	-.041* (.017)
<i>No. of obs.</i>	200	200	200	200	200	200
<i>(pseudo) R</i> ²	.027	.027	.048	.106	.106	.115

Note: * and ** respectively denote significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Cols. (1) - (3) dep. variable: no. of conflicts that began in a given year with at least one continental European entity involved in each. Cols. (4) - (6) dep. variable: all new or on-going conflicts in a given year with at least one continental European group involved in each. Source for conflict data: Brecke (1999). Source for distance measures: <http://www.geobytes.com/CityDistanceTool.htm>. Source for population data: McEvedy and Jones (1978). *AGOTHER*_{*t*-1} and *DISTANCE*_{*t*-1} included in cols. (3) and (6), not statistically significant, hence, not shown.

Table S.3: Lagged Explanatory Variables, 1401 C. E. - 1700 C. E.

Dependent Variable: No. of New Continental European Wars per Year, (1) - (3)
 No. of All Continental European Wars per Year, (4) - (6)

	Poisson Regressions					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$OTTOMAN_{t-1}$	-.518*	-.533*	-.511*	-.132*	-.142*	-.138**
	(.152)	(.154)	(.184)	(.063)	(.066)	(.072)
$OTHEROTTOMAN_{t-1}$.265	.262	.257	.012	.013	.056
	(.183)	(.184)	(.223)	(.114)	(.115)	(.124)
$TIME$	-.011	-.011	-.010	-.0028	-.0030	-.0042
	(.008)	(.008)	(.008)	(.0039)	(.0039)	(.0039)
$TIME * OTTOMAN_{t-1}$.0031*	.0033*	.0035*	.0007**	.0007**	.0009*
	(.0009)	(.0010)	(.0010)	(.0004)	(.0004)	(.0004)
$TIME * OTHEROT_{.t}$.0001	.0002	-.0005	.0004	.0004	.0003
	(.0013)	(.0013)	(.0014)	(.0008)	(.0008)	(.0008)
$EUCONFLICT_{t-1}$	-.032	-.033	-.042	.124*	.123*	.110*
	(.038)	(.038)	(.038)	(.009)	(.009)	(.010)
$EUROPEPOP_t$.041	.042	.0035	.009	.009	-.009
	(.042)	(.042)	(.044)	(.020)	(.020)	(.020)
$OTTOLENGTH_{t-1}$...	-.0012	-.00110037	.0032
		(.012)	(.012)		(.0051)	(.0041)
$OTHERLENGTH_{t-1}$...	-.0014	-.003*	...	-.0001	-.0012*
		(.0010)	(.001)		(.0005)	(.0005)
$AGOTTO_{t-1}$069029
			(.052)			(.023)
$OTHERDISTANCE_{t-1}$000200004
			(.0002)			(.00008)
$CENTURY_t$385*017
			(.188)			(.075)
$OTTOPOP_t$029**044*
			(.017)			(.008)
<i>No. of obs.</i>	299	299	299	299	299	299
<i>(pseudo) R²</i>	.034	.034	.045	.189	.190	.202

Note: * and ** respectively denote significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Cols. (1) - (3) dep. variable: no. of conflicts that began in a given year with at least one continental European entity involved in each. Cols. (4) - (6) dep. variable: all new or on-going conflicts in a given year with at least one continental European group involved in each. Source for conflict data: Brecke (1999). Source for distance measures: <http://www.geobytes.com/CityDistanceTool.htm>. Source for population data: McEvedy and Jones (1978). $AGOTHER_{t-1}$ and $DISTANCE_{t-1}$ included in cols. (3) and (6), not statistically significant, hence, not shown.

Table S.4: Lagged Explanatory Variables, 1401 C. E. - 1650 C. E.

