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Modern Physics and Tibetan Buddhism
SCIENTIFIC PARADIGMS AND THE THREE TURNINGS OF THE WHEEL: THE EVOLUTION OF COSMOLOGICAL CONCEPTS IN TIBETAN
BUDDHISM What do you think, O monks - are the Aggregates,
Bases of Consciousness and Elements permanent or
impermanent? Impermanent, Lord. But that which is impermanent, is it suffering or
happiness? Suffering, Lord.1 I. INTRODUCTION That the entire repertoire of human experience is
fleeting and ever changing is a fundamental teaching of Buddhism. Not one of the objects of our world, our perceptions of those
objects, our concepts, or even our gods is eternal. Like the river of Heraclites, life is ever flowing and ever
different, and suffering results when we cling to something that appears to be
permanent. Human experience
consists not of eternal ultimates and essences, but of combinations, the parts
of which are perpetually arising and perishing, just as the human body itself
changes form moment to moment. The mind and consciousness appear and disappear, like day and
night, like a monkey gamboling in a forest, leaping from branch to branch. Buddhism, as an ethical and philosophical system,
has been no more exempt from continual change than anything else in our world.
The evolution of Buddhism has been interpreted either as a process of
constant development spurred by internal and external challenges, perhaps
largely unforeseen by its founder, or as a complete and self-contained
philosophy taught by the Buddha and elucidated by subsequent commentators.
The latter interpretation is preferred by Tibetan Buddhists who describe
the unfolding of Buddhism in terms of the three turnings of the Wheel of Dharma:
first, the scripture of Hinayana; second, the intermediate scripture of Mahayana
including the Prajnaparamitas and the Madhyamika; third, the scripture of
Yogacara. These
three stages have been characterized respectively as: 1) Realism emphasizing the
"radical pluralism" implicit in the reality of "psychological
atoms" or dharmas; 2) Dialectical criticism
dominated by the concept of emptiness and by the towering figure of Nagarjuna; (3) Idealism represented by the
"absolutist idealism" of Cittamatrin or the "mind only"
school2. Interwoven throughout Buddhism are concepts that
because of their physical or cosmological content fall into the realms claimed
today by physics and cosmology. To a much greater extent than is experienced in
Western cultures today, these issues of cosmology find their way into the
every-day lives of ordinary people as they experience the surrounding world and
heavens. A number of these concepts experienced major, revolutionary
transformations in successive turnings of the wheel.
I shall explore some of those concepts that evolved through the three
turnings and shall indicate how they may be described in the same language used
to analyze western science. In
particular I shall suggest that the approach of the second turning has
similarities to the positivism of Neils Bohr and his co-called Copenhagen School
of quantum physics, which approach is probably preferred by most physicists
today. Furthermore, the third
turning as represented by the Yogacara writings of Asanga, may share many of the
aspects of modern critical realism. II.
PARADIGMS OF NATURAL SCIENCE Western science has also evolved through a number
of distinct stages, each described as a "paradigm" by Thomas Kuhn in
his remarkably influential book, The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions. One
of the essential aspects of the evolution of science as pointed out by Kuhn is
its non-cumulative development and its and non-anticipatory quality. Old science
such as Aristotelian dynamics or Ptolemic astronomy contained many beliefs that
were incompatible with the ones we hold today.
The old scientific beliefs were clearly wrong judged by current knowledge
of physical phenomena. What is even
more striking, the new science could never have been logically generated by the
logical methods of the old. The new
science would have been judged just as irrational by the standards of the old as
we today judge the old. Of course,
any claim that the earth is in the center of the solar system would be
"unscientific" today; a claim that the sun is in the center of the
solar system, such as was made by Aristarchus, was also judged to be
"unscientific" by the Aristotelians. If outmoded and rejected scientific concepts were
not "unscientific" in their days, then it is difficult, Kuhn argues,
to see the development of science as a process of accumulation and a steady
movement toward "truth". The
progress of science does not appear to be accumulative, continuous, or even
progressive, for that matter, but rather appears to occur through discrete jumps
involving revolutionary changes between successive scientific paradigms.
Kuhn primary uses the term paradigm to mean exemplar: "standard
examples of scientific work which embody a set of conceptual, methodological and
metaphysical assumptions."3 In the process of
becoming scientists, students study and often mold themselves according to the
research style of major paradigmatic figures, such as Newton, Maxwell, Bohr, or
Rutherford. The ruling paradigm,
through example, establishes appropriate style of discovery, tests of validity,
as well as language of communication among fellow scientists within the paradigm. There is the interesting possibility that the
three turnings may actually reflect progressive developments of science in the
Buddhist world during the millennium following death of the Buddha. In particular, Kloetzli has explored the possibility that
"each of the Buddhist cosmologies is grounded in a particular scientific
perception of reality".4
He suggests that the Madhyamikan revolution, led by Nagarjuna, is an
example of the entry of "scientific" insights into theology; the
science has been lost and only the Madhyamikan theology remains. In fact, one
can identify a number of possible elements of a highly relativitistic scientific
paradigm that may have been present in India at the time of Nagarjuna: 1.
rejection of absolute motion; 2. recognition of relative
motion and the rotation of the earth and other world disks; 3. rejection of indivisible
dharmas; 4. rejection of all absolutes
of size, space, time, and number; 5. rejection of geocentricity
and, in fact, even of heliocentricity; 6. assertion of the infinity of
space; 7. replaced emphasis on time of
the Sarvastivadins with emphasis on the ten directions of space 8. introduction of light as a
primary creative agent in the universe. Many of these items are intriguing for their
allusion to issues that are physical and astrophysical in nature.
However, evidence for an underlying science associated with the
Madhyamikan revolution is highly presumptive and circumstantial due to the lack
of documentation of Buddhist "scientific" cosmologies. In
addition there is a very ambiguous distinction between cosmology, science, and
theology in Buddhism. Buddhist
"science" would certainly not have been as neatly separated from the
rest of culture as it is presently separated in the West.
In the first place, in Buddhism,
ontological issues, standard western astronomical questions about the nature of
the universe, are always subservient to practical ethics and salvation.
Furthermore, the cosmology of Buddhism is a total system in which astronomical
cosmology and physics are inextricably intertwined with concerns for salvation. Using the terminology of Clifford Geertz 5, the map of the world, for the Buddhist, is not just a
model of something external as it is in Western science, but it
also is a model for effective living
by an individual and an entire community. Further
discussion of a possible Madhyamikan scientific paradigm will be given in the
section on the second turning. III. HUMAN EXPERIENCE AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE One of the significant areas of overlap between
Tibetan Buddhist philosophy and western science is interpretation of human
experience in the physical world. The
relationship between a "subjective" human observer and an
"objective" world are major concerns in both western science and
Buddhism. Are the scientists, for
example, "watchers" from a distance or are they participants who
create a world as they investigate it? During the 1930's and 1940' there was an
acceptance amongst philosophers of science of the positivist viewpoint that
science starts from "pure" data which are describable in a neutral
language which is independent of all theories.6 Since Hume,
positivists have argued that experience begins with the passive perception of
momentary, disconnected, un-interpreted sensory data.