Dependent Variable: No. of New Continental European Wars per Year, (1) - (3)
 No. of All Continental European Wars per Year, (4) - (6)

	Poisson Regressions					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>OTTOMAN</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	-.467* (.155)	-.474* (.161)	-.459* (.177)	-.109** (.066)	-.116** (.069)	-.105 (.074)
<i>OTHEROTTOMAN</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	.420* (.184)	.414* (.183)	.344 (.225)	.069 (.112)	.071 (.113)	.089 (.127)
<i>TIME</i>	-.016 (.012)	-.016 (.012)	-.018 (.013)	-.0004 (.0047)	-.0005 (.005)	-.003 (.005)
<i>TIME * OTTOMAN</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	.0026* (.0010)	.0028* (.0011)	.0034* (.0011)	.0004 (.0004)	.0003 (.0004)	.0007 (.0005)
<i>TIME * OTHEROT</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	-.0014 (.0012)	-.0014 (.0013)	-.0022** (.0013)	-.0003 (.0007)	-.0003 (.0008)	-.0005 (.0008)
<i>EUCONFLICT</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	-.038 (.040)	-.039 (.040)	-.035 (.040)	.117* (.008)	.117* (.008)	.116* (.009)
<i>EUROPEPOP</i> _{<i>t</i>}	.074 (.057)	.074 (.057)	.063 (.062)	.00003 (.023)	.0009 (.024)	.0055 (.025)
<i>OTTOLENGTH</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	...	-.0045 (.014)	.0002 (.013)004 (.005)	.0049 (.0047)
<i>OTHERLENGTH</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	...	-.0010 (.0012)	-.0021** (.0013)0002 (.0005)	-.0004 (.0006)
<i>DISTANCE</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	-.0003 (.0002)	-.00013** (.00007)
<i>OTHERDISTANCE</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}0002 (.00016)00007 (.00007)
<i>CENTURY</i> _{<i>t</i>}327** (.180)	-.035 (.068)
<i>OTTOPOP</i> _{<i>t</i>}006 (.023)016** (.009)
<i>No. of obs.</i>	249	249	249	249	249	249
<i>(pseudo) R</i> ²	.021	.021	.030	.139	.139	.142

Note: * and ** respectively denote significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Cols. (1) - (3) dep. variable: no. of conflicts that began in a given year with at least one continental European entity involved in each. Cols. (4) - (6) dep. variable: all new or on-going conflicts in a given year with at least one continental European group involved in each. Source for conflict data: Brecke (1999). Source for distance measures: <http://www.geobytes.com/CityDistanceTool.htm>. Source for population data: McEvedy and Jones (1978). *AGOTTO*_{*t*-1} and *AGOTHER*_{*t*-1} included in cols. (3) and (6), not statistically significant, hence, not shown.

Table S.5: Two-Stage *IV* estimates, 1401 C. E. – 1700 C. E.

Dependent Variable: No. of New Continental European Wars per Year, (1) - (3)
 No. of All Continental European Wars per Year, (4) - (6)

	<i>2SLS</i>					
	1st Stg.	1st Stg.	2st Stg.	1st Stg.	1st Stg.	2nd Stg.
<i>OTTOMAN</i> _{<i>t</i>}	<i>DVAR</i>	...	-2.46* (.975)	<i>DVAR</i>	...	-2.26** (1.27)
<i>OTHEROTTO.</i> _{<i>t</i>}	..	<i>DVAR</i>	1.67 (1.55)	..	<i>DVAR</i>	-1.24 (2.22)
<i>TIME * OTTOMAN</i> _{<i>t</i>}011 (.007)008 (.009)
<i>TIME * OTHEROT.</i> _{<i>t</i>}005 (.012)026 (.018)
<i>TURKMOM</i> _{<i>t</i>}	.848 (.609)	.288 (.451)860 (.601)	.263 (.451)	...
<i>EUMOM</i> _{<i>t</i>}	.019 (.477)	.743* (.354)036 (.476)	.707* (.353)	...
<i>ASCENDAGE</i> _{<i>t</i>}	.013* (.006)	.003 (.004)013* (.006)	.003 (.004)	...
<i>SULEYMAN I</i> _{<i>t</i>}	.167 (.281)	.513* (.208)197 (.285)	.489* (.212)	...
<i>SELIM I</i> _{<i>t</i>}	-1.27* (.643)	-.185 (.232)	...	-1.24** (.645)	.306 (.479)	...
<i>BEYAZID II</i> _{<i>t</i>}	-.159 (.363)	-.599* (.269)	...	-.143 (.361)	-.579* (.268)	...
<i>AHMED I</i> _{<i>t</i>}	.428** (.227)	-.076 (.168)451** (.228)	-.067 (.169)	...
<i>IBRAHIM I</i> _{<i>t</i>}	.569** (.293)	.072 (.217)510** (.310)	.095 (.230)	...
<i>EUCONFLICT</i> _{<i>t-1</i>}	-.019 (.080)688* (.058)
<i>No. of obs.</i>	299	299	299	299	299	299
<i>F Statistic :</i>	1.89	1.35	2.90	1.91	1.30	48.7
<i>Sargan test (p - value)</i>833250

Note: * and ** respectively denote significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Cols. (1) and (4) dep. variable: *OTTOMAN*_{*t*}. Cols. (2) and (5) dep. variable: *OTHEROTTOMAN*_{*t*}. Col. (3) dep. variable: no. new intra-European conflicts in year *t* with at least one continental European entity involved. Col. (6) dep. variable: All intra-European conflicts per year. Source for conflict data: Brecke (1999). Source for population data: McEvedy and Jones (1978). First-stage estimates for *TIME*OTTOMAN* and *TIME*OTHEROTTOMAN* not shown (F-statistics of 1.78, 1.44 in first specification and 1.80, 1.41 in second).

Table S.6: More Results with Annual Data, 1450 C. E. – 1700 C. E.

Dependent Variable: Distance-Adjusted No. of New Conflicts, (1)-(3);
Average Distance from Istanbul, (4)-(6);

	Poisson Regressions			Robust Regressions		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$OTTOMAN_t$	-.676* (.252)	-.613* (.250)	-.624** (.276)	144.6 (94.1)	146.5 (94.5)	196.1** (110.1)
$OTHEROTTOMAN_t$.181 (.320)	.220 (.308)	.395 (.315)	-28.6 (127.4)	-39.6 (130.7)	-5.85 (145.0)
$TIME$	-.022* (.009)	-.022* (.009)	-.021* (.008)	2.18 (3.72)	2.30 (3.75)	3.15 (4.05)
$TIME * OTTOMAN_t$.0033* (.0015)	.0031* (.0015)	.0027** (.0015)	-.418 (.591)	-.339 (.619)	-.300 (.642)
$TIME * OTHEROT_t$	-.0005 (.0017)	-.0001 (.0017)	.0001 (.0016)	.412 (.750)	.351 (.729)	.208 (.789)
$DEPVAR_{t-1}$	-.46.7 (55.4)	-49.0 (55.5)	-51.8 (56.9)	.103* (.035)	.103* (.035)	.096* (.036)
$EUROPEPOP_t$.097* (.045)	.098* (.045)	.058 (.047)	-10.0** (19.4)	-10.6* (19.6)	-12.7 (24.7)
$OTTOLENGTH_t$...	-.016 (.019)	-.013 (.019)	...	-4.25 (9.80)	-4.99 (9.96)
$OTHERLENGTH_t$...	-.052 (.046)	-.034 (.044)	...	9.87 (15.4)	7.55 (20.4)
$AGOTTO_t$017 (.061)	-55.3* (27.7)
$AGOTHER_t$	-.134 (.112)	-12.2 (51.2)
$CENTURY_t$217 (.201)	-118.6 (100.8)
$OTTOPOP_t$041* (.021)	4.85 (10.8)
<i>No. of obs.</i>	250	250	250	189	189	189
<i>(pseudo) R²</i>	.005	.006	.007	.056	.058	.080