That bare experience was viewed as "physical reality."
According to this view, the scientist, separate from that which he is measuring,
collects objective data and then forms inductive generalizations that we
identify as theories. In the 1950's criticism of the positivist viewpoint moved
slightly away from the belief in bare facts.
The empiricists or critical rationalists such as Karl Popper7
argued that there were two levels in science: a lower, fundamental level of
unchanging, objective data which were directly available to the senses which is
completely non-conceptual and a second level of theoretical concepts in which
creative imagination of the scientist played an essential role in the formation
of models and theories. In the 1960's a number of philosophers of science
argued that there are no such things as pure, un-interpreted data. Expectations
and conceptual commitments influence perceptions in everyday life as well as in
science. We supply the categories
of interpretation at the very beginning of the process of data collection.
The language that we use in science depends upon the kind of regularities
we expect to find. In the words of Hanson: "All data are
theory-laden."8 The dividing line
between observation and theory is not sharp or fixed. Kuhn has argued that the data of observation and
experiment were not independent of the paradigm and furthermore that the
criteria used for assessing the validity of theory were similarly influenced by
the paradigm. A shift of scientific
world view was not a calm and gradual evolution and growth of understanding but
rather more one of conversion than logical argument. Scientists view the world through eyes influenced
by the paradigm in which they live. Newton
saw the apple pulled downward by the force of gravity while the Aristotelians
saw the same phenomena as the apple seeking its natural state.
The same situation can be seen in different ways as in an gestalt switch.
Thus not only will scientists in different paradigms collect different sorts of
data, but event viewing identical data, they will come to different conclusions.
Different paradigms, argues Kuhn, solve address types of problems, often use
different types of logic, and rely upon different tests for "truth". Modern critical realists(9)
agree that experience in the world is strongly influenced by preconceptions and
research strategies based upon the established paradigm but insist that the full
experience is the product of something which is encountered and a consciousness
capable of apprehending and interpreting it. Consciousness has a selective
interest in the world and a selective response to that world and is therefore an
active agent, not merely a passive receiver. We supply the categories into which
experiences and observations are fitted. However,
although expectation, choices of objects of perception, and analytical
strategies strongly influence what we see, they do not entirely prevent
perception of the unexpected:
"Our expectations strongly structure what we see, but do not wholly
eliminate unexpected sights....Our categorizations and expectations
guide us by orienting us selectively towards the future;
they set us, in particular to perceive in certain ways and
not in others. Yet they do not
blind us to the unforeseen." 10. The respective contributions of observer and
external world, of subject and object are thus never completely separable.
The world is not purely subjective.
There is a portion which is given to us, which we seem powerless to alter
totally and which often places demands upon us to which we must conform.
To live in the world fully, to understand its richness, we can not merely
think about it. We must thoroughly investigate it and allow ourselves to be
surprised by it. IV. TENACITY AND COMMITMENT Kuhn sees commitment to "research
programs" as a important aspect of scientific paradigms: a particular model
is assumed to be correct and its implications are thoroughly explored throughout
the material world. The scientist
proceeds with his or her reigning paradigm with a kind of faith that it will
work, for only if it is not abandoned too quickly when apparent failures occur
will its potentialities be explored. Failures
are neglected in this approach as it is more important to discover the power and
breadth of applicability of the theory than its few areas which it apparently
does not fit. Often fits are made
by ad hoc hypothesis and the discrepancy is understood to be merely
illusory. Examples of research
programs are those which proceeded to show that the universe could be treated by
Newtonian physics as a mechanical system or that instituted by Bohr to show that
all atomic systems could be treated by quantum mechanics. As I
shall suggest in the discussion of the second turning, the approach of the
Prasangika Madhyamika in their systematic testing of every aspect of the world
for "true existence" has the character of an ambitious research
program that is approached in the spirit of modern physics. Paradigms contain models and metaphors which are
accepted as explanation and puzzle solutions.
Questions of "why" are answered either by reference to
established, analogical models or through identification of initial assumption
but not by reliance upon "ultimate" truths.
There are no ultimate truths in science as that no proposition can ever
be proven fully true. The act of the scientist within a paradigm is of three
basic sorts: the discovery of new aspects of the phenomenal world, the
demonstration that those aspects are consistent with the reigning theory, or the
demonstration that a theory is in conflict with the phenomenal world and hence
must be discarded. Nowhere in
science is there an attempt to prove as true a particular theory. Scientists, according to Kuhn, resist paradigm
revolutions because previous commitments have permeated all their thinking. The
new scientific revolution is complete only when the older scientists have either
been `converted' or have died off. In
his subsequent writings Kuhn has softened his initial belief in the total
incommensurability of paradigms. Communication
between different paradigm communities is possible, he suggests: `Both their
everyday and most of their scientific world and language are shared.
Given that much in common, they should be able to find out a great deal
about how they differ.'11 The problem, as
Kuhn sees its, is similar to that of translation between two language and
cultural communities, which is difficult in part and perhaps impossible in
total. Using the analogy with
language, the conversion of a scientist to a new paradigm would then correspond
to abandonment of mere translation of another language to the complete adoption
of the new language in which one thinks and speaks. The three turnings of the wheel do reveal
different worlds and do suggest radically different ways of dealing with
experience, but they not appear to correspond to in-commensurate paradigms; they
appear to be considerably more accumulative than is the case of scientific
paradigms. The incommensurability
of scientific revolutions is a highly controversial assertion of Kuhn.
He argued that a new paradigm does not merely add to the old paradigm but
actually replaces it. The
transformation from Aristotelian to Newtonian physics was a `transformation of
the scientific imagination' in which old data were seen in entirely new ways.
The very means for testing for truth and the logic of discovery and
analysis, may be totally different and hence incommensurate from one paradigm to
the next. The second and third turnings do not abandon and
nullify the teachings of the earlier turnings, but build upon them in a manner
which is indeed quite in contrast to western science.
The highly "practical" training of a modern scientist does not
typically include a study of pre-Newtonian paradigms nor the history of western
science which topics are considered irrelevant to the pursuit of scientific
research. Buddhists respect the totality of Buddhist sutra, but relegate
different portions to either provisional {T. drang.ton}
or final {T. ngl.ton} teachings. The
Hinayanists view the first turning as final and the second and third as
provisional teachings while the second turning for the Prasangikas is understood
to be final and the Yogacains see third as final.
For many Tibetan Buddhists, full knowledge of all three turnings is
considered necessary. V. THE FIRST TURNING The philosophical position of the first turning
was realistic and, in a sense, mechanistic. Reality was identified by the
Sarvastivadans (Sanskrit: sarvam asti,
everything exists) as fundamental "dharmas" and is presented in Abhidharmakosha
written by Vasubandhu in the 4th Century A.D.
The Sarvastivadans affirmed the composite existence of external objects
and the substantial existence of past, present, and future12.
Most significantly they constructed a world "beneath" our world
of sensory phenomena which consists of elemental and discrete psychological
experiences called dharmas. These psychological elements were considered real
for they are timeless and underived. They
exist by their own right, a common ground of the variety of experience,
independent and self-contained. Thus
reality can be described independently from the self and ego. Attachment to self
is one of the fundamental sources of suffering according to the Buddha. When one
searches for the "self" which appears to truly existent, one finds not
find the self but only its components, the underlying dharmas. While dharmas themselves do not exist in time,
their function is temporal. They
rise to function, carry out that function, and then cease to function. The fundamental unit of time is the minimum conceivable time
for the dharma to rise to function. Each unit of function is separate and
distinct. Movement is the result of a series of discrete, momentary flashings of
separate essences. Motion is thus
not continuous but divisible into a series of separate units.
Thus although the world encountered by our senses is empty of true
existence in the sense that is always changing, compounded, and dependent upon
causes and conditions, there is underlying our experiential reality a timeless
substratum containing fundamental elements which can be neither cut or
destroyed. VI. THE SINGLE WORLD DISK The model of the universe which is presented in
the Abidharmakosa is that of a world disk with the great cosmic mountain, Mt.
Meru, situated in the center surrounded by seven rings of mountains and oceans.
The sun, moon, and stars revolve about Mt. Meru.
We live on the southern of four major continents lying in the seventh
ocean beyond the seventh ring of mountains. Our disk floats on an ocean
supported by winds which arise out of space.
There may or may not be other world disks separated from ours by empty
space, but our world disk is the central one, the Buddha field {buddhaksetra} looked over by Buddha Sakyamuni. The drama of salvation for the Hinayana of the
first turning is that of a shravaka (hearer) or pratyekabuddha (solitary
realizer) as he or she moves upward through the successive heavens above Mt.
Meru. The Mt. Meru cosmology has
the structure of a space-time diagram with time extending along the vertical
axis and space expanding outward from the central mountain in seven successive
rings. The cosmological model of the first turning was
geocentric and absolutist. The
earth's disk was "absolutely" in the center; our disk was unique in
that it possessed a Buddha. Human experience arose from absolute and indivisible
dharmas forming a common ground for the rising and falling of particular events.
The cosmology was certainly pre-Copernican in its assumed centrality of our
world disk, although because the continent on which we live, Jambudvipa,
was in the seventh ocean, there was a peripheral quality to our experience which
was certainly not shared with the highly geocentric cosmos of the Greeks. The world view assumed by the first turning was
similar to that of a scientific realist who assumes that scientific theories are
accurate descriptions of the world as it actually exists. The realist believes
that the entities such as mass, force, charge, atoms, etc postulated in theories
do fully exist even though they may not be directly observable.
The real is thus is not necessarily the perceptible; indeed, for the
Hinayana the perceptible is empty of true existence.
But there is is a real which exists in an objective relationship to human
experience, namely the underlying dharmas.
Realists affirm that being is prior to knowing and that knowledge
converges upon that being. VII. THE SECOND TURNING The second turning represented a major and
dramatic shift away from the realism and process of solitary enlightenment of
Hinayana. The towering figure of
the second turning is Nagarjuna who lived in the second century A.D.. For Nagarjuna the error of misplaced absoluteness13
was one of the main causes of suffering in the world.
The common human thirst for the absolute and the infinitely varied
struggles to find and grasp the absolutes produs greater and greater suffering
and frustration. My approach to the second turning will be
primarily that of the Prasangika Madhyamika school.
Their basic position is that there is no object, self, or phenomenon
whose ultimate nature is not "emptiness or voidness". The terms "empty" and void" are short-hand for
the proposition that all phenomena and selves are empty of true existence.
The term, "true existence" is carefully defined as meaning a
state (1) which is independent of all external causes and conditions, (2) which
possesses a self-existence "from its own side" independent of names
and categories which are imposed upon its, either deliberately or instinctively
by the mind, and (3) which is eternal and unchanging.
The basic proposition of the second turning is that one can not find
either an aspect of oneself or of any phenomena which is truly existent as it is
so defined. The sanskrit term for
emptiness is sunyata which comes from
root svi meaning to swell.
The implication is that our sense of our selves is not only swollen in
self-esteem but hollow and empty inside. If
we search for the heart or essence of a swollen and bloated fruit which has been
lying rotten in the sun for some time, we find only hollowness and empty space. Reality can only be described using the non-affirming
negation [prasajya pratisedha].
A distinctive character of the second turning was the scrupulous
avoidance of any positive statement about reality. The only secure knowledge
that we possess is that nothing is completely independent and unchanging.
The lack of true existence of phenomena is the only statement that can be
made; no positive implications of an existent reality can be affirmed. There is a strong hint of the infinity and
interdependent nature of the world in the second turning.
But, it is only a hint. Positive
statements about reality can not be authentic. Reality is so infinite and so
mutually interdependent that authentic portions can not be captured.
Scraps can not be cut out of the whole tapestry of reality without
causing the unraveling of the cloth. Absolutely
valid statements can not be made by us, for the infinite can not be grasped or
authentically divided. But
infinity, itself, can also only be hinted, as it is only a provisional concept;
the infinite also is empty of true existence.14 The Prasangika Madhyamika follow closely the
teachings of Nagarjuna in denying the true existence everything which can be
identified. Known as the
Consequence School, the Prasangika excel in debate.
Their debating style is to carry every positive assertion to its absurd
consequence, a reductio ad absurdum.
They do not concede that phenomena exist independently evenly conventionally,
for all phenomena are compounds and therefore subject to dependent origination [pratitya
samutpada] from extrinsic causes and conditions. When we search for phenomena which sometime
appear to be so definite and clearly existence, we discover that they do not
survive under "ultimate analysis" by which the Prasangika Madhyamika
mean a highly ruthless search, in which no quarter is given, for the essence or
true existence of a thing. For,
where exactly is the essence of a flower, a rock, or a frog?
The essence of the flower is not in the petals, the roots, the scent, the
stamen, the color; the essence is nowhere to be found. It is neither in the
flower nor is it not in the flower. It
is unfindable although no one can doubt that conventionally the flower certainly
exists. A highly important aspect of the Prasangika
strategy, which can not be overemphasized, is that one must be very specific
about emptiness and what it is that can not be found.
Emptiness does not mean that phenomena do not exist; emptiness must refer
to a particular object and must specify what the object is empty of. The fundamental statement of the second turning that all
things which can be identified or named are empty of true existence.
No such statement is made about that which can not be identified.