Note: * and ** respectively denote significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Cols. (1) - (3) dep. variable: the ratio of the no. of conflicts that began in a given year (with at least one continental European entity involved in each) to the average distance (in miles) of the capitals of the warring sides from Istanbul. Cols. (4) - (6) dep. variable: the average distance (in miles) of the capitals of the warring sides from Istanbul. Source for conflict data: Brecke (1999). Source for distance measures: <http://www.geobytes.com/CityDistanceTool.htm>. Source for population data: McEvedy and Jones (1978). $DISTANCE_t$ and $OTHERDISTANCE_t$ included in cols. (3) and (6), not statistically significant, hence, not shown.

Table S.7: Annual Data, 1451 C. E. - 1650 C. E.

Dependent Variable: No. of New Continental European Wars per Year, (1) - (3)
 No. of All Continental European Wars per Year, (4) - (6)

	Poisson Regressions					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>OTTOMAN_t</i>	-.345 (.239)	-.273 (.232)	-.375 (.271)	-.215* (.095)	-.203* (.096)	-.184** (.109)
<i>OTHEROTTOMAN_t</i>	.037 (.325)	.065 (.307)	.098 (.325)	-.083 (.111)	-.065 (.107)	-.090 (.123)
<i>TIME</i>	-.020** (.011)	-.020** (.011)	-.018 (.011)	-.0015 (.0047)	-.0015 (.0048)	-.0003 (.0055)
<i>TIME * OTTOMAN_t</i>	.0012 (.0015)	.0011 (.0015)	.0010 (.0015)	.0009 (.0006)	.0009 (.0007)	.0009 (.0008)
<i>TIME * OTHEROT._t</i>	.0007 (.0019)	.0010 (.0019)	.0017 (.0018)	.0007 (.0007)	.0008 (.0007)	.0009 (.0007)
<i>EUCONFLICT_{t-1}</i>	-.077 (.051)	-.077 (.051)	-.085** (.053)	.123* (.010)	.123* (.011)	.120* (.012)
<i>EUROPEPOP_t</i>	.097** (.054)	-.097** (.054)	.152* (.055)	.0068 (.024)	.0070 (.0241)	.039 (.029)
<i>OTTOLENGTH_t</i>	...	-.018 (.018)	-.022 (.018)	...	-.003 (.007)	-.0028 (.0064)
<i>OTHERLENGTH_t</i>	...	-.044 (.030)	-.009 (.030)	...	-.014 (.011)	-.0066 (.0145)
<i>DISTANCE_t</i>0002 (.0003)	-.0001 (.0001)
<i>OTHERDISTANCE_t</i>	-.0003** (.00017)	-.00005 (.00006)
<i>CENTURY_t</i>	-.133 (.194)	-.273* (.090)
<i>OTTOPOP_t</i>	-.078* (.039)	-.031** (.018)
<i>No. of obs.</i>	200	200	200	200	200	200
<i>(pseudo) R²</i>	.017	.020	.029	.103	.104	.109

Note: * and ** respectively denote significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Cols. (1) - (3) dep. variable: no. of conflicts that began in a given year with at least one continental European entity involved in each. Cols. (4) - (6) dep. variable: all new or on-going conflicts in a given year with at least one continental European group involved in each. Source for conflict data: Brecke (1999). Source for distance measures: <http://www.geobytes.com/CityDistanceTool.htm>. Source for population data: McEvedy and Jones (1978). AGOTTO_t and AGOTHER_t included in cols. (3) and (6), not statistically significant, hence, not shown.

Table S.8: Annual Data, 1401 C. E. - 1700 C. E.