All objects in the world which can be identified
must be investigated with care and precision to demonstrate their lack of true
existence. Such careful
investigation of phenomena and ones self has been made into a meditative
technique by the Prasangika Madhyamika, as they test the hypothesis that no
phenomenon can be found which has true existence.
However, the Prasangika Madhyamikas assert that one must be very careful
first to identify the object which one is investigating.
It is not proper to issue a general statement that all aspects of the
universe are lacking in true existence; the prediction by the Prasangika is
limited only to identifiable objects, objects to which we can give names or
phenomena which have a basis which can be identified.
Another form of the prediction of Prasangika is that once one has
identified an object or a phenomenon, it is ultimately not findable, that is, it
does not exist as a single, "atomic" or fundamental object, precisely
localizable in space and time. The Prasangika Madhyamika identify two
"truths", ultimate and conventional.
The phenomena of the world are understood to exist conventionally, to
obey laws which are conventionally true and to function according to the
"infallible laws of cause and effect."
When these two truths or natures "are
seen to be non-contradictory then we have understood the `unification' of the
two truths."_15_ All phenomena have two modes of existence: conventional
and ultimate, of which voidness or emptiness is the ultimate nature of being.
Conventional truth deals with our everyday experiences and expresses the
interdependence between a valid basis for imputation and a valid imputing
consciousness. The ultimate truth is that all things and selves are empty of
true existence. A popular example
of invalid imputations is that of the mistake of a coil of rope for a snake or a
pile of rocks for a person. Neither
the pile or rock nor the rope can function properly as snake or person,
respectively, and hence are judged as invalid._16_ Such a quasi-experimental approach advocated by the
Madhyamikans in which predicted function of an imputation is used to judge its
validity is similar to the standard inductive-deductive strategy of modern
science as well as to that of modern empiricists such as Karl Popper who insist
that discordant data falsify theories. According to Popper, an inductive theory is judged to be
valid on the basis of the agreement between predicted qualities and test by
experimental fact, and is rejected if it fails the "test of fact".
In Madhyamikan terms, if the imputation does not function appropriately,
it is not only not truly existent is simply non-existent. There are three levels of imputation for the coil
of rope-snake combination: 1. The snake is non-existent as a coil of rope has been mistaken for
the snake as is discovered upon closer inspection. 2.
The snake was actually a snake in the grass but the snake is given
a self-existent nature; one is deceived when one believes that
the is truly existent, dangerous, and evil in its own right and
from its own side. 3.
The snake is accepted as a snake without any assumptions of goodness
or badness or without any inherent self-nature. The snake
functions as a snake and hence the presence of the snake is a
conventional truth. But, even
though conventionally true, the snake
is deceptive as it still appears in a manner different from its
actual existence. According to the Prasangika, objects of sense
consciousness such as the snake or rope are external to the perceiving
consciousness. These objects are
the cause of the arising of a sense consciousness; sense consciousness could not
arise as an effect without a preceding causes. An ultimate truth is understood by a direct valid
perception in which all dualistic appearances have subsided: deceptive truth can
be understood by a direct valid perception in which dualistic appearances have
not subsided. A dualistic
appearance is that of an object together with its apparent inherent existence. If forms do not exist in the way they appear they
are deceptive and not truly existent, for to be truly existent means that forms
just appear and exist in the same way. In
the Prasangika view of reality there is only one thing is which is truly
existent and that is the emptiness of all selves and phenomena. VIII. UNCERTAINTY AND COMPLEMENTARITY There is a fascinating similarity between the
approach to physical experience of the second turning and that of the so-called
Copenhagen School of Quantum Mechanics fathered by Neils Bohr. This approach is
probably that held today by most physicists who think about such matters. The
Copenhagen School's representation of physical reality may approached through
the famous Uncertainty Principle of Heisenberg, which states that one can not
know simultaneously and with ultimate precision both the position and velocity
of a particle. Most physicists are
convinced that such uncertainty is not a result of temporary ignorance, but is a
fundamental limitation on human knowledge.
One form of such ignorance is that it is introduced by the actual process
of observation, by our presence in the world. Every act of questioning alters the situation since there is
always a minimal interaction between the observer [who should be identified as a
participant rather than separate, isolated observer] and the observed.
Because the disturbance of that which is external is unavoidable, one can
never know the observed. Another form of uncertainty in physics results
from our conceptual limitations which Bohr maintains are inescapable. Concepts
are derived from our everyday experience and we have a limited number of such
concepts, which are inadequate to describe the alien world of the atom, for
instance. Because we try to force
the non-human world into our conceptual molds we encounter the paradox of the
Uncertainty Principle in Quantum Mechanics. These concepts are useful in
enabling one to make [limited] predictions about the atomic world, but they are
not the real nor even representations of the real.
Thus, the physicist would agree with the statement that the atom is
indeed empty of true existence for it is built out of "flawed"
experience due to an inseparability between the observer and the observed and
the inadequacy of "local" concepts to apply to other realms of
reality. Closely related to the meaning of the Uncertainty
Principle is the wave-particle dualism of electrons as well as light.
In some situations electrons and light behave as waves; in other they
clearly and unambiguously behave as if they were particles. Bohr used the term complementarity to describe such paradoxical behavior:
"However far the phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical
explanation, the account of all evidence must be expressed
in classical terms. The argument is
simply that by the
word "experiment" we refer to a situation where we can tell others
what we have done.... This implies the impossibility of any
sharp separation between the behavior of atomic objects and the
interaction with the measuring instruments which serve to define
the conditions under which the phenomena appear. Any attempt
of subdividing the phenomena will demand a change in the experimental
arrangement, introducing new possibilities of interaction
between objects and measuring instruments which in principle
cannot be controlled. Consequently,
evidence obtained within
a single picture must be regarded as complementary in the sense
that only the totality of the phenomena exhausts the possible
information about the subjects."17 Bohr's argument consists of the following points:
a.
However alien phenomena may be involving microscopic spaces of the
atom or vast spaces of the cosmos, the evidence of such phenomena
must be expressed analogically in terms of the names, concepts,
and symbols derived from ordinary, conventional experience. b.
Because we are participants and not separate, uninvolved spectators,
a sharp demarcation between phenomena and our experience
is impossible. c.
Every attempt we make to explore more deeply and with alternate
approaches will introduce new possibilities of interactions
between ourselves and the phenomenal world and hen will
introduce new results, altering thereby alter the very phenomena
we are striving to understand. d.
Experience obtained from a single set of experiences or mode of
interaction is complementary in that only the totality of all possible
interactions, infinite in number and variety, can exhaust
the potential information associated with that phenomena. The Copenhagen School asserts that in finite
human experience one can never achieve final and total knowledge of the world.
Our knowledge of the atomic realm is fatally flawed because of the participatory
quality of our experience and our conceptual limitations.
According to Bohr's thinking our problems are not merely temporary but
shall always be with us. No matter how many experiments we perform, no matter
how sophisticated our equipment becomes, every time we attempt to measure
simultaneously the velocity and position of an electron we shall discover the
that electron as a discrete particle with the behavior of a billiard ball does
not exist. The early model of the
atoms which imagined it as a miniature solar system with particle-like electrons
in orbit around the nucleus could be visualized.
But the modern atom which has emerged from quantum physics is not
picturable at all. Pictures in
one's head of probability functions and oscillating waves do not help very much.
The atom and its electrons are both inaccessible to direct observation
and unimaginable in terms of our five or six senses. They can not be
conceptualized in terms of space, time, causality, and mass.
The domain of the very small is fundamentally different from the world of
ordinary human experience. of
quantum mechanics. In physics,
there is a strong encouragement to repeat the search for the billiard-electron
in as many different circumstances as possible to affirm and re-affirm the
uncertainty relation and the fact that it is un-findable and does not exist. In a like manner, the Prasangika Madhyamika is encouraged to
seek everywhere and in every situation confirmation and re-confirmation that
every phenomena is similarly lacking in true existence. Both are "research
programs" devoted to demonstrating our inability to conceptualize the truly
existent. IX. INFINITE SPACE, INNUMERABLE WORLDS A highly dramatic change in the cosmological view
is associated with the second turning. Because
of its non-absolutist approach, the Prasangika Madhyamika could not claim that
our world disk was central, unique, nor the major domain of the Buddha. Hence the cosmos was transformed into boundless space
containing unlimited numbers of world disks, each with their cosmic mountain,
none at a center or at an edge, none superior, each associated with a Buddha.
There can be no absolute requirements on sizes of the worlds and
consequently other worlds may be both infinitesimal and immense compared to
ours. Such a non-geocentric and
non-heliocentric model is a remarkable leap of thought, considerably closer to
modern astrophysics than were the models of contemporary Greek world. Indeed
the vastness of the second turning cosmos exceeded the vision of western
astronomers until this century. Astrophysical cosmology today is based on a
fundamental assumption known as the "Cosmological Principle" that the
large scale features of the universe are identical when
viewed from all possible locations. Thus we do not assume that our location is
unique in any way whatsoever; our observations made from Earth and from our
galaxy thus are typical and generic. Between our world and the innumerable other
worlds there is simply space which is understood by the Prasangika Madhyamika to
be the absence of obstructive contact 18.
Space is considered to be a permanent phenomena (nitya)
which does not disintegrate with time. Although
space is considered by the Buddhists to be the fifth element, in addition to
earth, fire, air, and water, space can be cognized only by our mental
consciousness since all phenomena composed of the four "lower"
elements which can be contacted by the five physical senses are impermanent.
Space is considered to be unconditioned since it does not depend upon
external causes and conditions. Space is all pervading since it is
non-obstructive everywhere; solid objects could not exist in space unless it was
non-obstructive without limit. As a
non-affirming negative [no positive thing is implied in its place] space is
similar to the ultimate truth that all phenomena are empty of true existence. It
is asserted that similar to emptiness, space has its parts because each object
has an associated lack of obstructive contact just as it each object has a lack
of true existence. Space is thus
used by the Prasangika Madhyamika as an analogical model for emptiness. There is a slight distinction which is made between emptiness
and space such that space is known to be a non-occasional permanent phenomenon
while emptiness is an occasional permanent phenomenon.
The emptiness of a book, for example, is comes into being when the book
is created and disappears when the book disappears.
While the book is present as a conventional phenomenon, its emptiness
does not change or disintegrate. As
a general quality, emptiness is always present, as there never is a time when
there is not an example of emptiness. Similarly,
space has been present since "beginningless time". X. MADHYAMIKAN PARADIGM The second turning represents a curious leap from
realism and world affirmation of the first turning to the sceptical and
negativistic attitude of Nagarjuna. In
the 2nd Century A.D. Buddhism thus shifted away from a common sense approach to
phenomena to a more subtle and non-picturable appreciation of reality.
Apparently Nagarjuna did not intend to produce a new paradigm nor
metaphysics but instead to develop an approach to life involving an all
embracing scepticism of all models and concepts. The technique was certainly negative in its criticism of
incomplete concepts and relatives mistaken for absolutes, but Nagarjuna's goal
was not nihilistic but that of freeing the mind from attachment to old concepts.
His encouragement was to give the mind freedom to explore the depths of
experience and to penetrate new realms closed by a too rigid view of reality.
Such a sceptical approach to established models
and the advocacy of intellectual freedom is highly reminiscent of Einstein's
description of his approaches leading to the theories of relativity.19
However, to claim that Nagarjuna anticipated many of the aspects of
modern relativity is unjustified. Nagarjuna's rejection of absolute motion was
partly due to his rejection of the Sarvastivadan's reliance upon absolute
dharmas and their consequent discrete appearance in the world.
Motion according to the Sarvastivadan's could not be continuous and hence
had no genuine existence. Einstein's
rejection of absolute motion was for a different reason, namely the
impossibility of establishing an absolute frame of reference. Similarly,
Nagarjuna's rejection of absolute motion did not necessarily imply a recognition
of the rotation of the earth. But, there was undeniable power in Nagarjuna's
rejection of all absolutes and although he may not have anticipated each and
every aspect of experience where such rejection now applies, it was a major
revolutionary change in viewing the world, radically different from the
cosmological thinking that was occurring in the western world at that time. XI. THIRD TURNING The third turning is called the turning of
"fine distinctions" for its concern was to modify or soften the
apparent nihilism of the second turning and to suggest that a positive statement
can be made about reality. The
outgrowth of the third turning was the second major Mahayana school of
Cittamatrins and Yogacaran, sometimes known as the "mind only" school.
While the central concern of the second turning
was the emptiness of true existence, the third turning emphasizes the emptiness
of subject-object distinction. A fundamental deception identified by the third
turning is subject-object duality: the belief that there is a fundamental
difference between subject and object, that objects truly exist as external
phenomena, and that the self therefore also exists.
The most dangerous consequence of subject-object distinction is that of
identification of the self and the consequent proliferation of grasping
tendencies of the ego. The second turning has been called idealistic,
although there is appears to be a full spectrum ranging from the extreme
idealism associated with the Cittamatrins, the "mind only school" to a
very limited idealism of Asanga and the Yogacara.
My approach in this section will be to discuss primarily the approach to
physical reality contained in the late 4th Century A.D. Yogacara literature of
Asanga, the Tattvartha chapter of the
Bodhisattvabhumi, and the Tri-svabhava-nirdesa
written by his brother Vasubandhu. The
discussion of the Tathagatagarbha literature will be based on the Uttaratantra
of Maitreya and Asanga. The third
turning is often identified with the idealism of the Cittamatrins and before
discussing the Yogacara, a brief description of the "extreme"
idealistic position is appropriate. Often one finds that the extreme idealistic
position seems to be presented by opponents rather than advocates. XII. CITTAMATRIN The extreme idealistic position attributed to the
Cittamatrins is that all phenomena are of the same nature of the mind.