Dependent Variable: No. of New Continental European Wars per Year, (1) - (3)
 No. of All Continental European Wars per Year, (4) - (6)

	Poisson Regressions					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>OTTOMAN_t</i>	-.435* (.2177)	-.382* (.170)	-.300 (.200)	-.119 (.075)	-.119** (.073)	-.070 (.083)
<i>OTHEROTTOMAN_t</i>	.091 (.244)	.133 (.240)	.170 (.253)	-.060 (.077)	-.039 (.074)	-.0036 (.081)
<i>TIME</i>	-.012 (.008)	-.012 (.008)	-.012 (.008)	-.0032 (.0037)	-.0034 (.0037)	-.004 (.004)
<i>TIME * OTTOMAN_t</i>	.0023* (.0012)	.0022** (.0012)	.0014 (.0012)	.0004 (.0005)	.0004 (.0006)	.0002 (.0006)
<i>TIME * OTHEROT._t</i>	.0001 (.0015)	.0004 (.0015)	.0006 (.0013)	.0006 (.0006)	.0007 (.0006)	.0007 (.0006)
<i>EUCONFLICT_{t-1}</i>	-.009 (.039)	-.009 (.039)	-.025 (.040)	.125* (.008)	.124* (.008)	.108* (.009)
<i>EUROPEPOP_t</i>	.049 (.041)	.050 (.041)	.020 (.040)	.011 (.018)	.012 (.018)	-.008 (.019)
<i>OTTOLENGTH_t</i>	...	-.014 (.017)	-.013 (.017)0026 (.0065)	.0030 (.006)
<i>OTHERLENGTH_t</i>	...	-.045 (.039)	-.026 (.040)	...	-.018 (.011)	-.024** (.014)
<i>DISTANCE_t</i>00007 (.00025)	-.0001 (.0001)
<i>OTHERDISTANCE_t</i>	-.0002 (.00018)	-.00006 (.0001)
<i>CENTURY_t</i>293 (.186)0006 (.076)
<i>OTTOPOP_t</i>031** (.019)044* (.008)
<i>No. of obs.</i>	299	299	299	299	299	299
<i>(pseudo) R²</i>	.023	.024	.033	.189	.189	.200

Note: * and ** respectively denote significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Cols. (1) - (3) dep. variable: no. of conflicts that began in a given year with at least one continental European entity involved in each. Cols. (4) - (6) dep. variable: all new or on-going conflicts in a given year with at least one continental European group involved in each. Source for conflict data: Brecke (1999). Source for distance measures: <http://www.geobytes.com/CityDistanceTool.htm>. Source for population data: McEvedy and Jones (1978). AGOTTO_t and AGOTHER_t included in cols. (3) and (6), not statistically significant, hence, not shown.

Table S.9: Annual Data, 1401 C. E. - 1650 C. E.

Dependent Variable: No. of New Continental European Wars per Year, (1) - (3)
 No. of All Continental European Wars per Year, (4) - (6)

	Poisson Regressions					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>OTTOMAN_t</i>	-.330** (.181)	-.274 (.177)	-.201 (.211)	-.110 (.076)	-.108 (.073)	-.052 (.086)
<i>OTHEROTTOMAN_t</i>	-.045 (.262)	-.0014 (.256)	-.039 (.280)	-.114 (.078)	-.090 (.075)	-.086 (.087)
<i>TIME</i>	-.017 (.011)	-.017 (.011)	-.015 (.012)	-.0004 (.0045)	-.0008 (.0046)	-.0012 (.0055)
<i>TIME * OTTOMAN_t</i>	.0012 (.0013)	.0010 (.0013)	.0006 (.0013)	.0003 (.0006)	.0002 (.0006)	.0001 (.0006)
<i>TIME * OTHEROT._t</i>	.0012 (.0016)	.0015 (.0016)	.0020 (.0016)	.0010** (.0005)	.001* (.0005)	.0011* (.0005)
<i>EUCONFLICT_{t-1}</i>	-.017 (.042)	-.017 (.042)	-.025 (.042)	.116* (.007)	.115* (.007)	.111* (.008)
<i>EUROPEPOP_t</i>	.077 (.054)	.078 (.055)	.060 (.054)	-.0006 (.022)	.0012 (.022)	.0003 (.025)
<i>OTTOLENGTH_t</i>	...	-.014 (.018)	-.015 (.018)0024 (.006)	.0022 (.006)
<i>OTHERLENGTH_t</i>	...	-.045 (.032)	-.019 (.034)	...	-.019** (.010)	-.016 (.013)
<i>DISTANCE_t</i>00008 (.0003)	-.00004 (.0001)
<i>OTHERDISTANCE_t</i>	-.0002 (.00017)	-.00005 (.00006)
<i>CENTURY_t</i>166 (.176)	-.089 (.066)
<i>OTTOPOP_t</i>001 (.026)013 (.010)
<i>No. of obs.</i>	249	249	249	249	249	249
<i>(pseudo) R²</i>	.013	.015	.019	.141	.141	.143