Phenomena are not identical to the mind because mind is an observer of
objects. As in a dream, objects are
neither the mind which perceives them nor separate from the mind.
The perception of external objects is thus deceptive as they are not
external to the mind. Like an
elephant in a dream, phenomena are neither only mind nor separate from mind.
Thus there are no objects nor phenomena which exist truly separate from
and independent of a perceiving consciousness.
Apparently "external" objects are produced from the storehouse
mind [_alaya vijnana_] or root consciousness, from seeds [_bijas_] which had
been implanted from previous experience. The
storehouse mind produces both the "external" objects perceived by the
mind and the active perceiving mind itself.
There is, consequently, no essential distinction between perceiver and
perceived, between subject and object: all are produced by the mind.
Forms exist as products of that mind and the illusion that they are
external, not the object themselves, is deceptive.
The Cittamatrin position counters two errors which may, but do not
necessarily, arise form the second turning: (1) subject object dualism, i.e.
that the subject and object are essentially different entities; and (2) the
nihilistic position that neither subject and object exist. XIII. IDEALISM The scientific idealist identifies the human mind
as the primary creative agent in the cosmos.
The structures of the world expressed in physical theory, according to
the idealist are entirely imposed upon essentially chaotic sense-data by the
human mind. Mind has invented
patterns and created order out of chaos. Sir Arthur Eddington describes our
experience in the world in terms of following foot prints in the sand to
discover that the tracks are our own; "the foot print we have discovered on
the shores of the unknown is our own" 20. There is a hint of idealism in the non-cumulative
viewpoint of science; alternative human interpretations of experience emerge
from different paradigms and each of these are the results of model-building and
metaphor-creating by the human mind. It
is not altogether unconvincing to argue that the law of gravity as envisioned by
Newton did not exist until Newton created it; nor does it exist now as a genuine
description of nature for it has been replaced by the new gravitational theory
of General Relativity. But to
say that the metaphor connecting the falling apple and the swinging moon is a
creation of the mind, is quite different from arguing that the apple and the
moon are nothing more than products of the mind. XIV. YOGACARA The position of Yogacaras, contained in the
writings of Asanga and Vasubandhu, is that the subject object dualism which is
perceived by the mind is indeed produced by the mind.
All that we perceive as objects are projected from the mind; all that we
see is deceptive in that it appears different from what it is. But, and here is
a very significant departure from the pure idealistic position, there is
something "out there" which acts as stimulus to the mind and which is
in some sense external to and independent of the mind. However, we ordinary
beings can not come into contact with that which truly exists beyond the mind
for we are so dominated by dualistic projections from our mind. A dangerous and very common trap to fall into is
to mistake something which we have created from our mind to exist independently
from the mind. Such traps are
seemingly more common today than they have ever been in the past, for besides
being surrounded by those venerable "ultimates" such as truth beauty,
and justice, we have in addition all those persuasive "truths" of
modern science such as the forces of nature, DNA molecules, elementary
particles, and the expanding universe. And, indeed, we hear warnings from
physicists and philosophers of science against literalism and the mistaking of
metaphors for reality. The names we use [prajnapti]
and and the concepts [vijnapti] we
have generated are understood by Asanga to be deceptive for they do not
adequately or correctly correspond to reality; furthermore names and concepts
are dangerous in that they reinforce subject-object dualism and propagate a
sense of personal ego. But names
and concepts can be used skillfully as pointing devices, as symbolic arrows
pointing beyond themselves. According to Asanga there
exists a reality beyond subject-object duality which is inexpressible and beyond
discursive thought. That reality is known by many names, all of which are
inadequate partial representations: tathata, suchness; samata, sameness; sunyata,
voidness; Buddhanature. The third turning emphasizes that assertions
about the voidness of true existence of all phenomena and selves does not
require or even imply their non-existence.
Voidness and emptiness certainly should not lead to nihilism.
The revolutionary assertion of the third turning is that beyond voidness
is an transcendent existence or reality which provides the basis for the
phenomena which we experience. Dharmas,
things, and selves thus do exist though in a manner different from appearance.
Things of the world are deceptive in that appearance and reality are not
identical. The new view point
expressed in the third turning, which represents a significant paradigmatic
change, is that "reality" can be discussed positively.
Although the essential nature is inexpressible and beyond the sphere of
cognitive activity or discursive thought it still can be pointed to and hinted
at. As a revolutionary alternative to the two truths of the
second turning [conventional and ultimate truths], Asanga and Vasubandhu present
the three nature theory of Yogacara, the
tri-svabhava nirdesa:21 1. parikalpita-svabhava:(realistic) The imagined nature in which
the individual and phenomena are seen as distinct, self-existent
objects or as the subject of experience 2. paratantra-svabhva:(causal interdependence) This view encompasses causality
and dependent arising of all phenomena but still recognizes
a subject-object distinction. 3. parinispanna-svabhava:(totality) The "absolutely
accomplished nature", the ultimate reality, in which all subject-object
duality has been eliminated. The illusory and unreal nature of things (parikalpita) as well as the relative and mutually dependent nature (paratantra)
are based upon a real, existent, though inexpressible substratum of reality,
which makes conceptualization and the process of naming possible.
The advocacy of such an inexpressible foundation of selves and things and
their causal interconnections existing a major revolutionary break from the
second turning. "The illusory or unreal nature [parikalpita] as well as the relative nature [paratantra]
must nevertheless be grounded in the real [parinispanna]. That is,
his [Asanga's] formulation allows for an existent, though
inexpressible, substratum of reality (which makes cognition, however
distorted, and naming possible at all).22 The denial of the object of naming is permissible
only if one understands that one is denying the projection of the mind upon the
basis of the name and not the existence of something which exists.
It is "a grave error to deny the existence of the inexpressible
[ultimate] foundation [adhisthanam] of a thing [vastu].
For, according to Asanga, that inexpressible foundation does exist in an
ultimate sense. It is the true, parinispanna,
reality."23
Both designations {prajnapti
and vijnapti} and referents, basis of
designation are grounded in the
inexpressible reality. "There
can be no this without that." The undiscriminating, blanket denial of the
conventional world of designation and causality [parikalpita and paratrantra]
prevents one from arriving at a knowledge of ultimate reality Designations arise
when there are both things and the projecting mind present. "Voidness is logical when one thing is void
of another because of that {other's} absence and because of the presence of the
void thing itself" 24.
The Prasangikas certainly voice identical caution.
Blanket statements about voidness are dangerously nihilistic; one must
use the term with great precision. Not
only must a specific object be identified but also that of which it is void must
be explicitly identified. Furthermore, the object which is void of true
existence must be conventionally present and identifiable, though, of course,
under ultimate analysis, it will be unfindable. Asanga asserts the existence of the ordinary
world of cause and effect, paratantra,
the other dependent nature. Speaking
to his supposed prasangika debating opponent: "You deny the self-existent
nature. In this we agree with you.