Note: * and ** respectively denote significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Cols. (1) - (3) dep. variable: no. of conflicts that began in a given year with at least one continental European entity involved in each. Cols. (4) - (6) dep. variable: all new or on-going conflicts in a given year with at least one continental European group involved in each. Source for conflict data: Brecke (1999). Source for distance measures: <http://www.geobytes.com/CityDistanceTool.htm>. Source for population data: McEvedy and Jones (1978). AGOTTO_t and AGOTHER_t included in cols. (3) and (6), not statistically significant, hence, not shown.

Table S.10: More results with the Levy (1983) Dataset

Dependent Variable: No. of Intra-European Conflicts, 1495 A. D. - 1700 A. D., (1)-(3);
 Intra-European Conflict Duration, 1495 A. D. - 1700 A. D., (4)-(6);

	Poisson Regressions			Robust Regressions		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>OTTOMAN_t</i>	-1.35** (.761)	-1.00 (.676)	-.894 (.723)	-1.90* (.566)	-1.77** (1.01)	-3.58* (.886)
<i>OTHEROTTOMAN_t</i>	-.015 (.084)	-.047 (.086)	.008 (.332)	.269 (.441)	.228 (.711)	.635 (.710)
<i>TIME</i>	-.011 (.014)	-.008 (.011)	-.009 (.010)	-.012 (.021)	-.029 (.035)	-.207* (.031)
<i>TIME * OTTOMAN_t</i>	.0003 (.007)	.0025 (.0055)	.0023 (.006)	-.0003 (.0053)	.025* (.0088)	.026* (.0075)
<i>TIME * OTHEROT._t</i>	-.0008 (.0016)	-.0005 (.0013)	-.0008 (.0013)	.0041 (.0059)	.0046 (.0095)	.022* (.0078)
<i>DEPVAR_{t-1}</i>	.161 (.333)	.176 (.254)	.167 (.300)	.019 (.192)	.297 (.327)	.812* (.285)
<i>EUROPEPOP_t</i>	.064 (.078)	.062 (.062)	.059 (.055)	.059 (.117)	.155 (.195)	1.61* (.196)
<i>CENTURY_t</i>141 (.555)	-1.72* (.854)
<i>OTTOPOP_t</i>	...	-.023 (.020)	-.021 (.032)	...	-.0004 (.0006)	-.561* (.083)
<i>OTTOINTENSITY_t</i>	...	-.0013 (.0010)	-.0013 (.0010)	...	-.192** (.101)	-.0023* (.0005)
<i>No. of obs.</i>	47	47	47	47	47	47
<i>(psuedo) R²</i>	.115	.139	.142

Note: * and ** respectively denote significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Cols. (1) - (3) dep. variable: no. of conflicts that began in a given year with at least one continental European entity involved in each. Cols. (4) - (6) dep. variable: the average duration (in years) of the conflicts that began in a given year (with at least one continental European entity involved in each). Source for conflict data in Col. (1) - (3): Brecke (1999). Source for battle intensity data: Levy (1983). Source for distance measures: <http://www.geobytes.com/CityDistanceTool.htm>. Source for population data: McEvedy and Jones (1978). AGOTTO_t and AGOTHER_t included in cols. (3) and (6), not statistically significant, hence, not shown.