You also deny the non-self-existent entity [paratantra], but in this
denial we can not agree with you." Causality,
interdependence exist; voidness exists as the interdependent aspect of nature.
Non-self-existence exists.25 Asanga's vision of the Middle Path is that
of one who neither exaggerates nor minimizes reality, one who neither affirms
nor denies totally, one who "recognizes that it is possible for a thing to
exist in such a way that it is neither totally existent nor totally
nonexistent."26 XV. CRITICAL REALISM Critical realism occupies a similar middle ground
between the literalism of a naive realist and fictionalism at the other. Valid
scientific theories are true as well as useful, although they are clearly
incomplete. Scientific theories are symbol systems which partially represent a
particular aspect of the world for a particular purpose. Science is a process of
discovery and exploration as well as that of invention and creative
construction. The scientist seeks
to understand as well as to predict; merely predictive models which have no
claim to reality are not attractive to the scientist.
For all their incompleteness, scientific theories are to be taken
seriously.27 Scientific theories are
too successful to be dismissed as merely purely fictional products of the human
mind, yet they are clearly too incomplete and too heavily dependent upon human
symbolism to justify a claim to absolute truth. Unlike the naive realist, the
critical realist recognizes the great importance of human imagination in the
creation of new theories. Scientific theories have not simply been lying in the
ground waiting to be unearthed by clever diggers. Thus the critical realist acknowledges both the
creativity of the human mind as well as the existence of patterns in events not
created entirely by the mind. Descriptions of the world are human creations, but
there exists a world out there which accepts certain theories and rejects
others. There appear to be
objective relationships in nature. There
is a "being" which somehow exists in addition to knowning; being is
not necessarily prior or dominant to knowing, but being can not be entirely
dismissed. No theory is an exact
copy of the world, but some theories agree with experiments and observations
because the world seems to have an objective nature of its own.
When creating a model or theory, the scientist has a realistic intent all the while recognizing the incomplete nature of the result. The scientist tends to take his science, his theories and models, seriously but not literally. and views his theories as having some degree of tentative ontological claim. Scientists are generally motivated by a desire to know and understand in addition to predict and perhaps to control.
Science,
to the critical realist, is a quest for coherence and simplicity, for
understanding and elegance. Einstein
remarked that the most incomprehensible thing about the world was it
comprehensibility; the great mystery to him was that elegant mathematical theories coming
from the human mind should bear any resemblance to the physical world. Asanga refers to "names" in a manner
similar to the that which the critical realist refers to models and theories.
The theory is clearly incomplete and imperfect, but it serves a useful
purpose in that it guides human activity and provides one with some hints of
echoes from a reality that has as yet been only partially explored.
Names, according to Asanga, in their subject-object distinction generate
ideas of things which are either exaggerations or underestimations of those
things. "...all
dharmas have an inexpressible essential nature. Why is expression
applicable at all? Verily, because
without expression,
the inexpressible true nature could not be told to other,
nor heard by others." 28 Vasubandhu, echoes also the position of the
critical realist; we live in a world of immense variety, depth, and surprise.
Our approach to that world is most often dualistic, imaging a firm
separation between subject and object which is deceptive, illusory, and
imaginary and which our mind has projected outward. But, the sense that there is
a reality beyond, yet not totally separate from our mind, a the plurality of
things themselves, which are there "independent of any mental activity by
any beings" 29 is not deceptive. A highly important consequence of the destruction
of subject-object duality is the resultant openness to possibilities which lie
beyond that duality: "From the
non-perception of duality there arises the perception of the essence of reality;
from the perception of the essence of reality there arises the perception of
unlimitedness." Such a goal of perceiving things as they are beyond
subject-object duality or duality in general is one which is very close to the
heart of the physicist. We have
apparent dualities in physics such as energy-matter, space-time, and
wave-particle which must be transcended in order to reach a more fundamental
level of the physical world. XV1. TATHAGATAGARBHA A major revolutionary change in the third turning
occurred in the so-called tathagatagarbha literature which is represented by the
Uttaratantra 30. In that work,
which is described as the bridge between the sutras and tantras, Asanga and
Maitreya suggest that there must exist something external which initiates the
process of perception and evokes compassion and widsom from sentient beings.
Because of its highly affirmative nature, the approach of the
Uttaratantra is closer to that of a religious paradigm than is the approach of
the Prasangika. Barbour
acknowledges that religious paradigms there is more influence from the `top
down':"from paradigms, through interpretive mdels and beliefs, to
experience."31
Characteristics of "postulated" Buddha-nature are thus
identified and are proposed to be present in human beings at all times. In the Uttaratantra
the presence of Buddha-nature is identified as the positive attribute of
reality, a positive assertion which is highly revolutionary compared to the
non-affirming negations of the second turning.
Other terms for Buddha-nature are Sugatagarbha and "other
emptiness" [gzhen-stong] 32. Tathagatagarbha
is not only the primordial awareness of a fully awakened beings, totally beyond
sense organs and beyond concepts and ordinary consciousness, but it is also
representative of ultimate reality itself.
Emptiness is assumed to be identical with the awareness of the fully
awakened being. Buddha-nature is considered to be totally beyond speech and
concepts, hence the term is understood to be merely a way of pointing, a symbol
pointing beyond itself. The Uttaratantra proposes a number of representations of
Buddha-nature: 1. unification of emptiness and luminosity; 2. inconceivable 3. permanent, everlasting, indestructible; 4. all pervading; present in all beings but
obscured; 5. inexhaustible in extent like the waters of a
great ocean; 6. undifferentiated; The sun in its luminosity and space in its
emptiness are used often as analogical models for Buddha-nature, which is
described as luminous in nature and empty in essence.
The deceptive appearance of the world is likened to a cloudy day over
which the sun is nevertheless shinning. Indeed,
the program of "photism" which in a sense has been building through
the first two turnings, breaks through brilliantly in the Uttaratantra in its rich metaphorical use of sun and sunlight.
In a dramatic shift of perspective, one is transported from the surface
of the earth, on which the view of the sun is often obscured by clouds, to the
sun itself and the perspective of the cosmos obtainable from the source. To see better the revolution represented by the Uttaratantra,
I review the differences in the physical views of the three turnings by means of
the different interpretations of emptiness, space, and time.
For the Sarvastivadins, the world apprehended by our senses is empty of
true existence for it arises from dharmas, those indivisible, unchanging sources
of experience. The world which we experience is void of reality and rests upon a
foundation of fundamental "psychological atoms" which are real.
Reality seems dominated by time, which seems to have an existence of its own,
for immense amounts of time which are required for sentient beings to achieve
enlightenment. Space is defined simply as having the quality of non-obstruction;
cosmic space is small, containing primarily only the single world disk on which
we live and the empty darkness lying beyond. In the second turning the reality of indivisible
dharmas was rejected as were all other positive references to reality.
The Prasangika Madhyamika maintain that all selves and phenomena are
empty of true existence, that is, they are dependent upon other causes and
conditions and are not eternal (rang.tong,
empty in itself). All statements concerning emptiness are likewise empty of true
existence, e.g., the concepts of infinity and emptiness are empty of true
existence. Although space and
emptiness are recognized to have similar qualities of permanence and
pervasiveness, there is no ontological connection drawn between them. The only ultimate truth is the non-affirming negation of true
existence. However, such a truth
must be applied carefully; true existence can be denied only for that which can
be named or located. A positive
quality which emerges is the interdependent quality of all existence.
An example of such interweaving is in the presentation of the four
elements, earth, water, fire, and air. The
second turning stresses their mutual inter-dependence as well as their lack of
self-existence. There is a striking
openness in the second turning view of reality; space and time are without
limit; worlds unlimited in number and size stretch outward in all ten directions
of space. The Yogacarins identified emptiness in terms of
non-duality: Subject-object distinction is empty of true existence.
However, they indicated that there is a state beyond subject-object
dualism, the absolutely accomplished nature, parinispanna-svabhava
about which one can make positive statements.
Emptiness beocomes a positive quality of experience and is understood to
be identical to the "primordial awareness" of a fully awakened being.
Emptiness is not a thing, but the awareness of a fully awakened being.
Buddha-nature is said to be empty because it is absolutely empty of all
the qualities which are associated with all the reality which is known such as
subject-object dualism and belief in the true existence of phenomena (gzen.tong,
emptiness of other). The Yogacaras
moved through the door which the Prasangika Madhyamikas left slightly open.
That which can be named and identified has no true existence. But, what
of that which can not be named? One
does not deny the existence of that which can not be found. The Uttaratantra
carries the third turing program of making positive statements about reality a
large step futher. Since form and
function is a deceptive duality, the function of the mind possessing primordial
awarness must also be an existent form. Buddha-nature
is then identified as a quality of reality which is of the same nature as the
fully awakened mind. Emptiness becomes a "thing", since
"things" and the manner of viewing things can not be separated, and
thus emptiness acquires an ontological existence.
According to the Uttaratantra one can make statements about that existant which is
called emptiness; it is indivisible, permanent, and inconceivable.
No complete statement can be made about Buddha-nature yet the position is
clearly not nihilistic because the act of pointing beyond symbols becomes very
important. There is something very powerful beyond duality, beyond words
and concepts which pervades all space, which is pure, immaculate, and luminous,
and which acts in a positive fashion upon consciousness.
The common analogical symbols for Buddha-nature involve light and rays of
the sun; Buddha-nature is understood to be empty in essence and luminous in
nature. In its manifestation it is
the basis for all sensory experience; it is like space, the unconditioned basis
for all objects; it is like the pure mind which is the basis for all deceptions.33
Space as a concept has thus evolved from that which is simply
non-obstructive to a powerful symbol for the all pervasive foundation of
experience as well as an active agent for enlightenment. XVII. CONCLUSION: PARADIGMS AND EVOLUTION According to Vasubandhu in the Tri-svabhava nirdesa, one approaches understanding the truth of
things through an evolutionary process of "knowledge, rejection and
attainment"34, a personal journey
parallel to the three turnings. One
must first become a realist, perhaps even a naive one, and acquire a detailed
knowledge of the imagined and deceptive nature of things.
One must immerse oneself in the world to know it.
It is the ignorance of the illusory world, which leads us to believe in
and grasp permanent absolutes. Although
clearly not naïve realists, Prasangika Madhyamika similarly assert that one
must first investigate in great detail all aspects of the material world in
their full diversity in order to convince oneself that the things of the world
do not truly exist, as they appear to exist.
Secondly, one must recognize the dependent arising of all things. The objects of the world do not exist as independent and
self-existent objects but are dependent upon causes and conditions external to
them. The
world is a network of tightly intertwined phenomena, and as a successful
ecologist in a forest recognizes the integrated nature of the whole forest, so
must one recognize the totality of experience.
Finally, one must reject the apparent duality implied by cause and effect
and between subject and object, no matter how interdependent they may be.
Direct realization of paranispanna
means the perception of the whole cloth of the universe without any seams,
boundaries, or distinctions. We are
nevertheless left with the ultimate paradox: even that seamless cloth, in its
wholeness and totality, is empty of true existence.
NOTES 1. quoted in Etienne Lamotte, The Buddha, His
Teachings and His Sangha in The World of Buddhism, edited by Heinz Bechert and Richard Gombrich,
London: Thames and Hudson, 1984. 2. A. K. Chatterjee, The
Yogacara Idealism, Varanasi: Banaras
Hindu University Press, 1962; Stcherbatsky, Th., Buddhist Logic, New York: Dover, 1962, I, 3-14. 3. Kuhn, Thomas, The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chapter II, Chicago: The University of
Chicago, 1962. 4. Randy Kloetzli, Buddhist
Cosmology, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1983. 5. Geertz, Clifford, The
Interpretation of Cultures, Chapter 4, New York: Basic Books, 1973. 6. Percy Bridgman, The
Logic of Modern Physics, New York: The
Macmillan Co., 1927. 7. Karl Popper, The
Logic of Scientific Discovery
Hutchinson's University Library, 1956. 8. N. R. Hanson, Patterns
of Discovery, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1958. 9. Ian Barbour, Myths,
Models, and Paradigms, New York: Harper & Row, 1974. 10. Israel Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity, New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1967, pg. 44. 11. Thomas Kuhn, The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions Second Edition, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1970; see also `Second Thoughts on Paradigms', in Frederick Suppe
(ed.), The
Structure of Scientific Theories, University of Illinois Press, 1973. 12. K. V. Raman, Nagarjuna's
Philosophy, Rutland: Charles E.
Tuttle, 1966. 13. Ramanan, p.38; S. sasvabhavavada. 14. Geshe Rabten, Echoes
of Voidness: The Sixth Chapter of
Chandrakirti's Madhyamakavatara, London: Wisdom Publications,
1983. 15. Shantideva, Bodhisattvacharyavatara,
tr. Stephen Batchelor, Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1979,
chapter 9; also Geshe Kelsang Gyatso, Meaningful
to Behold, Cumbria, England: Wisdom Press, 1980, pg. 259-265. 16. Jeffrey Hopkins, Meditation
on Emptiness, London: Wisdom
Publications, 1983; pg. 539-547. 17. Niels Bohr, Atomic
Physics and Human Knowledge, New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1958, pg. 39. 18. Hopkins pg. 217-219. 19. Albert Einstein, Autobiographical Notes in Albert
Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, P.A. Schlipp (ed), New York: Harper and
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